[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / onion_message / messenger.rs

// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.

//! LDK sends, receives, and forwards onion messages via the [`OnionMessenger`]. See its docs for
//! more information.

use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey};

use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient, Sign};
use ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessageHandler};
use ln::onion_utils;
use super::blinded_route::{BlindedRoute, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
use super::packet::{BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN, ForwardControlTlvs, Packet, Payload, ReceiveControlTlvs, SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN};
use super::utils;
use util::events::OnionMessageProvider;
use util::logger::Logger;

use core::ops::Deref;
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use prelude::*;

/// A sender, receiver and forwarder of onion messages. In upcoming releases, this object will be
/// used to retrieve invoices and fulfill invoice requests from [offers]. Currently, only sending
/// and receiving empty onion messages is supported.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// # extern crate bitcoin;
/// # use bitcoin::hashes::_export::_core::time::Duration;
/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
/// # use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysManager, KeysInterface};
/// # use lightning::onion_message::{BlindedRoute, Destination, OnionMessenger};
/// # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
/// # use std::sync::Arc;
/// # struct FakeLogger {};
/// # impl Logger for FakeLogger {
/// #     fn log(&self, record: &Record) { unimplemented!() }
/// # }
/// # let seed = [42u8; 32];
/// # let time = Duration::from_secs(123456);
/// # let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, time.as_secs(), time.subsec_nanos());
/// # let logger = Arc::new(FakeLogger {});
/// # let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
/// # let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
/// # let hop_node_id1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_secret);
/// # let (hop_node_id2, hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4) = (hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1,
/// hop_node_id1);
/// # let destination_node_id = hop_node_id1;
/// #
/// // Create the onion messenger. This must use the same `keys_manager` as is passed to your
/// // ChannelManager.
/// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger);
///
/// // Send an empty onion message to a node id.
/// let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
/// let reply_path = None;
/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::Node(destination_node_id), reply_path);
///
/// // Create a blinded route to yourself, for someone to send an onion message to.
/// # let your_node_id = hop_node_id1;
/// let hops = [hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4, your_node_id];
/// let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new::<InMemorySigner, _, _>(&hops, &keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
///
/// // Send an empty onion message to a blinded route.
/// # let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
/// let reply_path = None;
/// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), reply_path);
/// ```
///
/// [offers]: <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/798>
/// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::OnionMessenger
pub struct OnionMessenger<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref>
        where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
              L::Target: Logger,
{
        keys_manager: K,
        logger: L,
        pending_messages: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>>>,
        secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
        // Coming soon:
        // invoice_handler: InvoiceHandler,
        // custom_handler: CustomHandler, // handles custom onion messages
}

/// The destination of an onion message.
pub enum Destination {
        /// We're sending this onion message to a node.
        Node(PublicKey),
        /// We're sending this onion message to a blinded route.
        BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute),
}

impl Destination {
        pub(super) fn num_hops(&self) -> usize {
                match self {
                        Destination::Node(_) => 1,
                        Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { blinded_hops, .. }) => blinded_hops.len(),
                }
        }
}

/// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message].
///
/// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SendError {
        /// Errored computing onion message packet keys.
        Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error),
        /// Because implementations such as Eclair will drop onion messages where the message packet
        /// exceeds 32834 bytes, we refuse to send messages where the packet exceeds this size.
        TooBigPacket,
        /// The provided [`Destination`] was an invalid [`BlindedRoute`], due to having fewer than two
        /// blinded hops.
        TooFewBlindedHops,
}

impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
        where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
              L::Target: Logger,
{
        /// Constructs a new `OnionMessenger` to send, forward, and delegate received onion messages to
        /// their respective handlers.
        pub fn new(keys_manager: K, logger: L) -> Self {
                let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
                OnionMessenger {
                        keys_manager,
                        pending_messages: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
                        secp_ctx,
                        logger,
                }
        }

        /// Send an empty onion message to `destination`, routing it through `intermediate_nodes`.
        /// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
        pub fn send_onion_message(&self, intermediate_nodes: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>) -> Result<(), SendError> {
                if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { ref blinded_hops, .. }) = destination {
                        if blinded_hops.len() < 2 {
                                return Err(SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
                        }
                }
                let blinding_secret_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
                let blinding_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&blinding_secret_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
                let (introduction_node_id, blinding_point) = if intermediate_nodes.len() != 0 {
                        (intermediate_nodes[0], PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret))
                } else {
                        match destination {
                                Destination::Node(pk) => (pk, PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret)),
                                Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { introduction_node_id, blinding_point, .. }) =>
                                        (introduction_node_id, blinding_point),
                        }
                };
                let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
                        &self.secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
                        .map_err(|e| SendError::Secp256k1(e))?;

                let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
                let onion_packet = construct_onion_message_packet(
                        packet_payloads, packet_keys, prng_seed).map_err(|()| SendError::TooBigPacket)?;

                let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
                let pending_msgs = pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(introduction_node_id).or_insert_with(VecDeque::new);
                pending_msgs.push_back(
                        msgs::OnionMessage {
                                blinding_point,
                                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                        }
                );
                Ok(())
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub(super) fn release_pending_msgs(&self) -> HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>> {
                let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
                let mut msgs = HashMap::new();
                core::mem::swap(&mut *pending_msgs, &mut msgs);
                msgs
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessageHandler for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
        where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
              L::Target: Logger,
{
        /// Handle an incoming onion message. Currently, if a message was destined for us we will log, but
        /// soon we'll delegate the onion message to a handler that can generate invoices or send
        /// payments.
        fn handle_onion_message(&self, _peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OnionMessage) {
                let control_tlvs_ss = match self.keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &msg.blinding_point, None) {
                        Ok(ss) => ss,
                        Err(e) =>  {
                                log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to retrieve node secret: {:?}", e);
                                return
                        }
                };
                let onion_decode_ss = {
                        let blinding_factor = {
                                let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"blinded_node_id");
                                hmac.input(control_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
                                Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
                        };
                        match self.keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key,
                                Some(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()))
                        {
                                Ok(ss) => ss.secret_bytes(),
                                Err(()) => {
                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute onion packet shared secret");
                                        return
                                }
                        }
                };
                match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(onion_decode_ss, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..],
                        msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, control_tlvs_ss)
                {
                        Ok((Payload::Receive {
                                control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id }), reply_path,
                        }, None)) => {
                                log_info!(self.logger,
                                        "Received an onion message with path_id: {:02x?} and {}reply_path",
                                                path_id, if reply_path.is_some() { "" } else { "no " });
                        },
                        Ok((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
                                next_node_id, next_blinding_override
                        })), Some((next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes)))) => {
                                // TODO: we need to check whether `next_node_id` is our node, in which case this is a dummy
                                // blinded hop and this onion message is destined for us. In this situation, we should keep
                                // unwrapping the onion layers to get to the final payload. Since we don't have the option
                                // of creating blinded routes with dummy hops currently, we should be ok to not handle this
                                // for now.
                                let new_pubkey = match onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &onion_decode_ss) {
                                        Ok(pk) => pk,
                                        Err(e) => {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute next hop packet pubkey: {}", e);
                                                return
                                        }
                                };
                                let outgoing_packet = Packet {
                                        version: 0,
                                        public_key: new_pubkey,
                                        hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
                                        hmac: next_hop_hmac,
                                };

                                let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
                                let pending_msgs = pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(next_node_id).or_insert_with(VecDeque::new);
                                pending_msgs.push_back(
                                        msgs::OnionMessage {
                                                blinding_point: match next_blinding_override {
                                                        Some(blinding_point) => blinding_point,
                                                        None => {
                                                                let blinding_factor = {
                                                                        let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
                                                                        sha.input(&msg.blinding_point.serialize()[..]);
                                                                        sha.input(control_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
                                                                        Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
                                                                };
                                                                let next_blinding_point = msg.blinding_point;
                                                                match next_blinding_point.mul_tweak(&self.secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()) {
                                                                        Ok(bp) => bp,
                                                                        Err(e) => {
                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute next blinding point: {}", e);
                                                                                return
                                                                        }
                                                                }
                                                        },
                                                },
                                                onion_routing_packet: outgoing_packet,
                                        },
                                );
                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Forwarding an onion message to peer {}", next_node_id);
                        },
                        Err(e) => {
                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Errored decoding onion message packet: {:?}", e);
                        },
                        _ => {
                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Received bogus onion message packet, either the sender encoded a final hop as a forwarding hop or vice versa");
                        },
                };
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref> OnionMessageProvider for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L>
        where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
              L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<msgs::OnionMessage> {
                let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
                if let Some(msgs) = pending_msgs.get_mut(&peer_node_id) {
                        return msgs.pop_front()
                }
                None
        }
}

// TODO: parameterize the below Simple* types with OnionMessenger and handle the messages it
// produces
/// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] and
/// [`SimpleArcPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
///
///[`SimpleArcChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager
///[`SimpleArcPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager
pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<L>>;
/// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] and
/// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
///
///[`SimpleRefChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleRefChannelManager
///[`SimpleRefPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleRefPeerManager
pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, &'a KeysManager, &'b L>;

/// Construct onion packet payloads and keys for sending an onion message along the given
/// `unblinded_path` to the given `destination`.
fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
        secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, mut reply_path:
        Option<BlindedRoute>, session_priv: &SecretKey
) -> Result<(Vec<(Payload, [u8; 32])>, Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>), secp256k1::Error> {
        let num_hops = unblinded_path.len() + destination.num_hops();
        let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
        let mut onion_packet_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);

        let (mut intro_node_id_blinding_pt, num_blinded_hops) = if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute {
                introduction_node_id, blinding_point, blinded_hops }) = &destination {
                (Some((*introduction_node_id, *blinding_point)), blinded_hops.len()) } else { (None, 0) };
        let num_unblinded_hops = num_hops - num_blinded_hops;

        let mut unblinded_path_idx = 0;
        let mut blinded_path_idx = 0;
        let mut prev_control_tlvs_ss = None;
        utils::construct_keys_callback(secp_ctx, unblinded_path, Some(destination), session_priv, |_, onion_packet_ss, ephemeral_pubkey, control_tlvs_ss, unblinded_pk_opt, enc_payload_opt| {
                if num_unblinded_hops != 0 && unblinded_path_idx < num_unblinded_hops {
                        if let Some(ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
                                payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(
                                        ForwardTlvs {
                                                next_node_id: unblinded_pk_opt.unwrap(),
                                                next_blinding_override: None,
                                        }
                                )), ss));
                        }
                        prev_control_tlvs_ss = Some(control_tlvs_ss);
                        unblinded_path_idx += 1;
                } else if let Some((intro_node_id, blinding_pt)) = intro_node_id_blinding_pt.take() {
                        if let Some(control_tlvs_ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
                                payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
                                        next_node_id: intro_node_id,
                                        next_blinding_override: Some(blinding_pt),
                                })), control_tlvs_ss));
                        }
                        if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
                                payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload)),
                                        control_tlvs_ss));
                        } else { debug_assert!(false); }
                        blinded_path_idx += 1;
                } else if blinded_path_idx < num_blinded_hops - 1 && enc_payload_opt.is_some() {
                        payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(enc_payload_opt.unwrap())),
                                control_tlvs_ss));
                        blinded_path_idx += 1;
                } else if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
                        payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
                                control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload),
                                reply_path: reply_path.take(),
                        }, control_tlvs_ss));
                }

                let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(onion_packet_ss.as_ref());
                onion_packet_keys.push(onion_utils::OnionKeys {
                        #[cfg(test)]
                        shared_secret: onion_packet_ss,
                        #[cfg(test)]
                        blinding_factor: [0; 32],
                        ephemeral_pubkey,
                        rho,
                        mu,
                });
        })?;

        if let Some(control_tlvs_ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss {
                payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
                        control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id: None, }),
                        reply_path: reply_path.take(),
                }, control_tlvs_ss));
        }

        Ok((payloads, onion_packet_keys))
}

/// Errors if the serialized payload size exceeds onion_message::BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
fn construct_onion_message_packet(payloads: Vec<(Payload, [u8; 32])>, onion_keys: Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Packet, ()> {
        // Spec rationale:
        // "`len` allows larger messages to be sent than the standard 1300 bytes allowed for an HTLC
        // onion, but this should be used sparingly as it is reduces anonymity set, hence the
        // recommendation that it either look like an HTLC onion, or if larger, be a fixed size."
        let payloads_ser_len = onion_utils::payloads_serialized_length(&payloads);
        let hop_data_len = if payloads_ser_len <= SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN {
                SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
        } else if payloads_ser_len <= BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN {
                BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
        } else { return Err(()) };

        Ok(onion_utils::construct_onion_message_packet::<_, _>(
                payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, hop_data_len))
}