1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
22 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
32 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
33 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
34 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
35 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
36 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
39 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
40 use crate::prelude::*;
42 use core::convert::TryFrom;
43 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
44 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
45 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
46 use crate::sync::Mutex;
47 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
48 use core::str::FromStr;
50 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
51 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
53 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
55 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
57 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
58 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
60 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
61 /// refuse to relay the message.
62 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
64 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
65 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
66 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
68 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
69 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
70 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
73 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
74 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
75 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
78 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
79 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
83 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
84 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
85 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
89 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
90 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
91 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
94 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
95 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
96 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
100 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
101 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
106 impl Eq for NodeId {}
108 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
109 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
110 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
114 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
115 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
116 Some(self.cmp(other))
120 impl Ord for NodeId {
121 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
122 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
126 impl Writeable for NodeId {
127 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
128 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
133 impl Readable for NodeId {
134 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
135 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
136 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
141 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
142 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
143 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
147 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
148 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
150 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
155 impl FromStr for NodeId {
156 type Err = bitcoin::hashes::hex::Error;
158 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
159 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
164 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
165 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
166 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
167 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
168 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
170 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
171 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
172 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
173 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
175 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
176 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
177 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
178 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
179 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
180 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
181 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
184 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
185 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
186 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
187 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
188 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
189 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
190 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
191 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
192 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
193 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
196 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
197 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
198 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
199 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
202 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
203 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
205 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
206 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
207 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
208 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
209 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
210 ChannelUpdateMessage {
211 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
214 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
215 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
217 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
218 short_channel_id: u64,
219 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
220 /// `channel_update` message is received.
223 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
224 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
226 /// The node id of the failed node.
228 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
229 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
234 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
235 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
238 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
239 (0, short_channel_id, required),
240 (2, is_permanent, required),
242 (4, NodeFailure) => {
243 (0, node_id, required),
244 (2, is_permanent, required),
248 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
249 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
250 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
251 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
252 /// serving historical announcements.
253 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
254 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
257 utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
258 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
259 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
260 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
264 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
265 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
267 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
268 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
269 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
270 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
271 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
274 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
275 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
277 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
282 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
283 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
284 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
285 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
286 self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
289 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
290 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
292 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
293 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
297 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
298 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
299 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
300 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
301 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
302 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
303 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
310 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
312 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
314 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
317 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
318 if update_msg.as_ref()
319 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
325 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
328 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
329 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
330 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
337 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
341 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
342 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
344 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
345 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
346 match *network_update {
347 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
348 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
349 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
350 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
351 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
352 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
354 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
356 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
357 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
360 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
362 log_debug!(self.logger,
363 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
364 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
371 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
372 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
373 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
376 return Err(LightningError {
377 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
378 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
379 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
381 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
383 log_level: Level::Trace,
391 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
392 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
393 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
394 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
395 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
396 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
397 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
399 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
401 log_level: Level::Trace
407 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
409 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
410 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
411 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
412 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
417 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
419 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
420 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
421 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
422 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
423 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
424 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
425 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
430 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
431 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
433 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
434 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
435 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
436 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
437 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
440 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
441 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
442 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
445 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
446 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
447 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
450 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
451 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
452 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
453 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
454 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
455 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
456 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
457 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
458 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
460 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
461 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
463 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
465 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
466 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
472 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
473 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
474 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
475 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
479 for (_, ref node) in iter {
480 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
481 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
489 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
490 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
491 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
493 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
494 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
495 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
496 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
497 /// tracking this directly.
499 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
500 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
501 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
502 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
503 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
504 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
505 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
506 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
507 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
508 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
512 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
514 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
515 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
516 // updates from all our peers normally.
518 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
519 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
520 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
523 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
524 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
525 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
526 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
527 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
529 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
530 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
531 // relying on it useless.
533 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
534 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
535 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
537 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
538 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
539 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
540 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
541 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
544 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
545 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
546 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
547 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
548 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
549 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
550 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
552 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
553 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
554 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
555 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
557 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
558 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
559 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
561 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
562 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
563 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
564 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
566 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
567 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
568 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
570 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
574 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
575 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
576 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
577 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
578 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
579 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
580 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
586 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
587 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
588 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
589 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
593 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
594 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
595 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
596 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
600 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
601 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
602 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
603 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
604 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
605 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
606 /// memory constrained systems.
607 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
608 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
610 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
612 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
613 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
614 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
616 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
617 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
618 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
619 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
620 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
621 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
622 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
623 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
624 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
626 short_channel_ids: vec![],
629 return Err(LightningError {
630 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
631 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
635 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
636 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
637 // exists even if its not yet routable.
638 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
639 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
640 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
641 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
642 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
643 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
644 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
647 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
648 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
653 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
654 let batch_count = batches.len();
655 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
656 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
657 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
658 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
660 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
661 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
662 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
663 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
664 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
665 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
666 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
668 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
669 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
670 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
672 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
673 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
674 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
676 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
677 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
678 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
679 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
681 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
682 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
684 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
687 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
689 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
690 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
691 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
692 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
696 short_channel_ids: batch,
704 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
707 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
708 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
712 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
713 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
714 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
718 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
719 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
720 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
724 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
725 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
729 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
731 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
734 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
735 let mut ret = Vec::new();
736 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
737 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
742 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
743 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
744 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
745 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
746 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
747 pub last_update: u32,
748 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
750 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
751 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
752 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
753 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
754 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
755 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
756 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
757 pub fees: RoutingFees,
758 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
759 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
760 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
761 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
762 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
765 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
766 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
767 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
772 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
773 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
774 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
775 (0, self.last_update, required),
776 (2, self.enabled, required),
777 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
778 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
779 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
780 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
781 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
782 (10, self.fees, required),
783 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
789 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
790 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
791 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
792 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
793 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
794 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
795 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
796 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
797 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
799 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
800 (0, last_update, required),
801 (2, enabled, required),
802 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
803 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
804 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
805 (10, fees, required),
806 (12, last_update_message, required)
809 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
810 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
811 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
812 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
813 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
814 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
816 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
817 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
820 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
825 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
826 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
827 /// Received within a channel announcement.
828 pub struct ChannelInfo {
829 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
830 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
831 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
832 pub node_one: NodeId,
833 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
834 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
835 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
836 pub node_two: NodeId,
837 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
838 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
839 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
840 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
841 /// An initial announcement of the channel
842 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
843 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
844 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
845 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
846 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
847 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
848 /// network graph in memory!).
849 announcement_received_time: u64,
853 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
854 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
855 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
856 let (direction, source) = {
857 if target == &self.node_one {
858 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
859 } else if target == &self.node_two {
860 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
865 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
868 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
869 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
870 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
871 let (direction, target) = {
872 if source == &self.node_one {
873 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
874 } else if source == &self.node_two {
875 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
880 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
883 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
884 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
885 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
887 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
889 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
894 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
895 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
896 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
897 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
902 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
903 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
904 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
905 (0, self.features, required),
906 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
907 (2, self.node_one, required),
908 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
909 (6, self.node_two, required),
910 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
911 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
912 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
918 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
919 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
920 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
921 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
922 // channel updates via the gossip network.
923 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
925 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
926 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
927 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
928 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
929 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
930 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
931 Err(err) => Err(err),
936 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
937 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
938 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
939 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
940 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
941 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
942 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
943 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
944 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
945 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
946 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
947 (0, features, required),
948 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
949 (2, node_one, required),
950 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
951 (6, node_two, required),
952 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
953 (10, capacity_sats, required),
954 (12, announcement_message, required),
958 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
959 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
960 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
961 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
962 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
963 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
964 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
965 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
970 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
971 /// source node to a target node.
973 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
974 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
975 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
976 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
977 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
980 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
982 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
983 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
984 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
986 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
987 Some(capacity_msat) => {
988 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
989 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
991 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
995 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
999 /// Returns information for the channel.
1001 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1003 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
1005 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1006 self.htlc_maximum_msat
1009 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1011 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1012 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1014 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1015 self.effective_capacity
1018 /// Returns information for the direction.
1020 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1023 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1024 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1025 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1026 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1031 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1033 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1034 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1035 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1036 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1037 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1040 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1042 liquidity_msat: u64,
1044 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1046 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1049 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1051 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1053 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1054 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1056 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1059 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1060 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1064 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1065 /// use when making routing decisions.
1066 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1068 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1069 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1070 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1072 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1073 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1074 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1075 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1076 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1081 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1082 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1083 pub struct RoutingFees {
1084 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1086 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1087 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1088 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1091 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1092 (0, base_msat, required),
1093 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1096 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1097 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1098 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1099 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1100 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1101 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1102 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1103 pub last_update: u32,
1104 /// Color assigned to the node
1106 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1107 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1108 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1109 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1110 /// An initial announcement of the node
1111 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1112 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1113 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1114 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1117 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1118 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1119 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[NetAddress] {
1120 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1121 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1122 .unwrap_or_default()
1126 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1127 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1128 let empty_addresses = Vec::<NetAddress>::new();
1129 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1130 (0, self.features, required),
1131 (2, self.last_update, required),
1132 (4, self.rgb, required),
1133 (6, self.alias, required),
1134 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1135 (10, empty_addresses, vec_type), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1141 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1142 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1143 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1144 (0, features, required),
1145 (2, last_update, required),
1147 (6, alias, required),
1148 (8, announcement_message, option),
1149 (10, _addresses, vec_type), // deprecated, not used anymore
1151 let _: Option<Vec<NetAddress>> = _addresses;
1152 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1153 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1157 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1159 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1160 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1162 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1164 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1165 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1166 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1167 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1168 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1169 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1171 use core::fmt::Write;
1172 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1173 // Display printable ASCII characters
1174 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1175 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1184 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1185 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1190 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1191 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1192 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1196 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1197 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1198 pub struct NodeInfo {
1199 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1200 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1201 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1202 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1203 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1204 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1207 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1208 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1209 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1210 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1215 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1216 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1217 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1218 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1219 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1220 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1226 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1227 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1228 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1229 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1230 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1232 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1233 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1234 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1235 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1237 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1244 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1245 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1246 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1247 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1248 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1249 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1250 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1251 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1252 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1253 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1255 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1256 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1257 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1258 (4, channels, vec_type),
1262 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1263 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1268 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1269 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1271 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1272 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1273 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1275 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1276 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1277 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1278 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1279 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1280 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1282 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1283 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1284 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1285 node_id.write(writer)?;
1286 node_info.write(writer)?;
1289 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1290 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1291 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1297 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1298 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1299 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1301 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1302 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1303 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1304 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1305 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1306 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1307 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1309 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1310 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1311 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1312 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1313 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1314 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1317 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1318 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1319 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1323 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1326 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1327 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1328 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1329 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1330 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1331 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1336 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1337 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1338 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1339 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1340 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1342 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1343 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1344 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1350 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1351 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1352 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1353 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1354 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1355 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1359 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1360 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1361 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1363 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1364 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
1366 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1367 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1368 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1369 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1370 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1371 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1375 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1376 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1377 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1378 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1379 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1385 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1386 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1387 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1388 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1391 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1392 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1393 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1394 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1397 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1400 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1401 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1402 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1406 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1407 /// given node announcement.
1409 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1410 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1411 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1412 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1413 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1414 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1417 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1418 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1419 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1421 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1422 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1425 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1426 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1427 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1429 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1430 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1431 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1434 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1435 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1436 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1437 // that it be at least the current time.
1438 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1439 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1440 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1441 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1446 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1447 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1448 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1449 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1450 features: msg.features.clone(),
1451 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1454 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1462 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1464 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1465 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1466 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1468 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1469 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1470 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1471 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1472 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1474 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1476 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1477 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1480 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1482 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1483 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1484 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1486 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1487 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1488 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1489 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1490 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1493 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1494 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1495 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1497 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1498 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1499 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1500 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1501 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1503 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1505 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1508 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1510 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1511 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1513 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1514 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1515 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1516 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1519 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1520 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1521 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1523 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1525 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1527 capacity_sats: None,
1528 announcement_message: None,
1529 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1532 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1535 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1536 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1537 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1539 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1540 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1542 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1543 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1544 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1545 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1547 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1548 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1549 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1550 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1552 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1553 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1555 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1556 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1557 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1559 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1562 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1563 entry.insert(channel_info);
1567 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1568 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1569 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1570 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1572 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1573 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1574 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1575 announcement_info: None,
1584 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1585 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1586 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1588 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1590 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1591 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1594 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1595 return Err(LightningError {
1596 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1597 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1602 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1604 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1605 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1606 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1607 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1609 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1610 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1611 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1612 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1614 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1615 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1616 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1617 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1618 return Err(LightningError {
1619 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1620 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1623 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1624 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1625 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1626 return Err(LightningError {
1627 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1628 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1635 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1636 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1637 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1638 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1639 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1640 return Err(LightningError{
1641 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1642 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1646 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1647 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1649 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1650 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1651 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1653 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1656 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1657 features: msg.features.clone(),
1658 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1660 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1662 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1663 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1664 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1665 announcement_received_time,
1668 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1670 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1674 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1676 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1677 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1678 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1679 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1680 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1681 let current_time_unix = None;
1683 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1686 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1688 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1689 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1690 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1691 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1692 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1693 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1694 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1698 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1699 /// from local storage.
1700 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1701 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1702 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1703 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1704 let current_time_unix = None;
1706 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1707 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1708 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1709 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1710 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1712 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1713 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1714 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1715 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1716 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1717 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1720 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1721 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1724 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1727 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1731 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1732 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1733 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1736 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1737 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1738 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1740 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1741 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1743 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1744 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1746 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1747 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1748 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1749 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1750 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1753 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1754 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1757 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1758 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1759 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1761 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1762 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1764 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1765 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1766 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1767 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1768 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1769 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1770 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1771 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1772 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1774 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1775 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1776 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1777 info.one_to_two = None;
1779 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1780 info.two_to_one = None;
1782 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1783 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1784 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1785 // channel_update for.
1786 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1787 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1791 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1792 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1793 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1794 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1795 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1796 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1800 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1801 if let Some(time) = time {
1802 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1804 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1805 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1806 // of this function.
1807 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1809 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1810 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1813 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1817 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1818 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1821 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1824 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1825 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1826 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1828 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1829 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1830 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1831 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1834 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1835 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1836 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1838 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1839 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1840 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1841 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1844 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1845 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1847 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1848 return Err(LightningError {
1849 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1850 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1854 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1856 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1857 // disable this check during tests!
1858 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1859 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1860 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1862 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1863 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1867 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1868 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1870 core::mem::drop(channels);
1871 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1872 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1875 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1876 return Err(LightningError{err:
1877 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1878 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1881 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1882 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1883 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1884 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1885 return Err(LightningError{err:
1886 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1887 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1890 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1891 ($target: expr) => {
1892 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1893 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1894 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1895 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1896 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1897 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1898 // but only in the non-normative section.
1899 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1900 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1901 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1902 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1908 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1910 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1911 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1913 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1914 enabled: chan_enabled,
1915 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1916 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1917 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1918 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1920 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1921 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1925 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1929 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1930 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1931 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1932 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1933 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1934 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1935 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1936 })?, "channel_update");
1938 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1940 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1941 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1942 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1943 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1944 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1945 })?, "channel_update");
1947 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1955 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1956 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1957 ($node_id: expr) => {
1958 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1959 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1960 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1962 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1963 entry.remove_entry();
1966 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1971 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1972 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1976 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1977 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1979 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1980 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1984 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1985 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1986 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1989 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1990 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1991 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1992 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1995 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1997 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1998 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2002 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2003 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2004 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2007 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2008 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2009 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2010 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2013 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2014 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2015 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2016 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
2017 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2018 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2023 pub(crate) mod tests {
2024 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2025 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2026 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2027 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2028 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2029 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2030 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2031 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2032 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2033 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2034 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2035 use crate::util::test_utils;
2036 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2037 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2039 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2040 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2042 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2043 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2044 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2045 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2046 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2047 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2051 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2052 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2055 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2056 use crate::prelude::*;
2057 use crate::sync::Arc;
2059 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2060 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2061 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2064 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2065 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2066 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2068 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2069 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2070 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2071 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2075 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2076 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2077 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2078 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2079 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2081 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2082 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2083 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2084 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2085 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2086 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2089 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2090 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2091 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2092 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2096 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2097 addresses: Vec::new(),
2098 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2099 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2101 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2102 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2104 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2105 contents: unsigned_announcement
2109 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2110 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2111 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2112 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2113 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2115 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2116 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2117 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2118 short_channel_id: 0,
2119 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2120 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2121 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2122 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2123 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2125 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2126 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2127 ChannelAnnouncement {
2128 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2129 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2130 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2131 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2132 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2136 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2137 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2138 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2139 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2140 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2143 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2144 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2145 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2146 short_channel_id: 0,
2149 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2150 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2151 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2152 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2153 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2154 excess_data: Vec::new()
2156 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2157 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2159 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2160 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2165 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2166 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2167 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2169 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2170 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2171 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2173 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2174 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2176 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2180 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2181 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2182 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2183 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2188 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2189 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2193 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2194 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2196 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2197 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2200 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2203 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2204 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2205 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2206 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2207 // Return false because contains excess data.
2208 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2209 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2213 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2214 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2215 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2216 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2217 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2218 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2220 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2225 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2226 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2227 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2229 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2230 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2232 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2233 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2235 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2236 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2237 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2238 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2239 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2244 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2250 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2251 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2252 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2254 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2257 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2258 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2259 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2260 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2261 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2263 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2264 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2265 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2266 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2268 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2271 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2272 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2273 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2274 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2275 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2276 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2277 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2278 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2283 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2289 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2290 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2291 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2292 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2293 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2295 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2298 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2300 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2302 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2303 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2304 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2306 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2307 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2308 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2309 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2310 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2312 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2315 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2317 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2318 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2319 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2324 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2325 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2326 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2327 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2328 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2329 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2330 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2334 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2335 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2336 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2338 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2341 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2342 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2344 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2347 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2348 // announcement is mainnet).
2349 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2350 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash();
2351 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2352 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2354 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2359 fn handling_channel_update() {
2360 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2361 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2362 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2363 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2364 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2366 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2367 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2369 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2370 let short_channel_id;
2373 // Announce a channel we will update
2374 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2375 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2376 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2378 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2379 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2380 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2387 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2388 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2389 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2394 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2396 Some(channel_info) => {
2397 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2398 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2403 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2404 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2405 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2406 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2407 // Return false because contains excess data
2408 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2409 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2413 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2414 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2415 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2416 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2417 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2419 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2422 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2423 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2424 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2425 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2426 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2428 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2431 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2432 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2433 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2434 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2435 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2437 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2440 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2441 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2442 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2443 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2444 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2445 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2447 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2450 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2451 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2452 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2453 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2454 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2455 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2456 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2458 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2461 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2462 // update is mainet).
2463 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2464 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash();
2465 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2467 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2469 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2474 fn handling_network_update() {
2475 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2476 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2477 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2479 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2480 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2481 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2484 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2485 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2488 let short_channel_id;
2490 // Announce a channel we will update
2491 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2492 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2493 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2494 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2495 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2497 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2498 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2500 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2501 msg: valid_channel_update,
2504 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2507 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2509 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2511 Some(channel_info) => {
2512 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2516 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2518 is_permanent: false,
2521 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2523 Some(channel_info) => {
2524 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2529 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2530 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2535 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2536 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2537 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2540 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2541 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2543 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2544 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2545 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2546 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2547 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2548 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2550 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2551 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2553 is_permanent: false,
2556 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2557 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2559 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2560 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2565 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2566 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2567 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2572 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2573 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2574 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2575 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2576 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2577 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2578 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2580 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2581 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2583 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2584 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2585 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2586 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2587 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2589 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2590 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2591 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2592 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2594 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2595 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2596 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2598 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2599 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2600 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2602 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2603 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2604 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2605 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2607 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2608 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2610 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2612 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2613 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2614 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2615 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2616 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2618 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2619 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2620 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2621 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2622 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2623 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2624 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2625 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2626 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2627 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2628 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2629 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2630 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2631 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2632 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2633 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2634 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2637 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2638 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2639 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2641 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2643 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2645 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2647 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2648 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2649 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2651 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2652 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2653 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2654 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2656 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2657 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2658 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2660 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2661 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2662 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2663 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2665 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2666 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2667 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2668 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2669 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2672 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2674 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2675 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2676 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2678 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2680 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2681 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2682 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2684 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2685 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2686 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2687 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2689 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2690 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2691 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2693 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2694 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2695 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2697 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2698 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2699 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2700 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2701 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2706 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2707 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2708 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2709 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2710 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2712 // Channels were not announced yet.
2713 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2714 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2716 let short_channel_id;
2718 // Announce a channel we will update
2719 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2720 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2721 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2727 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2728 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2729 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2730 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2731 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2732 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2738 // Valid channel update
2739 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2740 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2741 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2742 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2748 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2749 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2750 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2751 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2752 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2753 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2759 // Channel update with excess data.
2760 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2761 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2762 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2763 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2764 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2770 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2771 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2772 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2773 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2774 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2775 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2780 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2781 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2782 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2786 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2787 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2788 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2789 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2790 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2791 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2794 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2795 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2798 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2799 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2800 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2806 // Nodes were never announced
2807 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2808 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2811 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2812 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2817 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2818 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2824 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2825 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2827 // Skip the first node.
2828 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2829 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2832 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2833 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2834 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2835 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2836 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2837 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2838 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2843 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2844 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2848 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2849 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2850 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2852 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2853 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2855 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2856 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2857 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2858 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2862 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2863 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2868 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2869 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2870 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2871 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2873 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2874 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2878 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2879 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2880 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2882 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2883 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2885 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2886 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2887 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2888 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2892 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2893 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2894 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2895 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2897 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2898 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2899 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2900 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2902 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2904 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2906 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2907 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2908 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2912 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2914 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2915 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2916 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2917 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2918 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2921 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2922 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2923 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2924 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2925 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2926 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2927 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2929 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2935 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2936 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2937 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2939 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2940 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2941 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2942 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2944 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2945 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2946 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2949 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2950 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2951 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2954 // used for testing resumption on same block
2955 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2958 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2959 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2960 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2961 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2967 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2968 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2972 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2974 number_of_blocks: 0,
2977 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2978 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2980 number_of_blocks: 0,
2981 sync_complete: true,
2982 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2986 // Error when wrong chain
2987 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2991 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2993 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2996 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2997 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2999 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3000 sync_complete: true,
3001 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3005 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3006 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3010 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3011 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3012 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3015 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3016 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3017 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3018 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3019 sync_complete: true,
3020 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3024 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3025 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3029 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3030 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3031 number_of_blocks: 1,
3036 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3037 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3038 number_of_blocks: 1,
3039 sync_complete: true,
3040 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3045 // No results in valid query range
3046 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3050 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3051 first_blocknum: 1000,
3052 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3057 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3058 first_blocknum: 1000,
3059 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3060 sync_complete: true,
3061 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3066 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3067 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3071 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3072 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3073 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3078 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3079 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3080 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3081 sync_complete: true,
3082 short_channel_ids: vec![
3083 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3089 // Single block exactly full
3090 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3094 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3095 first_blocknum: 100000,
3096 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3101 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3102 first_blocknum: 100000,
3103 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3104 sync_complete: true,
3105 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3106 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3112 // Multiple split on new block
3113 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3117 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3118 first_blocknum: 100000,
3119 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3124 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3125 first_blocknum: 100000,
3126 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3127 sync_complete: false,
3128 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3129 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3133 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3134 first_blocknum: 107999,
3135 number_of_blocks: 2,
3136 sync_complete: true,
3137 short_channel_ids: vec![
3138 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3144 // Multiple split on same block
3145 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3149 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3150 first_blocknum: 100002,
3151 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3156 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3157 first_blocknum: 100002,
3158 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3159 sync_complete: false,
3160 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3161 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3165 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3166 first_blocknum: 108001,
3167 number_of_blocks: 1,
3168 sync_complete: true,
3169 short_channel_ids: vec![
3170 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3177 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3178 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3179 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3180 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3182 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3184 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3185 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3186 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3187 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3190 assert!(result.is_ok());
3192 assert!(result.is_err());
3195 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3196 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3198 for i in 0..events.len() {
3199 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3201 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3202 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3203 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3204 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3205 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3206 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3207 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3209 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3210 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3211 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3212 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3213 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3215 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3216 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3217 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3220 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3226 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3227 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3228 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3229 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3230 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3232 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3234 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3236 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3238 assert!(result.is_err());
3242 fn displays_node_alias() {
3243 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3244 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3245 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3246 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3249 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3250 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3251 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3253 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3254 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3255 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3256 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3259 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3260 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3261 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3265 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3266 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3267 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3268 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3269 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3270 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3272 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3273 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3276 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3277 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3278 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3279 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3280 last_update_message: None,
3283 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3284 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3286 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3287 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3288 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3290 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3291 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3292 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3294 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3295 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3296 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3297 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3298 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3300 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3301 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3302 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3304 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3305 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3306 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3307 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3308 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3310 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3312 capacity_sats: None,
3313 announcement_message: None,
3314 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3317 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3318 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3320 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3321 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3323 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3324 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3325 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3326 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3327 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3328 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3329 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3330 capacity_sats: None,
3331 announcement_message: None,
3332 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3335 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3336 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3338 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3339 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3341 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3342 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3343 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3345 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3346 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3347 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3348 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3349 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3350 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3351 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3353 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3354 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3355 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3356 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3357 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3361 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3362 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3363 let announcement_message = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3364 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3365 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3366 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3369 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3370 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3373 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3374 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3375 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3376 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3377 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3379 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3380 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3381 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3383 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3384 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3385 channels: Vec::new(),
3386 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3389 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3390 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3391 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3392 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3394 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3395 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3396 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3400 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3401 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = hex::decode("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3402 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3403 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3404 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3405 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3409 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3417 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3418 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3419 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3420 let mut v = Vec::new();
3421 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3423 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3428 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3429 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3430 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3431 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3433 let _ = net_graph.encode();