1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use crate::prelude::*;
12 use crate::ln::msgs::LightningError;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24 use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
25 use crate::util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_twice;
26 use crate::util::ser::VecWriter;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
29 /// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
30 /// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
31 /// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
32 pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
34 // Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
35 const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
36 // Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
37 const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
39 pub enum NextNoiseStep {
51 // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
54 struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
58 enum DirectionalNoiseState {
63 ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
64 re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
65 temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
71 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
72 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
84 pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
85 their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
87 noise_state: NoiseState,
90 impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
91 pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
92 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
94 sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
95 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
97 PeerChannelEncryptor {
98 their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
99 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
100 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
101 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
104 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
112 pub fn new_inbound<C: secp256k1::Signing>(our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
113 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
115 let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_node_secret);
116 sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
117 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
119 PeerChannelEncryptor {
121 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
122 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
123 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
128 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
137 fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
138 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
139 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
141 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
142 let mut tag = [0; 16];
143 chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
144 res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
148 /// Encrypts the message in res[offset..] in-place and pushes a 16-byte tag onto the end of
150 fn encrypt_in_place_with_ad(res: &mut Vec<u8>, offset: usize, n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8]) {
151 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
152 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
154 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
155 let mut tag = [0; 16];
156 chacha.encrypt_full_message_in_place(&mut res[offset..], &mut tag);
157 res.extend_from_slice(&tag);
161 fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
162 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
163 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
165 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
166 if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
167 return Err(LightningError{err: "Bad MAC".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
173 fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
174 let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
180 fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
181 let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
183 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
185 sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
186 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
188 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
189 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
191 let mut res = [0; 50];
192 res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
193 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
195 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
197 sha.input(&res[34..]);
198 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
204 fn inbound_noise_act(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], our_key: &SecretKey) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), LightningError> {
205 assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
208 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
211 let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
212 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Invalid public key {}", &act[1..34].to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
216 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
218 sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
219 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
221 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, &our_key);
222 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
224 let mut dec = [0; 0];
225 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
227 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
229 sha.input(&act[34..]);
230 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
232 Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
235 pub fn get_act_one<C: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> [u8; 50] {
236 match self.noise_state {
237 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
238 match directional_state {
239 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
240 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
241 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
244 let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
245 *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
248 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
250 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
254 pub fn process_act_one_with_keys<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
255 &mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
256 -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> {
257 assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
259 match self.noise_state {
260 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
261 match directional_state {
262 &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
263 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
264 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
267 let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, &our_node_secret)?;
268 ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
270 re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
273 PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
274 *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
275 *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
278 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
280 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
284 pub fn process_act_two<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
285 &mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
286 -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> {
287 assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
291 let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
292 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
293 match directional_state {
294 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
295 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
296 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
299 let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, &ie)?;
301 let mut res = [0; 66];
302 let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
304 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
306 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
307 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
308 sha.input(&res[1..50]);
309 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
311 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&re, our_node_secret);
312 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
314 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
315 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
316 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
319 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
321 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
324 let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
325 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
334 Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
337 pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, LightningError> {
338 assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
342 match self.noise_state {
343 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
344 match directional_state {
345 &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
346 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
347 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
349 if act_three[0] != 0 {
350 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act_three[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
353 let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
354 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
355 self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
357 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Bad node_id from peer, {}", &their_node_id.to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
360 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
361 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
362 sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
363 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
365 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
366 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
368 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
369 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
370 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
372 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
374 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
377 let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
378 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
387 Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
390 /// Encrypts the given pre-serialized message, returning the encrypted version.
391 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
392 pub fn encrypt_buffer(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
393 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
394 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
397 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
398 res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
400 match self.noise_state {
401 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
403 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
409 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
412 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
415 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
421 /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version.
422 /// panics if the length of `message`, once encoded, is greater than 65535 or if the Noise
423 /// handshake has not finished.
424 pub fn encrypt_message<M: wire::Type>(&mut self, message: &M) -> Vec<u8> {
425 // Allocate a buffer with 2KB, fitting most common messages. Reserve the first 16+2 bytes
426 // for the 2-byte message type prefix and its MAC.
427 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(2048));
428 res.0.resize(16 + 2, 0);
429 wire::write(message, &mut res).expect("In-memory messages must never fail to serialize");
431 let msg_len = res.0.len() - 16 - 2;
432 if msg_len > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
433 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
436 match self.noise_state {
437 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
439 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
445 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res.0[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
448 Self::encrypt_in_place_with_ad(&mut res.0, 16+2, *sn, sk, &[0; 0]);
451 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
457 /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
458 /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
459 pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, LightningError> {
460 assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
462 match self.noise_state {
463 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
465 let (new_rck, new_rk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(rck, rk);
471 let mut res = [0; 2];
472 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
474 Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(res))
476 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
480 /// Decrypts the given message.
481 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
482 pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, LightningError> {
483 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16 {
484 panic!("Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!");
487 match self.noise_state {
488 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
489 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() - 16);
490 res.resize(msg.len() - 16, 0);
491 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
496 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
500 pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
501 match self.noise_state {
502 NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
504 &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
505 &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
506 &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
509 NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
513 pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
514 match self.noise_state {
515 NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
516 NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
523 use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
525 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
526 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
530 use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
532 fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
533 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
534 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
536 let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
537 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one(&secp_ctx)[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
541 fn get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
542 // transport-responder successful handshake
543 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
544 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
545 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
547 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
549 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
550 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
552 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
553 // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
554 // from transport-initiator successful handshake
555 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
557 match inbound_peer.noise_state {
558 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
559 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
561 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
562 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
564 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
573 fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
574 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
575 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
578 // transport-initiator successful handshake
579 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
581 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
582 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
584 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
585 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
586 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
588 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
589 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
591 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
597 // transport-initiator act2 short read test
598 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
601 // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
602 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
604 let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
605 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
609 // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
610 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
612 let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
613 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
617 // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
618 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
620 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
621 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
626 fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
627 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
628 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
632 let _ = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
635 // transport-responder act1 short read test
636 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
639 // transport-responder act1 bad version test
640 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
642 let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
643 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
646 // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
647 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
649 let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
650 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
653 // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
654 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
656 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
657 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
660 // transport-responder act3 bad version test
661 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
663 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
664 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
666 let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
667 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
670 // transport-responder act3 short read test
671 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
674 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
675 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
677 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
678 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
680 let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
681 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
684 // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
685 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
687 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
688 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
690 let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
691 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
694 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
695 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
697 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
698 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
700 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
701 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
707 fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
708 // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
709 // here and use them to encrypt.
710 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
714 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
716 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
717 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
719 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
720 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
721 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
723 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
724 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
726 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
732 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
735 let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
736 let res = outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg);
737 assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
739 let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
740 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
741 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&res[2+16..]).unwrap()[..], msg[..]);
744 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
746 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
748 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
750 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
751 } else if i == 1000 {
752 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
753 } else if i == 1001 {
754 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
760 fn max_msg_len_limit_value() {
761 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, 65535);
762 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::core::u16::MAX as usize);
766 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!")]
767 fn max_message_len_encryption() {
768 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
769 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 1];
770 outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg);
774 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!")]
775 fn max_message_len_decryption() {
776 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
778 // MSG should not exceed LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16
779 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 17];
780 inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&msg).unwrap();