2684ab8b3e8aaac5462d4a033db67e3b18e6636c
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / onion_message / messenger.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! LDK sends, receives, and forwards onion messages via the [`OnionMessenger`]. See its docs for
11 //! more information.
12
13 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
14 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
15 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
17
18 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient, Sign};
19 use ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessageHandler};
20 use ln::onion_utils;
21 use super::blinded_route::{BlindedRoute, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
22 use super::packet::{BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN, ForwardControlTlvs, Packet, Payload, ReceiveControlTlvs, SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN};
23 use super::utils;
24 use util::events::OnionMessageProvider;
25 use util::logger::Logger;
26
27 use core::mem;
28 use core::ops::Deref;
29 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
30 use prelude::*;
31
32 /// A sender, receiver and forwarder of onion messages. In upcoming releases, this object will be
33 /// used to retrieve invoices and fulfill invoice requests from [offers]. Currently, only sending
34 /// and receiving empty onion messages is supported.
35 ///
36 /// # Example
37 ///
38 //  Needs to be `ignore` until the `onion_message` module is made public, otherwise this is a test
39 //  failure.
40 /// ```ignore
41 /// # extern crate bitcoin;
42 /// # use bitcoin::hashes::_export::_core::time::Duration;
43 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
44 /// # use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysManager, KeysInterface};
45 /// # use lightning::onion_message::{BlindedRoute, Destination, OnionMessenger};
46 /// # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
47 /// # use std::sync::Arc;
48 /// # struct FakeLogger {};
49 /// # impl Logger for FakeLogger {
50 /// #     fn log(&self, record: &Record) { unimplemented!() }
51 /// # }
52 /// # let seed = [42u8; 32];
53 /// # let time = Duration::from_secs(123456);
54 /// # let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, time.as_secs(), time.subsec_nanos());
55 /// # let logger = Arc::new(FakeLogger {});
56 /// # let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
57 /// # let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
58 /// # let hop_node_id1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_secret);
59 /// # let (hop_node_id2, hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4) = (hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1,
60 /// hop_node_id1);
61 /// # let destination_node_id = hop_node_id1;
62 /// #
63 /// // Create the onion messenger. This must use the same `keys_manager` as is passed to your
64 /// // ChannelManager.
65 /// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger);
66 ///
67 /// // Send an empty onion message to a node id.
68 /// let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
69 /// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::Node(destination_node_id));
70 ///
71 /// // Create a blinded route to yourself, for someone to send an onion message to.
72 /// # let your_node_id = hop_node_id1;
73 /// let hops = [hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4, your_node_id];
74 /// let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new::<InMemorySigner, _, _>(&hops, &keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
75 ///
76 /// // Send an empty onion message to a blinded route.
77 /// # let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
78 /// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route));
79 /// ```
80 ///
81 /// [offers]: <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/798>
82 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::OnionMessenger
83 pub struct OnionMessenger<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref>
84         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
85               L::Target: Logger,
86 {
87         keys_manager: K,
88         logger: L,
89         pending_messages: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, Vec<msgs::OnionMessage>>>,
90         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
91         // Coming soon:
92         // invoice_handler: InvoiceHandler,
93         // custom_handler: CustomHandler, // handles custom onion messages
94 }
95
96 /// The destination of an onion message.
97 pub enum Destination {
98         /// We're sending this onion message to a node.
99         Node(PublicKey),
100         /// We're sending this onion message to a blinded route.
101         BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute),
102 }
103
104 impl Destination {
105         pub(super) fn num_hops(&self) -> usize {
106                 match self {
107                         Destination::Node(_) => 1,
108                         Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { blinded_hops, .. }) => blinded_hops.len(),
109                 }
110         }
111 }
112
113 /// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message].
114 ///
115 /// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
116 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
117 pub enum SendError {
118         /// Errored computing onion message packet keys.
119         Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error),
120         /// Because implementations such as Eclair will drop onion messages where the message packet
121         /// exceeds 32834 bytes, we refuse to send messages where the packet exceeds this size.
122         TooBigPacket,
123         /// The provided [`Destination`] was an invalid [`BlindedRoute`], due to having fewer than two
124         /// blinded hops.
125         TooFewBlindedHops,
126 }
127
128 impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
129         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
130               L::Target: Logger,
131 {
132         /// Constructs a new `OnionMessenger` to send, forward, and delegate received onion messages to
133         /// their respective handlers.
134         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, logger: L) -> Self {
135                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
136                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
137                 OnionMessenger {
138                         keys_manager,
139                         pending_messages: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
140                         secp_ctx,
141                         logger,
142                 }
143         }
144
145         /// Send an empty onion message to `destination`, routing it through `intermediate_nodes`.
146         /// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
147         pub fn send_onion_message(&self, intermediate_nodes: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>) -> Result<(), SendError> {
148                 if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { ref blinded_hops, .. }) = destination {
149                         if blinded_hops.len() < 2 {
150                                 return Err(SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
151                         }
152                 }
153                 let blinding_secret_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
154                 let blinding_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&blinding_secret_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
155                 let (introduction_node_id, blinding_point) = if intermediate_nodes.len() != 0 {
156                         (intermediate_nodes[0], PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret))
157                 } else {
158                         match destination {
159                                 Destination::Node(pk) => (pk, PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret)),
160                                 Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { introduction_node_id, blinding_point, .. }) =>
161                                         (introduction_node_id, blinding_point),
162                         }
163                 };
164                 let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
165                         &self.secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
166                         .map_err(|e| SendError::Secp256k1(e))?;
167
168                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
169                 let onion_packet = construct_onion_message_packet(
170                         packet_payloads, packet_keys, prng_seed).map_err(|()| SendError::TooBigPacket)?;
171
172                 let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
173                 let pending_msgs = pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(introduction_node_id).or_insert(Vec::new());
174                 pending_msgs.push(
175                         msgs::OnionMessage {
176                                 blinding_point,
177                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
178                         }
179                 );
180                 Ok(())
181         }
182
183         #[cfg(test)]
184         pub(super) fn release_pending_msgs(&self) -> HashMap<PublicKey, Vec<msgs::OnionMessage>> {
185                 let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
186                 let mut msgs = HashMap::new();
187                 core::mem::swap(&mut *pending_msgs, &mut msgs);
188                 msgs
189         }
190 }
191
192 impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessageHandler for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
193         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
194               L::Target: Logger,
195 {
196         /// Handle an incoming onion message. Currently, if a message was destined for us we will log, but
197         /// soon we'll delegate the onion message to a handler that can generate invoices or send
198         /// payments.
199         fn handle_onion_message(&self, _peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OnionMessage) {
200                 let control_tlvs_ss = match self.keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &msg.blinding_point, None) {
201                         Ok(ss) => ss,
202                         Err(e) =>  {
203                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to retrieve node secret: {:?}", e);
204                                 return
205                         }
206                 };
207                 let onion_decode_ss = {
208                         let blinding_factor = {
209                                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"blinded_node_id");
210                                 hmac.input(control_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
211                                 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
212                         };
213                         match self.keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key,
214                                 Some(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()))
215                         {
216                                 Ok(ss) => ss.secret_bytes(),
217                                 Err(()) => {
218                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute onion packet shared secret");
219                                         return
220                                 }
221                         }
222                 };
223                 match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(onion_decode_ss, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..],
224                         msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, control_tlvs_ss)
225                 {
226                         Ok((Payload::Receive {
227                                 control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id }), reply_path,
228                         }, None)) => {
229                                 log_info!(self.logger,
230                                         "Received an onion message with path_id: {:02x?} and {}reply_path",
231                                                 path_id, if reply_path.is_some() { "" } else { "no " });
232                         },
233                         Ok((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
234                                 next_node_id, next_blinding_override
235                         })), Some((next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes)))) => {
236                                 // TODO: we need to check whether `next_node_id` is our node, in which case this is a dummy
237                                 // blinded hop and this onion message is destined for us. In this situation, we should keep
238                                 // unwrapping the onion layers to get to the final payload. Since we don't have the option
239                                 // of creating blinded routes with dummy hops currently, we should be ok to not handle this
240                                 // for now.
241                                 let new_pubkey = match onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &onion_decode_ss) {
242                                         Ok(pk) => pk,
243                                         Err(e) => {
244                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute next hop packet pubkey: {}", e);
245                                                 return
246                                         }
247                                 };
248                                 let outgoing_packet = Packet {
249                                         version: 0,
250                                         public_key: new_pubkey,
251                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
252                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac,
253                                 };
254
255                                 let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
256                                 let pending_msgs = pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(next_node_id).or_insert(Vec::new());
257                                 pending_msgs.push(
258                                         msgs::OnionMessage {
259                                                 blinding_point: match next_blinding_override {
260                                                         Some(blinding_point) => blinding_point,
261                                                         None => {
262                                                                 let blinding_factor = {
263                                                                         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
264                                                                         sha.input(&msg.blinding_point.serialize()[..]);
265                                                                         sha.input(control_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
266                                                                         Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
267                                                                 };
268                                                                 let next_blinding_point = msg.blinding_point;
269                                                                 match next_blinding_point.mul_tweak(&self.secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()) {
270                                                                         Ok(bp) => bp,
271                                                                         Err(e) => {
272                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute next blinding point: {}", e);
273                                                                                 return
274                                                                         }
275                                                                 }
276                                                         },
277                                                 },
278                                                 onion_routing_packet: outgoing_packet,
279                                         },
280                                 );
281                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Forwarding an onion message to peer {}", next_node_id);
282                         },
283                         Err(e) => {
284                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Errored decoding onion message packet: {:?}", e);
285                         },
286                         _ => {
287                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received bogus onion message packet, either the sender encoded a final hop as a forwarding hop or vice versa");
288                         },
289                 };
290         }
291 }
292
293 impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessageProvider for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
294         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
295               L::Target: Logger,
296 {
297         fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<msgs::OnionMessage> {
298                 None
299         }
300 }
301
302 // TODO: parameterize the below Simple* types with OnionMessenger and handle the messages it
303 // produces
304 /// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] and
305 /// [`SimpleArcPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
306 ///
307 ///[`SimpleArcChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager
308 ///[`SimpleArcPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager
309 pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<L>>;
310 /// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] and
311 /// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
312 ///
313 ///[`SimpleRefChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleRefChannelManager
314 ///[`SimpleRefPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleRefPeerManager
315 pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, &'a KeysManager, &'b L>;
316
317 /// Construct onion packet payloads and keys for sending an onion message along the given
318 /// `unblinded_path` to the given `destination`.
319 fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
320         secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, mut reply_path:
321         Option<BlindedRoute>, session_priv: &SecretKey
322 ) -> Result<(Vec<(Payload, [u8; 32])>, Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>), secp256k1::Error> {
323         let num_hops = unblinded_path.len() + destination.num_hops();
324         let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
325         let mut onion_packet_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
326
327         let (mut intro_node_id_blinding_pt, num_blinded_hops) = if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute {
328                 introduction_node_id, blinding_point, blinded_hops }) = &destination {
329                 (Some((*introduction_node_id, *blinding_point)), blinded_hops.len()) } else { (None, 0) };
330         let num_unblinded_hops = num_hops - num_blinded_hops;
331
332         let mut unblinded_path_idx = 0;
333         let mut blinded_path_idx = 0;
334         let mut prev_control_tlvs_ss = None;
335         utils::construct_keys_callback(secp_ctx, unblinded_path, Some(destination), session_priv, |_, onion_packet_ss, ephemeral_pubkey, control_tlvs_ss, unblinded_pk_opt, enc_payload_opt| {
336                 if num_unblinded_hops != 0 && unblinded_path_idx < num_unblinded_hops {
337                         if let Some(ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
338                                 payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(
339                                         ForwardTlvs {
340                                                 next_node_id: unblinded_pk_opt.unwrap(),
341                                                 next_blinding_override: None,
342                                         }
343                                 )), ss));
344                         }
345                         prev_control_tlvs_ss = Some(control_tlvs_ss);
346                         unblinded_path_idx += 1;
347                 } else if let Some((intro_node_id, blinding_pt)) = intro_node_id_blinding_pt.take() {
348                         if let Some(control_tlvs_ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
349                                 payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
350                                         next_node_id: intro_node_id,
351                                         next_blinding_override: Some(blinding_pt),
352                                 })), control_tlvs_ss));
353                         }
354                         if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
355                                 payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload)),
356                                         control_tlvs_ss));
357                         } else { debug_assert!(false); }
358                         blinded_path_idx += 1;
359                 } else if blinded_path_idx < num_blinded_hops - 1 && enc_payload_opt.is_some() {
360                         payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(enc_payload_opt.unwrap())),
361                                 control_tlvs_ss));
362                         blinded_path_idx += 1;
363                 } else if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
364                         payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
365                                 control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload),
366                                 reply_path: reply_path.take(),
367                         }, control_tlvs_ss));
368                 }
369
370                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(onion_packet_ss.as_ref());
371                 onion_packet_keys.push(onion_utils::OnionKeys {
372                         #[cfg(test)]
373                         shared_secret: onion_packet_ss,
374                         #[cfg(test)]
375                         blinding_factor: [0; 32],
376                         ephemeral_pubkey,
377                         rho,
378                         mu,
379                 });
380         })?;
381
382         if let Some(control_tlvs_ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss {
383                 payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
384                         control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id: None, }),
385                         reply_path: reply_path.take(),
386                 }, control_tlvs_ss));
387         }
388
389         Ok((payloads, onion_packet_keys))
390 }
391
392 /// Errors if the serialized payload size exceeds onion_message::BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
393 fn construct_onion_message_packet(payloads: Vec<(Payload, [u8; 32])>, onion_keys: Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Packet, ()> {
394         // Spec rationale:
395         // "`len` allows larger messages to be sent than the standard 1300 bytes allowed for an HTLC
396         // onion, but this should be used sparingly as it is reduces anonymity set, hence the
397         // recommendation that it either look like an HTLC onion, or if larger, be a fixed size."
398         let payloads_ser_len = onion_utils::payloads_serialized_length(&payloads);
399         let hop_data_len = if payloads_ser_len <= SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN {
400                 SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
401         } else if payloads_ser_len <= BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN {
402                 BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
403         } else { return Err(()) };
404
405         Ok(onion_utils::construct_onion_message_packet::<_, _>(
406                 payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, hop_data_len))
407 }