1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use core::str::FromStr;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Create a new NodeId from a slice of bytes
77 pub fn from_slice(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
78 if bytes.len() != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE {
79 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
81 let mut data = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
82 data.copy_from_slice(bytes);
86 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
91 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
92 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
96 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
97 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
98 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
102 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
103 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
104 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
107 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
108 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
109 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
113 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
114 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
119 impl Eq for NodeId {}
121 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
122 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
123 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
127 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
128 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
129 Some(self.cmp(other))
133 impl Ord for NodeId {
134 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
135 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
139 impl Writeable for NodeId {
140 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
141 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
146 impl Readable for NodeId {
147 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
148 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
149 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
154 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
155 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
156 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
160 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
161 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
163 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
168 impl FromStr for NodeId {
169 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
171 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
172 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
177 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
178 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
179 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
180 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
181 chain_hash: ChainHash,
183 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
184 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
185 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
186 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
188 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
189 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
190 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
191 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
192 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
193 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
194 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
197 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
198 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
199 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
200 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
201 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
202 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
203 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
204 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
205 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
206 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
209 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
210 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
211 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
212 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
215 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
216 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
218 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
219 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
220 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
221 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
222 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
223 ChannelUpdateMessage {
224 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
227 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
228 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
230 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
231 short_channel_id: u64,
232 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
233 /// `channel_update` message is received.
236 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
237 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
239 /// The node id of the failed node.
241 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
242 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
248 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
251 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
252 (0, short_channel_id, required),
253 (2, is_permanent, required),
255 (4, NodeFailure) => {
256 (0, node_id, required),
257 (2, is_permanent, required),
261 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
262 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
263 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
264 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
265 /// serving historical announcements.
266 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
267 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
270 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
271 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
272 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
273 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
277 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
278 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
280 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
281 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
282 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
283 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
284 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
287 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
288 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
289 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
290 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
295 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
296 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
297 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
298 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
299 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
302 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
303 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
305 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
306 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
310 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
311 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
312 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
313 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
314 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
315 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
316 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
323 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
325 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
327 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
329 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
330 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
331 if update_msg.as_ref()
332 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
337 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
338 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
340 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
341 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
342 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
343 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
350 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
354 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
355 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
357 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
358 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
360 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
361 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
362 match *network_update {
363 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
364 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
365 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
366 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
367 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
369 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
371 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
372 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
375 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
377 log_debug!(self.logger,
378 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
379 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
385 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
386 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
391 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
392 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
393 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
396 return Err(LightningError {
397 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
398 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
399 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
400 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
401 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
403 log_level: Level::Trace,
411 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
412 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
413 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
414 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
415 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
416 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
418 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
419 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
421 log_level: Level::Trace
427 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
428 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
429 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
430 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
433 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
435 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
436 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
437 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
438 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
443 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
445 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
446 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
447 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
448 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
449 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
450 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
451 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
456 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
457 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
459 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
460 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
461 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
462 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
463 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
466 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
467 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
468 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
471 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
472 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
473 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
476 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
477 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
478 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
479 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
480 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
481 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
482 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
483 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
484 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
486 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
487 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
489 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
491 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
492 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
498 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
499 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
500 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
501 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
505 for (_, ref node) in iter {
506 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
507 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
515 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
516 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
517 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
519 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
520 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
521 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
522 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
523 /// tracking this directly.
525 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
526 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
527 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
528 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
529 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
530 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
531 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
532 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
533 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
534 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
538 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
540 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
541 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
542 // updates from all our peers normally.
544 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
545 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
546 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
549 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
550 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
551 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
552 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
553 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
555 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
556 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
557 // relying on it useless.
559 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
560 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
561 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
563 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
564 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
565 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
566 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
567 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
570 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
571 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
572 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
573 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
574 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
575 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
576 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
578 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
579 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
580 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
581 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
583 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
584 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
585 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
587 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
588 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
589 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
590 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
592 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
593 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
594 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
596 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
600 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
601 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
602 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
603 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
604 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
605 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
606 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
612 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
613 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
614 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
615 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
619 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
620 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
621 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
622 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
626 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
627 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
628 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
629 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
630 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
631 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
632 /// memory constrained systems.
633 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
634 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
636 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
638 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
639 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
640 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
642 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
643 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
644 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
645 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
646 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
647 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
648 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
649 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
650 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
652 short_channel_ids: vec![],
655 return Err(LightningError {
656 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
657 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
661 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
662 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
663 // exists even if its not yet routable.
664 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
665 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
666 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
667 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
668 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
669 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
670 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
673 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
674 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
679 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
680 let batch_count = batches.len();
681 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
682 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
683 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
684 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
686 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
687 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
688 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
689 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
690 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
691 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
692 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
694 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
695 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
696 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
698 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
699 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
700 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
702 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
703 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
704 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
705 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
707 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
708 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
710 (false, block_from_scid(*batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
713 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
715 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
716 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
717 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
718 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
722 short_channel_ids: batch,
730 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
733 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
734 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
738 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
739 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
740 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
744 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
745 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
746 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
750 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
751 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
755 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
757 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
760 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
761 let mut ret = Vec::new();
762 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
763 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
768 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
769 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
770 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
771 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
772 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
773 pub last_update: u32,
774 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
776 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
777 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
778 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
779 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
780 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
781 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
782 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
783 pub fees: RoutingFees,
784 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
785 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
786 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
787 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
788 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
791 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
792 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
793 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
798 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
799 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
800 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
801 (0, self.last_update, required),
802 (2, self.enabled, required),
803 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
804 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
805 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
806 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
807 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
808 (10, self.fees, required),
809 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
815 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
816 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
817 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
818 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
819 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
820 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
821 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
822 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
823 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
825 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
826 (0, last_update, required),
827 (2, enabled, required),
828 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
829 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
830 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
831 (10, fees, required),
832 (12, last_update_message, required)
835 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
836 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
837 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
838 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
839 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
840 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
842 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
843 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
846 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
851 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
852 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
853 /// Received within a channel announcement.
854 pub struct ChannelInfo {
855 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
856 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
857 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
858 pub node_one: NodeId,
859 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
860 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
861 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
862 pub node_two: NodeId,
863 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
864 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
865 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
866 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
867 /// An initial announcement of the channel
868 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
869 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
870 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
871 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
872 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
873 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
874 /// network graph in memory!).
875 announcement_received_time: u64,
879 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
880 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
881 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
882 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
883 if target == &self.node_one {
884 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
885 } else if target == &self.node_two {
886 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
891 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
894 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
895 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
896 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
897 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
898 if source == &self.node_one {
899 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
900 } else if source == &self.node_two {
901 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
906 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
909 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
910 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
911 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
913 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
915 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
920 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
921 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
922 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
923 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
928 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
929 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
930 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
931 (0, self.features, required),
932 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
933 (2, self.node_one, required),
934 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
935 (6, self.node_two, required),
936 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
937 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
938 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
944 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
945 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
946 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
947 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
948 // channel updates via the gossip network.
949 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
951 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
952 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
953 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
954 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
955 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
956 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
957 Err(err) => Err(err),
962 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
963 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
964 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
965 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
966 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
967 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
968 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
969 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
970 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
971 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
972 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
973 (0, features, required),
974 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
975 (2, node_one, required),
976 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
977 (6, node_two, required),
978 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
979 (10, capacity_sats, required),
980 (12, announcement_message, required),
984 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
985 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
986 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
987 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
988 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
989 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
990 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
991 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
996 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
997 /// source node to a target node.
999 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1000 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
1001 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
1002 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
1003 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
1004 from_node_one: bool,
1007 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1009 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1010 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one }
1013 /// Returns information for the channel.
1015 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1017 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1019 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1020 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1023 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1024 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1025 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1027 match capacity_msat {
1028 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1029 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1030 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1032 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1036 /// Returns information for the direction.
1038 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1040 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1042 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1044 pub fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1046 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1048 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1050 pub fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1053 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1054 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1055 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1056 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1061 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1063 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1064 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1065 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1066 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1067 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1070 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1072 liquidity_msat: u64,
1074 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1076 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1079 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1081 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1083 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1084 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1086 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1089 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1091 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1094 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1095 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1099 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1100 /// use when making routing decisions.
1101 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1103 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1104 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1105 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1107 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1108 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1109 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1110 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1111 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1112 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1117 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1118 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1119 pub struct RoutingFees {
1120 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1122 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1123 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1124 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1127 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1128 (0, base_msat, required),
1129 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1132 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1133 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1134 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1135 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1136 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1137 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1138 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1139 pub last_update: u32,
1140 /// Color assigned to the node
1142 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1143 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1144 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1145 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1146 /// An initial announcement of the node
1147 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1148 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1149 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1150 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1153 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1154 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1155 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1156 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1157 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1158 .unwrap_or_default()
1162 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1163 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1164 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1165 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1166 (0, self.features, required),
1167 (2, self.last_update, required),
1168 (4, self.rgb, required),
1169 (6, self.alias, required),
1170 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1171 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1177 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1178 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1179 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1180 (0, features, required),
1181 (2, last_update, required),
1183 (6, alias, required),
1184 (8, announcement_message, option),
1185 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1187 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1188 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1189 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1193 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1195 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1196 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1197 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1198 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1200 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1201 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1202 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1203 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1204 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1205 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1207 use core::fmt::Write;
1208 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1209 // Display printable ASCII characters
1210 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1211 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1220 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1221 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1226 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1227 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1228 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1232 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1233 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1234 pub struct NodeInfo {
1235 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1236 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1237 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1238 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1239 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1240 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1244 /// Returns whether the node has only announced Tor addresses.
1245 pub fn is_tor_only(&self) -> bool {
1246 self.announcement_info
1248 .map(|info| info.addresses())
1249 .and_then(|addresses| (!addresses.is_empty()).then(|| addresses))
1250 .map(|addresses| addresses.iter().all(|address| address.is_tor()))
1255 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1256 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1257 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1258 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1263 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1264 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1265 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1266 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1267 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1268 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1274 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1275 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1276 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1277 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1278 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1280 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1281 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1282 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1283 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1285 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1292 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1293 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1294 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1295 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1296 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1297 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1298 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1299 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1300 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1301 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1302 (4, channels, required_vec),
1304 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1305 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1308 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1314 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1315 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1317 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1318 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1319 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1321 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1322 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1323 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1324 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1325 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1326 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1328 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1329 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1330 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1331 node_id.write(writer)?;
1332 node_info.write(writer)?;
1335 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1336 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1337 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1343 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1344 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1345 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1347 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1348 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1349 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1350 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1351 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1352 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1353 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1354 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1356 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1357 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1358 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1359 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1360 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1361 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1362 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1365 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1366 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1367 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1371 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1374 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1375 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1376 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1377 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1378 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1379 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1384 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1385 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1386 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1387 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1388 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1390 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1391 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1392 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1398 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1399 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1400 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1401 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1402 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1403 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1404 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1405 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1406 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1407 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1408 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1412 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1413 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1414 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1416 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1417 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1419 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1420 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1421 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1422 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1423 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1424 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1428 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1429 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1430 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1431 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1432 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1438 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1439 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1440 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1441 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1444 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1445 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1446 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1447 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1450 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1453 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1454 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1455 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1459 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1460 /// given node announcement.
1462 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1463 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1464 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1465 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1466 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1467 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1470 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1471 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1472 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1474 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1475 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1478 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1479 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1480 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1482 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1483 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1484 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1487 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1488 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1489 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1490 // that it be at least the current time.
1491 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1492 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1493 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1494 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1499 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1500 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1501 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1502 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1503 features: msg.features.clone(),
1504 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1507 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1515 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1517 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1518 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1519 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1521 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1522 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1523 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1524 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1525 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1527 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1529 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1530 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1533 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1535 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1536 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1537 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1539 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1540 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1541 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1542 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1543 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1546 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1547 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1548 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1550 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1551 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1552 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1553 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1554 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1556 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1558 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1561 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1563 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1564 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1566 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1567 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1568 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1569 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1572 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1573 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1574 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1576 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1578 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1580 capacity_sats: None,
1581 announcement_message: None,
1582 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1585 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1588 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1589 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1590 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1592 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1593 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1595 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1597 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1598 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1599 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1600 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1602 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1603 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1604 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1605 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1607 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1608 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1610 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1611 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1612 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1614 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1617 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1618 entry.insert(channel_info);
1622 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1623 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1624 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1625 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1627 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1628 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1629 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1630 announcement_info: None,
1639 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1640 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1641 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1643 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1645 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1646 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1649 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1650 return Err(LightningError {
1651 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1652 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1657 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1659 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1660 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1661 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1662 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1664 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1665 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1666 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1667 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1669 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1670 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1671 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1672 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1673 return Err(LightningError {
1674 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1675 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1678 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1679 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1680 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1681 return Err(LightningError {
1682 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1683 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1690 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1691 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1692 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1693 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1694 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1695 return Err(LightningError{
1696 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1697 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1701 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1702 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1704 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1705 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1706 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1708 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1711 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1712 features: msg.features.clone(),
1713 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1715 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1717 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1718 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1719 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1720 announcement_received_time,
1723 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1725 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1729 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1731 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1732 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1733 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1734 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1735 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1736 let current_time_unix = None;
1738 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1741 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1743 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1744 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1745 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1746 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1747 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1748 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1749 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1753 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1754 /// from local storage.
1755 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1756 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1757 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1758 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1759 let current_time_unix = None;
1761 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1762 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1763 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1764 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1765 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1767 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1768 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1769 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1770 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1771 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1772 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1775 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1776 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1779 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1782 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1786 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1787 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1788 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1791 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1792 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1793 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1795 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1796 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1798 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1799 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1801 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1802 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1803 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1804 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1805 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1808 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1809 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1812 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1813 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1814 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1816 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1817 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1819 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1820 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1821 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1822 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1823 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1824 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1825 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1826 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1827 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1829 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1830 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1831 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1832 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1833 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1834 info.one_to_two = None;
1836 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1837 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1838 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1839 info.two_to_one = None;
1841 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1842 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1843 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1844 // channel_update for.
1845 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1846 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1847 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1848 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1849 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1853 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1854 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1855 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1856 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1857 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1858 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1862 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1863 if let Some(time) = time {
1864 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1866 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1867 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1868 // of this function.
1869 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1871 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1872 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1875 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1879 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1880 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1883 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1886 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1887 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1888 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1890 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1891 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1892 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1893 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1896 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1897 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1898 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1900 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1901 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1902 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1903 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1906 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1908 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1910 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1911 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1912 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1913 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1916 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1917 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
1918 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1920 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1922 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1923 return Err(LightningError {
1924 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1925 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1929 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1931 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1932 // disable this check during tests!
1933 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1934 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1935 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1937 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1938 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1942 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
1944 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1945 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1947 core::mem::drop(channels);
1948 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1949 return Err(LightningError {
1950 err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
1951 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
1955 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1956 return Err(LightningError{err:
1957 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1958 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1961 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1962 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1963 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1964 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1965 return Err(LightningError{err:
1966 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1967 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1970 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1971 ($target: expr) => {
1972 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1973 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1974 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1975 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1976 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1977 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1978 // but only in the non-normative section.
1979 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1980 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1981 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1982 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1988 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1990 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1991 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1993 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1994 enabled: chan_enabled,
1995 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1996 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1997 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1998 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2000 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2001 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2005 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2009 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2010 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2011 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2012 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2013 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2014 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2015 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2016 })?, "channel_update");
2019 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2022 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2023 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2024 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2025 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2026 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2027 })?, "channel_update");
2030 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2039 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2040 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2041 ($node_id: expr) => {
2042 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2043 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2044 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2046 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2047 entry.remove_entry();
2050 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2055 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2056 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2060 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2061 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2063 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2064 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2068 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2069 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2070 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2073 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2074 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2075 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2076 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2079 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2081 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2082 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2086 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2087 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2088 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2091 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2092 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2093 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2094 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2097 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2098 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2099 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2100 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2101 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2102 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2107 pub(crate) mod tests {
2108 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2109 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2110 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2111 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2112 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2113 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2114 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2115 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2116 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2117 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2118 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2119 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2120 use crate::util::test_utils;
2121 use crate::util::ser::{Hostname, ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2122 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2124 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2125 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2127 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2128 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2129 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2130 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2131 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2132 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2133 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2134 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2135 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2138 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2139 use crate::prelude::*;
2140 use crate::sync::Arc;
2142 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2143 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2144 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2147 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2148 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2149 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2152 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2153 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2154 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2158 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2159 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2160 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2161 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2162 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2164 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2165 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2166 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2167 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2168 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2169 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2172 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2173 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2174 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2175 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2179 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2180 addresses: Vec::new(),
2181 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2182 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2184 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2185 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2187 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2188 contents: unsigned_announcement
2192 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2193 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2194 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2195 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2196 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2198 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2199 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2200 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2201 short_channel_id: 0,
2202 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2203 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2204 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2205 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2206 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2208 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2209 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2210 ChannelAnnouncement {
2211 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2212 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2213 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2214 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2215 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2219 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2220 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2221 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2222 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2223 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2226 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2227 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2228 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2229 short_channel_id: 0,
2232 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2233 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2234 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2235 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2236 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2237 excess_data: Vec::new()
2239 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2240 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2242 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2243 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2248 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2249 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2250 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2252 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2253 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2254 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2256 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2257 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2259 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2263 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2264 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2265 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2266 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2271 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2272 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2276 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2277 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2279 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2280 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2283 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2286 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2287 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2288 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2289 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2290 // Return false because contains excess data.
2291 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2292 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2296 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2297 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2298 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2299 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2300 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2301 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2303 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2308 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2309 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2310 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2312 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2313 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2315 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2316 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2318 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2319 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2320 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2321 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2322 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2327 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2333 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2334 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2335 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2337 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2340 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2341 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2342 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2343 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2344 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2346 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2347 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2348 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2349 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2351 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2354 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2355 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2356 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2357 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2358 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2359 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2360 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2361 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2366 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2372 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2373 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2374 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2375 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2376 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2378 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2381 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2383 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2385 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2386 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2387 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2389 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2390 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2391 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2392 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2393 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2395 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2398 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2400 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2401 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2402 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2407 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2408 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2409 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2410 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2411 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2412 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2413 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2417 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2418 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2419 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2421 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2424 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2425 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2427 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2430 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2431 // announcement is mainnet).
2432 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2433 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2434 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2435 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2437 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2442 fn handling_channel_update() {
2443 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2444 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2445 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2446 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2447 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2449 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2450 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2452 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2453 let short_channel_id;
2456 // Announce a channel we will update
2457 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2458 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2459 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2461 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2462 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2463 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2470 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2471 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2472 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2473 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2478 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2480 Some(channel_info) => {
2481 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2482 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2487 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2488 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2489 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2490 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2491 // Return false because contains excess data
2492 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2493 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2497 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2498 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2499 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2500 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2501 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2503 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2506 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2507 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2508 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2509 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2510 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2512 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2515 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2516 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2517 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2518 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2519 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2521 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2524 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2525 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2526 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2527 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2528 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2529 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2531 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2534 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2535 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2536 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2537 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2538 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2539 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2540 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2542 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2545 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2546 // update is mainet).
2547 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2548 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2549 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2551 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2553 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2558 fn handling_network_update() {
2559 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2560 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2563 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2564 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2565 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2568 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2569 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2572 let short_channel_id;
2574 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2575 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2576 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2577 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2578 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2579 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2580 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2582 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2583 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2585 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2586 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2589 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2590 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2593 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2595 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2597 Some(channel_info) => {
2598 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2602 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2604 is_permanent: false,
2607 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2609 Some(channel_info) => {
2610 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2615 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2616 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2621 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2622 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2623 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2626 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2627 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2629 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2630 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2631 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2632 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2633 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2634 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2636 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2637 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2639 is_permanent: false,
2642 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2643 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2645 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2646 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2651 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2652 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2653 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2658 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2659 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2660 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2661 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2662 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2663 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2666 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2667 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2669 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2670 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2671 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2672 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2673 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2675 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2676 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2677 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2678 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2680 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2681 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2682 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2684 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2685 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2686 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2688 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2689 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2690 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2691 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2693 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2694 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2696 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2698 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2699 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2700 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2701 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2702 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2704 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2705 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2706 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2707 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2708 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2709 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2710 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2711 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2712 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2713 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2714 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2715 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2716 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2717 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2718 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2719 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2720 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2723 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2724 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2725 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2727 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2729 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2731 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2733 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2734 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2735 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2737 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2738 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2739 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2740 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2742 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2743 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2744 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2746 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2747 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2748 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2749 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2751 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2752 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2753 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2754 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2755 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2758 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2760 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2761 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2762 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2764 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2766 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2767 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2768 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2770 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2771 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2772 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2773 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2775 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2776 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2777 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2779 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2780 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2781 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2783 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2784 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2785 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2786 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2787 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2792 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2793 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2794 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2795 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2796 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2798 // Channels were not announced yet.
2799 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2800 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2802 let short_channel_id;
2804 // Announce a channel we will update
2805 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2806 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2807 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2813 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2814 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2815 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2816 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2817 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2818 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2824 // Valid channel update
2825 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2826 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2827 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2828 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2834 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2835 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2836 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2837 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2838 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2839 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2845 // Channel update with excess data.
2846 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2847 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2848 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2849 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2850 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2856 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2857 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2858 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2859 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2860 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2861 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2866 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2867 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2868 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2872 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2873 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2874 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2875 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2876 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2877 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2880 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2881 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2884 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2885 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2886 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2892 // Nodes were never announced
2893 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2894 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2897 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2898 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2903 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2904 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2910 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2911 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2913 // Skip the first node.
2914 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2915 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2918 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2919 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2920 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2921 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2922 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2923 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2924 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2929 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2930 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2934 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2935 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2936 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2938 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2939 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2941 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2942 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2943 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2944 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2948 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2949 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2954 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2955 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2956 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2957 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2959 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2960 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2964 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2965 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2966 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2968 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2969 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2971 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2972 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2973 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2974 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2978 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2979 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2980 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2981 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2983 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2984 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2985 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2986 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2988 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
2990 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2992 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2993 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2994 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2998 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3000 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3001 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3002 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3003 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3004 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3007 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3008 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3009 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3010 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3011 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3012 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3013 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3015 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3021 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3022 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3023 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3025 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3026 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3027 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3028 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3030 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3031 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3032 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3035 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3036 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3037 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3040 // used for testing resumption on same block
3041 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3044 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3045 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3046 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3047 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3053 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3054 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3058 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3060 number_of_blocks: 0,
3063 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3064 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3066 number_of_blocks: 0,
3067 sync_complete: true,
3068 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3072 // Error when wrong chain
3073 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3077 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3079 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3082 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3083 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3085 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3086 sync_complete: true,
3087 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3091 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3092 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3096 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3097 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3098 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3101 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3102 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3103 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3104 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3105 sync_complete: true,
3106 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3110 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3111 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3115 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3116 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3117 number_of_blocks: 1,
3122 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3123 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3124 number_of_blocks: 1,
3125 sync_complete: true,
3126 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3131 // No results in valid query range
3132 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3136 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3137 first_blocknum: 1000,
3138 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3143 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3144 first_blocknum: 1000,
3145 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3146 sync_complete: true,
3147 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3152 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3153 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3157 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3158 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3159 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3164 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3165 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3166 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3167 sync_complete: true,
3168 short_channel_ids: vec![
3169 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3175 // Single block exactly full
3176 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3180 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3181 first_blocknum: 100000,
3182 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3187 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3188 first_blocknum: 100000,
3189 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3190 sync_complete: true,
3191 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3192 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3198 // Multiple split on new block
3199 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3203 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3204 first_blocknum: 100000,
3205 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3210 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3211 first_blocknum: 100000,
3212 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3213 sync_complete: false,
3214 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3215 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3219 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3220 first_blocknum: 107999,
3221 number_of_blocks: 2,
3222 sync_complete: true,
3223 short_channel_ids: vec![
3224 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3230 // Multiple split on same block
3231 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3235 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3236 first_blocknum: 100002,
3237 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3242 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3243 first_blocknum: 100002,
3244 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3245 sync_complete: false,
3246 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3247 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3251 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3252 first_blocknum: 108001,
3253 number_of_blocks: 1,
3254 sync_complete: true,
3255 short_channel_ids: vec![
3256 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3263 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3264 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3265 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3266 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3268 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3270 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3271 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3272 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3273 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3276 assert!(result.is_ok());
3278 assert!(result.is_err());
3281 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3282 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3284 for i in 0..events.len() {
3285 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3287 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3288 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3289 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3290 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3291 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3292 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3293 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3295 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3296 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3297 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3298 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3299 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3301 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3302 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3303 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3306 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3312 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3313 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3314 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3315 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3316 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3318 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3320 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3322 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3324 assert!(result.is_err());
3328 fn displays_node_alias() {
3329 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3330 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3331 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3332 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3335 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3336 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3337 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3339 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3340 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3341 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3342 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3345 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3346 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3347 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3351 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3352 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3353 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3354 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3355 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3356 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3358 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3359 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3362 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3363 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3364 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3365 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3366 last_update_message: None,
3369 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3370 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3372 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3373 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3374 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3376 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3377 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3378 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3380 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3381 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3382 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3383 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3384 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3386 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3387 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3388 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3390 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3391 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3392 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3393 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3394 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3396 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3398 capacity_sats: None,
3399 announcement_message: None,
3400 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3403 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3404 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3406 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3407 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3409 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3410 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3411 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3412 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3413 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3414 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3415 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3416 capacity_sats: None,
3417 announcement_message: None,
3418 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3421 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3422 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3424 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3425 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3427 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3428 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3429 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3431 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3432 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3433 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3434 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3435 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3436 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3437 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3439 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3440 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3441 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3442 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3443 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3447 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3448 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3449 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3450 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3451 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3452 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3455 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3456 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3459 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3460 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3461 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3462 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3463 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3465 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3466 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3467 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3469 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3470 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3471 channels: Vec::new(),
3472 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3475 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3476 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3477 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3478 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3480 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3481 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3482 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3486 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3487 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3488 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3489 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3490 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3491 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3495 fn test_node_id_display() {
3496 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3497 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3501 fn is_tor_only_node() {
3502 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3503 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3505 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3506 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3507 let node_1_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
3509 let announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3510 gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3512 let tcp_ip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3513 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3516 let tcp_ip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3517 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3520 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2([255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]);
3521 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3522 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3527 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
3528 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3532 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3534 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3535 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3536 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3538 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3540 announcement.addresses = vec![
3541 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone(),
3544 announcement.timestamp += 1000;
3546 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3548 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3549 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3551 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3553 announcement.addresses = vec![
3554 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3556 announcement.timestamp += 2000;
3558 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3560 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3561 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3563 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3565 announcement.addresses = vec![
3566 tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3568 announcement.timestamp += 3000;
3570 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3572 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3573 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3575 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3577 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
3578 announcement.timestamp += 4000;
3580 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3582 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3583 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3585 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3587 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone()];
3588 announcement.timestamp += 5000;
3590 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3592 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3593 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3595 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3597 announcement.addresses = vec![tcp_ip_v4.clone()];
3598 announcement.timestamp += 6000;
3600 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3602 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3603 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3611 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3613 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3614 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3615 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3616 let mut v = Vec::new();
3617 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3618 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3619 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3623 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3624 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3625 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3626 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3627 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3628 black_box(&net_graph).encode()