Bump workspace to rust edition 2018
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / onion_message / messenger.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! LDK sends, receives, and forwards onion messages via the [`OnionMessenger`]. See its docs for
11 //! more information.
12
13 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
14 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
15 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
17
18 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient, Sign};
19 use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessageHandler};
21 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
22 use crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
23 use super::blinded_route::{BlindedRoute, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
24 pub use super::packet::{CustomOnionMessageContents, OnionMessageContents};
25 use super::packet::{BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN, ForwardControlTlvs, Packet, Payload, ReceiveControlTlvs, SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN};
26 use super::utils;
27 use crate::util::events::OnionMessageProvider;
28 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
29 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
30
31 use core::ops::Deref;
32 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
33 use crate::prelude::*;
34
35 /// A sender, receiver and forwarder of onion messages. In upcoming releases, this object will be
36 /// used to retrieve invoices and fulfill invoice requests from [offers]. Currently, only sending
37 /// and receiving custom onion messages is supported.
38 ///
39 /// # Example
40 ///
41 /// ```
42 /// # extern crate bitcoin;
43 /// # use bitcoin::hashes::_export::_core::time::Duration;
44 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
45 /// # use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysManager, KeysInterface};
46 /// # use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
47 /// # use lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
48 /// # use lightning::onion_message::{BlindedRoute, CustomOnionMessageContents, Destination, OnionMessageContents, OnionMessenger};
49 /// # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
50 /// # use lightning::util::ser::{MaybeReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
51 /// # use lightning::io;
52 /// # use std::sync::Arc;
53 /// # struct FakeLogger {};
54 /// # impl Logger for FakeLogger {
55 /// #     fn log(&self, record: &Record) { unimplemented!() }
56 /// # }
57 /// # let seed = [42u8; 32];
58 /// # let time = Duration::from_secs(123456);
59 /// # let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, time.as_secs(), time.subsec_nanos());
60 /// # let logger = Arc::new(FakeLogger {});
61 /// # let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
62 /// # let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
63 /// # let hop_node_id1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_secret);
64 /// # let (hop_node_id2, hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4) = (hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1, hop_node_id1);
65 /// # let destination_node_id = hop_node_id1;
66 /// # let your_custom_message_handler = IgnoringMessageHandler {};
67 /// // Create the onion messenger. This must use the same `keys_manager` as is passed to your
68 /// // ChannelManager.
69 /// let onion_messenger = OnionMessenger::new(&keys_manager, logger, your_custom_message_handler);
70 ///
71 /// # struct YourCustomMessage {}
72 /// impl Writeable for YourCustomMessage {
73 ///     fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
74 ///             # Ok(())
75 ///             // Write your custom onion message to `w`
76 ///     }
77 /// }
78 /// impl CustomOnionMessageContents for YourCustomMessage {
79 ///     fn tlv_type(&self) -> u64 {
80 ///             # let your_custom_message_type = 42;
81 ///             your_custom_message_type
82 ///     }
83 /// }
84 /// impl MaybeReadableArgs<u64> for YourCustomMessage {
85 ///     fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R, message_type: u64) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
86 ///             # unreachable!()
87 ///             // Read your custom onion message of type `message_type` from `r`, or return `None`
88 ///             // if the message type is unknown
89 ///     }
90 /// }
91 /// // Send a custom onion message to a node id.
92 /// let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
93 /// let reply_path = None;
94 /// # let your_custom_message = YourCustomMessage {};
95 /// let message = OnionMessageContents::Custom(your_custom_message);
96 /// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::Node(destination_node_id), message, reply_path);
97 ///
98 /// // Create a blinded route to yourself, for someone to send an onion message to.
99 /// # let your_node_id = hop_node_id1;
100 /// let hops = [hop_node_id3, hop_node_id4, your_node_id];
101 /// let blinded_route = BlindedRoute::new(&hops, &keys_manager, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
102 ///
103 /// // Send a custom onion message to a blinded route.
104 /// # let intermediate_hops = [hop_node_id1, hop_node_id2];
105 /// let reply_path = None;
106 /// # let your_custom_message = YourCustomMessage {};
107 /// let message = OnionMessageContents::Custom(your_custom_message);
108 /// onion_messenger.send_onion_message(&intermediate_hops, Destination::BlindedRoute(blinded_route), message, reply_path);
109 /// ```
110 ///
111 /// [offers]: <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/798>
112 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::OnionMessenger
113 pub struct OnionMessenger<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref>
114         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
115               L::Target: Logger,
116               CMH:: Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
117 {
118         keys_manager: K,
119         logger: L,
120         pending_messages: Mutex<HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>>>,
121         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
122         custom_handler: CMH,
123         // Coming soon:
124         // invoice_handler: InvoiceHandler,
125 }
126
127 /// The destination of an onion message.
128 pub enum Destination {
129         /// We're sending this onion message to a node.
130         Node(PublicKey),
131         /// We're sending this onion message to a blinded route.
132         BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute),
133 }
134
135 impl Destination {
136         pub(super) fn num_hops(&self) -> usize {
137                 match self {
138                         Destination::Node(_) => 1,
139                         Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { blinded_hops, .. }) => blinded_hops.len(),
140                 }
141         }
142 }
143
144 /// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message].
145 ///
146 /// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
147 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
148 pub enum SendError {
149         /// Errored computing onion message packet keys.
150         Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error),
151         /// Because implementations such as Eclair will drop onion messages where the message packet
152         /// exceeds 32834 bytes, we refuse to send messages where the packet exceeds this size.
153         TooBigPacket,
154         /// The provided [`Destination`] was an invalid [`BlindedRoute`], due to having fewer than two
155         /// blinded hops.
156         TooFewBlindedHops,
157         /// Our next-hop peer was offline or does not support onion message forwarding.
158         InvalidFirstHop,
159         /// Onion message contents must have a TLV type >= 64.
160         InvalidMessage,
161         /// Our next-hop peer's buffer was full or our total outbound buffer was full.
162         BufferFull,
163 }
164
165 /// Handler for custom onion messages. If you are using [`SimpleArcOnionMessenger`],
166 /// [`SimpleRefOnionMessenger`], or prefer to ignore inbound custom onion messages,
167 /// [`IgnoringMessageHandler`] must be provided to [`OnionMessenger::new`]. Otherwise, a custom
168 /// implementation of this trait must be provided, with [`CustomMessage`] specifying the supported
169 /// message types.
170 ///
171 /// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
172 ///
173 /// [`IgnoringMessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler
174 /// [`CustomMessage`]: Self::CustomMessage
175 pub trait CustomOnionMessageHandler {
176         /// The message known to the handler. To support multiple message types, you may want to make this
177         /// an enum with a variant for each supported message.
178         type CustomMessage: CustomOnionMessageContents;
179         /// Called with the custom message that was received.
180         fn handle_custom_message(&self, msg: Self::CustomMessage);
181 }
182
183 impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L, CMH>
184         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
185               L::Target: Logger,
186               CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
187 {
188         /// Constructs a new `OnionMessenger` to send, forward, and delegate received onion messages to
189         /// their respective handlers.
190         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, logger: L, custom_handler: CMH) -> Self {
191                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
192                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
193                 OnionMessenger {
194                         keys_manager,
195                         pending_messages: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
196                         secp_ctx,
197                         logger,
198                         custom_handler,
199                 }
200         }
201
202         /// Send an onion message with contents `message` to `destination`, routing it through `intermediate_nodes`.
203         /// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
204         pub fn send_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(&self, intermediate_nodes: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, message: OnionMessageContents<T>, reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>) -> Result<(), SendError> {
205                 if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { ref blinded_hops, .. }) = destination {
206                         if blinded_hops.len() < 2 {
207                                 return Err(SendError::TooFewBlindedHops);
208                         }
209                 }
210                 let OnionMessageContents::Custom(ref msg) = message;
211                 if msg.tlv_type() < 64 { return Err(SendError::InvalidMessage) }
212
213                 let blinding_secret_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
214                 let blinding_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&blinding_secret_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
215                 let (introduction_node_id, blinding_point) = if intermediate_nodes.len() != 0 {
216                         (intermediate_nodes[0], PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret))
217                 } else {
218                         match destination {
219                                 Destination::Node(pk) => (pk, PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret)),
220                                 Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute { introduction_node_id, blinding_point, .. }) =>
221                                         (introduction_node_id, blinding_point),
222                         }
223                 };
224                 let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
225                         &self.secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, message, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
226                         .map_err(|e| SendError::Secp256k1(e))?;
227
228                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
229                 let onion_routing_packet = construct_onion_message_packet(
230                         packet_payloads, packet_keys, prng_seed).map_err(|()| SendError::TooBigPacket)?;
231
232                 let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
233                 if outbound_buffer_full(&introduction_node_id, &pending_per_peer_msgs) { return Err(SendError::BufferFull) }
234                 match pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(introduction_node_id) {
235                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(SendError::InvalidFirstHop),
236                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
237                                 e.get_mut().push_back(msgs::OnionMessage { blinding_point, onion_routing_packet });
238                                 Ok(())
239                         }
240                 }
241         }
242
243         #[cfg(test)]
244         pub(super) fn release_pending_msgs(&self) -> HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>> {
245                 let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
246                 let mut msgs = HashMap::new();
247                 // We don't want to disconnect the peers by removing them entirely from the original map, so we
248                 // swap the pending message buffers individually.
249                 for (peer_node_id, pending_messages) in &mut *pending_msgs {
250                         msgs.insert(*peer_node_id, core::mem::take(pending_messages));
251                 }
252                 msgs
253         }
254 }
255
256 fn outbound_buffer_full(peer_node_id: &PublicKey, buffer: &HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<msgs::OnionMessage>>) -> bool {
257         const MAX_TOTAL_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = (1 << 20) * 128;
258         const MAX_PER_PEER_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = (1 << 10) * 256;
259         let mut total_buffered_bytes = 0;
260         let mut peer_buffered_bytes = 0;
261         for (pk, peer_buf) in buffer {
262                 for om in peer_buf {
263                         let om_len = om.serialized_length();
264                         if pk == peer_node_id {
265                                 peer_buffered_bytes += om_len;
266                         }
267                         total_buffered_bytes += om_len;
268
269                         if total_buffered_bytes >= MAX_TOTAL_BUFFER_SIZE ||
270                                 peer_buffered_bytes >= MAX_PER_PEER_BUFFER_SIZE
271                         {
272                                 return true
273                         }
274                 }
275         }
276         false
277 }
278
279 impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageHandler for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L, CMH>
280         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
281               L::Target: Logger,
282               CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
283 {
284         /// Handle an incoming onion message. Currently, if a message was destined for us we will log, but
285         /// soon we'll delegate the onion message to a handler that can generate invoices or send
286         /// payments.
287         fn handle_onion_message(&self, _peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OnionMessage) {
288                 let control_tlvs_ss = match self.keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &msg.blinding_point, None) {
289                         Ok(ss) => ss,
290                         Err(e) =>  {
291                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to retrieve node secret: {:?}", e);
292                                 return
293                         }
294                 };
295                 let onion_decode_ss = {
296                         let blinding_factor = {
297                                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"blinded_node_id");
298                                 hmac.input(control_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
299                                 Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
300                         };
301                         match self.keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key,
302                                 Some(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()))
303                         {
304                                 Ok(ss) => ss.secret_bytes(),
305                                 Err(()) => {
306                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute onion packet shared secret");
307                                         return
308                                 }
309                         }
310                 };
311                 match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(onion_decode_ss, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..],
312                         msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, control_tlvs_ss)
313                 {
314                         Ok((Payload::Receive::<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as CustomOnionMessageHandler>::CustomMessage> {
315                                 message, control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id }), reply_path,
316                         }, None)) => {
317                                 log_info!(self.logger,
318                                         "Received an onion message with path_id {:02x?} and {} reply_path",
319                                                 path_id, if reply_path.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
320                                 match message {
321                                         OnionMessageContents::Custom(msg) => self.custom_handler.handle_custom_message(msg),
322                                 }
323                         },
324                         Ok((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
325                                 next_node_id, next_blinding_override
326                         })), Some((next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes)))) => {
327                                 // TODO: we need to check whether `next_node_id` is our node, in which case this is a dummy
328                                 // blinded hop and this onion message is destined for us. In this situation, we should keep
329                                 // unwrapping the onion layers to get to the final payload. Since we don't have the option
330                                 // of creating blinded routes with dummy hops currently, we should be ok to not handle this
331                                 // for now.
332                                 let new_pubkey = match onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &onion_decode_ss) {
333                                         Ok(pk) => pk,
334                                         Err(e) => {
335                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute next hop packet pubkey: {}", e);
336                                                 return
337                                         }
338                                 };
339                                 let outgoing_packet = Packet {
340                                         version: 0,
341                                         public_key: new_pubkey,
342                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
343                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac,
344                                 };
345                                 let onion_message = msgs::OnionMessage {
346                                         blinding_point: match next_blinding_override {
347                                                 Some(blinding_point) => blinding_point,
348                                                 None => {
349                                                         let blinding_factor = {
350                                                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
351                                                                 sha.input(&msg.blinding_point.serialize()[..]);
352                                                                 sha.input(control_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
353                                                                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
354                                                         };
355                                                         let next_blinding_point = msg.blinding_point;
356                                                         match next_blinding_point.mul_tweak(&self.secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap()) {
357                                                                 Ok(bp) => bp,
358                                                                 Err(e) => {
359                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to compute next blinding point: {}", e);
360                                                                         return
361                                                                 }
362                                                         }
363                                                 },
364                                         },
365                                         onion_routing_packet: outgoing_packet,
366                                 };
367
368                                 let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
369                                 if outbound_buffer_full(&next_node_id, &pending_per_peer_msgs) {
370                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to peer {:?}: outbound buffer full", next_node_id);
371                                         return
372                                 }
373
374                                 #[cfg(fuzzing)]
375                                 pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(next_node_id).or_insert_with(VecDeque::new);
376
377                                 match pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(next_node_id) {
378                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
379                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to disconnected peer {:?}", next_node_id);
380                                                 return
381                                         },
382                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
383                                                 e.get_mut().push_back(onion_message);
384                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Forwarding an onion message to peer {}", next_node_id);
385                                         }
386                                 };
387                         },
388                         Err(e) => {
389                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Errored decoding onion message packet: {:?}", e);
390                         },
391                         _ => {
392                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received bogus onion message packet, either the sender encoded a final hop as a forwarding hop or vice versa");
393                         },
394                 };
395         }
396
397         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
398                 if init.features.supports_onion_messages() {
399                         let mut peers = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
400                         peers.insert(their_node_id.clone(), VecDeque::new());
401                 }
402                 Ok(())
403         }
404
405         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, _no_connection_possible: bool) {
406                 let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
407                 pending_msgs.remove(their_node_id);
408         }
409
410         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
411                 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
412                 features.set_onion_messages_optional();
413                 features
414         }
415
416         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
417                 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
418                 features.set_onion_messages_optional();
419                 features
420         }
421 }
422
423 impl<Signer: Sign, K: Deref, L: Deref, CMH: Deref> OnionMessageProvider for OnionMessenger<Signer, K, L, CMH>
424         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
425               L::Target: Logger,
426               CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
427 {
428         fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<msgs::OnionMessage> {
429                 let mut pending_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
430                 if let Some(msgs) = pending_msgs.get_mut(&peer_node_id) {
431                         return msgs.pop_front()
432                 }
433                 None
434         }
435 }
436
437 // TODO: parameterize the below Simple* types with OnionMessenger and handle the messages it
438 // produces
439 /// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] and
440 /// [`SimpleArcPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
441 ///
442 /// (C-not exported) as `Arc`s don't make sense in bindings.
443 ///
444 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleArcChannelManager
445 /// [`SimpleArcPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleArcPeerManager
446 pub type SimpleArcOnionMessenger<L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<L>, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
447 /// Useful for simplifying the parameters of [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] and
448 /// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]. See their docs for more details.
449 ///
450 /// (C-not exported) as general type aliases don't make sense in bindings.
451 ///
452 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::SimpleRefChannelManager
453 /// [`SimpleRefPeerManager`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::SimpleRefPeerManager
454 pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<'a, 'b, L> = OnionMessenger<InMemorySigner, &'a KeysManager, &'b L, IgnoringMessageHandler>;
455
456 /// Construct onion packet payloads and keys for sending an onion message along the given
457 /// `unblinded_path` to the given `destination`.
458 fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: CustomOnionMessageContents, S: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
459         secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<S>, unblinded_path: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination,
460         message: OnionMessageContents<T>, mut reply_path: Option<BlindedRoute>, session_priv: &SecretKey
461 ) -> Result<(Vec<(Payload<T>, [u8; 32])>, Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>), secp256k1::Error> {
462         let num_hops = unblinded_path.len() + destination.num_hops();
463         let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
464         let mut onion_packet_keys = Vec::with_capacity(num_hops);
465
466         let (mut intro_node_id_blinding_pt, num_blinded_hops) = if let Destination::BlindedRoute(BlindedRoute {
467                 introduction_node_id, blinding_point, blinded_hops }) = &destination {
468                 (Some((*introduction_node_id, *blinding_point)), blinded_hops.len()) } else { (None, 0) };
469         let num_unblinded_hops = num_hops - num_blinded_hops;
470
471         let mut unblinded_path_idx = 0;
472         let mut blinded_path_idx = 0;
473         let mut prev_control_tlvs_ss = None;
474         let mut final_control_tlvs = None;
475         utils::construct_keys_callback(secp_ctx, unblinded_path, Some(destination), session_priv, |_, onion_packet_ss, ephemeral_pubkey, control_tlvs_ss, unblinded_pk_opt, enc_payload_opt| {
476                 if num_unblinded_hops != 0 && unblinded_path_idx < num_unblinded_hops {
477                         if let Some(ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
478                                 payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(
479                                         ForwardTlvs {
480                                                 next_node_id: unblinded_pk_opt.unwrap(),
481                                                 next_blinding_override: None,
482                                         }
483                                 )), ss));
484                         }
485                         prev_control_tlvs_ss = Some(control_tlvs_ss);
486                         unblinded_path_idx += 1;
487                 } else if let Some((intro_node_id, blinding_pt)) = intro_node_id_blinding_pt.take() {
488                         if let Some(control_tlvs_ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {
489                                 payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
490                                         next_node_id: intro_node_id,
491                                         next_blinding_override: Some(blinding_pt),
492                                 })), control_tlvs_ss));
493                         }
494                         if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
495                                 payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload)),
496                                         control_tlvs_ss));
497                         } else { debug_assert!(false); }
498                         blinded_path_idx += 1;
499                 } else if blinded_path_idx < num_blinded_hops - 1 && enc_payload_opt.is_some() {
500                         payloads.push((Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded(enc_payload_opt.unwrap())),
501                                 control_tlvs_ss));
502                         blinded_path_idx += 1;
503                 } else if let Some(encrypted_payload) = enc_payload_opt {
504                         final_control_tlvs = Some(ReceiveControlTlvs::Blinded(encrypted_payload));
505                         prev_control_tlvs_ss = Some(control_tlvs_ss);
506                 }
507
508                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(onion_packet_ss.as_ref());
509                 onion_packet_keys.push(onion_utils::OnionKeys {
510                         #[cfg(test)]
511                         shared_secret: onion_packet_ss,
512                         #[cfg(test)]
513                         blinding_factor: [0; 32],
514                         ephemeral_pubkey,
515                         rho,
516                         mu,
517                 });
518         })?;
519
520         if let Some(control_tlvs) = final_control_tlvs {
521                 payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
522                         control_tlvs,
523                         reply_path: reply_path.take(),
524                         message,
525                 }, prev_control_tlvs_ss.unwrap()));
526         } else {
527                 payloads.push((Payload::Receive {
528                         control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(ReceiveTlvs { path_id: None, }),
529                         reply_path: reply_path.take(),
530                         message,
531                 }, prev_control_tlvs_ss.unwrap()));
532         }
533
534         Ok((payloads, onion_packet_keys))
535 }
536
537 /// Errors if the serialized payload size exceeds onion_message::BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
538 fn construct_onion_message_packet<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(payloads: Vec<(Payload<T>, [u8; 32])>, onion_keys: Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Packet, ()> {
539         // Spec rationale:
540         // "`len` allows larger messages to be sent than the standard 1300 bytes allowed for an HTLC
541         // onion, but this should be used sparingly as it is reduces anonymity set, hence the
542         // recommendation that it either look like an HTLC onion, or if larger, be a fixed size."
543         let payloads_ser_len = onion_utils::payloads_serialized_length(&payloads);
544         let hop_data_len = if payloads_ser_len <= SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN {
545                 SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
546         } else if payloads_ser_len <= BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN {
547                 BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN
548         } else { return Err(()) };
549
550         Ok(onion_utils::construct_onion_message_packet::<_, _>(
551                 payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, hop_data_len))
552 }