1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
54 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
56 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
57 /// refuse to relay the message.
58 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
60 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
61 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
62 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
64 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
65 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
66 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
69 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
70 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
71 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
74 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
75 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
80 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
81 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
82 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
86 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
87 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
94 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
95 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
96 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
100 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
101 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
102 Some(self.cmp(other))
106 impl Ord for NodeId {
107 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
108 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
112 impl Writeable for NodeId {
113 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
114 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
119 impl Readable for NodeId {
120 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
121 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
122 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
127 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
128 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
129 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
130 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
131 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
133 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
134 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
135 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
136 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
138 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
139 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
140 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
141 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
142 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
143 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
144 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
147 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
148 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
149 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
150 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
151 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
152 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
153 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
154 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
157 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
158 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
159 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
160 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
163 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
164 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
166 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
167 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
168 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
169 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
170 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
171 ChannelUpdateMessage {
172 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
175 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
176 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
178 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
180 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
181 /// `channel_update` message is received.
184 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
185 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
187 /// The node id of the failed node.
189 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
190 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
195 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
196 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
199 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
200 (0, short_channel_id, required),
201 (2, is_permanent, required),
203 (4, NodeFailure) => {
204 (0, node_id, required),
205 (2, is_permanent, required),
209 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
210 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
211 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
212 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
213 /// serving historical announcements.
215 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
216 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
217 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
218 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
221 chain_access: Option<C>,
222 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
223 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
224 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
228 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
229 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
231 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
232 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
233 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
234 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
235 /// channel owners' keys.
236 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
239 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
240 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
242 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
247 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
248 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
249 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
250 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
251 self.chain_access = chain_access;
254 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
255 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
257 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
258 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
262 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
263 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
264 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
265 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
266 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
267 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
268 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
276 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
277 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
278 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
279 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
280 match *network_update {
281 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
282 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
283 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
284 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
285 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
286 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
288 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
289 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
291 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
293 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
295 log_debug!(self.logger,
296 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
297 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
306 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
307 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
308 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
311 return Err(LightningError {
312 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
313 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
314 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
316 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
318 log_level: Level::Trace,
326 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
327 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
329 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
330 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
331 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
332 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
333 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
336 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
337 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
338 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
339 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
342 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
343 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
344 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
347 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
348 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
349 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
350 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
351 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
352 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
353 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
354 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
355 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
357 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
358 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
360 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
362 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
363 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
369 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
370 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
371 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
372 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
376 for (_, ref node) in iter {
377 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
378 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
386 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
387 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
388 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
390 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
391 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
392 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
393 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
394 /// tracking this directly.
395 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
396 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
397 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
398 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
399 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
403 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
405 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
406 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
407 // updates from all our peers normally.
409 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
410 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
411 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
414 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
415 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
416 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
417 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
418 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
420 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
421 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
422 // relying on it useless.
424 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
425 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
426 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
428 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
429 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
430 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
431 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
432 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
435 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
436 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
437 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
438 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
439 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
440 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
441 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
443 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
444 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
445 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
446 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
448 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
449 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
450 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
452 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
453 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
454 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
455 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
457 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
458 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
459 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
461 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
465 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
466 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
467 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
468 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
469 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
470 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
471 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
477 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
478 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
479 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
480 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
484 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
485 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
486 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
487 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
491 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
492 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
493 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
494 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
495 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
496 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
497 /// memory constrained systems.
498 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
499 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
501 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
503 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
504 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
505 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
507 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
508 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
509 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
510 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
511 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
512 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
513 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
514 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
515 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
517 short_channel_ids: vec![],
520 return Err(LightningError {
521 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
522 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
526 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
527 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
528 // exists even if its not yet routable.
529 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
530 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
531 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
532 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
533 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
534 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
535 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
538 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
539 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
544 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
545 let batch_count = batches.len();
546 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
547 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
548 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
549 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
551 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
552 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
553 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
554 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
555 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
556 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
557 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
559 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
560 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
561 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
563 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
564 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
565 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
567 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
568 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
569 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
570 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
572 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
573 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
575 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
578 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
580 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
581 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
582 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
583 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
587 short_channel_ids: batch,
595 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
598 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
599 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
603 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
604 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
605 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
609 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
610 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
611 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
616 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
618 C::Target: chain::Access,
621 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
622 let mut ret = Vec::new();
623 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
624 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
629 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
630 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
631 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
632 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
633 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
634 pub last_update: u32,
635 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
637 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
638 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
639 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
640 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
641 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
642 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
643 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
644 pub fees: RoutingFees,
645 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
646 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
647 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
648 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
649 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
652 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
653 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
654 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
659 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
660 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
661 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
662 (0, self.last_update, required),
663 (2, self.enabled, required),
664 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
665 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
666 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
667 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
668 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
669 (10, self.fees, required),
670 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
676 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
677 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
678 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
679 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
680 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
681 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
682 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
683 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
684 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
686 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
687 (0, last_update, required),
688 (2, enabled, required),
689 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
690 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
691 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
692 (10, fees, required),
693 (12, last_update_message, required)
696 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
697 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
698 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
699 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
700 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
701 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
703 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
704 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
707 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
712 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
713 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
714 /// Received within a channel announcement.
715 pub struct ChannelInfo {
716 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
717 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
718 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
719 pub node_one: NodeId,
720 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
721 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
722 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
723 pub node_two: NodeId,
724 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
725 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
726 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
727 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
728 /// An initial announcement of the channel
729 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
730 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
731 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
732 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
733 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
734 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
735 /// network graph in memory!).
736 announcement_received_time: u64,
740 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
741 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
742 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
743 let (direction, source) = {
744 if target == &self.node_one {
745 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
746 } else if target == &self.node_two {
747 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
752 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
755 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
756 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
757 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
758 let (direction, target) = {
759 if source == &self.node_one {
760 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
761 } else if source == &self.node_two {
762 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
767 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
770 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
771 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
772 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
774 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
776 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
781 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
782 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
783 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
784 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
789 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
790 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
791 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
792 (0, self.features, required),
793 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
794 (2, self.node_one, required),
795 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
796 (6, self.node_two, required),
797 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
798 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
799 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
805 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
806 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
807 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
808 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
809 // channel updates via the gossip network.
810 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
812 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
813 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
814 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
815 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
816 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
817 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
818 Err(err) => Err(err),
823 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
824 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
825 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
826 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
827 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
828 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
829 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
830 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
831 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
832 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
833 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
834 (0, features, required),
835 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
836 (2, node_one, required),
837 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
838 (6, node_two, required),
839 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
840 (10, capacity_sats, required),
841 (12, announcement_message, required),
845 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
846 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
847 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
848 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
849 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
850 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
851 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
852 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
857 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
858 /// source node to a target node.
860 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
861 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
862 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
863 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
864 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
867 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
869 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
870 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
871 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
873 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
874 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
875 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
876 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
878 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
879 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
881 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
882 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
884 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
888 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
892 /// Returns information for the channel.
893 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
895 /// Returns information for the direction.
896 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
898 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
899 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
900 self.htlc_maximum_msat
903 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
905 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
906 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
908 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
909 self.effective_capacity
912 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
913 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
914 match self.direction {
915 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
921 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
922 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
923 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
924 .field("channel", &self.channel)
929 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
931 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
932 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
935 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
936 /// Returns information for the channel.
938 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
940 /// Returns information for the direction.
942 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
944 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
946 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
949 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
950 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
955 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
957 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
958 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
959 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
960 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
961 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
964 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
968 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
970 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
973 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
975 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
977 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
978 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
980 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
983 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
984 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
988 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
989 /// use when making routing decisions.
990 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
992 impl EffectiveCapacity {
993 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
994 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
996 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
997 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
998 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
999 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1000 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1005 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1006 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
1007 pub struct RoutingFees {
1008 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
1010 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1011 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1012 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1015 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1016 (0, base_msat, required),
1017 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1020 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1021 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1022 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1023 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1024 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1025 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1026 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1027 pub last_update: u32,
1028 /// Color assigned to the node
1030 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1031 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1032 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1033 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1034 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1035 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1036 /// An initial announcement of the node
1037 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1038 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1039 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1040 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1043 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1044 (0, features, required),
1045 (2, last_update, required),
1047 (6, alias, required),
1048 (8, announcement_message, option),
1049 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1052 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1054 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1055 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1056 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1057 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1059 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1060 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1061 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1062 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1063 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1064 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1066 for c in alias.chars() {
1067 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1068 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1069 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1073 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1074 // Display printable ASCII characters
1075 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1076 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1077 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1085 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1086 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1091 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1092 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1093 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1097 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1098 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1099 pub struct NodeInfo {
1100 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1101 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1102 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1103 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1104 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1105 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1106 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1107 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1108 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1109 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1112 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1113 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1114 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1115 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1120 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1121 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1122 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1123 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1124 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1125 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1131 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1132 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1133 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1134 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1135 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1137 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1138 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1139 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1140 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1142 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1149 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1150 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1151 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1152 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1153 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1155 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1156 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1157 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1158 (4, channels, vec_type),
1162 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1163 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1164 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1169 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1170 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1172 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1173 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1174 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1176 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1177 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1178 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1179 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1180 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1181 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1183 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1184 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1185 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1186 node_id.write(writer)?;
1187 node_info.write(writer)?;
1190 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1191 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1192 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1198 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1199 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1200 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1202 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1203 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1204 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1205 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1206 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1207 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1208 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1210 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1211 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1212 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1213 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1214 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1215 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1218 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1219 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1220 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1224 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1227 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1228 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1229 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1230 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1231 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1236 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1237 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1238 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1239 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1240 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1242 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1243 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1244 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1250 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1251 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1252 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1253 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1254 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1255 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1259 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1260 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1261 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1263 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1266 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1267 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1268 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1269 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1270 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1274 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1275 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1276 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1277 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1278 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1284 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1285 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1286 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1287 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1290 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1291 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1292 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1293 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1296 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1299 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1300 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1301 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1305 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1306 /// given node announcement.
1308 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1309 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1310 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1311 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1312 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1313 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1314 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1317 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1318 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1319 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1321 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1322 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1325 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1326 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1327 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1329 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1330 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1331 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1332 // that it be at least the current time.
1333 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1334 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1335 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1336 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1341 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1342 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1343 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1344 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1345 features: msg.features.clone(),
1346 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1348 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1349 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1350 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1358 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1360 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1361 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1362 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1364 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1365 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1366 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1367 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1368 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1370 C::Target: chain::Access,
1372 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1373 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1374 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1375 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1376 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1377 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1380 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1381 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1382 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1384 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1385 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1386 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1387 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1388 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1390 C::Target: chain::Access,
1392 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1395 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1397 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1398 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1400 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1401 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1402 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1403 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1406 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1407 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1408 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1410 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1412 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1414 capacity_sats: None,
1415 announcement_message: None,
1416 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1419 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1422 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1423 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1424 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1426 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1427 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1429 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1430 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1431 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1432 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1434 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1435 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1436 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1437 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1439 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1440 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1442 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1443 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1444 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1446 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1449 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1450 entry.insert(channel_info);
1454 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1455 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1456 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1457 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1459 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1460 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1461 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1462 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1463 announcement_info: None,
1472 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1473 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1474 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1476 C::Target: chain::Access,
1478 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1479 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1482 let node_one = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1);
1483 let node_two = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2);
1486 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1488 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1489 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1490 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1491 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1493 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1494 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1495 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1496 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1498 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1499 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1500 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1501 if node_one == chan.node_one && node_two == chan.node_two {
1502 return Err(LightningError {
1503 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1504 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1507 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1508 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1509 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1510 return Err(LightningError {
1511 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1512 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1519 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1520 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1521 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1522 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_one) ||
1523 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_two) {
1524 return Err(LightningError{
1525 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1526 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1530 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1532 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1535 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1536 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1537 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1538 let expected_script =
1539 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1540 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1541 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1543 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1544 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1547 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1548 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1550 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1551 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1557 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1558 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1559 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1561 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1564 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1565 features: msg.features.clone(),
1570 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1571 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1572 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1573 announcement_received_time,
1576 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1579 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1580 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1581 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1582 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1583 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1584 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1585 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1586 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1587 let current_time_unix = None;
1589 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1591 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1592 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1593 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1594 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1597 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1598 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1599 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1601 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1602 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1608 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1609 /// from local storage.
1610 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1611 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1612 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1613 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1614 let current_time_unix = None;
1616 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1617 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1618 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1619 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1620 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1622 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1623 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1624 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1625 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1626 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1627 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1630 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1631 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1634 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1637 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1641 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1642 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1643 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1646 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1647 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1648 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1650 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1651 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1653 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1654 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1656 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1657 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1658 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1659 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1660 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1663 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1664 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1667 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1668 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1669 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1671 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1672 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1674 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1675 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1676 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1677 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1678 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1679 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1680 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1681 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1682 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1684 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1685 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1686 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1687 info.one_to_two = None;
1689 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1690 info.two_to_one = None;
1692 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1693 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1694 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1695 // channel_update for.
1696 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1697 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1701 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1702 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1703 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1704 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1705 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1709 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1710 if let Some(time) = time {
1711 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1713 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1714 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1715 // of this function.
1716 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1718 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1719 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1722 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1726 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1727 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1730 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1733 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1734 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1735 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1737 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1738 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1739 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1740 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1743 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1744 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1745 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1747 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1748 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1749 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1750 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1753 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1755 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1756 let chan_was_enabled;
1758 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1760 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1761 // disable this check during tests!
1762 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1763 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1764 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1766 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1767 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1771 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1772 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1773 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1775 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1776 return Err(LightningError{err:
1777 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1778 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1781 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1782 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1783 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1784 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1785 return Err(LightningError{err:
1786 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1787 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1790 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1791 ($target: expr) => {
1792 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1793 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1794 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1795 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1796 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1797 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1798 // but only in the non-normative section.
1799 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1800 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1801 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1802 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1804 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1806 chan_was_enabled = false;
1811 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1813 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1814 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1816 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1817 enabled: chan_enabled,
1818 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1819 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1820 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1821 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1823 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1824 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1828 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1832 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1833 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1834 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1835 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1836 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1837 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1838 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1839 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1840 })?, "channel_update");
1842 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1844 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1845 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1846 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1847 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1848 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1849 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1850 })?, "channel_update");
1852 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1857 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1859 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1860 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1861 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1862 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1863 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1864 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1866 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1868 proportional_millionths
1870 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1871 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1872 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1874 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1875 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1877 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1878 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1880 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1882 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1883 if chan_info.enabled {
1884 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1885 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1886 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1887 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1892 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1898 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1899 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1900 ($node_id: expr) => {
1901 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1902 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1903 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1905 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1906 entry.remove_entry();
1909 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1914 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1915 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1919 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1920 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1922 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1923 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1927 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1928 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1929 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1932 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1933 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1934 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1935 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1938 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1940 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1941 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1945 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1946 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1947 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1950 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1951 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1952 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1953 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1956 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1957 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1958 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1959 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1960 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1961 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1962 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1972 use ln::channelmanager;
1973 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1974 use ln::PaymentHash;
1975 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
1976 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1977 use ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1978 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1979 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1980 use util::test_utils;
1981 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1982 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1983 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1985 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1986 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1988 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1989 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1990 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1991 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1992 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1993 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1997 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1998 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2001 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2005 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2006 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2007 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2008 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
2011 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2012 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2013 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2015 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2016 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2017 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2018 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2022 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2023 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2024 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2025 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2026 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2028 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2029 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2030 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2031 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2032 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2033 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2036 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2037 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
2038 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2039 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
2044 addresses: Vec::new(),
2045 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2046 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2048 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2049 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2051 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2052 contents: unsigned_announcement
2056 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2057 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2058 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2059 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2060 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2062 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2063 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
2064 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2065 short_channel_id: 0,
2068 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
2069 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
2070 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2072 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2073 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2074 ChannelAnnouncement {
2075 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2076 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2077 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2078 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2079 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2083 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2084 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2085 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2086 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2087 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2090 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2091 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2092 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2093 short_channel_id: 0,
2096 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2097 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2098 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2099 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2100 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2101 excess_data: Vec::new()
2103 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2104 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2106 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2107 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2112 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2113 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2114 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2116 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2117 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2118 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2120 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2121 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2123 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2127 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2128 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2129 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2130 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2135 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2136 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2140 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2141 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2143 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2144 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2147 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2150 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2151 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2152 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2153 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2154 // Return false because contains excess data.
2155 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2156 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2160 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2161 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2162 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2163 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2164 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2165 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2167 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2172 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2173 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2174 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2176 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2177 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2179 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2180 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2182 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2183 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2184 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2185 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2186 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2187 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2192 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2198 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2199 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2200 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2202 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2205 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2206 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2207 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2208 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2209 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2211 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2212 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2213 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2214 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2216 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2219 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2220 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2221 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2222 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2223 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2224 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2225 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2230 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2236 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2237 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2238 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2239 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2241 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2244 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2246 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2248 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2249 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2250 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2252 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2253 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2254 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2255 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2256 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2258 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2261 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2263 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2264 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2265 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2270 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2271 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2272 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2273 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2274 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2275 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2276 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2280 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2281 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2282 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2284 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2287 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2288 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2290 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2295 fn handling_channel_update() {
2296 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2297 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2298 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2299 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2300 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2301 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2303 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2304 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2306 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2307 let short_channel_id;
2310 // Announce a channel we will update
2311 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2312 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2314 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2315 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2316 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2323 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2324 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2325 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2330 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2332 Some(channel_info) => {
2333 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2334 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2339 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2340 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2341 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2342 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2343 // Return false because contains excess data
2344 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2345 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2349 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2350 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2351 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2352 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2353 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2355 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2358 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2359 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2360 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2361 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2362 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2364 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2367 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2368 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2369 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2370 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2371 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2373 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2376 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2377 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2378 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2379 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2380 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2381 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2383 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2386 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2387 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2388 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2389 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2390 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2391 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2392 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2394 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2399 fn handling_network_update() {
2400 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2401 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2402 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2405 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2406 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2407 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2410 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2411 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2414 let short_channel_id;
2416 // Announce a channel we will update
2417 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2418 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2419 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2420 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2421 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2423 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2424 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2426 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2428 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2429 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2430 all_paths_failed: true,
2432 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2433 msg: valid_channel_update,
2435 short_channel_id: None,
2441 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2444 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2446 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2448 Some(channel_info) => {
2449 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2453 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2455 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2456 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2457 all_paths_failed: true,
2459 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2461 is_permanent: false,
2463 short_channel_id: None,
2469 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2471 Some(channel_info) => {
2472 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2477 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2478 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2480 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2481 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2482 all_paths_failed: true,
2484 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2488 short_channel_id: None,
2494 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2495 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2496 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2499 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2500 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2502 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2503 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2504 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2505 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2506 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2507 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2509 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2510 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2512 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2513 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2514 all_paths_failed: true,
2516 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2518 is_permanent: false,
2520 short_channel_id: None,
2526 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2527 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2529 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2530 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2532 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2533 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2534 all_paths_failed: true,
2536 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2540 short_channel_id: None,
2546 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2547 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2548 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2553 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2554 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2555 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2556 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2557 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2558 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2559 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2562 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2563 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2565 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2566 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2567 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2568 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2569 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2571 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2572 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2573 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2575 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2576 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2577 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2579 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2580 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2582 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2583 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2584 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2585 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2586 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2587 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2588 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2590 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2591 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2592 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2595 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2596 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2598 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2600 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2602 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2604 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2605 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2606 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2608 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2609 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2610 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2611 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2613 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2614 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2615 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2617 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2618 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2619 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2620 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2622 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2623 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2624 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2625 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2626 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2629 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2631 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2632 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2633 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2635 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2637 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2638 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2639 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2641 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2642 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2643 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2644 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2646 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2647 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2648 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2650 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2651 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2652 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2654 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2655 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2656 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2657 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2658 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2663 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2664 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2665 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2666 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2667 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2669 // Channels were not announced yet.
2670 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2671 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2673 let short_channel_id;
2675 // Announce a channel we will update
2676 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2677 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2678 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2684 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2685 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2686 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2687 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2688 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2689 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2695 // Valid channel update
2696 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2697 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2698 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2699 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2705 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2706 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2707 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2708 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2709 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2710 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2716 // Channel update with excess data.
2717 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2718 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2719 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2720 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2721 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2727 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2728 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2729 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2730 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2731 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2732 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2737 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2738 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2739 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2743 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2744 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2745 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2746 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2747 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2748 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2751 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2752 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2755 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2756 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2757 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2763 // Nodes were never announced
2764 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2765 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2768 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2769 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2774 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2775 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2781 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2782 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2784 // Skip the first node.
2785 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2786 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2789 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2790 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2791 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2792 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2793 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2794 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2795 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2800 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2801 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2805 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2806 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2807 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2809 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2810 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2812 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2813 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2814 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2815 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2819 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2820 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2825 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2826 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2827 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2828 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2830 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2831 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2835 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2836 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2837 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2839 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2840 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2842 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2843 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2844 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2845 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2849 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2850 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2851 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2854 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2855 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2856 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2857 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2859 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2861 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2863 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2864 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2865 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2866 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2869 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2871 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2872 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2873 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2874 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2875 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2878 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2879 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2880 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2881 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2882 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2883 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2884 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2886 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2892 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2893 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2894 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2896 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2897 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2898 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2899 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2901 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2902 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2903 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2906 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2907 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2908 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2911 // used for testing resumption on same block
2912 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2915 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2916 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2917 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2918 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2924 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2925 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2929 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2931 number_of_blocks: 0,
2934 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2935 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2937 number_of_blocks: 0,
2938 sync_complete: true,
2939 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2943 // Error when wrong chain
2944 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2948 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2950 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2953 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2954 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2956 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2957 sync_complete: true,
2958 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2962 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2963 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2967 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2968 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2969 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2972 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2973 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2974 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2975 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2976 sync_complete: true,
2977 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2981 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2982 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2986 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2987 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2988 number_of_blocks: 1,
2993 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2994 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2995 number_of_blocks: 1,
2996 sync_complete: true,
2997 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3002 // No results in valid query range
3003 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3007 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3008 first_blocknum: 1000,
3009 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3014 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3015 first_blocknum: 1000,
3016 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3017 sync_complete: true,
3018 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3023 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3024 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3028 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3029 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3030 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3035 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3036 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3037 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3038 sync_complete: true,
3039 short_channel_ids: vec![
3040 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3046 // Single block exactly full
3047 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3051 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3052 first_blocknum: 100000,
3053 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3058 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3059 first_blocknum: 100000,
3060 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3061 sync_complete: true,
3062 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3063 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3069 // Multiple split on new block
3070 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3074 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3075 first_blocknum: 100000,
3076 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3081 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3082 first_blocknum: 100000,
3083 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3084 sync_complete: false,
3085 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3086 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3090 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3091 first_blocknum: 107999,
3092 number_of_blocks: 2,
3093 sync_complete: true,
3094 short_channel_ids: vec![
3095 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3101 // Multiple split on same block
3102 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3106 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3107 first_blocknum: 100002,
3108 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3113 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3114 first_blocknum: 100002,
3115 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3116 sync_complete: false,
3117 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3118 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3122 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3123 first_blocknum: 108001,
3124 number_of_blocks: 1,
3125 sync_complete: true,
3126 short_channel_ids: vec![
3127 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3134 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3135 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3136 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3137 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3139 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3141 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3142 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3143 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3144 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3147 assert!(result.is_ok());
3149 assert!(result.is_err());
3152 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3153 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3155 for i in 0..events.len() {
3156 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3158 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3159 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3160 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3161 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3162 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3163 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3164 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3166 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3167 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3168 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3169 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3170 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3172 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3173 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3174 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3177 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3183 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3184 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3185 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3186 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3187 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3189 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3191 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3193 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3195 assert!(result.is_err());
3199 fn displays_node_alias() {
3200 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3201 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3202 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3203 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3206 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3207 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3208 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3210 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3211 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3212 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3213 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3216 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3217 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3218 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3222 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3223 let chanmon_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3224 let node_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3225 let node_chanmgrs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3226 let nodes = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3228 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3229 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3232 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3233 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3234 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3235 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3236 last_update_message: None,
3239 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3240 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3242 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3243 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3244 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3246 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3247 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3248 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3250 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3251 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3252 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3253 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3254 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3256 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3257 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3258 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3260 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3261 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3262 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3263 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3264 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3266 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3268 capacity_sats: None,
3269 announcement_message: None,
3270 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3273 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3274 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3276 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3277 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3279 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3280 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3281 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3282 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3283 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3284 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3285 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3286 capacity_sats: None,
3287 announcement_message: None,
3288 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3291 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3292 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3294 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3295 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3297 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3298 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3299 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3301 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3302 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3303 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3304 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3305 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3306 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3307 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3309 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3310 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3311 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3312 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3313 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3317 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3318 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3320 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3321 let valid_netaddr = ::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: ::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3322 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3323 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
3326 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3327 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3328 announcement_message: None,
3331 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3332 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3333 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3334 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3336 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3337 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3338 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3340 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3341 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3342 channels: Vec::new(),
3343 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3344 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3347 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3348 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3349 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3350 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3352 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3353 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3354 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3358 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3366 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3367 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3368 let mut d = ::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3369 let mut v = Vec::new();
3370 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3372 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3377 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3378 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3379 let mut d = ::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3380 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3382 let _ = net_graph.encode();