1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use crate::chain::Access;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
82 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
83 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
84 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
87 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
88 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
89 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
93 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
94 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
101 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
102 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
103 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
107 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
108 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
109 Some(self.cmp(other))
113 impl Ord for NodeId {
114 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
115 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
119 impl Writeable for NodeId {
120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
121 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
126 impl Readable for NodeId {
127 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
128 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
129 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
134 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
135 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
136 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
137 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
138 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
140 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
141 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
142 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
143 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
145 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
146 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
147 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
148 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
149 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
150 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
151 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
154 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
155 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
156 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
157 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
159 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
160 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
161 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
164 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
165 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
166 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
167 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
170 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
171 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
173 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
175 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
176 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
177 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
178 ChannelUpdateMessage {
179 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
182 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
183 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
185 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
186 short_channel_id: u64,
187 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
188 /// `channel_update` message is received.
191 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
192 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
194 /// The node id of the failed node.
196 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
197 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
202 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
203 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
206 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
207 (0, short_channel_id, required),
208 (2, is_permanent, required),
210 (4, NodeFailure) => {
211 (0, node_id, required),
212 (2, is_permanent, required),
216 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
217 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
218 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
219 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
220 /// serving historical announcements.
221 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
222 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
225 chain_access: Option<C>,
226 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
227 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
228 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
232 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
233 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
235 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
236 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
237 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
238 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
239 /// channel owners' keys.
240 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
243 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
244 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
246 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
251 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
252 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
253 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
254 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
255 self.chain_access = chain_access;
258 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
259 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
261 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
262 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
267 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
268 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
269 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
270 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
271 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
272 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
280 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
281 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
283 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
284 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
285 match *network_update {
286 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
287 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
288 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
289 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
291 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
293 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
294 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
295 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
296 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
298 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
300 log_debug!(self.logger,
301 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
302 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
309 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
310 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
311 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
314 return Err(LightningError {
315 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
316 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
317 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
319 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
321 log_level: Level::Trace,
329 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
330 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
332 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
335 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
336 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
339 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
340 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
341 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
342 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
345 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
346 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
347 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
350 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
351 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
352 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
353 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
354 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
355 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
356 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
357 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
358 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
360 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
361 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
363 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
365 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
366 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
372 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
373 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
374 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
375 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
379 for (_, ref node) in iter {
380 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
381 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
399 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
400 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
401 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
402 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
406 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
408 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
409 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
410 // updates from all our peers normally.
412 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
413 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
414 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
417 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
418 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
419 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
420 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
421 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
423 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
424 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
425 // relying on it useless.
427 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
428 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
429 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
431 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
432 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
433 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
434 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
435 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
438 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
439 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
440 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
441 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
442 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
443 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
444 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
446 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
447 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
448 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
449 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
451 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
452 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
453 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
455 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
456 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
457 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
458 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
460 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
461 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
462 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
464 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
468 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
469 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
470 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
471 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
472 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
473 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
474 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
480 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
481 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
482 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
483 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
487 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
488 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
489 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
490 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
494 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
495 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
496 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
497 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
498 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
499 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
500 /// memory constrained systems.
501 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
502 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
504 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
506 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
507 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
508 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
510 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
511 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
512 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
513 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
514 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
515 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
516 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
517 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
518 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
520 short_channel_ids: vec![],
523 return Err(LightningError {
524 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
525 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
529 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
530 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
531 // exists even if its not yet routable.
532 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
533 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
534 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
535 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
536 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
537 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
538 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
541 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
542 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
547 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
548 let batch_count = batches.len();
549 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
550 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
551 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
552 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
554 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
555 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
556 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
557 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
558 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
559 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
560 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
562 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
563 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
564 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
566 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
567 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
568 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
570 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
571 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
572 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
573 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
575 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
576 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
578 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
581 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
583 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
584 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
585 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
586 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
590 short_channel_ids: batch,
598 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
601 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
602 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
606 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
607 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
608 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
612 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
613 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
614 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
619 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
621 C::Target: chain::Access,
624 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
625 let mut ret = Vec::new();
626 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
627 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
632 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
633 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
634 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
635 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
636 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
637 pub last_update: u32,
638 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
640 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
641 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
642 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
643 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
644 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
645 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
646 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
647 pub fees: RoutingFees,
648 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
649 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
650 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
651 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
652 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
655 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
656 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
657 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
662 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
663 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
664 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
665 (0, self.last_update, required),
666 (2, self.enabled, required),
667 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
668 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
669 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
670 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
671 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
672 (10, self.fees, required),
673 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
679 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
680 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
681 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
682 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
683 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
684 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
685 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
686 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
687 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
689 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
690 (0, last_update, required),
691 (2, enabled, required),
692 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
693 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
694 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
695 (10, fees, required),
696 (12, last_update_message, required)
699 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
700 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
701 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
702 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
703 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
704 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
706 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
707 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
710 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
715 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
716 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
717 /// Received within a channel announcement.
718 pub struct ChannelInfo {
719 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
720 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
721 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
722 pub node_one: NodeId,
723 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
724 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
725 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
726 pub node_two: NodeId,
727 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
728 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
729 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
730 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
731 /// An initial announcement of the channel
732 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
733 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
734 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
735 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
736 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
737 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
738 /// network graph in memory!).
739 announcement_received_time: u64,
743 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
744 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
745 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
746 let (direction, source) = {
747 if target == &self.node_one {
748 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
749 } else if target == &self.node_two {
750 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
755 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
758 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
759 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
760 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
761 let (direction, target) = {
762 if source == &self.node_one {
763 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
764 } else if source == &self.node_two {
765 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
770 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
773 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
774 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
775 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
777 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
779 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
784 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
785 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
786 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
787 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
792 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
793 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
794 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
795 (0, self.features, required),
796 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
797 (2, self.node_one, required),
798 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
799 (6, self.node_two, required),
800 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
801 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
802 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
808 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
809 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
810 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
811 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
812 // channel updates via the gossip network.
813 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
815 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
816 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
817 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
818 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
819 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
820 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
821 Err(err) => Err(err),
826 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
827 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
828 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
829 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
830 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
831 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
832 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
833 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
834 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
835 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
836 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
837 (0, features, required),
838 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
839 (2, node_one, required),
840 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
841 (6, node_two, required),
842 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
843 (10, capacity_sats, required),
844 (12, announcement_message, required),
848 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
849 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
850 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
851 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
852 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
853 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
854 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
855 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
860 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
861 /// source node to a target node.
863 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
864 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
865 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
866 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
867 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
870 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
872 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
873 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
874 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
876 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
877 Some(capacity_msat) => {
878 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
879 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
881 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
885 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
889 /// Returns information for the channel.
891 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
893 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
895 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
896 self.htlc_maximum_msat
899 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
901 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
902 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
904 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
905 self.effective_capacity
908 /// Returns information for the direction.
910 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
913 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
914 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
915 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
916 .field("channel", &self.channel)
921 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
923 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
924 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
925 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
926 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
927 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
930 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
934 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
936 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
939 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
941 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
943 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
944 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
946 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
949 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
950 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
954 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
955 /// use when making routing decisions.
956 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
958 impl EffectiveCapacity {
959 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
960 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
962 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
963 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
964 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
965 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
966 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
971 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
972 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
973 pub struct RoutingFees {
974 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
976 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
977 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
978 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
981 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
982 (0, base_msat, required),
983 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
986 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
987 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
988 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
989 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
990 pub features: NodeFeatures,
991 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
992 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
993 pub last_update: u32,
994 /// Color assigned to the node
996 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
997 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
998 /// should not be exposed to the user.
999 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1000 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1001 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1002 /// An initial announcement of the node
1003 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1004 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1005 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1006 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1009 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1010 (0, features, required),
1011 (2, last_update, required),
1013 (6, alias, required),
1014 (8, announcement_message, option),
1015 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1018 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1020 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1021 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1022 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1023 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1025 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1026 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1027 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1028 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1029 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1030 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1032 use core::fmt::Write;
1033 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1034 // Display printable ASCII characters
1035 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1036 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1045 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1046 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1051 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1052 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1053 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1057 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1058 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1059 pub struct NodeInfo {
1060 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1061 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1062 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1063 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1064 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1065 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1068 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1069 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1070 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1071 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1076 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1077 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1078 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1079 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1080 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1081 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1087 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1088 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1089 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1090 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1091 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1093 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1094 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1095 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1096 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1098 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1105 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1106 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1107 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1108 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1109 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1110 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1111 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1112 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1113 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1114 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1116 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1117 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1118 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1119 (4, channels, vec_type),
1123 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1124 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1129 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1130 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1132 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1133 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1134 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1136 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1137 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1138 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1139 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1140 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1141 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1143 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1144 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1145 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1146 node_id.write(writer)?;
1147 node_info.write(writer)?;
1150 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1151 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1152 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1158 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1159 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1160 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1162 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1163 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1164 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1165 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1166 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1167 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1168 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1170 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1171 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1172 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1173 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1174 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1175 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1178 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1179 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1180 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1184 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1187 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1188 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1189 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1190 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1191 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1196 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1197 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1198 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1199 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1200 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1202 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1203 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1204 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1210 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1211 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1212 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1213 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1214 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1215 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1219 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1220 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1221 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1223 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1226 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1227 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1228 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1229 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1230 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1234 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1235 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1236 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1237 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1238 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1244 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1245 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1246 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1247 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1250 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1251 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1252 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1253 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1256 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1259 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1260 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1261 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1265 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1266 /// given node announcement.
1268 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1269 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1270 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1271 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1272 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1273 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1274 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1277 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1278 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1279 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1281 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1282 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1285 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1286 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1287 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1289 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1290 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1291 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1292 // that it be at least the current time.
1293 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1294 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1295 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1296 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1301 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1302 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1303 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1304 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1305 features: msg.features.clone(),
1306 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1308 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1309 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1310 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1318 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1320 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1321 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1322 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1324 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1325 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1326 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1327 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1328 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1330 C::Target: chain::Access,
1332 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1333 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1334 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1335 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1336 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1337 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1340 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1341 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1342 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1344 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1345 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1346 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1347 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1348 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1350 C::Target: chain::Access,
1352 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1355 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1357 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1358 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1360 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1361 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1362 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1363 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1366 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1367 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1368 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1370 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1372 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1374 capacity_sats: None,
1375 announcement_message: None,
1376 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1379 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1382 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1383 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1384 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1386 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1387 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1389 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1390 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1391 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1392 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1394 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1395 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1396 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1397 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1399 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1400 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1402 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1403 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1404 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1406 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1409 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1410 entry.insert(channel_info);
1414 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1415 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1416 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1417 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1419 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1420 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1421 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1422 announcement_info: None,
1431 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1432 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1433 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1435 C::Target: chain::Access,
1437 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1438 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1441 let node_one = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1);
1442 let node_two = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2);
1445 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1447 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1448 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1449 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1450 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1452 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1453 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1454 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1455 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1457 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1458 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1459 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1460 if node_one == chan.node_one && node_two == chan.node_two {
1461 return Err(LightningError {
1462 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1463 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1466 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1467 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1468 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1469 return Err(LightningError {
1470 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1471 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1478 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1479 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1480 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1481 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_one) ||
1482 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_two) {
1483 return Err(LightningError{
1484 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1485 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1489 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1491 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1494 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1495 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1496 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1497 let expected_script =
1498 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1499 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1500 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1502 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1503 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1506 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1507 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1509 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1510 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1516 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1517 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1518 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1520 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1523 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1524 features: msg.features.clone(),
1529 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1530 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1531 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1532 announcement_received_time,
1535 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1538 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1539 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1540 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1541 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1542 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1543 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1544 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1545 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1546 let current_time_unix = None;
1548 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1551 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1552 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1553 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1554 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1555 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1556 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1558 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1559 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1560 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1561 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1564 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1565 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1566 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1568 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1569 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1575 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1576 /// from local storage.
1577 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1578 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1579 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1580 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1581 let current_time_unix = None;
1583 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1584 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1585 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1586 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1587 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1589 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1590 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1591 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1592 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1593 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1594 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1597 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1598 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1601 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1604 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1608 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1609 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1610 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1613 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1614 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1615 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1617 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1618 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1620 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1621 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1623 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1624 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1625 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1626 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1627 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1630 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1631 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1634 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1635 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1636 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1638 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1639 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1641 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1642 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1643 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1644 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1645 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1646 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1647 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1648 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1649 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1651 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1652 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1653 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1654 info.one_to_two = None;
1656 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1657 info.two_to_one = None;
1659 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1660 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1661 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1662 // channel_update for.
1663 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1664 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1668 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1669 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1670 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1671 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1672 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1673 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1677 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1678 if let Some(time) = time {
1679 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1681 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1682 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1683 // of this function.
1684 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1686 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1687 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1690 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1694 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1695 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1698 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1701 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1702 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1703 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1705 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1706 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1707 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1708 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1711 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1712 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1713 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1715 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1716 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1717 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1718 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1721 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1722 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1724 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1726 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1727 // disable this check during tests!
1728 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1729 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1730 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1732 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1733 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1737 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1738 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1739 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1741 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1742 return Err(LightningError{err:
1743 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1744 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1747 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1748 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1749 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1750 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1751 return Err(LightningError{err:
1752 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1753 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1756 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1757 ($target: expr) => {
1758 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1759 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1760 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1761 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1762 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1763 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1764 // but only in the non-normative section.
1765 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1766 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1767 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1768 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1774 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1776 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1777 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1779 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1780 enabled: chan_enabled,
1781 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1782 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1783 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1784 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1786 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1787 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1791 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1795 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1796 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1797 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1798 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1799 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1800 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1801 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1802 })?, "channel_update");
1804 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1806 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1807 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1808 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1809 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1810 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1811 })?, "channel_update");
1813 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1821 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1822 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1823 ($node_id: expr) => {
1824 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1825 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1826 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1828 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1829 entry.remove_entry();
1832 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1837 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1838 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1842 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1843 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1845 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1846 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1850 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1851 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1852 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1855 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1856 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1857 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1858 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1861 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1863 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1864 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1868 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1869 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1870 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1873 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1874 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1875 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1876 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1879 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1880 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1881 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1882 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1883 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1884 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1885 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1895 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1896 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1897 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1898 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1899 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1900 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1901 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1902 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1903 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1904 use crate::util::test_utils;
1905 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1906 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1907 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1909 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1910 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1912 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1913 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1914 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1915 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1916 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1917 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1921 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1922 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1925 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1926 use crate::prelude::*;
1927 use crate::sync::Arc;
1929 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1930 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1931 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1932 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1935 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1936 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1937 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1939 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1940 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1941 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1942 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1946 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1947 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1948 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1949 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1950 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1952 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1953 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1954 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1955 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1956 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1957 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1960 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1961 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1962 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1963 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1968 addresses: Vec::new(),
1969 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1970 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1972 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1973 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1975 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1976 contents: unsigned_announcement
1980 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1981 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1982 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1983 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1984 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1986 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1987 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1988 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1989 short_channel_id: 0,
1992 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1993 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1994 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1996 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1997 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1998 ChannelAnnouncement {
1999 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2000 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2001 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2002 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2003 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2007 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2008 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2009 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2010 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2011 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2014 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2015 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2016 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2017 short_channel_id: 0,
2020 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2021 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2022 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2023 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2024 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2025 excess_data: Vec::new()
2027 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2028 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2030 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2031 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2036 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2037 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2038 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2040 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2041 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2042 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2044 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2045 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2047 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2051 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2052 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2053 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2054 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2059 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2060 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2064 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2065 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2067 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2068 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2071 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2074 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2075 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2076 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2077 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2078 // Return false because contains excess data.
2079 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2080 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2084 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2085 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2086 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2087 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2088 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2089 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2091 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2096 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2097 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2098 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2100 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2101 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2103 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2104 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2106 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2107 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2108 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2109 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2110 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2111 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2116 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2122 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2123 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2124 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2126 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2129 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2130 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2131 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2132 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2133 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2135 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2136 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2137 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2138 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2140 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2143 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2144 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2145 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2146 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2147 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2148 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2149 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2154 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2160 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2161 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2162 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2163 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2165 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2168 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2170 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2172 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2173 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2174 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2176 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2177 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2178 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2179 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2180 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2182 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2185 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2187 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2188 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2189 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2194 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2195 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2196 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2197 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2198 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2199 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2200 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2204 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2205 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2206 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2208 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2211 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2212 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2214 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2219 fn handling_channel_update() {
2220 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2221 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2222 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2223 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2224 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2225 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2227 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2228 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2230 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2231 let short_channel_id;
2234 // Announce a channel we will update
2235 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2236 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2238 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2239 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2240 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2247 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2248 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2249 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2254 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2256 Some(channel_info) => {
2257 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2258 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2263 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2264 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2265 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2266 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2267 // Return false because contains excess data
2268 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2269 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2273 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2274 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2275 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2276 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2277 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2279 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2282 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2283 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2284 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2285 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2286 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2288 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2291 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2292 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2293 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2294 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2295 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2297 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2300 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2301 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2302 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2303 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2304 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2305 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2307 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2310 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2311 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2312 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2313 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2314 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2315 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2316 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2318 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2323 fn handling_network_update() {
2324 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2325 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2326 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2327 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2329 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2330 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2331 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2334 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2335 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2338 let short_channel_id;
2340 // Announce a channel we will update
2341 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2342 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2343 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2344 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2345 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2347 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2348 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2350 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2351 msg: valid_channel_update,
2354 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2357 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2359 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2361 Some(channel_info) => {
2362 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2366 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2368 is_permanent: false,
2371 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2373 Some(channel_info) => {
2374 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2379 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2380 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2385 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2386 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2387 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2390 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2391 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2393 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2394 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2395 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2396 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2397 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2398 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2400 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2401 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2403 is_permanent: false,
2406 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2407 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2409 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2410 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2415 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2416 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2417 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2422 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2423 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2424 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2425 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2426 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2427 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2428 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2429 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2431 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2432 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2434 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2435 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2436 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2437 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2438 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2440 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2441 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2442 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2443 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2445 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2446 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2447 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2449 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2450 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2451 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2453 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2454 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2455 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2456 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2458 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2459 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2461 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2463 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2464 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2465 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2466 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2467 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2469 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2470 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2471 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2472 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2473 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2474 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2475 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2476 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2477 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2478 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2479 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2480 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2481 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2482 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2483 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2484 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2485 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2488 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2489 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2490 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2492 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2494 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2496 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2498 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2499 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2500 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2502 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2503 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2504 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2505 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2507 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2508 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2509 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2511 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2512 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2513 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2514 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2516 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2517 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2518 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2519 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2520 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2523 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2525 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2526 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2527 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2529 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2531 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2532 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2533 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2535 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2536 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2537 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2538 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2540 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2541 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2542 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2544 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2545 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2546 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2548 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2549 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2550 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2551 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2552 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2557 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2558 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2559 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2560 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2561 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2563 // Channels were not announced yet.
2564 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2565 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2567 let short_channel_id;
2569 // Announce a channel we will update
2570 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2571 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2572 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2578 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2579 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2580 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2581 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2582 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2583 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2589 // Valid channel update
2590 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2591 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2592 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2593 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2599 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2600 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2601 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2602 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2603 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2604 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2610 // Channel update with excess data.
2611 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2612 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2613 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2614 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2615 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2621 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2622 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2623 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2624 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2625 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2626 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2631 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2632 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2633 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2637 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2638 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2639 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2640 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2641 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2642 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2645 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2646 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2649 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2650 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2651 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2657 // Nodes were never announced
2658 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2659 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2662 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2663 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2668 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2669 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2675 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2676 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2678 // Skip the first node.
2679 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2680 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2683 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2684 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2685 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2686 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2687 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2688 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2689 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2694 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2695 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2699 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2700 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2701 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2703 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2704 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2706 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2707 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2708 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2709 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2713 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2714 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2719 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2720 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2721 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2722 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2724 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2725 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2729 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2730 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2731 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2733 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2734 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2736 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2737 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2738 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2739 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2743 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2744 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2745 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2746 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2748 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2749 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2750 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2751 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2753 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2755 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2757 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2758 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2759 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2763 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2765 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2766 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2767 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2768 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2769 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2770 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2772 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2773 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2774 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2775 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2776 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2777 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2778 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2780 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2786 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2787 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2788 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2790 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2791 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2792 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2793 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2795 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2796 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2797 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2800 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2801 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2802 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2805 // used for testing resumption on same block
2806 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2809 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2810 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2811 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2812 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2818 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2819 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2823 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2825 number_of_blocks: 0,
2828 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2829 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2831 number_of_blocks: 0,
2832 sync_complete: true,
2833 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2837 // Error when wrong chain
2838 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2842 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2844 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2847 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2848 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2850 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2851 sync_complete: true,
2852 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2856 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2857 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2861 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2862 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2863 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2866 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2867 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2868 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2869 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2870 sync_complete: true,
2871 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2875 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2876 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2880 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2881 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2882 number_of_blocks: 1,
2887 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2888 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2889 number_of_blocks: 1,
2890 sync_complete: true,
2891 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2896 // No results in valid query range
2897 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2901 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2902 first_blocknum: 1000,
2903 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2908 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2909 first_blocknum: 1000,
2910 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2911 sync_complete: true,
2912 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2917 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2918 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2922 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2923 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2924 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2929 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2930 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2931 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2932 sync_complete: true,
2933 short_channel_ids: vec![
2934 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2940 // Single block exactly full
2941 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2945 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2946 first_blocknum: 100000,
2947 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2952 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2953 first_blocknum: 100000,
2954 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2955 sync_complete: true,
2956 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2957 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2963 // Multiple split on new block
2964 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2968 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2969 first_blocknum: 100000,
2970 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2975 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2976 first_blocknum: 100000,
2977 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2978 sync_complete: false,
2979 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2980 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2984 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2985 first_blocknum: 107999,
2986 number_of_blocks: 2,
2987 sync_complete: true,
2988 short_channel_ids: vec![
2989 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2995 // Multiple split on same block
2996 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3000 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3001 first_blocknum: 100002,
3002 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3007 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3008 first_blocknum: 100002,
3009 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3010 sync_complete: false,
3011 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3012 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3016 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3017 first_blocknum: 108001,
3018 number_of_blocks: 1,
3019 sync_complete: true,
3020 short_channel_ids: vec![
3021 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3028 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3029 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3030 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3031 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3033 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3035 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3036 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3037 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3038 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3041 assert!(result.is_ok());
3043 assert!(result.is_err());
3046 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3047 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3049 for i in 0..events.len() {
3050 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3052 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3053 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3054 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3055 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3056 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3057 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3058 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3060 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3061 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3062 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3063 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3064 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3066 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3067 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3068 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3071 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3077 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3078 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3079 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3080 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3081 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3083 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3085 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3087 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3089 assert!(result.is_err());
3093 fn displays_node_alias() {
3094 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3095 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3096 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3097 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3100 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3101 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3102 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3104 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3105 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3106 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3107 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3110 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3111 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3112 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3116 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3117 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3118 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3119 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3120 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3121 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3123 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3124 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3127 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3128 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3129 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3130 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3131 last_update_message: None,
3134 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3135 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3137 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3138 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3139 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3141 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3142 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3143 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3145 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3146 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3147 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3148 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3149 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3151 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3152 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3153 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3155 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3156 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3157 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3158 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3159 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3161 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3163 capacity_sats: None,
3164 announcement_message: None,
3165 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3168 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3169 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3171 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3172 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3174 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3175 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3176 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3177 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3178 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3179 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3180 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3181 capacity_sats: None,
3182 announcement_message: None,
3183 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3186 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3187 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3189 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3190 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3192 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3193 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3194 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3196 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3197 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3198 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3199 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3200 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3201 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3202 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3204 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3205 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3206 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3207 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3208 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3212 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3213 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3215 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3216 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3217 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3218 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3221 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3222 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3223 announcement_message: None,
3226 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3227 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3228 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3229 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3231 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3232 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3233 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3235 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3236 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3237 channels: Vec::new(),
3238 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3241 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3242 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3243 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3244 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3246 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3247 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3248 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3252 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3260 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3261 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3262 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3263 let mut v = Vec::new();
3264 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3266 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3271 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3272 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3273 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3274 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3276 let _ = net_graph.encode();