1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use crate::chain::Access;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
37 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
42 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use crate::sync::Mutex;
44 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
47 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
48 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
50 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
52 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
54 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
55 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
57 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
58 /// refuse to relay the message.
59 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
61 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
62 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
63 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
65 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
67 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
70 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
71 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
72 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
75 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
76 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
81 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
82 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
83 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
87 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
88 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
95 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
96 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
97 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
101 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
102 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 Some(self.cmp(other))
107 impl Ord for NodeId {
108 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
109 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
113 impl Writeable for NodeId {
114 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
115 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
120 impl Readable for NodeId {
121 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
122 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
123 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
128 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
129 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
130 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
131 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
132 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
134 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
135 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
136 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
137 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
139 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
140 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
141 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
142 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
143 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
144 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
145 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
148 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
149 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
150 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
151 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
152 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
153 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
154 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
155 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
159 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
160 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
161 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
164 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
165 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
167 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
168 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
170 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
171 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
172 ChannelUpdateMessage {
173 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
176 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
177 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
179 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
180 short_channel_id: u64,
181 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
182 /// `channel_update` message is received.
185 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
186 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
188 /// The node id of the failed node.
190 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
191 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
196 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
197 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
200 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
201 (0, short_channel_id, required),
202 (2, is_permanent, required),
204 (4, NodeFailure) => {
205 (0, node_id, required),
206 (2, is_permanent, required),
210 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
211 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
212 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
213 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
214 /// serving historical announcements.
216 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
217 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
218 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
219 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
222 chain_access: Option<C>,
223 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
224 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
225 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
229 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
230 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
232 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
233 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
234 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
235 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
236 /// channel owners' keys.
237 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
241 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
243 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
248 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
249 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
250 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
251 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
252 self.chain_access = chain_access;
255 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
256 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
258 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
259 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
263 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
264 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
265 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
266 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
267 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
268 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
269 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
277 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
278 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
279 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
280 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
281 match *network_update {
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
283 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
284 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
285 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
286 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
287 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
289 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
290 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
291 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
292 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
294 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
296 log_debug!(self.logger,
297 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
298 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
307 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
308 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
309 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
312 return Err(LightningError {
313 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
314 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
315 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
317 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
319 log_level: Level::Trace,
327 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
328 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
330 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
331 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
332 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
333 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
334 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
338 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
339 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
340 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
343 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
344 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
345 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
348 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
349 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
350 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
351 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
352 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
353 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
354 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
355 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
356 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
358 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
359 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
361 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
363 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
364 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
370 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
371 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
372 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
373 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
377 for (_, ref node) in iter {
378 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
379 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
387 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
388 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
389 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
391 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
392 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
393 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
394 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
395 /// tracking this directly.
396 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
397 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
398 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
399 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
400 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
404 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
406 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
407 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
408 // updates from all our peers normally.
410 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
411 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
412 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
415 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
416 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
417 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
418 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
419 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
421 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
422 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
423 // relying on it useless.
425 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
426 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
427 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
429 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
430 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
431 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
432 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
433 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
436 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
437 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
438 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
439 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
440 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
441 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
442 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
444 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
445 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
446 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
447 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
449 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
450 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
451 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
453 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
454 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
455 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
456 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
458 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
459 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
460 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
462 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
467 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
468 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
469 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
470 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
471 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
472 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
478 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
479 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
480 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
481 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
485 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
486 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
487 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
488 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
492 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
493 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
494 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
495 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
496 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
497 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
498 /// memory constrained systems.
499 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
500 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
502 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
504 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
505 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
506 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
508 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
509 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
510 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
511 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
512 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
513 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
514 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
515 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
516 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
518 short_channel_ids: vec![],
521 return Err(LightningError {
522 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
523 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
527 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
528 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
529 // exists even if its not yet routable.
530 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
531 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
532 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
533 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
534 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
535 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
536 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
539 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
540 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
545 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
546 let batch_count = batches.len();
547 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
548 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
549 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
550 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
552 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
553 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
554 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
555 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
556 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
557 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
558 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
560 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
561 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
562 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
564 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
565 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
566 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
568 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
569 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
570 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
571 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
573 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
574 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
576 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
579 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
581 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
582 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
583 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
584 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
588 short_channel_ids: batch,
596 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
599 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
600 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
604 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
605 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
606 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
610 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
611 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
612 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
617 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
619 C::Target: chain::Access,
622 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
623 let mut ret = Vec::new();
624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
625 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
630 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
631 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
632 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
633 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
634 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
635 pub last_update: u32,
636 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
638 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
639 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
640 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
641 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
642 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
643 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
644 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
645 pub fees: RoutingFees,
646 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
647 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
648 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
649 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
650 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
653 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
654 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
655 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
660 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
661 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
662 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
663 (0, self.last_update, required),
664 (2, self.enabled, required),
665 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
666 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
667 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
668 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
669 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
670 (10, self.fees, required),
671 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
677 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
678 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
679 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
680 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
681 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
682 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
683 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
684 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
685 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
687 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
688 (0, last_update, required),
689 (2, enabled, required),
690 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
691 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
692 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
693 (10, fees, required),
694 (12, last_update_message, required)
697 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
698 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
699 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
700 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
701 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
702 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
704 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
705 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
708 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
713 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
714 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
715 /// Received within a channel announcement.
716 pub struct ChannelInfo {
717 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
718 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
719 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
720 pub node_one: NodeId,
721 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
722 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
723 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
724 pub node_two: NodeId,
725 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
726 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
727 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
728 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
729 /// An initial announcement of the channel
730 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
731 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
732 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
733 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
734 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
735 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
736 /// network graph in memory!).
737 announcement_received_time: u64,
741 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
742 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
743 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
744 let (direction, source) = {
745 if target == &self.node_one {
746 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
747 } else if target == &self.node_two {
748 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
753 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
756 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
757 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
758 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
759 let (direction, target) = {
760 if source == &self.node_one {
761 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
762 } else if source == &self.node_two {
763 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
768 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
771 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
772 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
773 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
775 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
777 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
782 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
783 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
784 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
785 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
790 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
791 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
792 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
793 (0, self.features, required),
794 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
795 (2, self.node_one, required),
796 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
797 (6, self.node_two, required),
798 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
799 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
800 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
806 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
807 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
808 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
809 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
810 // channel updates via the gossip network.
811 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
813 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
814 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
815 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
816 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
817 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
818 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
819 Err(err) => Err(err),
824 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
825 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
826 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
827 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
828 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
829 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
830 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
831 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
832 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
833 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
834 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
835 (0, features, required),
836 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
837 (2, node_one, required),
838 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
839 (6, node_two, required),
840 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
841 (10, capacity_sats, required),
842 (12, announcement_message, required),
846 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
847 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
848 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
849 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
850 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
851 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
852 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
853 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
858 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
859 /// source node to a target node.
861 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
862 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
863 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
864 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
865 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
868 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
870 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
871 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
872 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
874 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
875 Some(capacity_msat) => {
876 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
877 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) }
879 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
883 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
887 /// Returns information for the channel.
889 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
891 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
893 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
894 self.htlc_maximum_msat
897 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
899 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
900 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
902 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
903 self.effective_capacity
906 /// Returns information for the direction.
908 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
911 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
912 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
913 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
914 .field("channel", &self.channel)
919 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
921 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
922 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
923 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
924 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
925 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
928 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
932 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
934 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
937 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
939 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
941 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
942 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
944 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
947 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
948 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
952 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
953 /// use when making routing decisions.
954 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
956 impl EffectiveCapacity {
957 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
958 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
960 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
961 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
962 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
963 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
964 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
969 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
970 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
971 pub struct RoutingFees {
972 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
974 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
975 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
976 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
979 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
980 (0, base_msat, required),
981 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
984 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
985 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
986 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
987 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
988 pub features: NodeFeatures,
989 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
990 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
991 pub last_update: u32,
992 /// Color assigned to the node
994 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
995 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
996 /// should not be exposed to the user.
997 pub alias: NodeAlias,
998 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
999 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1000 /// An initial announcement of the node
1001 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1002 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1003 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1004 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1007 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1008 (0, features, required),
1009 (2, last_update, required),
1011 (6, alias, required),
1012 (8, announcement_message, option),
1013 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1016 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1018 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1019 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1020 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1021 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1023 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1024 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1025 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1026 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1027 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1028 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1030 for c in alias.chars() {
1031 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1032 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1033 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1037 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1038 // Display printable ASCII characters
1039 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1040 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1041 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1049 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1050 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1055 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1056 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1057 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1061 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1062 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1063 pub struct NodeInfo {
1064 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1065 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1066 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1067 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1068 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1069 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1070 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1071 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1072 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1073 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1076 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1077 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1078 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1079 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1084 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1085 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1086 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1087 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1088 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1089 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1095 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1096 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1097 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1098 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1099 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1101 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1102 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1103 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1104 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1106 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1113 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1114 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1115 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1116 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1117 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1119 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1120 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1121 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1122 (4, channels, vec_type),
1126 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1127 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1128 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1133 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1134 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1136 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1137 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1138 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1140 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1141 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1142 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1143 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1144 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1145 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1147 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1148 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1149 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1150 node_id.write(writer)?;
1151 node_info.write(writer)?;
1154 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1155 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1156 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1162 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1163 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1164 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1166 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1167 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1168 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1169 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1170 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1171 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1172 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1174 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1175 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1176 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1177 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1178 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1179 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1182 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1183 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1184 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1188 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1191 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1192 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1193 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1194 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1195 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1200 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1201 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1202 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1203 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1204 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1206 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1207 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1208 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1214 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1215 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1216 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1217 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1218 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1219 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1223 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1224 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1225 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1227 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1230 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1231 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1232 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1233 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1234 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1238 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1239 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1240 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1241 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1242 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1248 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1249 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1250 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1251 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1254 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1255 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1256 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1257 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1260 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1263 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1264 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1265 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1269 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1270 /// given node announcement.
1272 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1273 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1274 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1275 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1276 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1277 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1278 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1281 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1282 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1283 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1285 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1286 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1289 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1290 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1291 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1293 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1294 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1295 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1296 // that it be at least the current time.
1297 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1298 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1299 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1300 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1305 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1306 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1307 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1308 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1309 features: msg.features.clone(),
1310 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1312 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1313 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1314 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1322 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1324 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1325 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1326 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1328 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1329 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1330 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1331 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1332 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1334 C::Target: chain::Access,
1336 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1337 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1338 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1339 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1340 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1341 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1344 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1345 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1346 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1348 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1349 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1350 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1351 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1352 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1354 C::Target: chain::Access,
1356 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1359 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1361 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1362 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1364 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1365 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1366 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1367 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1370 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1371 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1372 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1374 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1376 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1378 capacity_sats: None,
1379 announcement_message: None,
1380 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1383 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1386 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1387 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1388 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1390 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1391 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1393 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1394 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1395 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1396 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1398 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1399 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1400 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1401 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1403 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1404 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1406 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1407 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1408 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1410 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1413 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1414 entry.insert(channel_info);
1418 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1419 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1420 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1421 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1423 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1424 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1425 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1426 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1427 announcement_info: None,
1436 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1437 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1438 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1440 C::Target: chain::Access,
1442 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1443 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1446 let node_one = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1);
1447 let node_two = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2);
1450 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1452 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1453 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1454 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1455 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1457 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1458 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1459 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1460 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1462 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1463 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1464 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1465 if node_one == chan.node_one && node_two == chan.node_two {
1466 return Err(LightningError {
1467 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1468 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1471 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1472 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1473 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1474 return Err(LightningError {
1475 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1476 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1483 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1484 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1485 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1486 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_one) ||
1487 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_two) {
1488 return Err(LightningError{
1489 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1490 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1494 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1496 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1499 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1500 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1501 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1502 let expected_script =
1503 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1504 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1505 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1507 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1508 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1511 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1512 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1514 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1515 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1521 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1522 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1523 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1525 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1528 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1529 features: msg.features.clone(),
1534 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1535 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1536 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1537 announcement_received_time,
1540 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1543 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1544 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1545 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1546 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1547 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1548 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1549 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1550 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1551 let current_time_unix = None;
1553 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1555 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1556 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1557 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1558 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1561 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1562 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1563 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1565 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1566 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1572 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1573 /// from local storage.
1574 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1575 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1576 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1577 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1578 let current_time_unix = None;
1580 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1581 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1582 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1583 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1584 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1586 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1587 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1588 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1589 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1590 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1591 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1594 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1595 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1598 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1601 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1605 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1606 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1607 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1610 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1611 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1612 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1614 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1615 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1617 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1618 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1620 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1621 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1622 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1623 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1624 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1627 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1628 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1631 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1632 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1633 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1635 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1636 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1638 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1639 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1640 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1641 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1642 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1643 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1644 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1645 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1646 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1648 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1649 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1650 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1651 info.one_to_two = None;
1653 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1654 info.two_to_one = None;
1656 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1657 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1658 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1659 // channel_update for.
1660 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1661 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1665 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1666 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1667 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1668 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1669 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1673 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1674 if let Some(time) = time {
1675 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1677 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1678 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1679 // of this function.
1680 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1682 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1683 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1686 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1690 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1691 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1694 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1697 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1698 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1699 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1701 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1702 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1703 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1704 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1707 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1708 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1709 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1711 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1712 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1713 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1714 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1717 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1719 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1720 let chan_was_enabled;
1722 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1724 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1725 // disable this check during tests!
1726 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1727 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1728 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1730 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1731 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1735 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1736 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1737 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1739 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1740 return Err(LightningError{err:
1741 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1742 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1745 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1746 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1747 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1748 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1749 return Err(LightningError{err:
1750 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1751 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1754 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1755 ($target: expr) => {
1756 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1757 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1758 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1759 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1760 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1761 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1762 // but only in the non-normative section.
1763 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1764 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1765 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1766 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1768 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1770 chan_was_enabled = false;
1775 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1777 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1778 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1780 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1781 enabled: chan_enabled,
1782 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1783 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1784 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1785 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1787 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1788 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1792 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1796 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1797 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1798 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1799 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1800 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1801 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1802 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1803 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1804 })?, "channel_update");
1806 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1808 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1809 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1810 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1811 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1812 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1813 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1814 })?, "channel_update");
1816 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1821 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1823 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1824 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1825 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1826 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1827 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1828 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1830 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1832 proportional_millionths
1834 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1835 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1836 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1838 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1839 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1841 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1842 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1844 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1846 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1847 if chan_info.enabled {
1848 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1849 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1850 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1851 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1856 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1862 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1863 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1864 ($node_id: expr) => {
1865 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1866 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1867 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1869 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1870 entry.remove_entry();
1873 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1878 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1879 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1883 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1884 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1886 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1887 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1891 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1892 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1893 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1896 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1897 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1898 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1899 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1902 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1904 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1905 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1909 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1910 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1911 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1914 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1915 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1916 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1917 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1920 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1921 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1922 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1923 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1924 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1925 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1926 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1936 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1937 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1938 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
1939 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1940 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1941 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1942 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1943 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1944 use crate::util::test_utils;
1945 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1946 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1947 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1949 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1950 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1952 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1953 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1954 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1955 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1956 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1957 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1961 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1962 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1965 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1966 use crate::prelude::*;
1967 use crate::sync::Arc;
1969 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1970 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1971 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1972 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1975 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1976 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1977 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1980 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1981 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1982 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1986 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1987 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1988 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1989 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1990 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1992 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1993 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1994 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1995 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1996 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1997 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2000 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2001 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
2002 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2003 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
2008 addresses: Vec::new(),
2009 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2010 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2012 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2013 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2015 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2016 contents: unsigned_announcement
2020 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2021 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2022 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2023 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2024 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2026 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2027 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
2028 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2029 short_channel_id: 0,
2032 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
2033 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
2034 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2036 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2037 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2038 ChannelAnnouncement {
2039 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2040 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2041 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2042 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2043 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2047 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2048 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2049 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2050 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2051 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2054 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2055 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2056 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2057 short_channel_id: 0,
2060 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2061 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2062 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2063 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2064 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2065 excess_data: Vec::new()
2067 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2068 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2070 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2071 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2076 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2077 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2078 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2080 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2081 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2082 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2084 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2085 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2087 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2091 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2092 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2093 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2094 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2099 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2100 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2104 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2105 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2107 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2108 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2111 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2114 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2115 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2116 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2117 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2118 // Return false because contains excess data.
2119 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2120 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2124 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2125 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2126 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2127 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2128 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2129 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2131 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2136 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2137 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2138 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2140 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2141 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2143 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2144 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2146 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2147 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2148 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2149 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2150 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2151 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2156 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2162 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2163 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2164 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2166 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2169 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2170 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2171 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2172 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2173 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2175 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2176 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2177 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2178 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2180 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2183 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2184 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2185 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2186 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2187 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2188 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2189 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2194 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2200 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2201 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2202 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2203 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2205 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2208 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2210 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2212 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2213 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2214 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2216 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2217 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2218 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2219 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2220 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2222 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2225 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2227 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2228 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2229 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2234 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2235 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2236 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2237 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2238 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2239 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2240 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2244 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2245 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2246 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2248 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2251 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2252 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2254 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2259 fn handling_channel_update() {
2260 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2261 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2262 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2263 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2264 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2265 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2267 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2268 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2270 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2271 let short_channel_id;
2274 // Announce a channel we will update
2275 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2276 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2278 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2279 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2280 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2287 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2288 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2289 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2294 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2296 Some(channel_info) => {
2297 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2298 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2303 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2304 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2305 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2306 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2307 // Return false because contains excess data
2308 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2309 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2313 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2314 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2315 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2316 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2317 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2319 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2322 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2323 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2324 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2325 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2326 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2328 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2331 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2332 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2333 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2334 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2335 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2337 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2340 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2341 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2342 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2343 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2344 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2345 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2347 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2350 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2351 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2352 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2353 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2354 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2355 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2356 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2358 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2363 fn handling_network_update() {
2364 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2365 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2366 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2369 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2370 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2371 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2374 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2375 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2378 let short_channel_id;
2380 // Announce a channel we will update
2381 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2382 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2383 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2384 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2385 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2387 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2388 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2390 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2392 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2393 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2394 all_paths_failed: true,
2396 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2397 msg: valid_channel_update,
2399 short_channel_id: None,
2405 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2408 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2410 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2412 Some(channel_info) => {
2413 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2417 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2419 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2420 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2421 all_paths_failed: true,
2423 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2425 is_permanent: false,
2427 short_channel_id: None,
2433 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2435 Some(channel_info) => {
2436 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2441 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2442 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2444 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2445 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2446 all_paths_failed: true,
2448 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2452 short_channel_id: None,
2458 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2459 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2460 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2463 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2464 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2466 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2467 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2468 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2469 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2470 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2471 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2473 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2474 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2476 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2477 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2478 all_paths_failed: true,
2480 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2482 is_permanent: false,
2484 short_channel_id: None,
2490 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2491 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2493 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2494 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2496 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2497 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2498 all_paths_failed: true,
2500 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2504 short_channel_id: None,
2510 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2511 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2512 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2517 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2518 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2519 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2520 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2521 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2522 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2523 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2524 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2526 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2527 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2529 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2530 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2531 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2532 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2533 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2535 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2536 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2537 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2539 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2540 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2541 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2543 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2544 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2546 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2547 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2548 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2549 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2550 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2551 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2552 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2554 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2555 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2556 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2559 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2560 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2562 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2564 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2566 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2568 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2569 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2570 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2572 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2573 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2574 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2575 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2577 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2578 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2579 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2581 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2582 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2583 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2584 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2586 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2587 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2588 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2589 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2590 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2593 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2595 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2596 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2597 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2599 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2601 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2602 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2603 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2605 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2606 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2607 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2608 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2610 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2611 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2612 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2614 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2615 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2616 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2618 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2619 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2620 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2621 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2622 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2627 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2628 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2629 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2630 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2631 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2633 // Channels were not announced yet.
2634 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2635 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2637 let short_channel_id;
2639 // Announce a channel we will update
2640 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2641 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2642 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2648 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2649 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2650 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2651 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2652 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2653 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2659 // Valid channel update
2660 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2661 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2662 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2663 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2669 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2670 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2671 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2672 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2673 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2674 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2680 // Channel update with excess data.
2681 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2682 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2683 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2684 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2685 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2691 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2692 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2693 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2694 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2695 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2696 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2701 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2702 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2703 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2707 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2708 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2709 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2710 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2711 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2712 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2715 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2716 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2719 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2720 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2721 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2727 // Nodes were never announced
2728 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2729 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2732 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2733 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2738 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2739 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2745 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2746 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2748 // Skip the first node.
2749 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2750 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2753 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2754 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2755 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2756 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2757 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2758 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2759 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2764 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2765 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2769 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2770 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2771 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2773 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2774 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2776 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2777 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2778 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2779 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2783 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2784 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2789 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2790 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2791 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2792 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2794 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2795 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2799 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2800 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2801 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2803 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2804 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2806 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2807 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2808 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2809 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2813 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2814 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2815 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2816 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2818 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2819 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2820 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2821 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2823 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2825 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2827 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2828 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2829 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2833 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2835 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2836 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2837 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2838 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2839 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2842 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2843 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2844 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2845 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2846 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2847 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2848 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2850 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2856 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2857 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2858 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2860 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2861 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2862 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2863 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2865 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2866 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2867 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2870 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2871 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2872 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2875 // used for testing resumption on same block
2876 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2879 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2880 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2881 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2882 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2888 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2889 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2893 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2895 number_of_blocks: 0,
2898 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2899 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2901 number_of_blocks: 0,
2902 sync_complete: true,
2903 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2907 // Error when wrong chain
2908 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2912 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2914 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2917 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2918 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2920 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2921 sync_complete: true,
2922 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2926 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2927 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2931 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2932 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2933 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2936 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2937 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2938 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2939 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2940 sync_complete: true,
2941 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2945 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2946 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2950 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2951 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2952 number_of_blocks: 1,
2957 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2958 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2959 number_of_blocks: 1,
2960 sync_complete: true,
2961 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2966 // No results in valid query range
2967 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2971 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2972 first_blocknum: 1000,
2973 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2978 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2979 first_blocknum: 1000,
2980 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2981 sync_complete: true,
2982 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2987 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2988 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2992 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2993 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2994 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2999 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3000 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3001 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3002 sync_complete: true,
3003 short_channel_ids: vec![
3004 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3010 // Single block exactly full
3011 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3015 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3016 first_blocknum: 100000,
3017 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3022 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3023 first_blocknum: 100000,
3024 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3025 sync_complete: true,
3026 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3027 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3033 // Multiple split on new block
3034 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3038 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3039 first_blocknum: 100000,
3040 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3045 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3046 first_blocknum: 100000,
3047 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3048 sync_complete: false,
3049 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3050 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3054 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3055 first_blocknum: 107999,
3056 number_of_blocks: 2,
3057 sync_complete: true,
3058 short_channel_ids: vec![
3059 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3065 // Multiple split on same block
3066 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3070 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3071 first_blocknum: 100002,
3072 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3077 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3078 first_blocknum: 100002,
3079 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3080 sync_complete: false,
3081 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3082 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3086 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3087 first_blocknum: 108001,
3088 number_of_blocks: 1,
3089 sync_complete: true,
3090 short_channel_ids: vec![
3091 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3098 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3099 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3100 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3101 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3103 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3105 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3106 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3107 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3108 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3111 assert!(result.is_ok());
3113 assert!(result.is_err());
3116 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3117 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3119 for i in 0..events.len() {
3120 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3122 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3123 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3124 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3125 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3126 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3127 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3128 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3130 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3131 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3132 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3133 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3134 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3136 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3137 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3138 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3141 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3147 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3148 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3149 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3150 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3151 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3153 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3155 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3157 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3159 assert!(result.is_err());
3163 fn displays_node_alias() {
3164 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3165 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3166 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3167 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3170 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3171 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3172 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3174 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3175 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3176 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3177 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3180 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3181 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3182 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3186 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3187 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3188 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3189 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3190 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3192 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3193 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3196 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3197 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3198 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3199 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3200 last_update_message: None,
3203 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3204 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3206 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3207 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3208 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3210 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3211 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3212 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3214 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3215 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3216 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3217 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3218 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3220 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3221 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3222 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3224 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3225 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3226 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3227 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3228 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3230 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3232 capacity_sats: None,
3233 announcement_message: None,
3234 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3237 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3238 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3240 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3241 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3243 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3244 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3245 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3246 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3247 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3248 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3249 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3250 capacity_sats: None,
3251 announcement_message: None,
3252 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3255 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3256 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3258 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3259 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3261 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3262 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3263 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3265 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3266 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3267 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3268 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3269 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3270 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3271 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3273 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3274 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3275 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3276 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3277 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3281 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3282 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3284 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3285 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3286 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3287 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
3290 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3291 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3292 announcement_message: None,
3295 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3296 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3297 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3298 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3300 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3301 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3302 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3304 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3305 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3306 channels: Vec::new(),
3307 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3308 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3311 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3312 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3313 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3314 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3316 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3317 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3318 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3322 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3330 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3331 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3332 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3333 let mut v = Vec::new();
3334 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3336 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3341 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3342 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3343 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3344 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3346 let _ = net_graph.encode();