1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use core::str::FromStr;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Create a new NodeId from a slice of bytes
77 pub fn from_slice(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
78 if bytes.len() != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE {
79 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
81 let mut data = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
82 data.copy_from_slice(bytes);
86 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
91 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
92 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
96 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
97 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
98 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
102 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
103 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
104 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
107 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
108 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
109 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
113 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
114 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
119 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
120 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
121 Some(self.cmp(other))
125 impl Ord for NodeId {
126 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
127 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
131 impl Writeable for NodeId {
132 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
133 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
138 impl Readable for NodeId {
139 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
140 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
141 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
146 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
147 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
148 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
152 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
153 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
155 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
160 impl FromStr for NodeId {
161 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
163 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
164 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
169 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
170 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
171 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
172 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
173 chain_hash: ChainHash,
175 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
176 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
177 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
178 removed_node_counters: Mutex<Vec<u32>>,
179 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize,
180 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
182 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
183 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
184 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
185 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
186 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
187 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
188 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
191 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
192 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
193 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
194 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
195 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
196 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
197 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
198 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
199 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
200 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
203 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
204 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
205 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
206 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
207 max_node_counter: u32,
210 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
211 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
213 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
216 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
217 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
218 ChannelUpdateMessage {
219 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
222 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
223 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
225 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
226 short_channel_id: u64,
227 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
228 /// `channel_update` message is received.
231 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
232 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
234 /// The node id of the failed node.
236 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
237 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
242 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
243 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
246 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
247 (0, short_channel_id, required),
248 (2, is_permanent, required),
250 (4, NodeFailure) => {
251 (0, node_id, required),
252 (2, is_permanent, required),
256 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
257 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
258 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
259 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
260 /// serving historical announcements.
261 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
262 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
265 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
267 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
268 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
272 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
273 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
275 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
276 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
277 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
278 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
279 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
282 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
283 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
284 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
285 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
290 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
291 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
292 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
293 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
294 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
297 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
298 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
300 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
301 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
305 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
306 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
307 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
308 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
309 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
310 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
311 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
318 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
320 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
322 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
325 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
326 if update_msg.as_ref()
327 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
333 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
335 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
336 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
337 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
338 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
345 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
349 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
350 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
352 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
353 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
355 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
356 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
357 match *network_update {
358 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
359 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
360 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
361 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
362 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
364 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
366 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
367 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
370 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
372 log_debug!(self.logger,
373 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
374 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
380 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
381 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
386 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
387 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
388 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
391 return Err(LightningError {
392 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
393 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
394 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
395 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
396 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
398 log_level: Level::Trace,
406 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
407 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
408 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
409 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
410 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
411 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
412 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
413 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
414 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
416 log_level: Level::Trace
422 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
423 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
424 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
425 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
428 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
430 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
431 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
432 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
433 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
438 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
440 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
441 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
442 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
443 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
444 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
445 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
446 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
451 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
452 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
454 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
455 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
456 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
457 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
458 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
461 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
462 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
463 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
466 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
467 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
468 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
471 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
472 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
473 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
474 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
475 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
476 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
477 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
478 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
479 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
481 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
482 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
484 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
486 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
487 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
493 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
494 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
495 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
496 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
500 for (_, ref node) in iter {
501 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
502 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
510 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
511 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
512 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
514 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
515 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
516 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
517 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
518 /// tracking this directly.
520 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
521 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
522 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
523 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
524 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
525 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
526 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
527 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
528 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
529 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
533 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
535 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
536 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
537 // updates from all our peers normally.
539 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
540 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
541 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
544 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
545 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
546 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
547 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
548 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
550 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
551 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
552 // relying on it useless.
554 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
555 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
556 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
558 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
559 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
560 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
561 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
562 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
565 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
566 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
567 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
568 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
569 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
570 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
571 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
573 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
574 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
575 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
576 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
578 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
579 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
580 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
582 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
583 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
584 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
585 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
587 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
588 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
589 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
591 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
595 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
596 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
597 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
598 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
599 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
600 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
601 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
607 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
608 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
609 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
610 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
614 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
615 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
616 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
617 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
621 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
622 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
623 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
624 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
625 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
626 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
627 /// memory constrained systems.
628 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
629 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
631 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
633 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
634 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
635 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
637 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
638 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
639 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
640 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
641 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
642 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
643 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
644 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
645 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
647 short_channel_ids: vec![],
650 return Err(LightningError {
651 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
652 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
656 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
657 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
658 // exists even if its not yet routable.
659 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
660 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
661 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
662 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
663 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
664 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
665 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
668 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
669 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
674 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
675 let batch_count = batches.len();
676 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
677 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
678 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
679 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
681 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
682 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
683 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
684 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
685 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
686 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
687 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
689 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
690 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
691 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
693 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
694 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
695 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
697 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
698 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
699 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
700 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
702 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
703 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
705 (false, block_from_scid(*batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
708 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
710 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
711 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
712 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
713 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
717 short_channel_ids: batch,
725 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
728 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
729 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
733 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
734 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
735 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
739 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
740 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
741 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
745 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
746 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
750 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
752 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
755 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
756 let mut ret = Vec::new();
757 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
758 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
763 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
764 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
765 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
766 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
767 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
768 pub last_update: u32,
769 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
771 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
772 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
773 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
774 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
775 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
776 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
777 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
778 pub fees: RoutingFees,
779 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
780 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
781 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
782 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
783 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
786 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
787 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
788 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
793 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
794 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
795 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
796 (0, self.last_update, required),
797 (2, self.enabled, required),
798 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
799 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
800 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
801 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
802 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
803 (10, self.fees, required),
804 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
810 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
811 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
812 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
813 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
814 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
815 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
816 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
817 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
818 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
820 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
821 (0, last_update, required),
822 (2, enabled, required),
823 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
824 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
825 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
826 (10, fees, required),
827 (12, last_update_message, required)
830 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
831 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
832 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
833 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
834 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
835 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
837 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
838 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
841 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
846 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
847 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
848 /// Received within a channel announcement.
849 pub struct ChannelInfo {
850 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
851 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
852 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
853 pub node_one: NodeId,
854 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
855 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
856 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
857 pub node_two: NodeId,
858 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
859 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
860 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
861 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
862 /// An initial announcement of the channel
863 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
864 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
865 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
866 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
867 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
868 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
869 /// network graph in memory!).
870 announcement_received_time: u64,
872 /// The [`NodeInfo::node_counter`] of the node pointed to by [`Self::node_one`].
873 pub(crate) node_one_counter: u32,
874 /// The [`NodeInfo::node_counter`] of the node pointed to by [`Self::node_two`].
875 pub(crate) node_two_counter: u32,
878 impl PartialEq for ChannelInfo {
879 fn eq(&self, o: &ChannelInfo) -> bool {
880 self.features == o.features &&
881 self.node_one == o.node_one &&
882 self.one_to_two == o.one_to_two &&
883 self.node_two == o.node_two &&
884 self.two_to_one == o.two_to_one &&
885 self.capacity_sats == o.capacity_sats &&
886 self.announcement_message == o.announcement_message &&
887 self.announcement_received_time == o.announcement_received_time
892 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
893 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
894 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
895 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
896 if target == &self.node_one {
897 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
898 } else if target == &self.node_two {
899 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
904 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
907 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
908 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
909 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
910 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
911 if source == &self.node_one {
912 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
913 } else if source == &self.node_two {
914 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
919 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
922 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
923 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
924 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
926 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
928 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
933 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
934 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
935 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
936 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
941 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
942 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
943 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
944 (0, self.features, required),
945 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
946 (2, self.node_one, required),
947 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
948 (6, self.node_two, required),
949 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
950 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
951 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
957 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
958 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
959 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
960 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
961 // channel updates via the gossip network.
962 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
964 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
965 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
966 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
967 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
968 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
969 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
970 Err(err) => Err(err),
975 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
976 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
977 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
978 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
979 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
980 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
981 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
982 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
983 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
984 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
985 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
986 (0, features, required),
987 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
988 (2, node_one, required),
989 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
990 (6, node_two, required),
991 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
992 (10, capacity_sats, required),
993 (12, announcement_message, required),
997 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
998 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
999 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1000 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
1001 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1002 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
1003 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
1004 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1005 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1006 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1011 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
1012 /// source node to a target node.
1014 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1015 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
1016 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
1017 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
1018 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
1019 from_node_one: bool,
1022 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1024 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1025 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one }
1028 /// Returns information for the channel.
1030 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1032 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1034 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1035 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1038 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1039 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1040 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1042 match capacity_msat {
1043 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1044 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1045 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1047 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1051 /// Returns information for the direction.
1053 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1055 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1057 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1059 pub fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1061 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1063 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1065 pub fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1067 /// Returns the source node's counter
1069 pub(super) fn source_counter(&self) -> u32 { if self.from_node_one { self.channel.node_one_counter } else { self.channel.node_two_counter } }
1071 /// Returns the target node's counter
1073 pub(super) fn target_counter(&self) -> u32 { if self.from_node_one { self.channel.node_two_counter } else { self.channel.node_one_counter } }
1076 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1077 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1078 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1079 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1084 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1086 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1087 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1088 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1089 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1090 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1093 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1095 liquidity_msat: u64,
1097 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1099 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1102 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1104 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1106 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1107 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1109 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1112 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1114 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1117 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1118 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1122 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1123 /// use when making routing decisions.
1124 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1126 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1127 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1128 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1130 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1131 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1132 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1133 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1134 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1135 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1140 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1141 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1142 pub struct RoutingFees {
1143 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1145 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1146 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1147 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1150 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1151 (0, base_msat, required),
1152 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1155 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1156 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1157 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1158 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1159 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1160 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1161 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1162 pub last_update: u32,
1163 /// Color assigned to the node
1165 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1166 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1167 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1168 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1169 /// An initial announcement of the node
1170 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1171 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1172 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1173 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1176 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1177 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1178 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1179 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1180 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1181 .unwrap_or_default()
1185 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1186 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1187 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1188 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1189 (0, self.features, required),
1190 (2, self.last_update, required),
1191 (4, self.rgb, required),
1192 (6, self.alias, required),
1193 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1194 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1200 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1201 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1202 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1203 (0, features, required),
1204 (2, last_update, required),
1206 (6, alias, required),
1207 (8, announcement_message, option),
1208 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1210 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1211 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1212 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1216 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1218 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1219 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1220 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1221 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1223 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1224 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1225 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1226 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1227 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1228 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1230 use core::fmt::Write;
1231 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1232 // Display printable ASCII characters
1233 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1234 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1243 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1244 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1249 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1250 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1251 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1255 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
1256 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1257 pub struct NodeInfo {
1258 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1259 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1260 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1261 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1262 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1263 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>,
1264 /// In memory, each node is assigned a unique ID. They are eagerly reused, ensuring they remain
1265 /// relatively dense.
1267 /// These IDs allow the router to avoid a `HashMap` lookup by simply using this value as an
1268 /// index in a `Vec`, skipping a big step in some of the hottest code when routing.
1269 pub(crate) node_counter: u32,
1272 impl PartialEq for NodeInfo {
1273 fn eq(&self, o: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
1274 self.channels == o.channels && self.announcement_info == o.announcement_info
1279 /// Returns whether the node has only announced Tor addresses.
1280 pub fn is_tor_only(&self) -> bool {
1281 self.announcement_info
1283 .map(|info| info.addresses())
1284 .and_then(|addresses| (!addresses.is_empty()).then(|| addresses))
1285 .map(|addresses| addresses.iter().all(|address| address.is_tor()))
1290 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1291 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1292 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1293 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1298 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1299 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1300 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1301 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1302 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1303 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1309 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1310 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1311 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1312 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1313 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1315 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1316 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1317 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1318 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1320 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1327 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1328 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1329 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1330 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1331 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1332 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1333 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1334 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1335 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1336 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1337 (4, channels, required_vec),
1339 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1340 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1343 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1345 node_counter: u32::max_value(),
1350 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1351 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1353 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1354 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1355 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1357 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1359 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1360 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1361 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1362 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1363 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1364 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1366 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1367 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1368 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1369 node_id.write(writer)?;
1370 node_info.write(writer)?;
1373 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1374 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1375 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1381 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1382 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1383 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1385 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1386 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1387 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1388 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1389 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1390 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1391 let chan_info: ChannelInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1392 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1394 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1395 if nodes_count > u32::max_value() as u64 / 2 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1396 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1397 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1398 for i in 0..nodes_count {
1399 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1400 let mut node_info: NodeInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1401 node_info.node_counter = i as u32;
1402 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1405 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1406 chan.node_one_counter =
1407 nodes.get(&chan.node_one).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1408 chan.node_two_counter =
1409 nodes.get(&chan.node_two).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1412 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1413 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1414 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1418 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1421 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1422 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1423 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1424 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(nodes_count as usize),
1425 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1426 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1427 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1428 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1433 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1434 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1435 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1436 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1437 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1439 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1440 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1441 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1447 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1448 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1449 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1450 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1451 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1452 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1453 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1454 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1455 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1456 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1457 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1461 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1462 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1463 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1465 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1466 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1468 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1469 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1470 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1471 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1472 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1473 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1474 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1475 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1479 fn test_node_counter_consistency(&self) {
1480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1481 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1482 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1483 let removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1484 let next_counter = self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
1485 assert!(next_counter < (u32::max_value() as usize) / 2);
1486 let mut used_node_counters = vec![0u8; next_counter / 8 + 1];
1488 for counter in removed_node_counters.iter() {
1489 let pos = (*counter as usize) / 8;
1490 let bit = 1 << (counter % 8);
1491 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1492 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1494 for (_, node) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1495 assert!((node.node_counter as usize) < next_counter);
1496 let pos = (node.node_counter as usize) / 8;
1497 let bit = 1 << (node.node_counter % 8);
1498 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1499 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1502 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1503 assert_eq!(chan.node_one_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_one).unwrap().node_counter);
1504 assert_eq!(chan.node_two_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_two).unwrap().node_counter);
1509 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1510 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1511 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1512 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1513 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1514 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1517 max_node_counter: (self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).saturating_sub(1),
1521 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1522 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1523 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1524 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1527 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1528 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1529 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1530 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1533 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1536 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1537 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1538 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1542 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1543 /// given node announcement.
1545 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1546 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1547 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1548 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1549 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1550 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1553 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1554 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1555 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1557 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1558 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1561 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1562 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1563 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1565 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1566 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1567 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1570 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1571 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1572 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1573 // that it be at least the current time.
1574 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1575 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1576 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1577 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1582 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1583 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1584 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1585 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1586 features: msg.features.clone(),
1587 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1590 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1598 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1600 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1601 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1602 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1604 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1605 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1606 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1607 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1608 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1610 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1612 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1613 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1616 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1618 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1619 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1620 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1622 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1623 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1624 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1625 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1626 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1629 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1630 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1631 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1633 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1634 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1635 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1636 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1637 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1639 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1641 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1644 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1646 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1647 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1649 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1650 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1651 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1652 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1655 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1656 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1657 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1659 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1661 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1663 capacity_sats: None,
1664 announcement_message: None,
1665 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1666 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1667 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1670 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1673 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1674 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1675 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1677 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1678 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1680 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1682 let channel_entry = channels.entry(short_channel_id);
1683 let channel_info = match channel_entry {
1684 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1685 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1686 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1688 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1689 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1690 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1691 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1693 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1694 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1696 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1697 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1698 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1701 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1704 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1705 entry.insert(channel_info)
1709 let mut node_counter_id = [
1710 (&mut channel_info.node_one_counter, node_id_a),
1711 (&mut channel_info.node_two_counter, node_id_b)
1713 for (node_counter, current_node_id) in node_counter_id.iter_mut() {
1714 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1715 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1716 let node = node_entry.into_mut();
1717 node.channels.push(short_channel_id);
1718 **node_counter = node.node_counter;
1720 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1721 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1722 **node_counter = removed_node_counters.pop()
1723 .unwrap_or(self.next_node_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u32);
1724 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1725 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1726 announcement_info: None,
1727 node_counter: **node_counter,
1736 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1737 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1738 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1740 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1742 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1743 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1746 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1747 return Err(LightningError {
1748 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1749 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1754 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1756 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1757 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1758 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1759 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1761 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1762 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1763 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1764 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1766 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1767 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1768 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1769 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1770 return Err(LightningError {
1771 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1772 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1775 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1776 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1777 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1778 return Err(LightningError {
1779 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1780 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1787 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1788 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1789 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1790 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1791 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1792 return Err(LightningError{
1793 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1794 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1798 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1799 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1801 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1802 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1803 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1805 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1808 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1809 features: msg.features.clone(),
1810 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1812 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1814 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1815 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1816 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1817 announcement_received_time,
1818 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1819 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1822 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1824 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1828 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1830 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1831 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1832 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1833 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1834 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1835 let current_time_unix = None;
1837 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1840 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1842 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1843 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1844 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1845 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1846 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1847 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1848 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1852 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1853 /// from local storage.
1854 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1855 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1856 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1857 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1858 let current_time_unix = None;
1860 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1861 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1862 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1863 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1864 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1866 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1867 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1868 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1869 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1870 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1871 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1872 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1875 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1876 removed_node_counters.push(other_node_entry.get().node_counter);
1877 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1880 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1883 removed_node_counters.push(node.node_counter);
1884 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1888 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1889 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1890 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1893 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1894 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1895 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1897 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1898 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1900 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1901 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1903 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1904 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1905 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1906 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1907 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1910 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1911 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1914 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1915 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1916 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1918 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1919 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1921 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1922 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1923 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1924 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1925 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1926 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1927 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1928 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1929 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1931 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1932 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1933 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1934 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1935 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1936 info.one_to_two = None;
1938 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1939 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1940 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1941 info.two_to_one = None;
1943 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1944 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1945 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1946 // channel_update for.
1947 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1948 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1949 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1950 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1951 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1955 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1956 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1957 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1958 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1959 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1960 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1964 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1965 if let Some(time) = time {
1966 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1968 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1969 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1970 // of this function.
1971 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1973 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1974 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1977 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1981 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1982 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1985 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1988 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1989 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1990 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1992 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1993 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1994 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1995 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1998 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1999 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
2000 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
2002 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2003 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2004 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2005 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
2008 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
2010 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
2012 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2013 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2014 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2015 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
2018 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
2019 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
2020 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
2022 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
2024 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
2025 return Err(LightningError {
2026 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
2027 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
2031 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
2033 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
2034 // disable this check during tests!
2035 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2036 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
2037 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2039 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
2040 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2044 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
2046 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
2047 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
2049 core::mem::drop(channels);
2050 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
2051 return Err(LightningError {
2052 err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
2053 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
2057 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2058 return Err(LightningError{err:
2059 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
2060 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2063 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
2064 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
2065 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
2066 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
2067 return Err(LightningError{err:
2068 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
2069 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2072 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
2073 ($target: expr) => {
2074 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
2075 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
2076 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
2077 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
2078 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
2079 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
2080 // but only in the non-normative section.
2081 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
2082 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2083 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
2084 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2090 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
2092 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
2093 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
2095 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2096 enabled: chan_enabled,
2097 last_update: msg.timestamp,
2098 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
2099 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2100 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2102 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2103 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2107 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2111 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2112 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2113 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2114 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2115 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2116 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2117 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2118 })?, "channel_update");
2121 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2124 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2125 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2126 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2127 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2128 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2129 })?, "channel_update");
2132 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2141 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2142 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2143 ($node_id: expr) => {
2144 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2145 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2146 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2148 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2149 self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().push(entry.get().node_counter);
2150 entry.remove_entry();
2153 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2158 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2159 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2163 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2164 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2166 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2167 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2171 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2172 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2173 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2176 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2177 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2178 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2179 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2182 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2184 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2185 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2189 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2190 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2191 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2194 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2195 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2196 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2197 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2200 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2201 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2202 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2203 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2204 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2205 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2208 /// Gets the maximum possible node_counter for a node in this graph
2209 pub(crate) fn max_node_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2210 self.max_node_counter
2215 pub(crate) mod tests {
2216 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2217 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2218 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2219 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2220 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2221 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2222 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2223 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2224 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2225 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2226 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2227 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2228 use crate::util::test_utils;
2229 use crate::util::ser::{Hostname, ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2230 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2232 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2233 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2235 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2236 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2237 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2238 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2239 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2240 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2241 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2242 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2243 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2246 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2247 use crate::prelude::*;
2248 use crate::sync::Arc;
2250 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2251 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2252 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2255 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2256 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2257 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2260 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2261 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2262 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2267 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2268 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2269 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2270 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2272 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2273 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2274 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2275 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2276 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2277 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2280 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2281 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2282 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2283 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2287 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2288 addresses: Vec::new(),
2289 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2290 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2292 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2293 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2295 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2296 contents: unsigned_announcement
2300 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2301 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2302 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2303 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2304 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2306 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2307 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2308 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2309 short_channel_id: 0,
2310 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2311 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2312 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2313 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2314 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2316 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2317 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2318 ChannelAnnouncement {
2319 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2320 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2321 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2322 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2323 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2327 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2328 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2329 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2330 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2331 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2334 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2335 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2336 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2337 short_channel_id: 0,
2340 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2341 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2342 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2343 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2344 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2345 excess_data: Vec::new()
2347 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2348 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2350 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2351 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2356 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2357 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2358 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2360 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2361 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2362 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2364 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2365 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2367 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2371 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2372 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2373 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2374 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2379 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2380 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2384 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2385 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2387 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2388 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2391 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2394 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2395 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2396 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2397 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2398 // Return false because contains excess data.
2399 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2400 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2404 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2405 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2406 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2407 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2408 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2409 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2411 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2416 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2418 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2420 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2421 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2423 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2424 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2426 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2427 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2428 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2429 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2430 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2435 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2441 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2442 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2443 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2445 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2448 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2449 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2450 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2451 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2452 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2454 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2455 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2456 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2457 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2459 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2462 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2463 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2464 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2465 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2466 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2467 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2468 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2469 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2474 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2480 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2481 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2482 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2483 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2484 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2486 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2489 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2491 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2493 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2494 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2495 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2497 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2498 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2499 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2500 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2501 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2503 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2506 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2508 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2509 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2510 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2515 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2516 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2517 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2518 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2519 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2520 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2521 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2525 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2526 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2527 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2529 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2532 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2533 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2535 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2538 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2539 // announcement is mainnet).
2540 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2541 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2542 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2543 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2545 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2550 fn handling_channel_update() {
2551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2552 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2553 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2554 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2555 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2557 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2558 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2560 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2561 let short_channel_id;
2564 // Announce a channel we will update
2565 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2566 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2567 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2569 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2570 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2571 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2578 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2579 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2580 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2581 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2586 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2588 Some(channel_info) => {
2589 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2590 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2595 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2596 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2597 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2598 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2599 // Return false because contains excess data
2600 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2601 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2605 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2606 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2607 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2608 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2609 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2611 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2614 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2615 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2616 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2617 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2618 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2620 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2623 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2624 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2625 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2626 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2627 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2629 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2632 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2633 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2634 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2635 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2636 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2637 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2639 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2642 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2643 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2644 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2645 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2646 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2647 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2648 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2650 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2653 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2654 // update is mainet).
2655 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2656 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2657 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2659 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2661 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2666 fn handling_network_update() {
2667 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2668 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2669 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2671 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2672 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2673 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2676 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2677 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2680 let short_channel_id;
2682 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2683 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2684 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2685 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2686 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2687 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2688 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2690 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2691 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2693 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2694 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2697 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2698 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2701 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2703 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2705 Some(channel_info) => {
2706 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2710 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2712 is_permanent: false,
2715 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2717 Some(channel_info) => {
2718 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2723 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2724 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2729 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2730 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2731 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2734 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2735 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2737 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2738 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2739 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2740 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2741 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2742 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2744 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2745 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2747 is_permanent: false,
2750 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2751 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2753 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2754 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2759 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2760 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2761 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2766 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2767 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2768 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2769 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2770 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2771 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2772 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2774 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2775 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2777 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2778 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2779 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2780 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2781 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2783 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2784 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2785 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2786 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2788 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2789 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2790 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2792 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2793 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2794 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2796 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2797 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2798 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2799 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2801 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2802 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2804 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2806 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2807 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2808 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2809 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2810 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2812 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2813 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2814 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2815 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2816 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2817 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2818 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2819 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2820 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2821 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2822 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2823 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2824 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2825 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2826 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2827 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2828 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2831 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2832 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2833 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2835 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2837 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2839 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2841 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2842 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2843 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2845 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2846 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2847 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2848 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2850 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2851 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2852 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2854 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2855 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2856 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2857 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2859 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2860 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2861 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2862 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2863 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2866 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2868 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2869 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2870 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2872 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2874 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2875 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2876 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2878 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2879 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2880 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2881 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2883 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2884 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2885 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2887 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2888 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2889 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2891 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2892 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2893 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2894 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2895 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2900 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2901 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2902 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2903 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2904 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2906 // Channels were not announced yet.
2907 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2908 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2910 let short_channel_id;
2912 // Announce a channel we will update
2913 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2914 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2915 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2921 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2922 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2923 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2924 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2925 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2926 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2932 // Valid channel update
2933 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2934 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2935 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2936 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2942 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2943 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2944 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2945 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2946 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2947 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2953 // Channel update with excess data.
2954 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2955 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2956 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2957 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2958 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2964 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2965 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2966 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2967 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2968 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2969 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2974 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2975 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2976 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2980 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2981 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2982 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2983 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2984 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2985 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2988 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2989 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2992 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2993 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2994 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
3000 // Nodes were never announced
3001 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3002 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3005 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3006 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3011 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3012 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3018 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3019 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3021 // Skip the first node.
3022 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3023 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3026 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
3027 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3028 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
3029 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
3030 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3031 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3032 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
3037 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3038 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3042 fn network_graph_serialization() {
3043 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3044 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3046 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3047 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3049 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
3050 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3051 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3052 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
3056 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3057 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3062 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3063 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
3064 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
3065 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3067 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3068 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
3072 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
3073 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3074 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
3076 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3077 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3079 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3080 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
3081 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
3082 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
3086 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
3087 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
3088 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
3089 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
3091 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3092 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3093 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3094 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
3096 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3098 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
3100 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3101 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3102 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3106 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3108 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3109 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3110 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3111 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3112 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3115 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3116 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3117 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3118 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3119 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3120 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3121 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3123 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3129 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3130 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3131 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3133 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3134 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3135 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3136 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3138 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3139 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3140 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3143 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3144 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3145 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3148 // used for testing resumption on same block
3149 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3152 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3153 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3154 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3155 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3161 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3162 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3166 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3168 number_of_blocks: 0,
3171 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3172 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3174 number_of_blocks: 0,
3175 sync_complete: true,
3176 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3180 // Error when wrong chain
3181 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3185 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3187 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3190 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3191 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3193 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3194 sync_complete: true,
3195 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3199 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3200 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3204 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3205 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3206 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3209 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3210 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3211 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3212 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3213 sync_complete: true,
3214 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3218 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3219 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3223 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3224 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3225 number_of_blocks: 1,
3230 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3231 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3232 number_of_blocks: 1,
3233 sync_complete: true,
3234 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3239 // No results in valid query range
3240 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3244 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3245 first_blocknum: 1000,
3246 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3251 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3252 first_blocknum: 1000,
3253 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3254 sync_complete: true,
3255 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3260 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3261 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3265 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3266 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3267 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3272 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3273 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3274 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3275 sync_complete: true,
3276 short_channel_ids: vec![
3277 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3283 // Single block exactly full
3284 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3288 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3289 first_blocknum: 100000,
3290 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3295 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3296 first_blocknum: 100000,
3297 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3298 sync_complete: true,
3299 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3300 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3306 // Multiple split on new block
3307 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3311 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3312 first_blocknum: 100000,
3313 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3318 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3319 first_blocknum: 100000,
3320 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3321 sync_complete: false,
3322 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3323 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3327 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3328 first_blocknum: 107999,
3329 number_of_blocks: 2,
3330 sync_complete: true,
3331 short_channel_ids: vec![
3332 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3338 // Multiple split on same block
3339 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3343 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3344 first_blocknum: 100002,
3345 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3350 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3351 first_blocknum: 100002,
3352 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3353 sync_complete: false,
3354 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3355 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3359 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3360 first_blocknum: 108001,
3361 number_of_blocks: 1,
3362 sync_complete: true,
3363 short_channel_ids: vec![
3364 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3371 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3372 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3373 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3374 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3376 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3378 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3379 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3380 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3381 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3384 assert!(result.is_ok());
3386 assert!(result.is_err());
3389 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3390 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3392 for i in 0..events.len() {
3393 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3395 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3396 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3397 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3398 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3399 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3400 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3401 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3403 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3404 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3405 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3406 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3407 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3409 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3410 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3411 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3414 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3420 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3421 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3422 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3423 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3424 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3426 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3428 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3430 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3432 assert!(result.is_err());
3436 fn displays_node_alias() {
3437 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3438 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3439 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3440 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3443 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3444 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3445 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3447 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3448 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3449 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3450 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3453 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3454 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3455 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3459 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3460 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3461 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3462 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3463 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3464 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3466 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3467 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3470 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3471 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3472 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3473 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3474 last_update_message: None,
3477 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3478 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3480 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3481 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3482 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3484 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3485 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3486 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3488 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3489 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3490 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3491 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3492 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3494 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3495 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3496 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3498 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3499 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3500 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3501 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3502 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3504 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3506 capacity_sats: None,
3507 announcement_message: None,
3508 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3509 node_one_counter: 0,
3510 node_two_counter: 1,
3513 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3514 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3516 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3517 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3519 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3520 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3521 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3522 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3523 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3524 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3525 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3526 capacity_sats: None,
3527 announcement_message: None,
3528 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3529 node_one_counter: 0,
3530 node_two_counter: 1,
3533 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3534 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3536 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3537 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3539 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3540 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3541 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3543 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3544 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3545 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3546 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3547 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3548 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3549 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3551 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3552 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3553 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3554 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3555 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3559 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3560 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3561 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3562 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3563 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3564 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3567 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3568 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3571 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3572 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3573 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3574 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3575 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3577 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3578 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3579 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3581 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3582 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3583 channels: Vec::new(),
3584 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3588 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3589 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3590 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3591 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3593 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3594 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3595 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3599 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3600 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3601 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3602 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3603 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3604 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3608 fn test_node_id_display() {
3609 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3610 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3614 fn is_tor_only_node() {
3615 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3616 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3618 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3619 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3620 let node_1_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
3622 let announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3623 gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3625 let tcp_ip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3626 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3629 let tcp_ip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3630 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3633 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2([255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]);
3634 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3635 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3640 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
3641 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3645 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3647 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3648 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3649 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3651 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3653 announcement.addresses = vec![
3654 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone(),
3657 announcement.timestamp += 1000;
3659 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3661 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3662 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3664 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3666 announcement.addresses = vec![
3667 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3669 announcement.timestamp += 2000;
3671 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3673 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3674 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3676 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3678 announcement.addresses = vec![
3679 tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3681 announcement.timestamp += 3000;
3683 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3685 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3686 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3688 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3690 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
3691 announcement.timestamp += 4000;
3693 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3695 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3696 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3698 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3700 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone()];
3701 announcement.timestamp += 5000;
3703 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3705 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3706 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3708 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3710 announcement.addresses = vec![tcp_ip_v4.clone()];
3711 announcement.timestamp += 6000;
3713 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3715 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3716 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3724 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3726 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3727 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3728 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3729 let mut v = Vec::new();
3730 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3731 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3732 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3736 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3737 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3738 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3739 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3740 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3741 black_box(&net_graph).encode()