1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
11 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, RecipientOnionFields};
13 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
14 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkUpdate;
15 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop};
16 use crate::sign::NodeSigner;
17 use crate::crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
18 use crate::crypto::streams::ChaChaReader;
19 use crate::util::errors::{self, APIError};
20 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, LengthCalculatingWriter};
21 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
24 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Secp256k1, Scalar};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
32 use crate::prelude::*;
33 use crate::io::{Cursor, Read};
34 use core::convert::{AsMut, TryInto};
37 pub(crate) struct OnionKeys {
39 pub(crate) shared_secret: SharedSecret,
41 pub(crate) blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
42 pub(crate) ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
43 pub(crate) rho: [u8; 32],
44 pub(crate) mu: [u8; 32],
48 pub(crate) fn gen_rho_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
49 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
50 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
51 hmac.input(&shared_secret);
52 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()
56 pub(crate) fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
57 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
58 let mut engine_rho = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"rho");
59 engine_rho.input(&shared_secret);
60 let hmac_rho = Hmac::from_engine(engine_rho).to_byte_array();
62 let mut engine_mu = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"mu");
63 engine_mu.input(&shared_secret);
64 let hmac_mu = Hmac::from_engine(engine_mu).to_byte_array();
70 pub(super) fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
71 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
72 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
73 hmac.input(&shared_secret);
74 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()
78 pub(super) fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
79 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
80 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
81 hmac.input(&shared_secret);
82 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()
87 pub(super) fn gen_pad_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
88 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
89 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x70, 0x61, 0x64]); // pad
90 hmac.input(&shared_secret);
91 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()
94 /// Calculates a pubkey for the next hop, such as the next hop's packet pubkey or blinding point.
95 pub(crate) fn next_hop_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Verification>(
96 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, curr_pubkey: PublicKey, shared_secret: &[u8]
97 ) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
98 let blinding_factor = {
99 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
100 sha.input(&curr_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
101 sha.input(shared_secret);
102 Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
105 curr_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())
108 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
110 pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T, FType>(
111 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType
112 ) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error>
114 T: secp256k1::Signing,
115 FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, Option<&RouteHop>, usize)
117 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
118 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
120 let unblinded_hops_iter = path.hops.iter().map(|h| (&h.pubkey, Some(h)));
121 let blinded_pks_iter = path.blinded_tail.as_ref()
122 .map(|t| t.hops.iter()).unwrap_or([].iter())
123 .skip(1) // Skip the intro node because it's included in the unblinded hops
124 .map(|h| (&h.blinded_node_id, None));
125 for (idx, (pubkey, route_hop_opt)) in unblinded_hops_iter.chain(blinded_pks_iter).enumerate() {
126 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(pubkey, &blinded_priv);
128 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
129 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
130 sha.input(shared_secret.as_ref());
131 let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array();
133 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
135 blinded_priv = blinded_priv.mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())?;
136 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
138 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, route_hop_opt, idx);
144 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
145 pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
146 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len());
148 construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv,
149 |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _|
151 let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
157 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
167 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
168 pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload>, u64, u32), APIError> {
169 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
170 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
171 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
172 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload> = Vec::with_capacity(
173 path.hops.len() + path.blinded_tail.as_ref().map_or(0, |t| t.hops.len())
176 for (idx, hop) in path.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
177 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
178 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
179 // the intended recipient).
180 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
181 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
183 if let Some(BlindedTail {
184 blinding_point, hops, final_value_msat, excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, ..
185 }) = &path.blinded_tail {
186 let mut blinding_point = Some(*blinding_point);
187 for (i, blinded_hop) in hops.iter().enumerate() {
188 if i == hops.len() - 1 {
189 cur_value_msat += final_value_msat;
190 res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
191 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: *final_value_msat,
193 cltv_expiry_height: cur_cltv + excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta,
194 encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(),
195 intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(),
198 res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
199 encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(),
200 intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(),
205 res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
206 payment_data: if let Some(secret) = recipient_onion.payment_secret.take() {
207 Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
208 payment_secret: secret,
212 payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata.take(),
213 keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
214 custom_tlvs: recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.clone(),
215 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: value_msat,
216 cltv_expiry_height: cltv,
220 let payload = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
221 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
222 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
223 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv
225 res.insert(0, payload);
227 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
228 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
229 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Channel fees overflowed?".to_owned()});
231 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
232 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
233 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?".to_owned()});
235 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
237 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
240 /// Length of the onion data packet. Before TLV-based onions this was 20 65-byte hops, though now
241 /// the hops can be of variable length.
242 pub(crate) const ONION_DATA_LEN: usize = 20*65;
244 pub(super) const INVALID_ONION_BLINDING: u16 = 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 24;
247 fn shift_slice_right(arr: &mut [u8], amt: usize) {
248 for i in (amt..arr.len()).rev() {
256 pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(
257 payloads: Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32],
258 associated_data: &PaymentHash
259 ) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, ()> {
260 let mut packet_data = [0; ONION_DATA_LEN];
262 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
263 chacha.process(&[0; ONION_DATA_LEN], &mut packet_data);
265 let packet = FixedSizeOnionPacket(packet_data);
266 construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise::<_, _>(
267 payloads, onion_keys, packet, Some(associated_data))
271 /// Used in testing to write bogus `BogusOnionHopData` as well as `RawOnionHopData`, which is
272 /// otherwise not representable in `msgs::OnionHopData`.
273 pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet_with_writable_hopdata<HD: Writeable>(payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, ()> {
274 let mut packet_data = [0; ONION_DATA_LEN];
276 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
277 chacha.process(&[0; ONION_DATA_LEN], &mut packet_data);
279 let packet = FixedSizeOnionPacket(packet_data);
280 construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise::<_, _>(
281 payloads, onion_keys, packet, Some(associated_data))
284 /// Since onion message packets and onion payment packets have different lengths but are otherwise
285 /// identical, we use this trait to allow `construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise` to return either
287 pub(crate) trait Packet {
288 type Data: AsMut<[u8]>;
289 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: Self::Data, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self;
292 // Needed for rustc versions older than 1.47 to avoid E0277: "arrays only have std trait
293 // implementations for lengths 0..=32".
294 pub(crate) struct FixedSizeOnionPacket(pub(crate) [u8; ONION_DATA_LEN]);
296 impl AsMut<[u8]> for FixedSizeOnionPacket {
297 fn as_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
302 pub(crate) fn payloads_serialized_length<HD: Writeable>(payloads: &Vec<HD>) -> usize {
303 payloads.iter().map(|p| p.serialized_length() + 32 /* HMAC */).sum()
306 pub(crate) fn construct_onion_message_packet<HD: Writeable, P: Packet<Data = Vec<u8>>>(
307 payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], packet_data_len: usize) -> Result<P, ()>
309 let mut packet_data = vec![0; packet_data_len];
311 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
312 chacha.process_in_place(&mut packet_data);
314 construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise::<_, _>(payloads, onion_keys, packet_data, None)
317 fn construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise<HD: Writeable, P: Packet>(
318 mut payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, mut packet_data: P::Data, associated_data: Option<&PaymentHash>) -> Result<P, ()>
321 let packet_data = packet_data.as_mut();
322 const ONION_HOP_DATA_LEN: usize = 65; // We may decrease this eventually after TLV is common
323 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(ONION_HOP_DATA_LEN * (payloads.len() - 1));
326 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter().zip(onion_keys.iter()).enumerate() {
327 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
329 for _ in 0..(packet_data.len() - pos) {
330 let mut dummy = [0; 1];
331 chacha.process_in_place(&mut dummy); // We don't have a seek function :(
334 let mut payload_len = LengthCalculatingWriter(0);
335 payload.write(&mut payload_len).expect("Failed to calculate length");
336 pos += payload_len.0 + 32;
337 if pos > packet_data.len() {
341 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { break; }
343 res.resize(pos, 0u8);
344 chacha.process_in_place(&mut res);
349 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
350 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
351 let mut payload_len = LengthCalculatingWriter(0);
352 payload.write(&mut payload_len).expect("Failed to calculate length");
354 let packet_data = packet_data.as_mut();
355 shift_slice_right(packet_data, payload_len.0 + 32);
356 packet_data[0..payload_len.0].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
357 packet_data[payload_len.0..(payload_len.0 + 32)].copy_from_slice(&hmac_res);
359 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
360 chacha.process_in_place(packet_data);
363 let stop_index = packet_data.len();
364 let start_index = stop_index.checked_sub(filler.len()).ok_or(())?;
365 packet_data[start_index..stop_index].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
368 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
369 hmac.input(packet_data);
370 if let Some(associated_data) = associated_data {
371 hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
373 hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array();
376 Ok(P::new(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey, packet_data, hmac_res))
379 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
380 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
381 pub(super) fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
382 let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
384 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
385 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
386 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
387 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
388 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
389 data: packet_crypted,
393 pub(super) fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
394 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
395 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
397 let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
400 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
401 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
402 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
403 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
407 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
408 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
411 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
417 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
418 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
419 packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array();
425 pub(super) fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
426 let failure_packet = build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
427 encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
430 pub(crate) struct DecodedOnionFailure {
431 pub(crate) network_update: Option<NetworkUpdate>,
432 pub(crate) short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
433 pub(crate) payment_failed_permanently: bool,
434 pub(crate) failed_within_blinded_path: bool,
436 pub(crate) onion_error_code: Option<u16>,
438 pub(crate) onion_error_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
441 /// Note that we always decrypt `packet` in-place here even if the deserialization into
442 /// [`msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket`] ultimately fails.
443 fn decrypt_onion_error_packet(
444 packet: &mut Vec<u8>, shared_secret: SharedSecret
445 ) -> Result<msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket, msgs::DecodeError> {
446 let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
447 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
448 chacha.process_in_place(packet);
449 msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(packet))
452 /// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an
455 pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(
456 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut encrypted_packet: Vec<u8>
457 ) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger {
459 let (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat) = match htlc_source {
460 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } => {
461 (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat)
463 _ => { unreachable!() }
466 // Learnings from the HTLC failure to inform future payment retries and scoring.
467 struct FailureLearnings {
468 network_update: Option<NetworkUpdate>,
469 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
470 payment_failed_permanently: bool,
471 failed_within_blinded_path: bool,
473 let mut res: Option<FailureLearnings> = None;
474 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
475 let mut error_code_ret = None;
476 let mut error_packet_ret = None;
477 let mut is_from_final_node = false;
479 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
480 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
481 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
482 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
484 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
485 let callback = |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop_opt: Option<&RouteHop>, route_hop_idx|
487 if res.is_some() { return; }
489 let route_hop = match route_hop_opt {
492 // Got an error from within a blinded route.
493 error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding
494 error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]);
495 res = Some(FailureLearnings {
496 network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: false,
497 failed_within_blinded_path: true,
503 // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound channel
504 // from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel).
505 let num_blinded_hops = path.blinded_tail.as_ref().map_or(0, |bt| bt.hops.len());
506 // For 1-hop blinded paths, the final `path.hops` entry is the recipient.
507 is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len() && num_blinded_hops <= 1;
508 let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else {
509 match path.hops.get(route_hop_idx + 1) {
512 // The failing hop is within a multi-hop blinded path.
514 error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding
515 error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]);
518 // Actually parse the onion error data in tests so we can check that blinded hops fail
520 let err_packet = decrypt_onion_error_packet(
521 &mut encrypted_packet, shared_secret
524 Some(u16::from_be_bytes(err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2).unwrap().try_into().unwrap()));
525 error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
528 res = Some(FailureLearnings {
529 network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: false,
530 failed_within_blinded_path: true,
537 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
538 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
540 let err_packet = match decrypt_onion_error_packet(&mut encrypted_packet, shared_secret) {
544 let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
545 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
546 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
548 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array(), &err_packet.hmac) { return }
549 let error_code_slice = match err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
552 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it definitely came from the peer
554 let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
555 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
558 let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
559 res = Some(FailureLearnings {
560 network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently: is_from_final_node,
561 failed_within_blinded_path: false
567 let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2"));
568 error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
569 error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
571 let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
573 // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to update Route object
574 let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff {
575 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true,
577 } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes
579 let mut network_update = None;
580 let mut short_channel_id = None;
582 if error_code & BADONION == BADONION {
583 // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel from the node
584 // "originating" the error to its next hop. The "originator" is ultimately actually claiming
585 // that its counterparty is the one who is failing the HTLC.
586 // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the next-hop node as failed
587 // entirely, but we can't be confident in that, as it would allow any node to get us to
588 // completely ban one of its counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in
590 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
591 short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
594 } else if error_code & NODE == NODE {
595 let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
596 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
597 short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
598 } else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
600 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
601 short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
604 short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
606 } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
607 if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
608 let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
609 if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
610 // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type
611 // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now
612 // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many
613 // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we
614 // support both here.
615 // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current
616 // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility
617 // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that
618 // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02].
619 if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() {
620 update_slice = &update_slice[2..];
622 log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now.");
624 let update_opt = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice));
625 if update_opt.is_ok() || update_slice.is_empty() {
626 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
627 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
628 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
630 11 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
632 update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
633 12 => update_opt.is_ok() && amt_to_forward
634 .checked_mul(update_opt.as_ref().unwrap()
635 .contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
636 .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000)
637 .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add(
638 update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.fee_base_msat as u64))
639 .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats)
641 13 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
642 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >=
643 update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
644 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
645 20 => update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.flags & 2 == 0,
646 _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
648 if is_chan_update_invalid {
649 // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
650 // to the node in question corrupted something.
651 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
652 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
656 if let Ok(chan_update) = update_opt {
657 // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected
659 if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
660 short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
662 log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring.");
664 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
668 // The node in question intentionally encoded a 0-length channel update. This is
669 // likely due to https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/issues/6200.
670 short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
671 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
672 short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
678 // If the channel_update had a non-zero length (i.e. was
679 // present) but we couldn't read it, treat it as a total
682 "Failed to read a channel_update of len {} in an onion",
687 if network_update.is_none() {
688 // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
689 // trying to relay through them anymore.
690 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
691 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
695 if short_channel_id.is_none() {
696 short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
698 } else if payment_failed {
699 // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the corresponding value in the
701 short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff {
702 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id),
706 // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to forward...they probably can't
707 // understand our forwards so it's really not worth trying any further.
708 network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
709 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
712 short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
715 res = Some(FailureLearnings {
716 network_update, short_channel_id,
717 payment_failed_permanently: error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node,
718 failed_within_blinded_path: false
721 let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
722 if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
723 log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
725 log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
729 construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv, callback)
730 .expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
732 if let Some(FailureLearnings {
733 network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently, failed_within_blinded_path
735 DecodedOnionFailure {
736 network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently, failed_within_blinded_path,
738 onion_error_code: error_code_ret,
740 onion_error_data: error_packet_ret
743 // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
744 // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
745 DecodedOnionFailure {
746 network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: is_from_final_node,
747 failed_within_blinded_path: false,
749 onion_error_code: None,
751 onion_error_data: None
756 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
757 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
758 pub(super) struct HTLCFailReason(HTLCFailReasonRepr);
760 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
761 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
762 enum HTLCFailReasonRepr {
764 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
772 impl core::fmt::Debug for HTLCFailReason {
773 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
775 HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { ref failure_code, .. } => {
776 write!(f, "HTLC error code {}", failure_code)
778 HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { .. } => {
779 write!(f, "pre-built LightningError")
785 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
786 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
790 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
791 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, msgs::DecodeError> {
792 Ok(Self(Readable::read(reader)?))
796 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReasonRepr,
797 (0, LightningError) => {
801 (0, failure_code, required),
802 (2, data, required_vec),
806 impl HTLCFailReason {
808 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
809 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
810 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
811 const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
812 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
814 if failure_code == 1 | PERM { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
815 else if failure_code == 2 | NODE { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
816 else if failure_code == 2 | PERM | NODE { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
817 else if failure_code == 3 | PERM | NODE { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
818 else if failure_code == 4 | BADONION | PERM { debug_assert_eq!(data.len(), 32) }
819 else if failure_code == 5 | BADONION | PERM { debug_assert_eq!(data.len(), 32) }
820 else if failure_code == 6 | BADONION | PERM { debug_assert_eq!(data.len(), 32) }
821 else if failure_code == 7 | UPDATE {
822 debug_assert_eq!(data.len() - 2, u16::from_be_bytes(data[0..2].try_into().unwrap()) as usize) }
823 else if failure_code == 8 | PERM { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
824 else if failure_code == 9 | PERM { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
825 else if failure_code == 10 | PERM { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
826 else if failure_code == 11 | UPDATE {
827 debug_assert_eq!(data.len() - 2 - 8, u16::from_be_bytes(data[8..10].try_into().unwrap()) as usize) }
828 else if failure_code == 12 | UPDATE {
829 debug_assert_eq!(data.len() - 2 - 8, u16::from_be_bytes(data[8..10].try_into().unwrap()) as usize) }
830 else if failure_code == 13 | UPDATE {
831 debug_assert_eq!(data.len() - 2 - 4, u16::from_be_bytes(data[4..6].try_into().unwrap()) as usize) }
832 else if failure_code == 14 | UPDATE {
833 debug_assert_eq!(data.len() - 2, u16::from_be_bytes(data[0..2].try_into().unwrap()) as usize) }
834 else if failure_code == 15 | PERM { debug_assert_eq!(data.len(), 12) }
835 else if failure_code == 18 { debug_assert_eq!(data.len(), 4) }
836 else if failure_code == 19 { debug_assert_eq!(data.len(), 8) }
837 else if failure_code == 20 | UPDATE {
838 debug_assert_eq!(data.len() - 2 - 2, u16::from_be_bytes(data[2..4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize) }
839 else if failure_code == 21 { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
840 else if failure_code == 22 | PERM { debug_assert!(data.len() <= 11) }
841 else if failure_code == 23 { debug_assert!(data.is_empty()) }
842 else if failure_code & BADONION != 0 {
843 // We set some bogus BADONION failure codes in test, so ignore unknown ones.
845 else { debug_assert!(false, "Unknown failure code: {}", failure_code) }
847 Self(HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { failure_code, data })
850 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
851 Self::reason(failure_code, Vec::new())
854 pub(super) fn from_msg(msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Self {
855 Self(HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() })
858 pub(super) fn get_encrypted_failure_packet(&self, incoming_packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], phantom_shared_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>)
859 -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
861 HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
862 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
863 let phantom_packet = build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
864 let encrypted_phantom_packet = encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
865 encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
867 let packet = build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
868 encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
871 HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { ref err } => {
872 encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
877 pub(super) fn decode_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(
878 &self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource
879 ) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger {
881 HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { ref err } => {
882 process_onion_failure(secp_ctx, logger, &htlc_source, err.data.clone())
885 HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data, .. } => {
886 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
887 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
888 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
889 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
891 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } = htlc_source {
892 DecodedOnionFailure {
893 network_update: None,
894 payment_failed_permanently: false,
895 short_channel_id: Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id),
896 failed_within_blinded_path: false,
898 onion_error_code: Some(*failure_code),
900 onion_error_data: Some(data.clone()),
902 } else { unreachable!(); }
908 /// Allows `decode_next_hop` to return the next hop packet bytes for either payments or onion
909 /// message forwards.
910 pub(crate) trait NextPacketBytes: AsMut<[u8]> {
911 fn new(len: usize) -> Self;
914 impl NextPacketBytes for FixedSizeOnionPacket {
915 fn new(_len: usize) -> Self {
916 Self([0 as u8; ONION_DATA_LEN])
920 impl NextPacketBytes for Vec<u8> {
921 fn new(len: usize) -> Self {
926 /// Data decrypted from a payment's onion payload.
927 pub(crate) enum Hop {
928 /// This onion payload was for us, not for forwarding to a next-hop. Contains information for
929 /// verifying the incoming payment.
930 Receive(msgs::InboundOnionPayload),
931 /// This onion payload needs to be forwarded to a next-hop.
933 /// Onion payload data used in forwarding the payment.
934 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload,
935 /// HMAC of the next hop's onion packet.
936 next_hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
937 /// Bytes of the onion packet we're forwarding.
938 new_packet_bytes: [u8; ONION_DATA_LEN],
942 /// Error returned when we fail to decode the onion packet.
944 pub(crate) enum OnionDecodeErr {
945 /// The HMAC of the onion packet did not match the hop data.
947 err_msg: &'static str,
950 /// We failed to decode the onion payload.
952 err_msg: &'static str,
957 pub(crate) fn decode_next_payment_hop<NS: Deref>(
958 shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
959 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, node_signer: &NS,
960 ) -> Result<Hop, OnionDecodeErr> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
961 match decode_next_hop(
962 shared_secret, hop_data, hmac_bytes, Some(payment_hash), (blinding_point, node_signer)
964 Ok((next_hop_data, None)) => Ok(Hop::Receive(next_hop_data)),
965 Ok((next_hop_data, Some((next_hop_hmac, FixedSizeOnionPacket(new_packet_bytes))))) => {
976 /// Build a payment onion, returning the first hop msat and cltv values as well.
977 /// `cur_block_height` should be set to the best known block height + 1.
978 pub fn create_payment_onion<T: secp256k1::Signing>(
979 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64,
980 recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, cur_block_height: u32, payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
981 keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]
982 ) -> Result<(msgs::OnionPacket, u64, u32), APIError> {
983 let onion_keys = construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
984 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{
985 err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()
987 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = build_onion_payloads(
988 &path, total_msat, recipient_onion, cur_block_height, keysend_preimage
990 let onion_packet = construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
991 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{
992 err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()
994 Ok((onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv))
997 pub(crate) fn decode_next_untagged_hop<T, R: ReadableArgs<T>, N: NextPacketBytes>(shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], read_args: T) -> Result<(R, Option<([u8; 32], N)>), OnionDecodeErr> {
998 decode_next_hop(shared_secret, hop_data, hmac_bytes, None, read_args)
1001 fn decode_next_hop<T, R: ReadableArgs<T>, N: NextPacketBytes>(shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>, read_args: T) -> Result<(R, Option<([u8; 32], N)>), OnionDecodeErr> {
1002 let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1003 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1004 hmac.input(hop_data);
1005 if let Some(tag) = payment_hash {
1006 hmac.input(&tag.0[..]);
1008 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array(), &hmac_bytes) {
1009 return Err(OnionDecodeErr::Malformed {
1010 err_msg: "HMAC Check failed",
1011 err_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5,
1015 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1016 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&hop_data[..]) };
1017 match R::read(&mut chacha_stream, read_args) {
1019 let error_code = match err {
1020 // Unknown realm byte
1021 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1,
1022 // invalid_onion_payload
1023 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1024 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1025 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22,
1026 // Should never happen
1029 return Err(OnionDecodeErr::Relay {
1030 err_msg: "Unable to decode our hop data",
1031 err_code: error_code,
1035 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1036 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1037 return Err(OnionDecodeErr::Relay {
1038 err_msg: "Unable to decode our hop data",
1039 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
1042 if hmac == [0; 32] {
1045 if chacha_stream.read.position() < hop_data.len() as u64 - 64 {
1046 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion packet data is, at least, non-0.
1047 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1048 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1049 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1050 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1051 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1052 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1053 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1054 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1055 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1056 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1057 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1060 return Ok((msg, None)); // We are the final destination for this packet
1062 let mut new_packet_bytes = N::new(hop_data.len());
1063 let read_pos = hop_data.len() - chacha_stream.read.position() as usize;
1064 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut new_packet_bytes.as_mut()[..read_pos]).unwrap();
1065 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1067 // Check two things:
1068 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1069 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1070 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1072 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1074 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1075 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1076 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_bytes.as_mut()[read_pos..]);
1077 return Ok((msg, Some((hmac, new_packet_bytes)))) // This packet needs forwarding
1086 use crate::prelude::*;
1087 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
1088 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1089 use crate::routing::router::{Path, Route, RouteHop};
1090 use crate::ln::msgs;
1091 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
1093 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
1094 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1095 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1097 use super::OnionKeys;
1099 fn get_test_session_key() -> SecretKey {
1100 let hex = "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141";
1101 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap()
1104 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
1105 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
1106 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1109 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![
1111 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1112 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1113 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
1116 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1117 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1118 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
1121 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1122 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1123 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
1126 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1127 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1128 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
1131 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
1132 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1133 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
1135 ], blinded_tail: None }],
1139 let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &get_test_session_key()).unwrap();
1140 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.paths[0].hops.len());
1145 fn onion_vectors() {
1146 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1148 // Test generation of ephemeral keys and secrets. These values used to be part of the BOLT4
1149 // test vectors, but have since been removed. We keep them as they provide test coverage.
1150 let hex = "53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66";
1151 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1153 let hex = "2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36";
1154 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1156 let hex = "02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619";
1157 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1159 let hex = "ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986";
1160 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1162 let hex = "b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba";
1163 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1165 let hex = "a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae";
1166 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1168 let hex = "bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f";
1169 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1171 let hex = "028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2";
1172 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1174 let hex = "450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59";
1175 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1177 let hex = "05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9";
1178 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1180 let hex = "3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc";
1181 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1183 let hex = "a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5";
1184 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1186 let hex = "03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0";
1187 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1189 let hex = "11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea";
1190 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1192 let hex = "caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78";
1193 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1195 let hex = "21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d";
1196 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1198 let hex = "7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262";
1199 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1201 let hex = "031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595";
1202 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1204 let hex = "cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e";
1205 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1207 let hex = "5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9";
1208 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1210 let hex = "b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328";
1211 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret.secret_bytes(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1213 let hex = "c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205";
1214 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1216 let hex = "03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4";
1217 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1219 let hex = "034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b";
1220 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1222 let hex = "8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a";
1223 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]);
1225 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4 (see
1226 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/16973e2b857e853308cafd59e42fa830d75b1642/bolt04/onion-test.json).
1227 // Note that we represent the test vector payloads 2 and 5 through RawOnionHopData::data
1228 // with raw hex instead of our in-memory enums, as the payloads contains custom types, and
1229 // we have no way of representing that with our enums.
1230 let payloads = vec!(
1231 RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
1232 short_channel_id: 1,
1233 amt_to_forward: 15000,
1234 outgoing_cltv_value: 1500,
1237 The second payload is represented by raw hex as it contains custom type data. Content:
1238 1. length "52" (payload_length 82).
1240 The first part of the payload has the `NonFinalNode` format, with content as follows:
1241 2. amt_to_forward "020236b0"
1242 02 (type amt_to_forward) 02 (length 2) 36b0 (value 14000)
1243 3. outgoing_cltv_value "04020578"
1244 04 (type outgoing_cltv_value) 02 (length 2) 0578 (value 1400)
1245 4. short_channel_id "06080000000000000002"
1246 06 (type short_channel_id) 08 (length 8) 0000000000000002 (value 2)
1248 The rest of the payload is custom type data:
1249 5. custom_record "fd02013c0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f"
1252 data: <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("52020236b00402057806080000000000000002fd02013c0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f").unwrap(),
1254 RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
1255 short_channel_id: 3,
1256 amt_to_forward: 12500,
1257 outgoing_cltv_value: 1250,
1259 RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
1260 short_channel_id: 4,
1261 amt_to_forward: 10000,
1262 outgoing_cltv_value: 1000,
1265 The fifth payload is represented by raw hex as it contains custom type data. Content:
1266 1. length "fd0110" (payload_length 272).
1268 The first part of the payload has the `FinalNode` format, with content as follows:
1269 1. amt_to_forward "02022710"
1270 02 (type amt_to_forward) 02 (length 2) 2710 (value 10000)
1271 2. outgoing_cltv_value "040203e8"
1272 04 (type outgoing_cltv_value) 02 (length 2) 03e8 (value 1000)
1273 3. payment_data "082224a33562c54507a9334e79f0dc4f17d407e6d7c61f0e2f3d0d38599502f617042710"
1274 08 (type short_channel_id) 22 (length 34) 24a33562c54507a9334e79f0dc4f17d407e6d7c61f0e2f3d0d38599502f61704 (payment_secret) 2710 (total_msat value 10000)
1276 The rest of the payload is custom type data:
1277 4. custom_record "fd012de02a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a"
1280 data: <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap(),
1284 // Verify that the serialized OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode tlv payloads matches the test vectors
1285 let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
1286 payloads[0].write(&mut w).unwrap();
1287 let hop_1_serialized_payload = w.0;
1288 let hex = "1202023a98040205dc06080000000000000001";
1289 let expected_serialized_hop_1_payload = &<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..];
1290 assert_eq!(hop_1_serialized_payload, expected_serialized_hop_1_payload);
1292 w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
1293 payloads[2].write(&mut w).unwrap();
1294 let hop_3_serialized_payload = w.0;
1295 let hex = "12020230d4040204e206080000000000000003";
1296 let expected_serialized_hop_3_payload = &<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..];
1297 assert_eq!(hop_3_serialized_payload, expected_serialized_hop_3_payload);
1299 w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
1300 payloads[3].write(&mut w).unwrap();
1301 let hop_4_serialized_payload = w.0;
1302 let hex = "1202022710040203e806080000000000000004";
1303 let expected_serialized_hop_4_payload = &<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..];
1304 assert_eq!(hop_4_serialized_payload, expected_serialized_hop_4_payload);
1306 let pad_keytype_seed = super::gen_pad_from_shared_secret(&get_test_session_key().secret_bytes());
1308 let packet: msgs::OnionPacket = super::construct_onion_packet_with_writable_hopdata::<_>(payloads, onion_keys, pad_keytype_seed, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32])).unwrap();
1310 let hex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
1311 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1315 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
1316 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
1318 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
1319 let onion_error = super::build_failure_packet(onion_keys[4].shared_secret.as_ref(), 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
1320 let hex = "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";
1321 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1323 let onion_packet_1 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[4].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_error.encode()[..]);
1324 let hex = "a5e6bd0c74cb347f10cce367f949098f2457d14c046fd8a22cb96efb30b0fdcda8cb9168b50f2fd45edd73c1b0c8b33002df376801ff58aaa94000bf8a86f92620f343baef38a580102395ae3abf9128d1047a0736ff9b83d456740ebbb4aeb3aa9737f18fb4afb4aa074fb26c4d702f42968888550a3bded8c05247e045b866baef0499f079fdaeef6538f31d44deafffdfd3afa2fb4ca9082b8f1c465371a9894dd8c243fb4847e004f5256b3e90e2edde4c9fb3082ddfe4d1e734cacd96ef0706bf63c9984e22dc98851bcccd1c3494351feb458c9c6af41c0044bea3c47552b1d992ae542b17a2d0bba1a096c78d169034ecb55b6e3a7263c26017f033031228833c1daefc0dedb8cf7c3e37c9c37ebfe42f3225c326e8bcfd338804c145b16e34e4";
1325 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1327 let onion_packet_2 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[3].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
1328 let hex = "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";
1329 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1331 let onion_packet_3 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[2].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
1332 let hex = "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";
1333 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1335 let onion_packet_4 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[1].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
1336 let hex = "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";
1337 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1339 let onion_packet_5 = super::encrypt_failure_packet(onion_keys[0].shared_secret.as_ref(), &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
1340 let hex = "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";
1341 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap());
1344 struct RawOnionHopData {
1347 impl RawOnionHopData {
1348 fn new(orig: msgs::OutboundOnionPayload) -> Self {
1349 Self { data: orig.encode() }
1352 impl Writeable for RawOnionHopData {
1353 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1354 writer.write_all(&self.data[..])