1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use crate::chain::Access;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
37 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use crate::prelude::*;
39 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
41 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
82 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
83 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
84 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
87 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
88 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
89 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
93 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
94 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
101 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
102 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
103 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
107 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
108 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
109 Some(self.cmp(other))
113 impl Ord for NodeId {
114 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
115 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
119 impl Writeable for NodeId {
120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
121 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
126 impl Readable for NodeId {
127 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
128 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
129 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
134 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
135 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
136 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
137 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
138 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
140 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
141 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
142 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
143 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
145 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
146 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
147 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
148 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
149 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
150 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
151 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
154 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
155 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
156 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
157 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
159 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
160 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
161 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
164 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
165 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
166 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
167 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
170 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
171 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
173 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
175 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
176 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
177 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
178 ChannelUpdateMessage {
179 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
182 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
183 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
185 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
186 short_channel_id: u64,
187 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
188 /// `channel_update` message is received.
191 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
192 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
194 /// The node id of the failed node.
196 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
197 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
202 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
203 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
206 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
207 (0, short_channel_id, required),
208 (2, is_permanent, required),
210 (4, NodeFailure) => {
211 (0, node_id, required),
212 (2, is_permanent, required),
216 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
217 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
218 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
219 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
220 /// serving historical announcements.
221 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
222 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
225 chain_access: Option<C>,
226 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
227 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
228 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
232 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
233 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
235 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
236 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
237 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
238 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
239 /// channel owners' keys.
240 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
243 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
244 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
246 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
251 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
252 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
253 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
254 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
255 self.chain_access = chain_access;
258 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
259 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
261 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
262 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
267 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
268 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
269 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
270 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
271 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
272 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
280 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
281 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
283 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
284 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
285 match *network_update {
286 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
287 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
288 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
289 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
291 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
293 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
294 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
295 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
296 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
298 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
300 log_debug!(self.logger,
301 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
302 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
309 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
310 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
311 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
314 return Err(LightningError {
315 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
316 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
317 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
319 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
321 log_level: Level::Trace,
329 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
330 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
332 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
335 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
336 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
339 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
340 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
341 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
342 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
345 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
346 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
347 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
350 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
351 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
352 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
353 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
354 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
355 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
356 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
357 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
358 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
360 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
361 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
363 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
365 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
366 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
372 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
373 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
374 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
375 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
379 for (_, ref node) in iter {
380 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
381 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
399 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
400 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
401 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
402 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
406 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
408 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
409 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
410 // updates from all our peers normally.
412 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
413 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
414 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
417 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
418 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
419 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
420 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
421 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
423 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
424 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
425 // relying on it useless.
427 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
428 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
429 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
431 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
432 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
433 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
434 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
435 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
438 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
439 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
440 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
441 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
442 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
443 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
444 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
446 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
447 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
448 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
449 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
451 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
452 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
453 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
455 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
456 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
457 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
458 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
460 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
461 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
462 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
464 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
468 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
469 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
470 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
471 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
472 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
473 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
474 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
480 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
481 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
482 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
483 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
487 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
488 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
489 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
490 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
494 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
495 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
496 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
497 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
498 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
499 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
500 /// memory constrained systems.
501 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
502 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
504 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
506 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
507 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
508 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
510 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
511 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
512 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
513 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
514 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
515 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
516 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
517 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
518 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
520 short_channel_ids: vec![],
523 return Err(LightningError {
524 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
525 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
529 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
530 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
531 // exists even if its not yet routable.
532 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
533 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
534 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
535 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
536 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
537 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
538 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
541 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
542 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
547 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
548 let batch_count = batches.len();
549 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
550 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
551 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
552 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
554 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
555 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
556 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
557 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
558 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
559 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
560 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
562 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
563 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
564 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
566 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
567 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
568 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
570 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
571 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
572 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
573 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
575 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
576 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
578 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
581 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
583 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
584 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
585 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
586 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
590 short_channel_ids: batch,
598 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
601 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
602 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
606 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
607 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
608 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
612 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
613 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
614 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
619 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
621 C::Target: chain::Access,
624 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
625 let mut ret = Vec::new();
626 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
627 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
632 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
633 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
634 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
635 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
636 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
637 pub last_update: u32,
638 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
640 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
641 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
642 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
643 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
644 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
645 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
646 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
647 pub fees: RoutingFees,
648 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
649 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
650 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
651 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
652 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
655 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
656 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
657 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
662 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
663 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
664 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
665 (0, self.last_update, required),
666 (2, self.enabled, required),
667 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
668 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
669 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
670 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
671 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
672 (10, self.fees, required),
673 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
679 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
680 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
681 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
682 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
683 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
684 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
685 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
686 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
687 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
689 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
690 (0, last_update, required),
691 (2, enabled, required),
692 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
693 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
694 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
695 (10, fees, required),
696 (12, last_update_message, required)
699 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
700 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
701 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
702 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
703 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
704 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
706 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
707 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
710 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
715 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
716 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
717 /// Received within a channel announcement.
718 pub struct ChannelInfo {
719 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
720 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
721 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
722 pub node_one: NodeId,
723 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
724 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
725 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
726 pub node_two: NodeId,
727 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
728 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
729 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
730 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
731 /// An initial announcement of the channel
732 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
733 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
734 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
735 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
736 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
737 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
738 /// network graph in memory!).
739 announcement_received_time: u64,
743 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
744 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
745 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
746 let (direction, source) = {
747 if target == &self.node_one {
748 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
749 } else if target == &self.node_two {
750 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
755 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
758 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
759 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
760 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
761 let (direction, target) = {
762 if source == &self.node_one {
763 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
764 } else if source == &self.node_two {
765 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
770 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
773 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
774 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
775 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
777 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
779 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
784 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
785 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
786 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
787 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
792 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
793 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
794 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
795 (0, self.features, required),
796 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
797 (2, self.node_one, required),
798 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
799 (6, self.node_two, required),
800 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
801 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
802 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
808 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
809 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
810 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
811 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
812 // channel updates via the gossip network.
813 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
815 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
816 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
817 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
818 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
819 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
820 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
821 Err(err) => Err(err),
826 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
827 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
828 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
829 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
830 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
831 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
832 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
833 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
834 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
835 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
836 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
837 (0, features, required),
838 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
839 (2, node_one, required),
840 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
841 (6, node_two, required),
842 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
843 (10, capacity_sats, required),
844 (12, announcement_message, required),
848 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
849 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
850 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
851 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
852 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
853 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
854 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
855 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
860 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
861 /// source node to a target node.
863 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
864 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
865 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
866 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
867 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
870 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
872 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
873 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
874 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
876 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
877 Some(capacity_msat) => {
878 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
879 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
881 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
885 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
889 /// Returns information for the channel.
891 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
893 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
895 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
896 self.htlc_maximum_msat
899 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
901 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
902 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
904 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
905 self.effective_capacity
908 /// Returns information for the direction.
910 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
913 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
914 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
915 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
916 .field("channel", &self.channel)
921 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
923 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
924 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
925 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
926 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
927 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
930 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
934 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
936 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
939 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
941 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
943 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
944 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
946 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
949 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
950 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
954 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
955 /// use when making routing decisions.
956 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
958 impl EffectiveCapacity {
959 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
960 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
962 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
963 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
964 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
965 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
966 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
971 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
972 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
973 pub struct RoutingFees {
974 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
976 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
977 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
978 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
981 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
982 (0, base_msat, required),
983 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
986 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
987 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
988 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
989 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
990 pub features: NodeFeatures,
991 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
992 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
993 pub last_update: u32,
994 /// Color assigned to the node
996 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
997 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
998 /// should not be exposed to the user.
999 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1000 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1001 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1002 /// An initial announcement of the node
1003 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1004 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1005 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1006 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1009 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1010 (0, features, required),
1011 (2, last_update, required),
1013 (6, alias, required),
1014 (8, announcement_message, option),
1015 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1018 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1020 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1021 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1022 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1023 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1025 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1026 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1027 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1028 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1029 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1030 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1032 use core::fmt::Write;
1033 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1034 // Display printable ASCII characters
1035 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1036 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1045 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1046 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1051 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1052 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1053 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1057 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1058 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1059 pub struct NodeInfo {
1060 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1061 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1062 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1063 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1064 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1065 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1066 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1067 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1068 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1069 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1072 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1073 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1074 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1075 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1080 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1081 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1082 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1083 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1084 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1085 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1091 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1092 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1093 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1094 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1095 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1097 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1098 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1099 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1100 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1102 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1109 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1110 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1111 _init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1112 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1113 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1115 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1116 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1117 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1118 (4, channels, vec_type),
1122 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1123 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1124 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1129 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1130 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1132 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1133 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1134 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1136 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1137 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1138 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1139 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1140 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1141 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1143 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1144 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1145 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1146 node_id.write(writer)?;
1147 node_info.write(writer)?;
1150 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1151 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1152 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1158 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1159 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1160 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1162 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1163 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1164 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1165 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1166 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1167 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1168 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1170 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1171 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1172 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1173 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1174 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1175 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1178 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1179 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1180 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1184 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1187 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1188 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1189 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1190 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1191 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1196 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1197 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1198 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1199 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1200 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1202 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1203 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1204 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1210 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1211 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1212 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1213 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1214 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1215 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1219 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1220 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1221 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1223 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1226 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1227 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1228 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1229 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1230 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1234 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1235 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1236 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1237 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1238 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1244 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1245 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1246 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1247 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1250 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1251 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1252 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1253 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1256 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1259 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1260 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1261 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1265 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1266 /// given node announcement.
1268 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1269 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1270 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1271 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1272 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1273 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1274 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1277 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1278 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1279 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1281 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1282 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1285 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1286 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1287 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1289 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1290 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1291 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1292 // that it be at least the current time.
1293 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1294 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1295 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1296 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1301 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1302 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1303 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1304 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1305 features: msg.features.clone(),
1306 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1308 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1309 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1310 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1318 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1320 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1321 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1322 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1324 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1325 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1326 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1327 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1328 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1330 C::Target: chain::Access,
1332 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1333 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1334 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1335 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1336 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1337 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1340 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1341 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1342 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1344 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1345 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1346 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1347 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1348 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1350 C::Target: chain::Access,
1352 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1355 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1357 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1358 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1360 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1361 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1362 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1363 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1366 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1367 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1368 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1370 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1372 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1374 capacity_sats: None,
1375 announcement_message: None,
1376 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1379 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1382 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1383 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1384 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1386 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1387 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1389 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1390 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1391 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1392 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1394 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1395 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1396 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1397 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1399 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1400 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1402 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1403 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1404 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1406 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1409 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1410 entry.insert(channel_info);
1414 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1415 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1416 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1417 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1419 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1420 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1421 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1422 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1423 announcement_info: None,
1432 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1433 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1434 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1436 C::Target: chain::Access,
1438 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1439 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1442 let node_one = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1);
1443 let node_two = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2);
1446 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1448 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1449 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1450 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1451 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1453 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1454 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1455 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1456 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1458 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1459 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1460 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1461 if node_one == chan.node_one && node_two == chan.node_two {
1462 return Err(LightningError {
1463 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1464 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1467 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1468 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1469 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1470 return Err(LightningError {
1471 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1472 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1479 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1480 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1481 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1482 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_one) ||
1483 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_two) {
1484 return Err(LightningError{
1485 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1486 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1490 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1492 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1495 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1496 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1497 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1498 let expected_script =
1499 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1500 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1501 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1503 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1504 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1507 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1508 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1510 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1511 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1517 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1518 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1519 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1521 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1524 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1525 features: msg.features.clone(),
1530 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1531 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1532 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1533 announcement_received_time,
1536 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1539 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1540 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1541 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1542 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1543 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1544 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1545 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1546 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1547 let current_time_unix = None;
1549 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1552 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1553 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1554 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1555 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1556 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1557 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1559 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1560 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1561 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1562 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1565 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1566 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1567 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1569 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1570 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1576 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1577 /// from local storage.
1578 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1579 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1580 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1581 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1582 let current_time_unix = None;
1584 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1585 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1586 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1587 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1588 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1590 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1591 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1592 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1593 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1594 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1595 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1598 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1599 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1602 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1605 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1609 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1610 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1611 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1614 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1615 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1616 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1618 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1619 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1621 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1622 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1624 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1625 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1626 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1627 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1628 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1631 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1632 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1635 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1636 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1637 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1639 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1640 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1642 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1643 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1644 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1645 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1646 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1647 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1648 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1649 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1650 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1652 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1653 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1654 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1655 info.one_to_two = None;
1657 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1658 info.two_to_one = None;
1660 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1661 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1662 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1663 // channel_update for.
1664 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1665 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1669 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1670 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1671 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1672 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1673 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1674 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1678 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1679 if let Some(time) = time {
1680 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1682 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1683 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1684 // of this function.
1685 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1687 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1688 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1691 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1695 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1696 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1699 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1702 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1703 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1704 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1706 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1707 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1708 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1709 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1712 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1713 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1714 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1716 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1717 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1718 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1719 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1722 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1724 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1725 let chan_was_enabled;
1727 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1729 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1730 // disable this check during tests!
1731 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1732 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1733 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1735 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1736 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1740 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1741 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1742 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1744 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1745 return Err(LightningError{err:
1746 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1747 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1750 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1751 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1752 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1753 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1754 return Err(LightningError{err:
1755 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1756 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1759 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1760 ($target: expr) => {
1761 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1762 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1763 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1764 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1765 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1766 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1767 // but only in the non-normative section.
1768 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1769 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1770 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1771 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1773 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1775 chan_was_enabled = false;
1780 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1782 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1783 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1785 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1786 enabled: chan_enabled,
1787 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1788 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1789 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1790 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1792 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1793 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1797 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1801 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1802 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1803 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1804 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1805 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1806 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1807 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1808 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1809 })?, "channel_update");
1811 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1813 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1814 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1815 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1816 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1817 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1818 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1819 })?, "channel_update");
1821 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1826 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1828 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1829 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1830 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1831 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1832 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1833 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1835 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1837 proportional_millionths
1839 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1840 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1841 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1843 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1844 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1846 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1847 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1849 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1851 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1852 if chan_info.enabled {
1853 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1854 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1855 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1856 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1861 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1867 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1868 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1869 ($node_id: expr) => {
1870 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1871 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1872 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1874 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1875 entry.remove_entry();
1878 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1883 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1884 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1888 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1889 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1891 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1892 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1896 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1897 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1898 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1901 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1902 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1903 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1904 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1907 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1909 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1910 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1914 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1915 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1916 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1919 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1920 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1921 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1922 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1925 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1926 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1927 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1928 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1929 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1930 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1931 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1941 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1942 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1943 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1944 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1945 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1946 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1947 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1948 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1949 use crate::util::test_utils;
1950 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1951 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1952 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1954 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1955 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1957 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1958 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1959 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1960 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1961 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1962 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1966 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1967 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1970 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1971 use crate::prelude::*;
1972 use crate::sync::Arc;
1974 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1975 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1976 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1977 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1980 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1981 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1982 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1984 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1985 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1986 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1987 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1991 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1992 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1993 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1994 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1995 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1997 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1998 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1999 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2000 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2001 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2002 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2005 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2006 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
2007 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2008 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2013 addresses: Vec::new(),
2014 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2015 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2017 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2018 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2020 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2021 contents: unsigned_announcement
2025 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2026 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2027 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2028 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2029 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2031 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2032 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2033 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2034 short_channel_id: 0,
2037 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
2038 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
2039 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2041 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2042 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2043 ChannelAnnouncement {
2044 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2045 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2046 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2047 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2048 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2052 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2053 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2054 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2055 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2056 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2059 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2060 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2061 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2062 short_channel_id: 0,
2065 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2066 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2067 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2068 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2069 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2070 excess_data: Vec::new()
2072 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2073 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2075 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2076 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2081 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2082 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2083 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2085 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2086 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2087 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2089 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2090 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2092 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2096 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2097 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2098 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2099 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2104 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2105 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2109 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2110 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2112 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2113 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2116 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2119 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2120 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2121 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2122 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2123 // Return false because contains excess data.
2124 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2125 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2129 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2130 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2131 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2132 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2133 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2134 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2136 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2141 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2142 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2143 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2145 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2146 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2148 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2149 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2151 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2152 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2153 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2154 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2155 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2156 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2161 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2167 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2168 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2169 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2171 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2174 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2175 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2176 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2177 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2178 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2180 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2181 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2182 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2183 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2185 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2188 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2189 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2190 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2191 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2192 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2193 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2194 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2199 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2205 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2206 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2207 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2208 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2210 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2213 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2215 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2217 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2218 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2219 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2221 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2222 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2223 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2224 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2225 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2227 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2230 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2232 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2233 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2234 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2239 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2240 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2241 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2242 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2243 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2244 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2245 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2249 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2250 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2251 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2253 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2256 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2257 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2259 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2264 fn handling_channel_update() {
2265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2266 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2267 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2268 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2269 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2270 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2272 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2273 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2275 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2276 let short_channel_id;
2279 // Announce a channel we will update
2280 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2281 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2283 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2284 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2285 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2292 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2293 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2294 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2299 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2301 Some(channel_info) => {
2302 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2303 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2308 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2309 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2310 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2311 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2312 // Return false because contains excess data
2313 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2314 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2318 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2319 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2320 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2321 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2322 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2324 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2327 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2328 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2329 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2330 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2331 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2333 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2336 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2337 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2338 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2339 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2340 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2342 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2345 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2346 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2347 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2348 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2349 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2350 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2352 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2355 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2356 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2357 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2358 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2359 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2360 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2361 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2363 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2368 fn handling_network_update() {
2369 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2370 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2371 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2374 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2375 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2376 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2379 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2380 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2383 let short_channel_id;
2385 // Announce a channel we will update
2386 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2387 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2388 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2389 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2390 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2392 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2393 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2395 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2396 msg: valid_channel_update,
2399 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2402 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2404 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2406 Some(channel_info) => {
2407 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2411 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2413 is_permanent: false,
2416 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2418 Some(channel_info) => {
2419 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2424 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2425 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2430 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2431 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2432 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2435 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2436 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2438 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2439 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2440 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2441 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2442 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2443 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2445 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2446 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2448 is_permanent: false,
2451 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2452 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2454 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2455 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2460 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2461 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2462 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2467 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2468 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2469 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2470 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2471 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2472 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2473 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2476 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2477 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2479 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2480 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2481 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2482 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2483 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2485 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2486 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2487 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2488 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2490 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2491 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2492 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2494 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2495 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2496 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2498 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2499 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2500 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2501 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2503 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2504 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2506 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2508 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2509 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2510 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2511 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2512 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2514 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2515 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2516 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2517 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2518 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2519 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2520 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2521 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2522 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2523 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2524 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2525 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2526 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2527 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2528 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2529 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2530 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2533 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2534 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2535 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2537 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2539 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2541 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2543 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2544 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2545 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2547 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2548 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2549 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2550 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2552 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2553 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2554 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2556 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2557 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2558 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2559 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2561 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2562 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2563 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2564 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2565 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2568 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2570 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2571 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2572 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2574 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2576 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2577 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2578 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2580 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2581 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2582 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2583 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2585 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2586 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2587 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2589 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2590 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2591 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2593 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2594 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2595 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2596 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2597 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2602 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2603 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2604 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2605 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2606 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2608 // Channels were not announced yet.
2609 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2610 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2612 let short_channel_id;
2614 // Announce a channel we will update
2615 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2616 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2617 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2623 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2624 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2625 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2626 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2627 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2628 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2634 // Valid channel update
2635 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2636 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2637 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2638 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2644 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2645 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2646 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2647 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2648 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2649 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2655 // Channel update with excess data.
2656 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2657 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2658 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2659 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2660 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2666 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2667 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2668 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2669 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2670 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2671 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2676 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2677 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2678 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2682 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2683 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2684 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2685 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2686 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2687 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2690 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2691 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2694 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2695 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2696 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2702 // Nodes were never announced
2703 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2704 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2707 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2708 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2713 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2714 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2720 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2721 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2723 // Skip the first node.
2724 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2725 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2728 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2729 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2730 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2731 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2732 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2733 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2734 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2739 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2740 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2744 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2745 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2746 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2748 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2749 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2751 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2752 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2753 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2754 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2758 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2759 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2764 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2765 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2766 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2767 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2769 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2770 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2774 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2775 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2776 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2778 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2779 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2781 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2782 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2783 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2784 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2788 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2789 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2790 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2791 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2793 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2794 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2795 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2796 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2798 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2800 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2802 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2803 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2804 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2808 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2810 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2811 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2812 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2813 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2814 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2815 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2817 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2818 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2819 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2820 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2821 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2822 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2823 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2825 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2831 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2832 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2833 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2835 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2836 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2837 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2838 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2840 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2841 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2842 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2845 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2846 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2847 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2850 // used for testing resumption on same block
2851 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2854 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2855 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2856 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2857 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2863 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2864 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2868 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2870 number_of_blocks: 0,
2873 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2874 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2876 number_of_blocks: 0,
2877 sync_complete: true,
2878 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2882 // Error when wrong chain
2883 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2887 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2889 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2892 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2893 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2895 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2896 sync_complete: true,
2897 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2901 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2902 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2906 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2907 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2908 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2911 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2912 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2913 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2914 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2915 sync_complete: true,
2916 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2920 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2921 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2925 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2926 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2927 number_of_blocks: 1,
2932 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2933 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2934 number_of_blocks: 1,
2935 sync_complete: true,
2936 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2941 // No results in valid query range
2942 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2946 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2947 first_blocknum: 1000,
2948 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2953 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2954 first_blocknum: 1000,
2955 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2956 sync_complete: true,
2957 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2962 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2963 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2967 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2968 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2969 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2974 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2975 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2976 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2977 sync_complete: true,
2978 short_channel_ids: vec![
2979 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2985 // Single block exactly full
2986 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2990 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2991 first_blocknum: 100000,
2992 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2997 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2998 first_blocknum: 100000,
2999 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3000 sync_complete: true,
3001 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3002 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3008 // Multiple split on new block
3009 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3013 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3014 first_blocknum: 100000,
3015 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3020 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3021 first_blocknum: 100000,
3022 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3023 sync_complete: false,
3024 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3025 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3029 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3030 first_blocknum: 107999,
3031 number_of_blocks: 2,
3032 sync_complete: true,
3033 short_channel_ids: vec![
3034 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3040 // Multiple split on same block
3041 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3045 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3046 first_blocknum: 100002,
3047 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3052 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3053 first_blocknum: 100002,
3054 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3055 sync_complete: false,
3056 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3057 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3061 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3062 first_blocknum: 108001,
3063 number_of_blocks: 1,
3064 sync_complete: true,
3065 short_channel_ids: vec![
3066 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3073 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3074 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3075 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3076 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3078 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3080 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3081 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3082 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3083 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3086 assert!(result.is_ok());
3088 assert!(result.is_err());
3091 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3092 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3094 for i in 0..events.len() {
3095 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3097 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3098 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3099 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3100 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3101 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3102 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3103 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3105 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3106 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3107 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3108 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3109 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3111 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3112 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3113 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3116 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3122 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3123 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3124 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3125 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3126 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3128 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3130 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3132 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3134 assert!(result.is_err());
3138 fn displays_node_alias() {
3139 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3140 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3141 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3142 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3145 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3146 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3147 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3149 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3150 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3151 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3152 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3155 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3156 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3157 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3161 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3162 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3163 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3164 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3165 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3166 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3168 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3169 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3172 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3173 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3174 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3175 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3176 last_update_message: None,
3179 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3180 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3182 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3183 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3184 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3186 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3187 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3188 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3190 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3191 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3192 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3193 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3194 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3196 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3197 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3198 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3200 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3201 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3202 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3203 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3204 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3206 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3208 capacity_sats: None,
3209 announcement_message: None,
3210 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3213 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3214 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3216 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3217 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3219 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3220 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3221 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3222 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3223 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3224 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3225 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3226 capacity_sats: None,
3227 announcement_message: None,
3228 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3231 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3232 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3234 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3235 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3237 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3238 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3239 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3241 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3242 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3243 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3244 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3245 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3246 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3247 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3249 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3250 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3251 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3252 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3253 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3257 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3258 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3260 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3261 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3262 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3263 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3266 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3267 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3268 announcement_message: None,
3271 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3272 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3273 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3274 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3276 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3277 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3278 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3280 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3281 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3282 channels: Vec::new(),
3283 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3284 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3287 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3288 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3289 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3290 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3292 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3293 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3294 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3298 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3306 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3307 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3308 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3309 let mut v = Vec::new();
3310 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3312 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3317 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3318 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3319 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3320 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3322 let _ = net_graph.encode();