1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use core::str::FromStr;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
81 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
82 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
86 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
88 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
92 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
93 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
94 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
97 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
98 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
99 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
103 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
104 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
109 impl Eq for NodeId {}
111 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
112 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
113 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
117 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
118 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
119 Some(self.cmp(other))
123 impl Ord for NodeId {
124 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
125 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
129 impl Writeable for NodeId {
130 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
131 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
136 impl Readable for NodeId {
137 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
138 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
139 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
144 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
145 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
146 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
150 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
151 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
153 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
158 impl FromStr for NodeId {
159 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
161 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
162 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
167 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
168 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
169 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
170 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
171 chain_hash: ChainHash,
173 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
174 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
175 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
176 removed_node_counters: Mutex<Vec<u32>>,
177 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize,
178 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
180 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
181 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
182 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
183 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
184 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
185 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
186 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
189 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
190 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
191 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
192 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
193 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
194 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
195 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
196 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
197 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
198 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
201 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
202 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
203 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
204 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
207 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
208 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
210 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
211 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
212 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
213 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
214 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
215 ChannelUpdateMessage {
216 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
219 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
220 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
222 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
223 short_channel_id: u64,
224 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
225 /// `channel_update` message is received.
228 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
229 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
231 /// The node id of the failed node.
233 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
234 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
239 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
240 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
243 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
244 (0, short_channel_id, required),
245 (2, is_permanent, required),
247 (4, NodeFailure) => {
248 (0, node_id, required),
249 (2, is_permanent, required),
253 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
254 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
255 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
256 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
257 /// serving historical announcements.
258 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
259 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
262 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
263 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
264 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
265 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
269 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
270 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
272 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
273 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
274 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
275 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
276 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
279 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
280 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
281 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
282 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
287 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
288 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
289 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
290 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
291 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
294 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
295 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
297 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
298 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
302 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
303 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
304 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
305 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
306 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
307 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
308 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
315 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
317 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
319 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
321 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
322 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
323 if update_msg.as_ref()
324 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
329 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
330 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
333 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
334 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
335 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
342 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
346 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
347 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
349 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
350 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
352 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
353 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
354 match *network_update {
355 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
356 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
357 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
358 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
359 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
361 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
363 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
364 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
367 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
369 log_debug!(self.logger,
370 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
371 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
377 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
378 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
383 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
384 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
385 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
388 return Err(LightningError {
389 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
390 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
391 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
392 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
393 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
395 log_level: Level::Trace,
403 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
404 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
405 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
406 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
407 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
408 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
409 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
410 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
411 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
413 log_level: Level::Trace
419 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
420 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
421 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
422 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
425 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
427 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
428 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
429 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
430 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
435 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
437 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
438 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
439 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
440 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
441 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
442 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
443 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
448 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
449 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
451 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
452 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
453 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
454 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
455 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
458 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
459 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
460 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
463 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
464 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
465 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
468 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
469 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
470 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
471 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
472 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
473 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
474 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
475 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
476 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
478 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
479 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
481 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
483 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
484 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
490 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
491 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
492 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
493 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
497 for (_, ref node) in iter {
498 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
499 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
507 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
508 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
509 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
511 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
512 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
513 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
514 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
515 /// tracking this directly.
517 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
518 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
519 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
520 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
521 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
522 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
523 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
524 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
525 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
526 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
530 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
532 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
533 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
534 // updates from all our peers normally.
536 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
537 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
538 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
541 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
542 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
543 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
544 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
545 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
547 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
548 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
549 // relying on it useless.
551 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
552 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
553 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
555 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
556 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
557 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
558 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
559 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
562 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
563 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
564 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
565 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
566 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
567 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
568 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
570 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
571 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
572 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
573 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
575 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
576 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
577 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
579 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
580 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
581 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
582 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
584 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
585 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
586 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
588 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
592 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
593 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
594 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
595 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
596 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
597 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
598 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
604 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
605 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
606 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
607 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
611 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
612 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
613 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
614 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
618 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
619 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
620 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
621 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
622 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
623 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
624 /// memory constrained systems.
625 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
626 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
628 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
630 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
631 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
632 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
634 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
635 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
636 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
637 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
638 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
639 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
640 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
641 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
642 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
644 short_channel_ids: vec![],
647 return Err(LightningError {
648 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
649 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
653 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
654 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
655 // exists even if its not yet routable.
656 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
657 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
658 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
659 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
660 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
661 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
662 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
665 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
666 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
671 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
672 let batch_count = batches.len();
673 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
674 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
675 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
676 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
678 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
679 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
680 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
681 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
682 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
683 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
684 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
686 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
687 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
688 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
690 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
691 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
692 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
694 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
695 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
696 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
697 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
699 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
700 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
702 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
705 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
707 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
708 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
709 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
710 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
714 short_channel_ids: batch,
722 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
725 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
726 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
730 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
731 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
732 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
736 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
737 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
738 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
742 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
743 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
747 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
749 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
752 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
753 let mut ret = Vec::new();
754 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
755 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
760 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
761 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
762 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
763 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
764 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
765 pub last_update: u32,
766 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
768 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
769 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
770 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
771 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
772 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
773 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
774 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
775 pub fees: RoutingFees,
776 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
777 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
778 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
779 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
780 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
783 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
784 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
785 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
790 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
791 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
792 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
793 (0, self.last_update, required),
794 (2, self.enabled, required),
795 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
796 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
797 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
798 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
799 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
800 (10, self.fees, required),
801 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
807 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
808 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
809 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
810 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
811 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
812 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
813 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
814 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
815 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
817 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
818 (0, last_update, required),
819 (2, enabled, required),
820 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
821 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
822 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
823 (10, fees, required),
824 (12, last_update_message, required)
827 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
828 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
829 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
830 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
831 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
832 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
834 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
835 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
838 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
843 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
844 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
845 /// Received within a channel announcement.
846 pub struct ChannelInfo {
847 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
848 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
849 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
850 pub node_one: NodeId,
851 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
852 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
853 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
854 pub node_two: NodeId,
855 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
856 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
857 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
858 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
859 /// An initial announcement of the channel
860 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
861 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
862 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
863 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
864 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
865 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
866 /// network graph in memory!).
867 announcement_received_time: u64,
871 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
872 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
873 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
874 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
875 if target == &self.node_one {
876 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
877 } else if target == &self.node_two {
878 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
883 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
886 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
887 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
888 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
889 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
890 if source == &self.node_one {
891 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
892 } else if source == &self.node_two {
893 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
898 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
901 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
902 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
903 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
905 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
907 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
914 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
915 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
920 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
921 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
922 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
923 (0, self.features, required),
924 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
925 (2, self.node_one, required),
926 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
927 (6, self.node_two, required),
928 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
929 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
930 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
936 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
937 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
938 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
939 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
940 // channel updates via the gossip network.
941 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
943 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
944 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
945 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
946 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
947 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
948 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
949 Err(err) => Err(err),
954 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
955 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
956 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
957 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
958 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
959 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
960 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
961 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
962 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
963 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
964 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
965 (0, features, required),
966 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
967 (2, node_one, required),
968 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
969 (6, node_two, required),
970 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
971 (10, capacity_sats, required),
972 (12, announcement_message, required),
976 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
977 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
978 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
979 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
980 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
981 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
982 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
983 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
988 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
989 /// source node to a target node.
991 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
992 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
993 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
994 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
995 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
999 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1001 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1002 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one }
1005 /// Returns information for the channel.
1007 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1009 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1011 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1012 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1015 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1016 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1017 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1019 match capacity_msat {
1020 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1021 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1022 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1024 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1028 /// Returns information for the direction.
1030 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1032 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1034 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1036 pub(super) fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1038 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1040 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1042 pub(super) fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1045 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1046 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1047 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1048 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1053 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1055 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1056 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1057 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1058 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1059 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1062 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1064 liquidity_msat: u64,
1066 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1068 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1071 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1073 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1075 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1076 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1078 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1081 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1083 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1086 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1087 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1091 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1092 /// use when making routing decisions.
1093 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1095 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1096 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1097 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1099 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1100 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1101 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1102 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1103 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1104 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1109 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1110 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1111 pub struct RoutingFees {
1112 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1114 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1115 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1116 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1119 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1120 (0, base_msat, required),
1121 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1124 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1125 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1126 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1127 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1128 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1129 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1130 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1131 pub last_update: u32,
1132 /// Color assigned to the node
1134 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1135 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1136 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1137 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1138 /// An initial announcement of the node
1139 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1140 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1141 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1142 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1145 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1146 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1147 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1148 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1149 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1150 .unwrap_or_default()
1154 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1155 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1156 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1157 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1158 (0, self.features, required),
1159 (2, self.last_update, required),
1160 (4, self.rgb, required),
1161 (6, self.alias, required),
1162 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1163 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1169 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1170 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1171 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1172 (0, features, required),
1173 (2, last_update, required),
1175 (6, alias, required),
1176 (8, announcement_message, option),
1177 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1179 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1180 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1181 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1185 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1187 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1188 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1189 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1190 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1192 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1193 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1194 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1195 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1196 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1197 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1199 use core::fmt::Write;
1200 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1201 // Display printable ASCII characters
1202 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1203 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1212 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1213 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1218 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1219 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1220 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1224 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
1225 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1226 pub struct NodeInfo {
1227 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1228 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1229 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1230 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1231 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1232 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>,
1233 /// In memory, each node is assigned a unique ID. They are eagerly reused, ensuring they remain
1234 /// relatively dense.
1236 /// These IDs allow the router to avoid a `HashMap` lookup by simply using this value as an
1237 /// index in a `Vec`, skipping a big step in some of the hottest code when routing.
1238 pub(crate) node_counter: u32,
1241 impl PartialEq for NodeInfo {
1242 fn eq(&self, o: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
1243 self.channels == o.channels && self.announcement_info == o.announcement_info
1247 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1248 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1249 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1250 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1255 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1256 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1257 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1258 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1259 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1260 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1266 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1267 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1268 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1269 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1270 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1272 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1273 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1274 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1275 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1277 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1284 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1285 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1286 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1287 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1288 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1289 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1290 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1291 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1292 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1293 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1294 (4, channels, required_vec),
1296 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1297 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1300 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1302 node_counter: u32::max_value(),
1307 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1308 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1310 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1311 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1312 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1314 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1316 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1317 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1318 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1319 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1320 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1321 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1323 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1324 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1325 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1326 node_id.write(writer)?;
1327 node_info.write(writer)?;
1330 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1331 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1332 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1338 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1339 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1340 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1342 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1343 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1344 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1345 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1346 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1347 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1348 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1349 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1351 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1352 if nodes_count > u32::max_value() as u64 / 2 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1353 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1354 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1355 for i in 0..nodes_count {
1356 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1357 let mut node_info: NodeInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1358 node_info.node_counter = i as u32;
1359 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1362 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1363 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1364 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1368 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1371 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1372 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1373 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1374 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(nodes_count as usize),
1375 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1376 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1377 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1378 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1383 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1384 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1385 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1386 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1387 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1389 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1390 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1391 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1397 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1398 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1399 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1400 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1401 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1402 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1403 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1404 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1405 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1406 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1407 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1411 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1412 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1413 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1415 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1416 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1418 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1419 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1420 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1421 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1422 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1423 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1424 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1425 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1429 fn test_node_counter_consistency(&self) {
1430 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1431 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1432 let removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1433 let next_counter = self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
1434 assert!(next_counter < (u32::max_value() as usize) / 2);
1435 let mut used_node_counters = vec![0u8; next_counter / 8 + 1];
1437 for counter in removed_node_counters.iter() {
1438 let pos = (*counter as usize) / 8;
1439 let bit = 1 << (counter % 8);
1440 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1441 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1443 for (_, node) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1444 assert!((node.node_counter as usize) < next_counter);
1445 let pos = (node.node_counter as usize) / 8;
1446 let bit = 1 << (node.node_counter % 8);
1447 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1448 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1453 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1454 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1455 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1456 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1457 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1458 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1464 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1465 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1466 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1467 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1470 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1471 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1472 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1473 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1476 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1479 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1480 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1481 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1485 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1486 /// given node announcement.
1488 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1489 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1490 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1491 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1492 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1493 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1496 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1497 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1498 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1500 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1501 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1504 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1505 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1506 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1508 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1509 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1510 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1513 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1514 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1515 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1516 // that it be at least the current time.
1517 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1518 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1519 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1520 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1525 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1526 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1527 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1528 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1529 features: msg.features.clone(),
1530 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1533 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1541 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1543 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1544 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1545 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1547 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1548 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1549 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1550 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1551 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1553 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1555 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1556 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1559 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1561 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1562 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1563 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1565 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1566 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1567 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1568 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1569 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1572 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1573 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1574 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1576 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1577 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1578 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1579 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1580 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1582 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1584 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1587 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1589 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1590 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1592 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1593 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1594 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1595 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1598 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1599 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1600 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1602 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1604 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1606 capacity_sats: None,
1607 announcement_message: None,
1608 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1611 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1614 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1615 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1616 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1618 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1619 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1621 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1623 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1624 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1625 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1626 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1628 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1629 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1630 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1631 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1633 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1634 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1636 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1637 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1638 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1640 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1643 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1644 entry.insert(channel_info);
1648 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1649 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1650 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1651 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1653 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1654 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1655 let node_counter = removed_node_counters.pop()
1656 .unwrap_or(self.next_node_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u32);
1657 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1658 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1659 announcement_info: None,
1669 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1670 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1671 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1673 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1675 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1676 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1679 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1680 return Err(LightningError {
1681 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1682 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1687 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1689 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1690 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1691 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1692 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1694 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1695 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1696 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1697 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1699 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1700 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1701 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1702 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1703 return Err(LightningError {
1704 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1705 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1708 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1709 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1710 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1711 return Err(LightningError {
1712 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1713 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1720 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1721 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1722 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1723 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1724 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1725 return Err(LightningError{
1726 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1727 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1731 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1732 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1734 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1735 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1736 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1738 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1741 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1742 features: msg.features.clone(),
1743 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1745 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1747 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1748 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1749 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1750 announcement_received_time,
1753 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1755 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1759 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1761 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1762 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1763 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1764 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1765 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1766 let current_time_unix = None;
1768 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1771 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1773 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1774 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1775 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1776 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1777 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1778 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1779 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1783 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1784 /// from local storage.
1785 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1786 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1787 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1788 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1789 let current_time_unix = None;
1791 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1792 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1793 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1794 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1795 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1797 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1798 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1799 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1800 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1801 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1802 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1803 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1806 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1807 removed_node_counters.push(other_node_entry.get().node_counter);
1808 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1811 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1814 removed_node_counters.push(node.node_counter);
1815 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1819 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1820 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1821 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1824 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1825 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1826 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1828 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1829 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1831 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1832 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1834 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1835 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1836 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1837 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1838 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1841 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1842 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1845 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1846 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1847 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1849 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1850 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1852 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1853 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1854 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1855 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1856 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1857 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1858 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1859 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1860 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1862 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1863 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1864 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1865 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1866 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1867 info.one_to_two = None;
1869 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1870 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1871 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1872 info.two_to_one = None;
1874 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1875 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1876 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1877 // channel_update for.
1878 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1879 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1880 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1881 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1882 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1886 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1887 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1888 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1889 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1890 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1891 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1895 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1896 if let Some(time) = time {
1897 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1899 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1900 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1901 // of this function.
1902 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1904 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1905 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1908 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1912 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1913 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1916 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1919 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1920 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1921 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1923 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1924 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1925 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1926 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1929 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1930 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1931 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1933 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1934 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1935 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1936 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1939 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1941 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1943 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1944 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1945 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1946 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1949 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1950 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
1951 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1953 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1955 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1956 return Err(LightningError {
1957 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1958 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1962 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1964 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1965 // disable this check during tests!
1966 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1967 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1968 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1970 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1971 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1975 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
1977 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1978 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1980 core::mem::drop(channels);
1981 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1982 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1985 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1986 return Err(LightningError{err:
1987 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1988 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1991 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1992 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1993 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1994 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1995 return Err(LightningError{err:
1996 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1997 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2000 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
2001 ($target: expr) => {
2002 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
2003 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
2004 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
2005 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
2006 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
2007 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
2008 // but only in the non-normative section.
2009 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
2010 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2011 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
2012 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2018 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
2020 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
2021 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
2023 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2024 enabled: chan_enabled,
2025 last_update: msg.timestamp,
2026 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
2027 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2028 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2030 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2031 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2035 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2039 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2040 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2041 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2042 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2043 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2044 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2045 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2046 })?, "channel_update");
2049 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2052 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2053 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2054 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2055 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2056 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2057 })?, "channel_update");
2060 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2069 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2070 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2071 ($node_id: expr) => {
2072 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2073 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2074 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2076 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2077 self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().push(entry.get().node_counter);
2078 entry.remove_entry();
2081 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2086 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2087 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2091 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2092 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2094 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2095 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2099 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2100 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2101 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2104 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2105 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2106 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2107 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2110 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2112 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2113 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2117 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2118 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2119 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2122 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2123 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2124 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2125 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2128 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2129 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2130 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2131 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2132 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2133 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2138 pub(crate) mod tests {
2139 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2140 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2141 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2142 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2143 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2144 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2145 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2146 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2147 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2148 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2149 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2150 use crate::util::test_utils;
2151 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2152 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2154 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2155 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2157 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2158 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2159 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2160 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2161 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2162 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2163 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2164 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2165 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2168 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2169 use crate::prelude::*;
2170 use crate::sync::Arc;
2172 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2173 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2174 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2177 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2178 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2179 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2181 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2182 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2183 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2184 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2188 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2189 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2190 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2191 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2192 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2194 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2195 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2196 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2197 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2198 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2199 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2202 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2203 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2204 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2205 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2209 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2210 addresses: Vec::new(),
2211 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2212 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2214 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2215 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2217 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2218 contents: unsigned_announcement
2222 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2223 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2224 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2225 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2226 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2228 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2229 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2230 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2231 short_channel_id: 0,
2232 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2233 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2234 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2235 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2236 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2238 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2239 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2240 ChannelAnnouncement {
2241 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2242 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2243 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2244 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2245 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2249 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2250 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2251 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2252 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2253 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2256 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2257 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2258 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2259 short_channel_id: 0,
2262 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2263 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2264 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2265 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2266 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2267 excess_data: Vec::new()
2269 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2270 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2272 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2273 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2278 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2279 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2280 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2282 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2283 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2284 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2286 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2287 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2289 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2293 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2294 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2295 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2296 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2301 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2302 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2306 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2307 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2309 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2310 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2313 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2316 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2317 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2318 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2319 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2320 // Return false because contains excess data.
2321 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2322 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2326 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2327 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2328 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2329 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2330 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2331 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2333 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2338 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2339 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2340 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2342 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2343 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2345 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2346 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2348 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2349 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2350 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2351 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2352 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2357 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2363 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2364 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2365 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2367 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2370 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2371 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2372 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2373 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2374 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2376 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2377 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2378 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2379 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2381 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2384 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2385 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2386 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2387 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2388 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2389 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2390 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2391 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2396 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2402 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2403 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2404 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2405 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2406 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2408 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2411 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2413 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2415 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2416 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2417 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2419 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2420 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2421 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2422 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2423 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2425 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2428 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2430 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2431 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2432 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2437 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2438 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2439 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2440 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2441 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2442 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2443 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2447 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2448 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2449 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2451 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2454 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2455 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2457 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2460 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2461 // announcement is mainnet).
2462 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2463 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2464 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2465 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2467 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2472 fn handling_channel_update() {
2473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2474 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2475 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2476 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2477 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2479 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2480 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2482 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2483 let short_channel_id;
2486 // Announce a channel we will update
2487 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2488 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2489 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2491 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2492 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2493 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2500 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2501 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2502 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2503 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2508 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2510 Some(channel_info) => {
2511 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2512 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2517 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2518 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2519 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2520 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2521 // Return false because contains excess data
2522 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2523 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2527 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2528 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2529 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2530 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2531 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2533 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2536 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2537 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2538 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2539 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2540 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2542 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2545 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2546 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2547 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2548 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2549 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2551 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2554 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2555 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2556 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2557 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2558 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2559 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2561 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2564 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2565 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2566 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2567 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2568 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2569 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2570 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2572 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2575 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2576 // update is mainet).
2577 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2578 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2579 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2581 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2583 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2588 fn handling_network_update() {
2589 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2590 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2593 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2594 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2595 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2598 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2599 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2602 let short_channel_id;
2604 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2605 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2606 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2607 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2608 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2609 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2610 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2612 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2613 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2615 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2616 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2619 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2620 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2623 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2625 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2627 Some(channel_info) => {
2628 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2632 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2634 is_permanent: false,
2637 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2639 Some(channel_info) => {
2640 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2645 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2646 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2651 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2652 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2653 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2656 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2657 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2659 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2660 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2661 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2662 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2663 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2664 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2666 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2667 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2669 is_permanent: false,
2672 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2673 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2675 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2676 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2681 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2682 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2683 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2688 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2689 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2690 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2691 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2692 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2693 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2694 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2696 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2697 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2699 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2700 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2701 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2702 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2703 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2705 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2706 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2707 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2708 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2710 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2711 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2712 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2714 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2715 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2716 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2718 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2719 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2720 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2721 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2723 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2724 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2726 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2728 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2729 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2730 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2731 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2732 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2734 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2735 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2736 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2737 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2738 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2739 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2740 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2741 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2742 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2743 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2744 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2745 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2746 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2747 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2748 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2749 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2750 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2753 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2754 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2755 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2757 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2759 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2761 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2763 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2764 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2765 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2767 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2768 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2769 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2770 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2772 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2773 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2774 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2776 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2777 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2778 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2779 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2781 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2782 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2783 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2784 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2785 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2788 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2790 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2791 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2792 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2794 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2796 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2797 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2798 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2800 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2801 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2802 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2803 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2805 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2806 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2807 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2809 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2810 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2811 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2813 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2814 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2815 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2816 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2817 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2822 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2823 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2824 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2825 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2826 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2828 // Channels were not announced yet.
2829 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2830 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2832 let short_channel_id;
2834 // Announce a channel we will update
2835 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2836 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2837 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2843 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2844 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2845 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2846 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2847 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2848 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2854 // Valid channel update
2855 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2856 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2857 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2858 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2864 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2865 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2866 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2867 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2868 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2869 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2875 // Channel update with excess data.
2876 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2877 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2878 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2879 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2880 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2886 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2887 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2888 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2889 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2890 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2891 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2896 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2897 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2898 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2902 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2903 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2904 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2905 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2906 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2907 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2910 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2911 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2914 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2915 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2916 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2922 // Nodes were never announced
2923 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2924 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2927 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2928 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2933 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2934 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2940 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2941 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2943 // Skip the first node.
2944 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2945 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2948 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2949 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2950 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2951 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2952 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2953 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2954 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2959 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2960 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2964 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2965 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2966 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2968 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2969 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2971 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2972 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2973 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2974 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2978 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2979 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2984 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2985 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2986 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2987 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2989 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2990 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2994 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2995 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2996 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2998 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2999 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3001 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3002 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
3003 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
3004 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
3008 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
3009 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
3010 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
3011 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
3013 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3014 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3015 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3016 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
3018 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3020 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
3022 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3023 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3024 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3028 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3030 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3031 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3032 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3033 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3034 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3037 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3038 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3039 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3040 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3041 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3042 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3043 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3045 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3051 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3052 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3053 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3055 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3056 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3057 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3058 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3060 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3061 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3062 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3065 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3066 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3067 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3070 // used for testing resumption on same block
3071 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3074 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3075 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3076 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3077 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3083 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3084 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3088 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3090 number_of_blocks: 0,
3093 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3094 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3096 number_of_blocks: 0,
3097 sync_complete: true,
3098 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3102 // Error when wrong chain
3103 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3107 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3109 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3112 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3113 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3115 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3116 sync_complete: true,
3117 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3121 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3122 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3126 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3127 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3128 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3131 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3132 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3133 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3134 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3135 sync_complete: true,
3136 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3140 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3141 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3145 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3146 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3147 number_of_blocks: 1,
3152 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3153 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3154 number_of_blocks: 1,
3155 sync_complete: true,
3156 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3161 // No results in valid query range
3162 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3166 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3167 first_blocknum: 1000,
3168 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3173 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3174 first_blocknum: 1000,
3175 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3176 sync_complete: true,
3177 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3182 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3183 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3187 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3188 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3189 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3194 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3195 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3196 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3197 sync_complete: true,
3198 short_channel_ids: vec![
3199 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3205 // Single block exactly full
3206 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3210 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3211 first_blocknum: 100000,
3212 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3217 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3218 first_blocknum: 100000,
3219 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3220 sync_complete: true,
3221 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3222 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3228 // Multiple split on new block
3229 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3233 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3234 first_blocknum: 100000,
3235 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3240 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3241 first_blocknum: 100000,
3242 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3243 sync_complete: false,
3244 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3245 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3249 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3250 first_blocknum: 107999,
3251 number_of_blocks: 2,
3252 sync_complete: true,
3253 short_channel_ids: vec![
3254 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3260 // Multiple split on same block
3261 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3265 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3266 first_blocknum: 100002,
3267 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3272 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3273 first_blocknum: 100002,
3274 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3275 sync_complete: false,
3276 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3277 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3281 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3282 first_blocknum: 108001,
3283 number_of_blocks: 1,
3284 sync_complete: true,
3285 short_channel_ids: vec![
3286 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3293 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3294 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3295 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3296 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3298 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3300 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3301 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3302 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3303 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3306 assert!(result.is_ok());
3308 assert!(result.is_err());
3311 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3312 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3314 for i in 0..events.len() {
3315 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3317 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3318 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3319 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3320 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3321 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3322 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3323 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3325 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3326 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3327 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3328 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3329 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3331 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3332 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3333 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3336 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3342 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3343 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3344 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3345 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3346 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3348 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3350 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3352 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3354 assert!(result.is_err());
3358 fn displays_node_alias() {
3359 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3360 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3361 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3362 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3365 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3366 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3367 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3369 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3370 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3371 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3372 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3375 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3376 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3377 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3381 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3382 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3383 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3384 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3385 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3386 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3388 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3389 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3392 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3393 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3394 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3395 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3396 last_update_message: None,
3399 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3400 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3402 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3403 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3404 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3406 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3407 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3408 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3410 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3411 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3412 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3413 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3414 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3416 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3417 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3418 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3420 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3421 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3422 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3423 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3424 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3426 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3428 capacity_sats: None,
3429 announcement_message: None,
3430 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3433 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3434 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3436 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3437 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3439 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3440 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3441 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3442 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3443 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3444 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3445 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3446 capacity_sats: None,
3447 announcement_message: None,
3448 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3451 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3452 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3454 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3455 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3457 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3458 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3459 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3461 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3462 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3463 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3464 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3465 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3466 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3467 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3469 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3470 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3471 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3472 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3473 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3477 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3478 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3479 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3480 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3481 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3482 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3485 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3486 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3489 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3490 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3491 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3492 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3493 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3495 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3496 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3497 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3499 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3500 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3501 channels: Vec::new(),
3502 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3506 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3507 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3508 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3509 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3511 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3512 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3513 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3517 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3518 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3519 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3520 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3521 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3522 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3526 fn test_node_id_display() {
3527 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3528 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3536 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3538 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3539 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3540 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3541 let mut v = Vec::new();
3542 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3543 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3544 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3548 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3549 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3550 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3551 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3552 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3553 black_box(&net_graph).encode()