1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use crate::prelude::*;
12 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
13 use crate::ln::msgs::LightningError;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
26 use crate::util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_twice;
27 use crate::util::ser::VecWriter;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
32 /// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
33 /// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
34 /// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
35 pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
37 /// The (rough) size buffer to pre-allocate when encoding a message. Messages should reliably be
38 /// smaller than this size by at least 32 bytes or so.
39 pub const MSG_BUF_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 2048;
41 // Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
42 const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
43 // Sha256(NOISE_CK || "lightning")
44 const NOISE_H: [u8; 32] = [0xd1, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xde, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x32, 0xfd, 0x70, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x2a, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0x4c, 0x09, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x76];
46 enum NoiseSecretKey<'a, 'b, NS: Deref> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
47 InMemory(&'a SecretKey),
51 pub enum NextNoiseStep {
63 // When done swap noise_state for NoiseState::Finished
66 struct BidirectionalNoiseState {
70 enum DirectionalNoiseState {
75 ie: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActOne
76 re: Option<SecretKey>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
77 temp_k2: Option<[u8; 32]>, // filled in if state >= PostActTwo
83 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState,
84 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState,
96 pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
97 their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
99 noise_state: NoiseState,
102 impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
103 pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
104 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
106 sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
107 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
109 PeerChannelEncryptor {
110 their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
111 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
112 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
113 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
116 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
124 pub fn new_inbound<NS: Deref>(node_signer: &NS) -> PeerChannelEncryptor where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
125 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
127 let our_node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
128 sha.input(&our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
129 let h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
131 PeerChannelEncryptor {
133 noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
134 state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
135 directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
140 bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
149 fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
150 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
151 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
153 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
154 let mut tag = [0; 16];
155 chacha.encrypt(plaintext, &mut res[0..plaintext.len()], &mut tag);
156 res[plaintext.len()..].copy_from_slice(&tag);
160 /// Encrypts the message in res[offset..] in-place and pushes a 16-byte tag onto the end of
162 fn encrypt_in_place_with_ad(res: &mut Vec<u8>, offset: usize, n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8]) {
163 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
164 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
166 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
167 let mut tag = [0; 16];
168 chacha.encrypt_full_message_in_place(&mut res[offset..], &mut tag);
169 res.extend_from_slice(&tag);
172 fn decrypt_in_place_with_ad(inout: &mut [u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
173 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
174 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
176 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
177 let (inout, tag) = inout.split_at_mut(inout.len() - 16);
178 if chacha.check_decrypt_in_place(inout, tag).is_err() {
179 return Err(LightningError{err: "Bad MAC".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
185 fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
186 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
187 nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
189 let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
190 if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
191 return Err(LightningError{err: "Bad MAC".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
197 fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
198 let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
204 fn outbound_noise_act<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, our_key: &SecretKey, their_key: &PublicKey) -> ([u8; 50], [u8; 32]) {
205 let our_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_key);
207 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
209 sha.input(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
210 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
212 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&their_key, &our_key);
213 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
215 let mut res = [0; 50];
216 res[1..34].copy_from_slice(&our_pub.serialize()[..]);
217 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[34..], 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &[0; 0]);
219 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
221 sha.input(&res[34..]);
222 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
228 fn inbound_noise_act<'a, 'b, NS: Deref>(
229 state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, act: &[u8], secret_key: NoiseSecretKey<'a, 'b, NS>
230 ) -> Result<(PublicKey, [u8; 32]), LightningError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
231 assert_eq!(act.len(), 50);
234 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
237 let their_pub = match PublicKey::from_slice(&act[1..34]) {
238 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Invalid public key {}", &act[1..34].to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
242 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
244 sha.input(&their_pub.serialize()[..]);
245 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
247 let ss = match secret_key {
248 NoiseSecretKey::InMemory(secret_key) => SharedSecret::new(&their_pub, secret_key),
249 NoiseSecretKey::NodeSigner(node_signer) => node_signer
250 .ecdh(Recipient::Node, &their_pub, None)
251 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
252 err: "Failed to derive shared secret".to_owned(),
253 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }
256 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(state, ss);
258 let mut dec = [0; 0];
259 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut dec, 0, &temp_k, &state.h, &act[34..])?;
261 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
263 sha.input(&act[34..]);
264 state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
266 Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
269 pub fn get_act_one<C: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> [u8; 50] {
270 match self.noise_state {
271 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
272 match directional_state {
273 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
274 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
275 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
278 let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
279 *state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
282 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
284 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
288 pub fn process_act_one_with_keys<C: secp256k1::Signing, NS: Deref>(
289 &mut self, act_one: &[u8], node_signer: &NS, our_ephemeral: SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
290 -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
291 assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
293 match self.noise_state {
294 NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref mut directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
295 match directional_state {
296 &mut DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ref mut ie, ref mut re, ref mut temp_k2 } => {
297 if *state != NoiseStep::PreActOne {
298 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
301 let (their_pub, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_one, NoiseSecretKey::NodeSigner(node_signer))?;
302 ie.get_or_insert(their_pub);
304 re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
307 PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
308 *temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
309 *state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
312 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
314 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
318 pub fn process_act_two<NS: Deref>(
319 &mut self, act_two: &[u8], node_signer: &NS)
320 -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
321 assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
325 let res: [u8; 66] = match self.noise_state {
326 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
327 match directional_state {
328 &DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound { ref ie } => {
329 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActOne {
330 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
333 let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, NoiseSecretKey::<NS>::InMemory(&ie))?;
335 let mut res = [0; 66];
336 let our_node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).map_err(|_| LightningError {
337 err: "Failed to encrypt message".to_owned(),
338 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }
341 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
343 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
344 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
345 sha.input(&res[1..50]);
346 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
348 let ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &re, None).map_err(|_| LightningError {
349 err: "Failed to derive shared secret".to_owned(),
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }
352 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
354 PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
355 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
356 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
359 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
361 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
364 let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
365 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
374 Ok((res, self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone()))
377 pub fn process_act_three(&mut self, act_three: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, LightningError> {
378 assert_eq!(act_three.len(), 66);
382 match self.noise_state {
383 NoiseState::InProgress { ref state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
384 match directional_state {
385 &DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound { ie: _, ref re, ref temp_k2 } => {
386 if *state != NoiseStep::PostActTwo {
387 panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
389 if act_three[0] != 0 {
390 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Unknown handshake version number {}", act_three[0]), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }});
393 let mut their_node_id = [0; 33];
394 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut their_node_id, 1, &temp_k2.unwrap(), &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[1..50])?;
395 self.their_node_id = Some(match PublicKey::from_slice(&their_node_id) {
397 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Bad node_id from peer, {}", &their_node_id.to_hex()), action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None }}),
400 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
401 sha.input(&bidirectional_state.h);
402 sha.input(&act_three[1..50]);
403 bidirectional_state.h = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
405 let ss = SharedSecret::new(&self.their_node_id.unwrap(), &re.unwrap());
406 let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
408 PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
409 final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
410 ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
412 _ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
414 _ => panic!("Cannot get act one after noise handshake completes"),
417 let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
418 self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
427 Ok(self.their_node_id.unwrap().clone())
430 /// Encrypts the given pre-serialized message, returning the encrypted version.
431 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 or Noise handshake has not finished.
432 pub fn encrypt_buffer(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
433 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
434 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
437 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2);
438 res.resize(msg.len() + 16*2 + 2, 0);
440 match self.noise_state {
441 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
443 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
449 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
452 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
455 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
461 /// Encrypts the given message, returning the encrypted version.
462 /// panics if the length of `message`, once encoded, is greater than 65535 or if the Noise
463 /// handshake has not finished.
464 pub fn encrypt_message<M: wire::Type>(&mut self, message: &M) -> Vec<u8> {
465 // Allocate a buffer with 2KB, fitting most common messages. Reserve the first 16+2 bytes
466 // for the 2-byte message type prefix and its MAC.
467 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(MSG_BUF_ALLOC_SIZE));
468 res.0.resize(16 + 2, 0);
469 wire::write(message, &mut res).expect("In-memory messages must never fail to serialize");
471 let msg_len = res.0.len() - 16 - 2;
472 if msg_len > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN {
473 panic!("Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!");
476 match self.noise_state {
477 NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
479 let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
485 Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res.0[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
488 Self::encrypt_in_place_with_ad(&mut res.0, 16+2, *sn, sk, &[0; 0]);
491 _ => panic!("Tried to encrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
497 /// Decrypts a message length header from the remote peer.
498 /// panics if noise handshake has not yet finished or msg.len() != 18
499 pub fn decrypt_length_header(&mut self, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<u16, LightningError> {
500 assert_eq!(msg.len(), 16+2);
502 match self.noise_state {
503 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
505 let (new_rck, new_rk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(rck, rk);
511 let mut res = [0; 2];
512 Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
514 Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(res))
516 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
520 /// Decrypts the given message up to msg.len() - 16. Bytes after msg.len() - 16 will be left
521 /// undefined (as they contain the Poly1305 tag bytes).
523 /// panics if msg.len() > 65535 + 16
524 pub fn decrypt_message(&mut self, msg: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
525 if msg.len() > LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16 {
526 panic!("Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!");
529 match self.noise_state {
530 NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref rk, ref mut rn, rck: _ } => {
531 Self::decrypt_in_place_with_ad(&mut msg[..], *rn, rk, &[0; 0])?;
535 _ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
539 pub fn get_noise_step(&self) -> NextNoiseStep {
540 match self.noise_state {
541 NoiseState::InProgress {ref state, ..} => {
543 &NoiseStep::PreActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActOne,
544 &NoiseStep::PostActOne => NextNoiseStep::ActTwo,
545 &NoiseStep::PostActTwo => NextNoiseStep::ActThree,
548 NoiseState::Finished {..} => NextNoiseStep::NoiseComplete,
552 pub fn is_ready_for_encryption(&self) -> bool {
553 match self.noise_state {
554 NoiseState::InProgress {..} => { false },
555 NoiseState::Finished {..} => { true }
562 use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
564 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
565 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
569 use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::{PeerChannelEncryptor,NoiseState};
570 use crate::util::test_utils::TestNodeSigner;
572 fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
573 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
576 let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
577 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one(&secp_ctx)[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
581 fn get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
582 // transport-responder successful handshake
583 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
584 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
585 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
586 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
588 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
590 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
591 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
593 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
594 // test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
595 // from transport-initiator successful handshake
596 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).unwrap().serialize()[..], hex::decode("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa").unwrap()[..]);
598 match inbound_peer.noise_state {
599 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
600 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
602 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
603 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
605 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
614 fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
615 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
616 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
619 // transport-initiator successful handshake
620 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
622 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
623 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
625 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
626 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
627 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
629 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
630 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
632 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
638 // transport-initiator act2 short read test
639 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_two requires you pass the right length!
642 // transport-initiator act2 bad version test
643 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
645 let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
646 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).is_err());
650 // transport-initiator act2 bad key serialization test
651 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
653 let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
654 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).is_err());
658 // transport-initiator act2 bad MAC test
659 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
661 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
662 assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).is_err());
667 fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
668 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
669 let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
670 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
671 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
674 let _ = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
677 // transport-responder act1 short read test
678 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_one requires you pass the right length!
681 // transport-responder act1 bad version test
682 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
684 let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
685 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
688 // transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
689 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
691 let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
692 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
695 // transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
696 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
698 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
699 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
702 // transport-responder act3 bad version test
703 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
705 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
706 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
708 let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
709 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
712 // transport-responder act3 short read test
713 // Can't actually test this cause process_act_three requires you pass the right length!
716 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
717 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
719 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
720 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
722 let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
723 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
726 // transport-responder act3 bad rs test
727 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
729 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
730 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
732 let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
733 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
736 // transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
737 let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&&node_signer);
739 let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
740 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &&node_signer, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
742 let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
743 assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
749 fn message_encryption_decryption_test_vectors() {
750 // We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
751 // here and use them to encrypt.
752 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
755 let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
756 let node_signer = TestNodeSigner::new(our_node_id);
758 let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
759 assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &&node_signer).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
761 match outbound_peer.noise_state {
762 NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
763 assert_eq!(sk, hex::decode("969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9").unwrap()[..]);
765 assert_eq!(sck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
766 assert_eq!(rk, hex::decode("bb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442").unwrap()[..]);
768 assert_eq!(rck, hex::decode("919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01").unwrap()[..]);
774 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
777 let msg = [0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f];
778 let mut res = outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg);
779 assert_eq!(res.len(), 5 + 2*16 + 2);
781 let len_header = res[0..2+16].to_vec();
782 assert_eq!(inbound_peer.decrypt_length_header(&len_header[..]).unwrap() as usize, msg.len());
785 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("cf2b30ddf0cf3f80e7c35a6e6730b59fe802473180f396d88a8fb0db8cbcf25d2f214cf9ea1d95").unwrap());
787 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("72887022101f0b6753e0c7de21657d35a4cb2a1f5cde2650528bbc8f837d0f0d7ad833b1a256a1").unwrap());
789 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("178cb9d7387190fa34db9c2d50027d21793c9bc2d40b1e14dcf30ebeeeb220f48364f7a4c68bf8").unwrap());
791 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("1b186c57d44eb6de4c057c49940d79bb838a145cb528d6e8fd26dbe50a60ca2c104b56b60e45bd").unwrap());
792 } else if i == 1000 {
793 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("4a2f3cc3b5e78ddb83dcb426d9863d9d9a723b0337c89dd0b005d89f8d3c05c52b76b29b740f09").unwrap());
794 } else if i == 1001 {
795 assert_eq!(res, hex::decode("2ecd8c8a5629d0d02ab457a0fdd0f7b90a192cd46be5ecb6ca570bfc5e268338b1a16cf4ef2d36").unwrap());
798 inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&mut res[2+16..]).unwrap();
799 assert_eq!(res[2 + 16..res.len() - 16], msg[..]);
804 fn max_msg_len_limit_value() {
805 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, 65535);
806 assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::core::u16::MAX as usize);
810 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to encrypt message longer than 65535 bytes!")]
811 fn max_message_len_encryption() {
812 let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
813 let msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 1];
814 outbound_peer.encrypt_buffer(&msg);
818 #[should_panic(expected = "Attempted to decrypt message longer than 65535 + 16 bytes!")]
819 fn max_message_len_decryption() {
820 let mut inbound_peer = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
822 // MSG should not exceed LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 16
823 let mut msg = [4u8; LN_MAX_MSG_LEN + 17];
824 inbound_peer.decrypt_message(&mut msg).unwrap();