_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/peer_channel_encryptor.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use prelude::*;
  11
  12 use ln::msgs::LightningError;
  13 use ln::msgs;
  14
  15 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  17
  18 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  19 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  22
  23 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
  24 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_twice;
  25 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  26
  27 /// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
  28 /// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
  29 /// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
  30 pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
  31
  32 // Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
  33 const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
  34 // Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
  35 const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
  36
  37 pub enum NextNoiseStep {
  38         ActOne,
  39         ActTwo,
  40         ActThree,
  41         NoiseComplete,
  42 }
  43
  44 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  45 enum NoiseStep {
  46         PreActOne,
  47         PostActOne,
  48         PostActTwo,
  49         // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
  50 }
  51
  52 struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
  53         h: [u8; 32],
  54         ck: [u8; 32],
  55 }
  56 enum DirectionalNoiseState {
  57         Outbound {
  58                 ie: SecretKey,
  59         },
  60         Inbound {
  61                 ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
  62                 re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
  63                 temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
  64         }
  65 }
  66 enum NoiseState {
  67         InProgress {
  68                 state: NoiseStep,
  69                 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
  70                 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
  71         },
  72         Finished {
  73                 sk: [u8; 32],
  74                 sn: u64,
  75                 sck: [u8; 32],
  76                 rk: [u8; 32],
  77                 rn: u64,
  78                 rck: [u8; 32],
  79         }
  80 }
  81
  82 pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
  83         their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
  84
  85         noise_state: NoiseState,
  86 }
  87
  88 impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
  89         pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
  90                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
  91                 sha.input(&NOISE_H);
  92                 sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
  93                 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
  94
  95                 PeerChannelEncryptor {
  96                         their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
  97                         noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
  98                                 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
  99                                 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
 100                                         ie: ephemeral_key,
 101                                 },
 102                                 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
 103                                         h,
 104                                         ck: NOISE_CK,
 105                                 },
 106                         }
 107                 }
 108         }
 109
 110         pub fn new_inbound<C: secp256k1::Signing>(our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
 111                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 112                 sha.input(&NOISE_H);
 113                 let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_node_secret);
 114                 sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
 115                 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 116
 117                 PeerChannelEncryptor {
 118                         their_node_id: None,
 119                         noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
 120                                 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
 121                                 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
 122                                         ie: None,
 123                                         re: None,
 124                                         temp_k2: None,
 125                                 },
 126                                 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
 127                                         h,
 128                                         ck: NOISE_CK,
 129                                 },
 130                         }
 131                 }
 132         }
 133
 134         #[inline]
 135         fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
 136                 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
 137                 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
 138
 139                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
 140                 let mut tag = [0; 16];
 141                 chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
 142                 res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
 143         }
 144
 145         #[inline]
 146         fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
 147                 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
 148                 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
 149
 150                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
 151                 if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
 152                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Bad MAC".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
 153                 }
 154                 Ok(())
 155         }
 156
 157         #[inline]
 158         fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 159                 let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
 160                 state.ck = t1;
 161                 t2
 162         }
 163
 164         #[inline]
 165         fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
 166                 let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
 167
 168                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 169                 sha.input(&state.h);
 170                 sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
 171                 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 172
 173                 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
 174                 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
 175
 176                 let mut res = [0; 50];
 177                 res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
 178                 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
 179
 180                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 181                 sha.input(&state.h);
 182                 sha.input(&res[34..]);
 183                 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 184
 185                 (res, temp_k)
 186         }
 187
 188         #[inline]
 189         fn inbound_noise_act(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], our_key: &SecretKey) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), LightningError> {
 190                 assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
 191
 192                 if act[0] != 0 {
 193                         return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
 194                 }
 195
 196                 let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
 197                         Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Invalid public key {}", &act[1..34].to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
 198                         Ok(key) => key,
 199                 };
 200
 201                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 202                 sha.input(&state.h);
 203                 sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
 204                 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 205
 206                 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, &our_key);
 207                 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
 208
 209                 let mut dec = [0; 0];
 210                 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
 211
 212                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 213                 sha.input(&state.h);
 214                 sha.input(&act[34..]);
 215                 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 216
 217                 Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
 218         }
 219
 220         pub fn get_act_one<C: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> [u8; 50] {
 221                 match self.noise_state {
 222                         NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
 223                                 match directional_state {
 224                                         &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
 225                                                 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
 226                                                         panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
 227                                                 }
 228
 229                                                 let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
 230                                                 *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
 231                                                 res
 232                                         },
 233                                         _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
 234                                 },
 235                         _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
 236                 }
 237         }
 238
 239         pub fn process_act_one_with_keys<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
 240                 &mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
 241         -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> {
 242                 assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
 243
 244                 match self.noise_state {
 245                         NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
 246                                 match directional_state {
 247                                         &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
 248                                                 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
 249                                                         panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
 250                                                 }
 251
 252                                                 let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, &our_node_secret)?;
 253                                                 ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
 254
 255                                                 re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
 256
 257                                                 let (res, temp_k) =
 258                                                         PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
 259                                                 *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
 260                                                 *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
 261                                                 Ok(res)
 262                                         },
 263                                         _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
 264                                 },
 265                         _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
 266                 }
 267         }
 268
 269         pub fn process_act_two<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
 270                 &mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
 271         -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> {
 272                 assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
 273
 274                 let final_hkdf;
 275                 let ck;
 276                 let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
 277                         NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
 278                                 match directional_state {
 279                                         &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
 280                                                 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
 281                                                         panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
 282                                                 }
 283
 284                                                 let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, &ie)?;
 285
 286                                                 let mut res = [0; 66];
 287                                                 let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
 288
 289                                                 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
 290
 291                                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 292                                                 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
 293                                                 sha.input(&res[1..50]);
 294                                                 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 295
 296                                                 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&re, our_node_secret);
 297                                                 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
 298
 299                                                 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
 300                                                 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
 301                                                 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
 302                                                 res
 303                                         },
 304                                         _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
 305                                 },
 306                         _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
 307                 };
 308
 309                 let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
 310                 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
 311                         sk,
 312                         sn: 0,
 313                         sck: ck.clone(),
 314                         rk,
 315                         rn: 0,
 316                         rck: ck,
 317                 };
 318
 319                 Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
 320         }
 321
 322         pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, LightningError> {
 323                 assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
 324
 325                 let final_hkdf;
 326                 let ck;
 327                 match self.noise_state {
 328                         NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
 329                                 match directional_state {
 330                                         &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
 331                                                 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
 332                                                         panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
 333                                                 }
 334                                                 if act_three[0] != 0 {
 335                                                         return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act_three[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
 336                                                 }
 337
 338                                                 let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
 339                                                 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
 340                                                 self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
 341                                                         Ok(key) => key,
 342                                                         Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Bad node_id from peer, {}", &their_node_id.to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
 343                                                 });
 344
 345                                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 346                                                 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
 347                                                 sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
 348                                                 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 349
 350                                                 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
 351                                                 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
 352
 353                                                 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
 354                                                 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
 355                                                 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
 356                                         },
 357                                         _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
 358                                 },
 359                         _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
 360                 }
 361
 362                 let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
 363                 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
 364                         sk,
 365                         sn: 0,
 366                         sck: ck.clone(),
 367                         rk,
 368                         rn: 0,
 369                         rck: ck,
 370                 };
 371
 372                 Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
 373         }
 374
 375         /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version
 376         /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
 377         pub fn encrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
 378                 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
 379                         panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
 380                 }
 381
 382                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
 383                 res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
 384
 385                 match self.noise_state {
 386                         NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
 387                                 if *sn >= 1000 {
 388                                         let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
 389                                         *sck = new_sck;
 390                                         *sk = new_sk;
 391                                         *sn = 0;
 392                                 }
 393
 394                                 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
 395                                 *sn += 1;
 396
 397                                 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
 398                                 *sn += 1;
 399                         },
 400                         _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
 401                 }
 402
 403                 res
 404         }
 405
 406         /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
 407         /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
 408         pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, LightningError> {
 409                 assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
 410
 411                 match self.noise_state {
 412                         NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
 413                                 if *rn >= 1000 {
 414                                         let (new_rck, new_rk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(rck, rk);
 415                                         *rck = new_rck;
 416                                         *rk = new_rk;
 417                                         *rn = 0;
 418                                 }
 419
 420                                 let mut res = [0; 2];
 421                                 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
 422                                 *rn += 1;
 423                                 Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(res))
 424                         },
 425                         _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
 426                 }
 427         }
 428
 429         /// Decrypts the given message.
 430         /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
 431         pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, LightningError> {
 432                 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16 {
 433                         panic!("Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!");
 434                 }
 435
 436                 match self.noise_state {
 437                         NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
 438                                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() - 16);
 439                                 res.resize(msg.len() - 16, 0);
 440                                 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
 441                                 *rn += 1;
 442
 443                                 Ok(res)
 444                         },
 445                         _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
 446                 }
 447         }
 448
 449         pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
 450                 match self.noise_state {
 451                         NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
 452                                 match state {
 453                                         &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
 454                                         &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
 455                                         &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
 456                                 }
 457                         },
 458                         NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
 459                 }
 460         }
 461
 462         pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
 463                 match self.noise_state {
 464                         NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
 465                         NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
 466                 }
 467         }
 468 }
 469
 470 #[cfg(test)]
 471 mod tests {
 472         use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
 473
 474         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
 475         use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 476
 477         use hex;
 478
 479         use ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
 480
 481         fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
 482                 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 483                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
 484
 485                 let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
 486                 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one(&secp_ctx)[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
 487                 outbound_peer
 488         }
 489
 490         fn get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
 491                 // transport-responder successful handshake
 492                 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 493                 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 494                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
 495
 496                 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 497
 498                 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 499                 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
 500
 501                 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
 502                 // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
 503                 // from transport-initiator successful handshake
 504                 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
 505
 506                 match inbound_peer.noise_state {
 507                         NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
 508                                 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
 509                                 assert_eq!(sn, 0);
 510                                 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
 511                                 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
 512                                 assert_eq!(rn, 0);
 513                                 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
 514                         },
 515                         _ => panic!()
 516                 }
 517
 518                 inbound_peer
 519         }
 520
 521         #[test]
 522         fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
 523                 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 524                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
 525
 526                 {
 527                         // transport-initiator successful handshake
 528                         let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
 529
 530                         let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
 531                         assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
 532
 533                         match outbound_peer.noise_state {
 534                                 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
 535                                         assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
 536                                         assert_eq!(sn, 0);
 537                                         assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
 538                                         assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
 539                                         assert_eq!(rn, 0);
 540                                         assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
 541                                 },
 542                                 _ => panic!()
 543                         }
 544                 }
 545                 {
 546                         // transport-initiator act2 short read test
 547                         // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
 548                 }
 549                 {
 550                         // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
 551                         let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
 552
 553                         let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
 554                         assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
 555                 }
 556
 557                 {
 558                         // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
 559                         let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
 560
 561                         let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
 562                         assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
 563                 }
 564
 565                 {
 566                         // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
 567                         let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
 568
 569                         let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
 570                         assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
 571                 }
 572         }
 573
 574         #[test]
 575         fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
 576                 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 577                 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 578                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
 579
 580                 {
 581                         let _ = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
 582                 }
 583                 {
 584                         // transport-responder act1 short read test
 585                         // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
 586                 }
 587                 {
 588                         // transport-responder act1 bad version test
 589                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 590
 591                         let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 592                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
 593                 }
 594                 {
 595                         // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
 596                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 597
 598                         let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 599                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
 600                 }
 601                 {
 602                         // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
 603                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 604
 605                         let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
 606                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
 607                 }
 608                 {
 609                         // transport-responder act3 bad version test
 610                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 611
 612                         let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 613                         assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
 614
 615                         let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
 616                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
 617                 }
 618                 {
 619                         // transport-responder act3 short read test
 620                         // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
 621                 }
 622                 {
 623                         // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
 624                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 625
 626                         let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 627                         assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
 628
 629                         let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
 630                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
 631                 }
 632                 {
 633                         // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
 634                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 635
 636                         let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 637                         assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
 638
 639                         let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
 640                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
 641                 }
 642                 {
 643                         // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
 644                         let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
 645
 646                         let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
 647                         assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
 648
 649                         let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
 650                         assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
 651                 }
 652         }
 653
 654
 655         #[test]
 656         fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
 657                 // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
 658                 // here and use them to encrypt.
 659                 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
 660                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
 661
 662                 {
 663                         let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 664
 665                         let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
 666                         assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
 667
 668                         match outbound_peer.noise_state {
 669                                 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
 670                                         assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
 671                                         assert_eq!(sn, 0);
 672                                         assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
 673                                         assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
 674                                         assert_eq!(rn, 0);
 675                                         assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
 676                                 },
 677                                 _ => panic!()
 678                         }
 679                 }
 680
 681                 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
 682
 683                 for i in 0..1005 {
 684                         let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
 685                         let res = outbound_peer.encrypt_message(&msg);
 686                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
 687
 688                         let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
 689                         assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
 690                         assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&res[2+16..]).unwrap()[..], msg[..]);
 691
 692                         if i == 0 {
 693                                 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
 694                         } else if i == 1 {
 695                                 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
 696                         } else if i == 500 {
 697                                 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
 698                         } else if i == 501 {
 699                                 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
 700                         } else if i == 1000 {
 701                                 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
 702                         } else if i == 1001 {
 703                                 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
 704                         }
 705                 }
 706         }
 707
 708         #[test]
 709         fn max_msg_len_limit_value() {
 710                 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, 65535);
 711                 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::core::u16::MAX as usize);
 712         }
 713
 714         #[test]
 715         #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!")]
 716         fn max_message_len_encryption() {
 717                 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
 718                 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 1];
 719                 outbound_peer.encrypt_message(&msg);
 720         }
 721
 722         #[test]
 723         #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!")]
 724         fn max_message_len_decryption() {
 725                 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
 726
 727                 // MSG should not exceed LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16
 728                 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 17];
 729                 inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&msg).unwrap();
 730         }
 731 }