1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use core::str::FromStr;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
81 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
82 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
86 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
88 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
92 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
93 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
94 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
97 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
98 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
99 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
103 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
104 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
109 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
110 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
111 Some(self.cmp(other))
115 impl Ord for NodeId {
116 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
117 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
121 impl Writeable for NodeId {
122 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
123 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
128 impl Readable for NodeId {
129 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
130 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
131 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
136 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
137 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
138 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
142 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
143 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
145 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
150 impl FromStr for NodeId {
151 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
153 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
154 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
159 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
160 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
161 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
162 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
163 chain_hash: ChainHash,
165 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
166 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
167 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
168 removed_node_counters: Mutex<Vec<u32>>,
169 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize,
170 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
172 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
173 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
174 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
175 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
176 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
177 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
178 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
181 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
182 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
183 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
184 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
185 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
186 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
187 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
188 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
189 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
190 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
193 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
194 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
195 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
196 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
197 max_node_counter: u32,
200 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
201 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
203 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
204 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
205 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
206 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
207 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
208 ChannelUpdateMessage {
209 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
212 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
213 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
215 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
216 short_channel_id: u64,
217 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
218 /// `channel_update` message is received.
221 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
222 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
224 /// The node id of the failed node.
226 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
227 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
232 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
233 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
236 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
237 (0, short_channel_id, required),
238 (2, is_permanent, required),
240 (4, NodeFailure) => {
241 (0, node_id, required),
242 (2, is_permanent, required),
246 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
247 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
248 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
249 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
250 /// serving historical announcements.
251 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
252 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
255 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
256 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
257 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
258 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
262 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
263 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
265 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
266 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
267 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
268 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
269 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
272 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
273 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
274 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
275 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
280 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
281 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
282 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
283 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
284 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
287 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
288 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
290 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
291 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
295 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
296 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
297 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
298 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
299 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
300 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
301 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
308 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
310 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
312 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
314 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
315 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
316 if update_msg.as_ref()
317 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
323 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
326 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
327 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
328 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
335 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
339 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
340 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
342 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
343 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
345 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
346 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
347 match *network_update {
348 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
349 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
350 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
351 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
352 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
354 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
356 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
357 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
360 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
362 log_debug!(self.logger,
363 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
364 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
370 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
371 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
376 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
377 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
378 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
381 return Err(LightningError {
382 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
383 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
384 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
385 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
386 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
388 log_level: Level::Trace,
396 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
397 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
398 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
399 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
400 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
401 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
402 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
403 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
404 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
406 log_level: Level::Trace
412 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
413 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
414 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
415 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
418 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
420 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
421 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
422 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
423 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
428 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
430 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
431 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
432 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
433 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
434 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
435 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
436 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
441 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
442 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
444 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
445 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
446 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
447 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
448 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
451 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
452 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
453 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
456 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
457 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
458 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
461 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
462 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
463 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
464 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
465 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
466 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
467 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
468 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
469 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
471 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
472 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
474 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
476 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
477 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
483 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
484 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
485 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
486 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
490 for (_, ref node) in iter {
491 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
492 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
500 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
501 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
502 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
504 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
505 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
506 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
507 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
508 /// tracking this directly.
510 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
511 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
512 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
513 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
514 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
515 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
516 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
517 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
518 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
519 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
523 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
525 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
526 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
527 // updates from all our peers normally.
529 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
530 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
531 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
534 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
535 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
536 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
537 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
538 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
540 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
541 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
542 // relying on it useless.
544 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
545 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
546 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
548 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
549 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
550 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
551 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
552 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
555 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
556 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
557 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
558 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
559 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
560 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
561 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
563 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
564 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
565 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
566 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
568 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
569 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
570 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
572 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
573 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
574 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
575 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
577 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
578 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
579 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
581 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
585 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
586 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
587 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
588 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
589 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
590 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
591 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
597 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
598 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
599 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
600 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
604 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
605 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
606 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
607 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
611 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
612 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
613 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
614 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
615 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
616 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
617 /// memory constrained systems.
618 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
619 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
621 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
623 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
624 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
625 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
627 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
628 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
629 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
630 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
631 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
632 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
633 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
634 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
635 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
637 short_channel_ids: vec![],
640 return Err(LightningError {
641 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
642 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
646 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
647 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
648 // exists even if its not yet routable.
649 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
650 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
651 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
652 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
653 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
654 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
655 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
658 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
659 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
664 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
665 let batch_count = batches.len();
666 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
667 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
668 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
669 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
671 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
672 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
673 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
674 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
675 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
676 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
677 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
679 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
680 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
681 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
683 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
684 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
685 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
687 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
688 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
689 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
690 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
692 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
693 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
695 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
698 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
700 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
701 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
702 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
703 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
707 short_channel_ids: batch,
715 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
718 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
719 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
723 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
724 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
725 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
729 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
730 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
731 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
735 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
736 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
740 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
742 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
745 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
746 let mut ret = Vec::new();
747 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
748 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
753 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
754 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
755 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
756 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
757 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
758 pub last_update: u32,
759 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
761 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
762 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
763 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
764 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
765 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
766 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
767 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
768 pub fees: RoutingFees,
769 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
770 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
771 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
772 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
773 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
776 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
777 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
778 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
783 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
784 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
785 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
786 (0, self.last_update, required),
787 (2, self.enabled, required),
788 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
789 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
790 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
791 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
792 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
793 (10, self.fees, required),
794 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
800 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
801 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
802 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
803 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
804 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
805 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
806 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
807 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
808 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
810 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
811 (0, last_update, required),
812 (2, enabled, required),
813 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
814 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
815 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
816 (10, fees, required),
817 (12, last_update_message, required)
820 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
821 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
822 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
823 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
824 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
825 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
827 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
828 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
831 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
836 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
837 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
838 /// Received within a channel announcement.
839 pub struct ChannelInfo {
840 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
841 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
842 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
843 pub node_one: NodeId,
844 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
845 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
846 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
847 pub node_two: NodeId,
848 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
849 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
850 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
851 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
852 /// An initial announcement of the channel
853 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
854 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
855 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
856 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
857 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
858 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
859 /// network graph in memory!).
860 announcement_received_time: u64,
863 pub(crate) node_one_counter: u32,
865 pub(crate) node_two_counter: u32,
868 impl PartialEq for ChannelInfo {
869 fn eq(&self, o: &ChannelInfo) -> bool {
870 self.features == o.features &&
871 self.node_one == o.node_one &&
872 self.one_to_two == o.one_to_two &&
873 self.node_two == o.node_two &&
874 self.two_to_one == o.two_to_one &&
875 self.capacity_sats == o.capacity_sats &&
876 self.announcement_message == o.announcement_message &&
877 self.announcement_received_time == o.announcement_received_time
882 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
883 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
884 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
885 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
886 if target == &self.node_one {
887 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
888 } else if target == &self.node_two {
889 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
894 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
897 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
898 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
899 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
900 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
901 if source == &self.node_one {
902 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
903 } else if source == &self.node_two {
904 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
909 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
912 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
913 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
914 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
916 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
918 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
923 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
924 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
925 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
926 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
931 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
932 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
933 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
934 (0, self.features, required),
935 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
936 (2, self.node_one, required),
937 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
938 (6, self.node_two, required),
939 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
940 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
941 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
947 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
948 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
949 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
950 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
951 // channel updates via the gossip network.
952 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
954 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
955 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
956 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
957 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
958 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
959 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
960 Err(err) => Err(err),
965 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
966 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
967 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
968 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
969 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
970 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
971 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
972 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
973 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
974 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
975 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
976 (0, features, required),
977 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
978 (2, node_one, required),
979 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
980 (6, node_two, required),
981 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
982 (10, capacity_sats, required),
983 (12, announcement_message, required),
987 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
988 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
989 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
990 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
991 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
992 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
993 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
994 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
995 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
996 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1001 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
1002 /// source node to a target node.
1004 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1005 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
1006 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
1007 source_counter: u32,
1008 target_counter: u32,
1009 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
1010 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
1011 from_node_one: bool,
1014 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1016 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1017 let (source_counter, target_counter) = if from_node_one {
1018 (channel.node_one_counter, channel.node_two_counter)
1020 (channel.node_two_counter, channel.node_one_counter)
1022 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one, source_counter, target_counter }
1025 /// Returns information for the channel.
1027 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1029 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1031 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1032 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1035 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1036 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1037 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1039 match capacity_msat {
1040 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1041 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1042 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1044 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1048 /// Returns information for the direction.
1050 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1052 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1054 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1056 pub(super) fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1058 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1060 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1062 pub(super) fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1064 /// Returns the source node's counter
1066 pub(super) fn source_counter(&self) -> u32 { self.source_counter }
1068 /// Returns the target node's counter
1070 pub(super) fn target_counter(&self) -> u32 { self.target_counter }
1073 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1074 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1075 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1076 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1081 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1083 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1084 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1085 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1086 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1087 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1090 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1092 liquidity_msat: u64,
1094 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1096 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1099 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1101 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1103 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1104 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1106 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1109 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1111 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1114 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1115 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1119 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1120 /// use when making routing decisions.
1121 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1123 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1124 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1125 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1127 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1128 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1129 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1130 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1131 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1132 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1137 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1138 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1139 pub struct RoutingFees {
1140 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1142 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1143 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1144 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1147 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1148 (0, base_msat, required),
1149 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1153 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1154 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1155 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1156 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1157 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1158 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1159 pub last_update: u32,
1160 /// Color assigned to the node
1162 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1163 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1164 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1165 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1166 /// An initial announcement of the node
1167 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1168 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1169 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1170 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1173 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1174 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1175 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1176 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1177 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1178 .unwrap_or_default()
1182 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1183 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1184 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1185 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1186 (0, self.features, required),
1187 (2, self.last_update, required),
1188 (4, self.rgb, required),
1189 (6, self.alias, required),
1190 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1191 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1197 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1198 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1199 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1200 (0, features, required),
1201 (2, last_update, required),
1203 (6, alias, required),
1204 (8, announcement_message, option),
1205 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1207 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1208 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1209 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1213 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1215 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1216 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1217 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1218 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1220 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1221 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1222 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1223 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1224 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1225 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1227 use core::fmt::Write;
1228 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1229 // Display printable ASCII characters
1230 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1231 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1240 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1246 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1247 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1248 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1252 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
1253 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1254 pub struct NodeInfo {
1255 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1256 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1257 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1258 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1259 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1260 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>,
1262 pub(crate) node_counter: u32,
1265 impl PartialEq for NodeInfo {
1266 fn eq(&self, o: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
1267 self.channels == o.channels && self.announcement_info == o.announcement_info
1271 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1272 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1273 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1274 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1279 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1280 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1281 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1282 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1283 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1284 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1290 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1291 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1292 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1293 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1294 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1296 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1297 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1298 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1299 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1301 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1308 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1309 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1310 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1311 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1312 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1313 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1314 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1315 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1316 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1317 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1318 (4, channels, required_vec),
1320 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1321 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1324 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1326 node_counter: u32::max_value(),
1331 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1332 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1334 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1336 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1338 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1340 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1341 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1342 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1343 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1344 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1345 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1347 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1348 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1349 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1350 node_id.write(writer)?;
1351 node_info.write(writer)?;
1354 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1355 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1356 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1362 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1363 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1364 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1366 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1367 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1368 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1369 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1370 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1371 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1372 let chan_info: ChannelInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1373 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1375 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1376 if nodes_count > u32::max_value() as u64 / 2 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1377 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1378 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1379 for i in 0..nodes_count {
1380 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1381 let mut node_info: NodeInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1382 node_info.node_counter = i as u32;
1383 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1386 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1387 chan.node_one_counter =
1388 nodes.get(&chan.node_one).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1389 chan.node_two_counter =
1390 nodes.get(&chan.node_two).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1393 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1394 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1395 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1399 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1402 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1403 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1404 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1405 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(nodes_count as usize),
1406 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1407 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1408 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1409 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1414 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1415 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1416 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1417 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1418 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1420 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1421 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1422 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1428 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1429 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1430 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1431 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1432 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1433 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1434 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1435 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1436 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1437 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1438 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1442 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1443 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1444 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1446 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1447 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1449 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1450 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1451 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1452 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1453 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1454 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1455 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1456 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1460 fn test_node_counter_consistency(&self) {
1461 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1462 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1463 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1464 let removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1465 let next_counter = self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
1466 assert!(next_counter < (u32::max_value() as usize) / 2);
1467 let mut used_node_counters = vec![0u8; next_counter / 8 + 1];
1469 for counter in removed_node_counters.iter() {
1470 let pos = (*counter as usize) / 8;
1471 let bit = 1 << (counter % 8);
1472 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1473 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1475 for (_, node) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1476 assert!((node.node_counter as usize) < next_counter);
1477 let pos = (node.node_counter as usize) / 8;
1478 let bit = 1 << (node.node_counter % 8);
1479 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1480 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1483 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1484 assert_eq!(chan.node_one_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_one).unwrap().node_counter);
1485 assert_eq!(chan.node_two_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_two).unwrap().node_counter);
1490 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1491 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1492 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1493 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1494 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1495 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1498 max_node_counter: (self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).saturating_sub(1),
1502 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1503 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1504 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1505 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1508 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1509 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1510 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1511 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1514 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1517 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1518 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1519 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1523 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1524 /// given node announcement.
1526 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1527 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1528 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1529 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1530 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1531 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1534 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1535 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1536 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1538 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1539 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1542 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1543 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1544 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1546 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1547 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1548 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1551 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1552 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1553 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1554 // that it be at least the current time.
1555 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1556 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1557 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1558 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1563 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1564 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1565 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1566 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1567 features: msg.features.clone(),
1568 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1571 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1579 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1581 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1582 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1583 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1585 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1586 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1587 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1588 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1589 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1591 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1593 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1594 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1597 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1599 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1600 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1601 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1603 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1604 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1605 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1606 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1607 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1610 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1611 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1612 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1614 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1615 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1616 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1617 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1618 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1620 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1622 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1625 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1627 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1628 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1630 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1631 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1632 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1633 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1636 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1637 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1638 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1640 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1642 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1644 capacity_sats: None,
1645 announcement_message: None,
1646 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1647 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1648 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1651 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1654 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1655 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1656 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1658 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1659 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1661 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1663 let channel_entry = channels.entry(short_channel_id);
1664 let channel_info = match channel_entry {
1665 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1666 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1667 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1669 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1670 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1671 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1672 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1674 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1675 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1677 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1678 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1679 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1682 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1685 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1686 entry.insert(channel_info)
1690 let mut node_counter_id = [
1691 (&mut channel_info.node_one_counter, node_id_a),
1692 (&mut channel_info.node_two_counter, node_id_b)
1694 for (node_counter, current_node_id) in node_counter_id.iter_mut() {
1695 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1696 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1697 let node = node_entry.into_mut();
1698 node.channels.push(short_channel_id);
1699 **node_counter = node.node_counter;
1701 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1702 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1703 **node_counter = removed_node_counters.pop()
1704 .unwrap_or(self.next_node_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u32);
1705 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1706 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1707 announcement_info: None,
1708 node_counter: **node_counter,
1717 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1718 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1719 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1721 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1723 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1724 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1727 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1728 return Err(LightningError {
1729 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1730 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1735 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1737 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1738 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1739 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1740 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1742 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1743 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1744 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1745 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1747 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1748 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1749 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1750 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1751 return Err(LightningError {
1752 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1753 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1756 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1757 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1758 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1759 return Err(LightningError {
1760 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1761 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1768 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1769 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1770 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1771 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1772 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1773 return Err(LightningError{
1774 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1775 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1779 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1780 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1782 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1783 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1784 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1786 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1789 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1790 features: msg.features.clone(),
1791 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1793 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1795 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1796 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1797 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1798 announcement_received_time,
1799 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1800 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1803 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1805 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1809 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1811 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1812 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1813 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1814 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1815 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1816 let current_time_unix = None;
1818 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1821 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1823 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1824 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1825 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1826 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1827 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1828 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1829 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1833 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1834 /// from local storage.
1835 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1836 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1837 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1838 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1839 let current_time_unix = None;
1841 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1842 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1843 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1844 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1845 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1847 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1848 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1849 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1850 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1851 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1852 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1853 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1856 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1857 removed_node_counters.push(other_node_entry.get().node_counter);
1858 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1861 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1864 removed_node_counters.push(node.node_counter);
1865 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1869 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1870 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1871 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1874 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1875 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1876 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1878 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1879 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1881 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1882 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1884 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1885 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1886 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1887 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1888 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1891 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1892 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1895 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1896 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1897 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1899 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1900 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1902 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1903 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1904 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1905 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1906 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1907 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1908 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1909 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1910 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1912 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1913 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1914 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1915 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1916 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1917 info.one_to_two = None;
1919 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1920 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1921 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1922 info.two_to_one = None;
1924 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1925 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1926 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1927 // channel_update for.
1928 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1929 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1930 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1931 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1932 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1936 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1937 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1938 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1939 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1940 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1941 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1945 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1946 if let Some(time) = time {
1947 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1949 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1950 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1951 // of this function.
1952 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1954 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1955 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1958 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1962 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1963 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1966 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1969 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1970 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1971 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1973 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1974 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1975 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1976 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1979 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1980 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1981 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1983 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1984 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1985 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1986 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1989 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1991 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1993 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1994 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1995 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1996 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1999 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
2000 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
2001 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
2003 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
2005 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
2006 return Err(LightningError {
2007 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
2008 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
2012 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
2014 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
2015 // disable this check during tests!
2016 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2017 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
2018 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2020 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
2021 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2025 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
2027 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
2028 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
2030 core::mem::drop(channels);
2031 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
2032 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2035 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2036 return Err(LightningError{err:
2037 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
2038 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2041 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
2042 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
2043 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
2044 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
2045 return Err(LightningError{err:
2046 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
2047 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2050 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
2051 ($target: expr) => {
2052 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
2053 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
2054 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
2055 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
2056 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
2057 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
2058 // but only in the non-normative section.
2059 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
2060 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2061 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
2062 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2068 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
2070 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
2071 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
2073 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2074 enabled: chan_enabled,
2075 last_update: msg.timestamp,
2076 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
2077 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2078 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2080 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2081 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2085 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2089 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2090 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2091 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2092 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2093 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2094 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2095 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2096 })?, "channel_update");
2099 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2102 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2103 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2104 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2105 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2106 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2107 })?, "channel_update");
2110 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2119 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2120 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2121 ($node_id: expr) => {
2122 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2123 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2124 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2126 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2127 self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().push(entry.get().node_counter);
2128 entry.remove_entry();
2131 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2136 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2137 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2141 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2142 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2144 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2145 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2149 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2150 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2151 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2154 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2155 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2156 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2157 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2160 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2162 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2163 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2167 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2168 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2169 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2172 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2173 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2174 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2175 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2178 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2179 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2180 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2181 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2182 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2183 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2186 /// Gets the maximum possible node_counter for a node in this graph
2187 pub(crate) fn max_node_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2188 self.max_node_counter
2193 pub(crate) mod tests {
2194 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2195 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2196 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2197 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2198 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2199 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2200 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2201 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2202 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2203 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2204 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2205 use crate::util::test_utils;
2206 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2207 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2209 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2210 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2212 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2213 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2214 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2215 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2216 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2217 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2218 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2219 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2220 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2223 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2224 use crate::prelude::*;
2225 use crate::sync::Arc;
2227 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2228 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2229 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2232 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2233 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2234 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2236 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2237 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2238 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2239 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2243 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2244 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2245 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2246 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2247 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2249 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2250 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2251 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2252 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2253 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2254 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2257 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2258 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2259 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2260 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2264 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2265 addresses: Vec::new(),
2266 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2267 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2269 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2270 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2272 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2273 contents: unsigned_announcement
2277 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2278 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2279 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2280 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2281 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2283 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2284 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2285 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2286 short_channel_id: 0,
2287 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2288 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2289 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2290 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2291 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2293 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2294 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2295 ChannelAnnouncement {
2296 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2297 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2298 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2299 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2300 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2304 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2305 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2306 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2307 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2308 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2311 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2312 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2313 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2314 short_channel_id: 0,
2317 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2318 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2319 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2320 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2321 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2322 excess_data: Vec::new()
2324 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2325 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2327 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2328 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2333 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2334 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2335 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2337 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2338 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2339 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2341 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2342 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2344 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2348 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2349 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2350 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2351 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2356 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2357 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2361 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2362 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2364 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2365 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2368 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2371 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2372 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2373 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2374 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2375 // Return false because contains excess data.
2376 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2377 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2381 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2382 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2383 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2384 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2385 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2386 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2388 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2393 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2394 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2395 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2397 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2398 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2400 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2401 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2403 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2404 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2405 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2406 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2407 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2412 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2418 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2419 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2420 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2422 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2425 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2426 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2427 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2428 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2429 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2431 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2432 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2433 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2434 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2436 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2439 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2440 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2441 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2442 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2443 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2444 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2445 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2446 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2451 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2457 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2458 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2459 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2460 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2461 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2463 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2466 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2468 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2470 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2471 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2472 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2474 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2475 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2476 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2477 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2478 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2480 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2483 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2485 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2486 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2487 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2492 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2493 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2494 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2495 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2496 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2497 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2498 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2502 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2503 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2504 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2506 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2509 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2510 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2512 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2515 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2516 // announcement is mainnet).
2517 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2518 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2519 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2520 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2522 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2527 fn handling_channel_update() {
2528 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2529 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2530 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2531 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2532 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2534 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2535 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2537 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2538 let short_channel_id;
2541 // Announce a channel we will update
2542 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2543 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2544 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2546 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2547 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2548 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2555 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2556 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2557 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2558 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2563 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2565 Some(channel_info) => {
2566 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2567 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2572 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2573 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2574 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2575 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2576 // Return false because contains excess data
2577 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2578 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2582 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2583 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2584 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2585 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2586 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2588 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2591 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2592 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2593 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2594 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2595 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2597 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2600 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2601 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2602 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2603 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2604 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2606 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2609 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2610 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2611 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2612 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2613 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2614 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2616 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2619 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2620 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2621 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2622 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2623 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2624 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2625 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2627 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2630 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2631 // update is mainet).
2632 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2633 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2634 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2636 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2638 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2643 fn handling_network_update() {
2644 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2645 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2648 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2649 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2650 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2653 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2654 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2657 let short_channel_id;
2659 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2660 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2661 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2662 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2663 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2664 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2665 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2667 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2668 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2670 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2671 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2674 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2675 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2678 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2680 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2682 Some(channel_info) => {
2683 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2687 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2689 is_permanent: false,
2692 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2694 Some(channel_info) => {
2695 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2700 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2701 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2706 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2707 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2708 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2711 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2712 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2714 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2715 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2716 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2717 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2718 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2719 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2721 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2722 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2724 is_permanent: false,
2727 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2728 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2730 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2731 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2736 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2737 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2738 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2743 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2744 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2745 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2746 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2747 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2748 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2749 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2751 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2752 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2754 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2755 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2756 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2757 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2758 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2760 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2761 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2762 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2763 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2765 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2766 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2767 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2769 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2770 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2771 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2773 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2774 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2775 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2776 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2778 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2779 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2781 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2783 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2784 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2785 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2786 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2787 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2789 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2790 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2791 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2792 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2793 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2794 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2795 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2796 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2797 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2798 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2799 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2800 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2801 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2802 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2803 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2804 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2805 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2808 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2809 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2810 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2812 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2814 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2816 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2818 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2819 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2820 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2822 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2823 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2824 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2825 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2827 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2828 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2829 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2831 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2832 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2833 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2834 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2836 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2837 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2838 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2839 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2840 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2843 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2845 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2846 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2847 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2849 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2851 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2852 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2853 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2855 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2856 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2857 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2858 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2860 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2861 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2862 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2864 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2865 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2866 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2868 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2869 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2870 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2871 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2872 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2877 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2878 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2879 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2880 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2881 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2883 // Channels were not announced yet.
2884 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2885 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2887 let short_channel_id;
2889 // Announce a channel we will update
2890 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2891 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2892 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2898 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2899 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2900 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2901 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2902 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2903 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2909 // Valid channel update
2910 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2911 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2912 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2913 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2919 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2920 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2921 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2922 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2923 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2924 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2930 // Channel update with excess data.
2931 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2932 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2933 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2934 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2935 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2941 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2942 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2943 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2944 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2945 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2946 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2951 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2952 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2953 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2957 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2958 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2959 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2960 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2961 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2962 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2965 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2966 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2969 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2970 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2971 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2977 // Nodes were never announced
2978 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2979 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2982 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2983 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2988 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2989 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2995 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2996 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2998 // Skip the first node.
2999 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3000 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3003 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
3004 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3005 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
3006 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
3007 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3008 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3009 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
3014 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3015 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3019 fn network_graph_serialization() {
3020 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3021 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3023 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3024 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3026 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
3027 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3028 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3029 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
3033 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3034 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3039 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3040 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
3041 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
3042 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3044 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3045 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
3049 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
3050 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3051 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
3053 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3054 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3056 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3057 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
3058 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
3059 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
3063 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
3064 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
3065 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
3066 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
3068 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3069 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3070 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3071 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
3073 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3075 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
3077 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3078 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3079 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3080 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3083 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3085 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3086 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3087 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3088 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3089 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3092 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3093 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3094 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3095 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3096 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3097 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3098 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3100 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3106 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3107 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3108 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3110 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3111 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3112 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3113 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3115 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3116 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3117 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3120 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3121 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3122 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3125 // used for testing resumption on same block
3126 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3129 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3130 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3131 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3132 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3138 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3139 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3143 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3145 number_of_blocks: 0,
3148 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3149 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3151 number_of_blocks: 0,
3152 sync_complete: true,
3153 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3157 // Error when wrong chain
3158 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3162 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3164 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3167 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3168 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3170 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3171 sync_complete: true,
3172 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3176 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3177 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3181 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3182 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3183 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3186 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3187 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3188 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3189 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3190 sync_complete: true,
3191 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3195 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3196 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3200 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3201 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3202 number_of_blocks: 1,
3207 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3208 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3209 number_of_blocks: 1,
3210 sync_complete: true,
3211 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3216 // No results in valid query range
3217 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3221 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3222 first_blocknum: 1000,
3223 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3228 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3229 first_blocknum: 1000,
3230 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3231 sync_complete: true,
3232 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3237 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3238 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3242 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3243 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3244 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3249 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3250 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3251 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3252 sync_complete: true,
3253 short_channel_ids: vec![
3254 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3260 // Single block exactly full
3261 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3265 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3266 first_blocknum: 100000,
3267 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3272 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3273 first_blocknum: 100000,
3274 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3275 sync_complete: true,
3276 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3277 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3283 // Multiple split on new block
3284 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3288 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3289 first_blocknum: 100000,
3290 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3295 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3296 first_blocknum: 100000,
3297 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3298 sync_complete: false,
3299 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3300 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3304 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3305 first_blocknum: 107999,
3306 number_of_blocks: 2,
3307 sync_complete: true,
3308 short_channel_ids: vec![
3309 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3315 // Multiple split on same block
3316 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3320 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3321 first_blocknum: 100002,
3322 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3327 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3328 first_blocknum: 100002,
3329 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3330 sync_complete: false,
3331 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3332 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3336 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3337 first_blocknum: 108001,
3338 number_of_blocks: 1,
3339 sync_complete: true,
3340 short_channel_ids: vec![
3341 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3348 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3349 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3350 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3351 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3353 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3355 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3356 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3357 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3358 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3361 assert!(result.is_ok());
3363 assert!(result.is_err());
3366 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3367 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3369 for i in 0..events.len() {
3370 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3372 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3373 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3374 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3375 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3376 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3377 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3378 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3380 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3381 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3382 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3383 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3384 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3386 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3387 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3388 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3391 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3397 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3398 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3399 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3400 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3401 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3403 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3405 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3407 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3409 assert!(result.is_err());
3413 fn displays_node_alias() {
3414 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3415 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3416 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3417 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3420 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3421 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3422 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3424 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3425 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3426 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3427 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3430 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3431 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3432 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3436 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3437 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3438 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3439 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3440 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3441 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3443 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3444 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3447 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3448 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3449 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3450 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3451 last_update_message: None,
3454 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3455 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3457 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3458 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3459 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3461 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3462 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3463 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3465 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3466 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3467 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3468 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3469 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3471 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3472 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3473 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3475 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3476 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3477 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3478 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3479 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3481 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3483 capacity_sats: None,
3484 announcement_message: None,
3485 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3486 node_one_counter: 0,
3487 node_two_counter: 1,
3490 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3491 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3493 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3494 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3496 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3497 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3498 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3499 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3500 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3501 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3502 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3503 capacity_sats: None,
3504 announcement_message: None,
3505 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3506 node_one_counter: 0,
3507 node_two_counter: 1,
3510 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3511 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3513 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3514 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3516 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3517 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3518 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3520 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3521 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3522 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3523 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3524 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3525 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3526 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3528 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3529 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3530 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3531 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3532 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3536 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3537 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3538 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3539 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3540 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3541 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3544 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3545 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3548 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3549 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3550 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3551 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3552 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3554 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3555 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3556 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3558 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3559 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3560 channels: Vec::new(),
3561 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3565 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3566 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3567 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3568 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3570 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3571 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3572 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3576 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3577 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3578 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3579 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3580 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3581 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3585 fn test_node_id_display() {
3586 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3587 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3595 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3597 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3598 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3599 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3600 let mut v = Vec::new();
3601 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3602 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3603 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3607 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3608 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3609 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3610 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3611 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3612 black_box(&net_graph).encode()