1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
21 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
22 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
23 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
24 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
26 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup};
27 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
28 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
29 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
30 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
31 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
32 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
35 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
36 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
39 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
40 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
41 use crate::sync::Mutex;
42 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
45 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
47 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
49 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
51 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
52 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
54 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
55 /// refuse to relay the message.
56 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
58 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
59 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
60 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
62 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
63 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
64 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
67 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
68 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
69 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
72 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
73 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
78 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
79 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
80 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
84 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
85 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
89 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
90 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
97 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
98 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
99 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
103 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
104 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
105 Some(self.cmp(other))
109 impl Ord for NodeId {
110 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
111 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
115 impl Writeable for NodeId {
116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
117 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
122 impl Readable for NodeId {
123 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
124 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
125 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
130 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
131 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
132 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
133 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
134 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
136 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
137 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
139 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
141 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
142 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
143 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
144 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
145 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
146 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
147 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
150 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
151 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
152 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
153 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
154 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
155 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
156 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
157 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
159 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
162 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
163 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
164 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
165 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
168 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
169 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
171 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
172 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
173 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
174 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
175 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
176 ChannelUpdateMessage {
177 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
180 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
181 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
183 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
184 short_channel_id: u64,
185 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
186 /// `channel_update` message is received.
189 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
190 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
192 /// The node id of the failed node.
194 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
195 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
200 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
201 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
204 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
205 (0, short_channel_id, required),
206 (2, is_permanent, required),
208 (4, NodeFailure) => {
209 (0, node_id, required),
210 (2, is_permanent, required),
214 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
215 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
216 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
217 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
218 /// serving historical announcements.
219 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
220 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
223 utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
224 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
225 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
226 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
230 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
231 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
233 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
234 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
235 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
236 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
237 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
241 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
243 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
248 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
249 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
250 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
251 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
252 self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
255 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
256 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
258 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
259 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
263 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
264 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
265 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
266 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
267 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
268 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
269 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
276 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
278 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
280 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
282 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
283 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
284 if update_msg.as_ref()
285 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
290 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
291 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
293 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
294 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
295 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
296 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
303 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
307 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
308 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
310 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
311 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
312 match *network_update {
313 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
314 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
315 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
316 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
317 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
318 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
320 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
321 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
322 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
323 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
325 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
327 log_debug!(self.logger,
328 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
329 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
336 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
337 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
338 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
341 return Err(LightningError {
342 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
343 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
344 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
346 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
348 log_level: Level::Trace,
356 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
357 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
358 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
359 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
360 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
361 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
364 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
366 log_level: Level::Trace
372 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
373 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
375 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
376 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
377 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
378 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
379 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
382 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
383 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
384 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
385 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
388 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
389 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
390 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
393 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
394 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
395 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
396 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
397 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
398 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
399 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
400 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
401 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
403 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
404 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
406 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
408 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
409 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
415 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
416 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
417 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
418 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
422 for (_, ref node) in iter {
423 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
424 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
432 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
433 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
434 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
436 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
437 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
438 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
439 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
440 /// tracking this directly.
441 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
442 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
443 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
444 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
445 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
449 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
451 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
452 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
453 // updates from all our peers normally.
455 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
456 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
457 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
460 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
461 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
462 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
463 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
464 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
466 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
467 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
468 // relying on it useless.
470 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
471 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
472 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
474 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
475 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
476 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
477 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
478 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
481 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
482 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
483 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
484 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
485 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
486 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
487 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
489 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
490 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
491 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
492 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
494 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
495 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
496 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
498 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
499 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
500 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
501 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
503 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
504 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
505 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
507 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
511 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
512 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
513 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
514 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
515 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
516 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
517 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
523 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
524 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
525 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
526 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
530 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
531 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
532 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
533 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
537 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
538 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
539 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
540 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
541 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
542 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
543 /// memory constrained systems.
544 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
545 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
547 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
549 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
550 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
551 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
553 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
554 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
556 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
557 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
558 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
559 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
560 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
561 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
563 short_channel_ids: vec![],
566 return Err(LightningError {
567 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
568 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
572 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
573 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
574 // exists even if its not yet routable.
575 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
576 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
577 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
578 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
579 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
580 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
581 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
584 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
585 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
590 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
591 let batch_count = batches.len();
592 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
593 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
594 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
595 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
597 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
598 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
599 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
600 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
601 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
602 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
603 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
605 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
606 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
607 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
609 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
610 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
611 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
613 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
614 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
615 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
616 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
618 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
619 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
621 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
624 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
626 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
627 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
628 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
629 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
633 short_channel_ids: batch,
641 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
644 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
645 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
649 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
650 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
651 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
655 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
656 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
657 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
662 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
664 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
667 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
668 let mut ret = Vec::new();
669 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
670 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
675 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
676 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
677 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
678 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
679 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
680 pub last_update: u32,
681 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
683 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
684 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
685 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
686 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
687 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
688 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
689 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
690 pub fees: RoutingFees,
691 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
692 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
693 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
694 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
695 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
698 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
699 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
700 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
705 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
706 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
707 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
708 (0, self.last_update, required),
709 (2, self.enabled, required),
710 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
711 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
712 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
713 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
714 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
715 (10, self.fees, required),
716 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
722 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
723 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
724 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
725 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
726 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
727 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
728 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
729 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
730 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
732 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
733 (0, last_update, required),
734 (2, enabled, required),
735 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
736 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
737 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
738 (10, fees, required),
739 (12, last_update_message, required)
742 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
743 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
744 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
745 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
746 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
747 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
749 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
750 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
753 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
758 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
759 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
760 /// Received within a channel announcement.
761 pub struct ChannelInfo {
762 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
763 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
764 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
765 pub node_one: NodeId,
766 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
767 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
768 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
769 pub node_two: NodeId,
770 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
771 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
772 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
773 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
774 /// An initial announcement of the channel
775 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
776 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
777 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
778 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
779 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
780 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
781 /// network graph in memory!).
782 announcement_received_time: u64,
786 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
787 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
788 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
789 let (direction, source) = {
790 if target == &self.node_one {
791 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
792 } else if target == &self.node_two {
793 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
798 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
801 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
802 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
803 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
804 let (direction, target) = {
805 if source == &self.node_one {
806 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
807 } else if source == &self.node_two {
808 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
813 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
816 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
817 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
818 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
820 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
822 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
827 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
828 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
829 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
830 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
835 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
836 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
837 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
838 (0, self.features, required),
839 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
840 (2, self.node_one, required),
841 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
842 (6, self.node_two, required),
843 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
844 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
845 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
851 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
852 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
853 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
854 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
855 // channel updates via the gossip network.
856 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
858 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
859 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
860 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
861 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
862 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
863 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
864 Err(err) => Err(err),
869 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
870 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
871 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
872 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
873 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
874 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
875 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
876 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
877 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
878 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
879 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
880 (0, features, required),
881 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
882 (2, node_one, required),
883 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
884 (6, node_two, required),
885 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
886 (10, capacity_sats, required),
887 (12, announcement_message, required),
891 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
892 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
893 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
894 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
895 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
896 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
897 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
898 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
903 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
904 /// source node to a target node.
906 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
907 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
908 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
909 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
910 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
913 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
915 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
916 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
917 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
919 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
920 Some(capacity_msat) => {
921 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
922 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
924 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
928 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
932 /// Returns information for the channel.
934 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
936 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
938 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
939 self.htlc_maximum_msat
942 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
944 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
945 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
947 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
948 self.effective_capacity
951 /// Returns information for the direction.
953 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
956 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
957 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
958 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
959 .field("channel", &self.channel)
964 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
966 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
967 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
968 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
969 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
970 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
973 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
977 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
979 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
982 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
984 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
986 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
987 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
989 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
992 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
993 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
997 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
998 /// use when making routing decisions.
999 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1001 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1002 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1003 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1005 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1006 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1007 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1008 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1009 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1014 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1015 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
1016 pub struct RoutingFees {
1017 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
1019 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1020 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1021 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1024 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1025 (0, base_msat, required),
1026 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1029 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1030 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1031 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1032 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1033 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1034 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1035 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1036 pub last_update: u32,
1037 /// Color assigned to the node
1039 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1040 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1041 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1042 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1043 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1044 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1045 /// An initial announcement of the node
1046 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1047 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1048 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1049 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1052 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1053 (0, features, required),
1054 (2, last_update, required),
1056 (6, alias, required),
1057 (8, announcement_message, option),
1058 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1061 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1063 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1064 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1065 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1066 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1068 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1069 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1070 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1071 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1072 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1073 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1075 use core::fmt::Write;
1076 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1077 // Display printable ASCII characters
1078 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1079 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1088 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1089 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1094 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1095 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1096 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1100 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1101 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1102 pub struct NodeInfo {
1103 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1104 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1105 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1106 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1107 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1108 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1111 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1112 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1113 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1114 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1119 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1120 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1121 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1122 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1123 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1124 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1130 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1131 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1132 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1133 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1134 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1136 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1137 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1138 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1139 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1141 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1148 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1149 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1150 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1151 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1152 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1153 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1154 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1155 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1156 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1157 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1159 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1160 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1161 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1162 (4, channels, vec_type),
1166 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1167 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1172 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1173 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1175 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1177 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1179 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1180 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1181 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1182 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1183 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1184 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1186 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1187 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1188 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1189 node_id.write(writer)?;
1190 node_info.write(writer)?;
1193 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1194 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1195 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1201 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1202 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1203 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1205 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1206 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1207 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1208 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1209 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1210 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1211 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1213 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1214 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1215 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1216 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1217 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1218 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1221 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1222 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1223 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1227 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1230 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1231 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1232 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1233 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1234 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1235 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1240 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1241 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1242 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1243 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1244 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1246 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1247 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1248 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1254 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1255 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1256 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1257 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1258 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1259 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1263 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1264 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1265 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1267 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1270 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1271 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1272 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1273 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1274 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1275 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1279 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1280 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1281 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1282 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1283 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1289 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1290 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1291 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1292 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1295 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1296 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1297 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1298 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1301 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1304 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1305 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1306 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1310 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1311 /// given node announcement.
1313 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1314 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1315 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1316 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1317 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1318 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
1319 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1322 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1323 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1324 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1326 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1327 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1330 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1331 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1332 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1334 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1335 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1336 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1339 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1340 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1341 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1342 // that it be at least the current time.
1343 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1344 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1345 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1346 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1351 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1352 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1353 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1354 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1355 features: msg.features.clone(),
1356 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1358 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1359 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1360 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1368 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1370 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1371 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1372 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1374 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1375 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1376 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1377 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1378 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1380 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1382 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1383 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1384 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1385 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1386 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1387 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1390 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1391 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1392 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1394 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1395 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1396 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1397 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1398 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1400 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1402 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1405 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1407 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1408 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1410 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1411 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1412 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1413 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1416 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1417 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1418 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1420 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1422 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1424 capacity_sats: None,
1425 announcement_message: None,
1426 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1429 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1432 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1433 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1434 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1436 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1437 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1439 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1440 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1441 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1442 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1444 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1445 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1446 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1447 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1449 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1450 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1452 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1453 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1454 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1456 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1459 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1460 entry.insert(channel_info);
1464 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1465 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1466 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1467 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1469 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1470 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1471 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1472 announcement_info: None,
1481 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1482 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1483 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1485 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1487 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1488 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1492 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1494 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1495 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1496 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1497 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1499 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1500 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1501 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1502 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1504 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1505 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1506 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1507 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1508 return Err(LightningError {
1509 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1510 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1513 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1514 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1515 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1516 return Err(LightningError {
1517 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1518 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1525 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1526 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1527 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1528 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1529 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1530 return Err(LightningError{
1531 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1532 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1536 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1537 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1539 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1540 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1541 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1543 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1546 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1547 features: msg.features.clone(),
1548 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1550 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1552 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1553 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1554 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1555 announcement_received_time,
1558 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1561 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1562 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1563 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1564 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1565 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1566 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1567 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1568 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1569 let current_time_unix = None;
1571 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1574 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1575 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1576 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1577 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1578 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1579 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1581 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1582 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1583 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1584 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1587 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1588 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1589 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1591 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1592 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1598 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1599 /// from local storage.
1600 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1601 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1602 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1603 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1604 let current_time_unix = None;
1606 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1607 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1608 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1609 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1610 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1612 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1613 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1614 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1615 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1616 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1617 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1620 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1621 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1624 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1627 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1631 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1632 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1633 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1636 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1637 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1638 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1640 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1641 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1643 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1644 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1646 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1647 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1648 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1649 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1650 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1653 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1654 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1657 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1658 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1659 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1661 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1662 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1664 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1665 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1666 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1667 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1668 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1669 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1670 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1671 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1672 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1674 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1675 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1676 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1677 info.one_to_two = None;
1679 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1680 info.two_to_one = None;
1682 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1683 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1684 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1685 // channel_update for.
1686 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1687 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1691 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1692 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1693 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1694 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1695 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1696 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1700 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1701 if let Some(time) = time {
1702 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1704 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1705 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1706 // of this function.
1707 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1709 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1710 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1713 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1717 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1718 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1721 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1724 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1725 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1726 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1728 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1729 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1730 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1731 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1734 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1735 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1736 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1738 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1739 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1740 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1741 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1744 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1745 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1747 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1749 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1750 // disable this check during tests!
1751 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1752 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1753 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1755 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1756 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1760 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1761 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1763 core::mem::drop(channels);
1764 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1765 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1768 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1769 return Err(LightningError{err:
1770 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1771 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1774 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1775 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1776 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1777 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1778 return Err(LightningError{err:
1779 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1780 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1783 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1784 ($target: expr) => {
1785 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1786 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1787 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1788 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1789 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1790 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1791 // but only in the non-normative section.
1792 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1793 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1794 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1795 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1801 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1803 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1804 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1806 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1807 enabled: chan_enabled,
1808 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1809 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1810 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1811 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1813 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1814 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1818 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1822 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1823 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1824 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1825 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1826 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1827 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1828 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1829 })?, "channel_update");
1831 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1833 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1834 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1835 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1836 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1837 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1838 })?, "channel_update");
1840 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1848 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1849 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1850 ($node_id: expr) => {
1851 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1852 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1853 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1855 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1856 entry.remove_entry();
1859 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1864 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1865 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1869 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1870 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1872 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1873 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1877 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1878 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1879 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1882 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1883 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1884 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1885 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1888 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1890 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1891 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1895 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1896 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1897 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1900 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1901 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1902 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1903 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1906 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1907 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1908 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1909 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1910 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1911 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1912 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1921 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1922 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1923 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1924 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1925 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1926 use crate::routing::utxo::UtxoLookupError;
1927 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1928 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1929 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1930 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1931 use crate::util::test_utils;
1932 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1933 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1934 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1936 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1937 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1939 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1940 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1941 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1942 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1943 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1944 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1948 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1949 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1952 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1953 use crate::prelude::*;
1954 use crate::sync::Arc;
1956 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1957 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1958 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1959 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1962 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1963 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1964 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1967 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1968 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1969 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1973 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1974 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1975 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1976 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1977 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1979 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1980 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1981 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1982 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1983 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1984 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1987 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1988 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
1989 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1990 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1995 addresses: Vec::new(),
1996 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1997 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1999 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2000 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2002 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2003 contents: unsigned_announcement
2007 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2008 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2009 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2010 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2011 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2013 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2014 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2015 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2016 short_channel_id: 0,
2017 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2018 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2019 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2020 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2021 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2023 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2024 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2025 ChannelAnnouncement {
2026 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2027 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2028 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2029 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2030 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2034 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2035 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2036 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2037 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2038 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2041 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2042 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2043 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2044 short_channel_id: 0,
2047 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2048 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2049 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2050 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2051 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2052 excess_data: Vec::new()
2054 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2055 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2057 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2058 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2063 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2064 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2065 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2067 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2068 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2069 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2071 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2072 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2074 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2078 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2079 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2080 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2081 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2086 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2087 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2091 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2092 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2094 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2095 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2098 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2101 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2102 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2103 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2104 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2105 // Return false because contains excess data.
2106 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2107 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2111 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2112 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2113 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2114 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2115 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2116 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2118 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2123 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2124 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2125 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2127 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2128 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2130 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2131 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2133 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2134 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2135 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2136 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2137 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2138 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2143 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2149 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2150 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2151 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2153 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2156 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2157 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2158 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx);
2159 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2160 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2162 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2163 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2164 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2165 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2167 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2170 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2171 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2172 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2173 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2174 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2175 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2176 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2181 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2187 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2188 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2189 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2190 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2192 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2195 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2197 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2199 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2200 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2201 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2203 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2204 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2205 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2206 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2207 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2209 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2212 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2214 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2215 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2216 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2221 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2222 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2223 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2224 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2225 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2226 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2227 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2231 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2232 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2233 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2235 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2238 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2239 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2241 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2246 fn handling_channel_update() {
2247 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2248 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2249 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2250 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2251 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2252 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2254 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2255 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2257 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2258 let short_channel_id;
2261 // Announce a channel we will update
2262 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2263 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2265 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2266 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2267 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2274 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2275 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2276 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2281 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2283 Some(channel_info) => {
2284 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2285 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2290 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2291 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2292 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2293 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2294 // Return false because contains excess data
2295 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2296 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2300 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2301 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2302 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2303 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2304 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2306 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2309 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2310 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2311 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2312 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2313 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2315 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2318 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2319 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2320 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2321 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2322 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2324 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2327 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2328 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2329 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2330 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2331 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2332 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2334 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2337 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2338 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2339 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2340 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2341 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2342 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2343 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2345 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2350 fn handling_network_update() {
2351 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2352 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2353 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2354 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2356 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2357 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2358 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2361 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2362 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2365 let short_channel_id;
2367 // Announce a channel we will update
2368 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2369 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2370 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2371 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2372 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2374 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2375 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2377 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2378 msg: valid_channel_update,
2381 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2384 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2386 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2388 Some(channel_info) => {
2389 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2393 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2395 is_permanent: false,
2398 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2400 Some(channel_info) => {
2401 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2406 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2407 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2412 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2413 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2414 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2417 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2418 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2420 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2421 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2422 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2423 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2424 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2425 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2427 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2428 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2430 is_permanent: false,
2433 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2434 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2436 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2437 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2442 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2443 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2444 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2449 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2450 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2451 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2452 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2453 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2454 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2455 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2458 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2459 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2461 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2462 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2463 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2464 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2465 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2467 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2468 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2469 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2470 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2472 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2473 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2474 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2476 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2477 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2478 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2480 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2481 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2482 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2483 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2485 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2486 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2488 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2490 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2491 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2492 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2493 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2494 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2496 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2497 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2498 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2499 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2500 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2501 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2502 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2503 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2504 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2505 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2506 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2507 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2508 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2509 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2510 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2511 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2512 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2515 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2516 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2517 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2519 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2521 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2523 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2525 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2526 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2527 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2529 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2530 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2531 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2532 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2534 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2535 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2536 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2538 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2539 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2540 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2541 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2543 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2544 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2545 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2546 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2547 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2550 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2552 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2553 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2554 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2556 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2558 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2559 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2560 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2562 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2563 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2564 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2565 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2567 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2568 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2569 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2571 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2572 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2573 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2575 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2576 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2577 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2578 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2579 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2584 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2585 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2586 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2587 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2588 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2590 // Channels were not announced yet.
2591 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2592 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2594 let short_channel_id;
2596 // Announce a channel we will update
2597 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2598 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2599 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2605 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2606 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2607 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2608 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2609 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2610 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2616 // Valid channel update
2617 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2618 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2619 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2620 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2626 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2627 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2628 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2629 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2630 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2631 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2637 // Channel update with excess data.
2638 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2639 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2640 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2641 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2642 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2648 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2649 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2650 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2651 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2652 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2653 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2658 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2659 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2660 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2664 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2665 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2666 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2667 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2668 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2669 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2672 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2673 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2676 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2677 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2678 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2684 // Nodes were never announced
2685 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2686 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2689 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2690 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2695 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2696 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2702 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2703 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2705 // Skip the first node.
2706 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2707 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2710 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2711 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2712 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2713 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2714 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2715 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2716 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2721 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2722 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2726 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2727 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2728 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2730 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2731 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2733 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2734 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2735 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2736 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2740 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2741 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2746 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2747 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2748 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2749 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2751 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2752 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2756 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2757 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2758 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2760 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2761 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2763 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2764 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2765 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2766 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2770 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2771 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2772 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2773 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2775 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2776 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2777 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2778 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2780 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2782 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2784 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2785 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2786 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2790 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2792 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2793 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2794 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2795 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2796 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2799 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2800 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2801 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2802 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2803 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2804 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2805 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2807 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2813 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2814 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2815 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2817 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2818 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2819 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2820 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2822 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2823 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2824 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2827 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2828 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2829 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2832 // used for testing resumption on same block
2833 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2836 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2837 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2838 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2839 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2845 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2846 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2850 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2852 number_of_blocks: 0,
2855 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2856 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2858 number_of_blocks: 0,
2859 sync_complete: true,
2860 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2864 // Error when wrong chain
2865 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2869 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2871 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2874 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2875 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2877 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2878 sync_complete: true,
2879 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2883 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2884 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2888 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2889 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2890 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2893 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2894 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2895 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2896 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2897 sync_complete: true,
2898 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2902 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2903 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2907 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2908 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2909 number_of_blocks: 1,
2914 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2915 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2916 number_of_blocks: 1,
2917 sync_complete: true,
2918 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2923 // No results in valid query range
2924 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2928 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2929 first_blocknum: 1000,
2930 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2935 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2936 first_blocknum: 1000,
2937 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2938 sync_complete: true,
2939 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2944 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2945 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2949 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2950 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2951 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2956 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2957 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2958 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2959 sync_complete: true,
2960 short_channel_ids: vec![
2961 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2967 // Single block exactly full
2968 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2972 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2973 first_blocknum: 100000,
2974 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2979 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2980 first_blocknum: 100000,
2981 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2982 sync_complete: true,
2983 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2984 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2990 // Multiple split on new block
2991 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2995 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2996 first_blocknum: 100000,
2997 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3002 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3003 first_blocknum: 100000,
3004 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3005 sync_complete: false,
3006 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3007 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3011 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3012 first_blocknum: 107999,
3013 number_of_blocks: 2,
3014 sync_complete: true,
3015 short_channel_ids: vec![
3016 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3022 // Multiple split on same block
3023 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3027 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3028 first_blocknum: 100002,
3029 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3034 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3035 first_blocknum: 100002,
3036 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3037 sync_complete: false,
3038 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3039 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3043 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3044 first_blocknum: 108001,
3045 number_of_blocks: 1,
3046 sync_complete: true,
3047 short_channel_ids: vec![
3048 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3055 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3056 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3057 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3058 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3060 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3062 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3063 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3064 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3065 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3068 assert!(result.is_ok());
3070 assert!(result.is_err());
3073 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3074 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3076 for i in 0..events.len() {
3077 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3079 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3080 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3081 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3082 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3083 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3084 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3085 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3087 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3088 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3089 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3090 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3091 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3093 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3094 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3095 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3098 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3104 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3105 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3106 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3107 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3108 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3110 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3112 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3114 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3116 assert!(result.is_err());
3120 fn displays_node_alias() {
3121 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3122 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3123 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3124 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3127 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3128 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3129 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3131 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3132 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3133 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3134 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3137 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3138 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3139 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3143 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3144 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3145 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3146 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3147 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3148 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3150 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3151 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3154 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3155 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3156 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3157 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3158 last_update_message: None,
3161 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3162 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3164 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3165 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3166 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3168 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3169 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3170 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3172 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3173 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3174 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3175 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3176 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3178 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3179 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3180 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3182 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3183 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3184 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3185 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3186 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3188 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3190 capacity_sats: None,
3191 announcement_message: None,
3192 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3195 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3196 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3198 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3199 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3201 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3202 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3203 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3204 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3205 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3206 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3207 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3208 capacity_sats: None,
3209 announcement_message: None,
3210 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3213 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3214 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3216 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3217 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3219 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3220 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3221 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3223 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3224 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3225 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3226 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3227 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3228 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3229 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3231 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3232 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3233 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3234 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3235 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3239 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3240 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3242 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3243 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3244 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3245 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3248 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3249 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3250 announcement_message: None,
3253 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3254 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3255 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3256 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3258 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3259 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3260 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3262 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3263 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3264 channels: Vec::new(),
3265 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3268 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3269 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3270 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3271 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3273 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3274 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3275 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3279 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3287 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3288 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3289 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3290 let mut v = Vec::new();
3291 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3293 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3298 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3299 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3300 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3301 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3303 let _ = net_graph.encode();