1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
43 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
44 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
45 use crate::sync::Mutex;
46 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
81 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
82 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
83 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
87 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
88 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
89 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
92 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
93 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
94 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
98 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
99 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
104 impl Eq for NodeId {}
106 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
107 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
108 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
112 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
113 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
114 Some(self.cmp(other))
118 impl Ord for NodeId {
119 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
120 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
124 impl Writeable for NodeId {
125 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
126 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
131 impl Readable for NodeId {
132 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
133 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
134 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
139 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
140 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
141 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
145 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
146 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
148 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
153 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
154 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
155 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
156 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
157 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
159 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
160 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
161 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
162 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
164 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
165 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
166 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
167 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
168 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
169 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
170 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
173 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
174 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
175 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
176 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
177 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
178 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
179 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
180 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
181 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
182 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
185 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
186 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
187 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
188 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
191 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
192 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
194 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
195 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
196 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
197 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
198 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
199 ChannelUpdateMessage {
200 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
203 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
204 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
206 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
207 short_channel_id: u64,
208 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
209 /// `channel_update` message is received.
212 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
213 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
215 /// The node id of the failed node.
217 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
218 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
223 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
224 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
227 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
228 (0, short_channel_id, required),
229 (2, is_permanent, required),
231 (4, NodeFailure) => {
232 (0, node_id, required),
233 (2, is_permanent, required),
237 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
238 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
239 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
240 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
241 /// serving historical announcements.
242 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
243 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
246 utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
247 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
248 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
249 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
253 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
254 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
256 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
257 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
258 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
259 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
260 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
263 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
264 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
266 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
271 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
272 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
273 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
274 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
275 self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
278 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
279 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
281 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
282 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
286 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
287 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
288 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
289 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
290 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
291 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
292 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
299 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
301 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
303 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
306 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
307 if update_msg.as_ref()
308 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
313 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
314 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
317 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
318 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
319 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
326 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
330 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
331 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
333 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
334 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
335 match *network_update {
336 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
337 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
338 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
339 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
340 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
341 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
343 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
344 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
345 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
346 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
348 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
350 log_debug!(self.logger,
351 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
352 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
359 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
360 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
361 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
364 return Err(LightningError {
365 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
366 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
367 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
369 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
371 log_level: Level::Trace,
379 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
380 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
381 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
382 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
383 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
384 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
385 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
387 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
389 log_level: Level::Trace
395 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
396 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
398 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
399 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
400 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
401 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
402 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
405 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
406 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
407 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
410 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
411 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
412 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
415 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
416 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
417 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
418 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
419 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
420 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
421 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
422 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
423 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
425 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
426 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
428 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
430 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
431 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
437 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
438 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
439 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
440 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
444 for (_, ref node) in iter {
445 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
446 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
454 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
455 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
456 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
458 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
459 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
460 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
461 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
462 /// tracking this directly.
464 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
465 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
466 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
467 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
468 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
469 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
470 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
471 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
472 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
473 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
477 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
479 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
480 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
481 // updates from all our peers normally.
483 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
484 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
485 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
488 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
489 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
490 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
491 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
492 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
494 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
495 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
496 // relying on it useless.
498 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
499 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
500 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
502 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
503 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
504 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
505 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
506 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
509 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
510 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
511 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
512 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
513 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
514 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
515 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
517 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
518 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
519 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
520 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
522 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
523 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
524 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
526 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
527 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
528 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
529 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
531 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
532 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
533 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
535 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
539 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
540 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
541 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
542 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
543 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
544 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
545 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
551 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
552 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
553 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
554 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
558 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
559 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
560 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
561 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
565 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
566 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
567 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
568 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
569 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
570 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
571 /// memory constrained systems.
572 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
573 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
575 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
577 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
578 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
579 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
581 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
582 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
583 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
584 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
585 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
586 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
587 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
588 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
589 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
591 short_channel_ids: vec![],
594 return Err(LightningError {
595 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
596 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
600 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
601 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
602 // exists even if its not yet routable.
603 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
604 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
605 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
606 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
607 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
608 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
609 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
612 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
613 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
618 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
619 let batch_count = batches.len();
620 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
621 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
622 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
623 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
625 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
626 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
627 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
628 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
629 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
630 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
631 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
633 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
634 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
635 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
637 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
638 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
639 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
641 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
642 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
643 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
644 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
646 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
647 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
649 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
652 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
654 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
655 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
656 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
657 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
661 short_channel_ids: batch,
669 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
672 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
673 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
677 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
678 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
679 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
683 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
684 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
685 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
689 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
690 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
694 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
696 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
699 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
700 let mut ret = Vec::new();
701 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
702 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
707 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
708 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
709 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
710 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
711 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
712 pub last_update: u32,
713 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
715 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
716 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
717 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
718 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
719 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
720 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
721 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
722 pub fees: RoutingFees,
723 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
724 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
725 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
726 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
727 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
730 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
731 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
732 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
737 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
738 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
739 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
740 (0, self.last_update, required),
741 (2, self.enabled, required),
742 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
743 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
744 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
745 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
746 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
747 (10, self.fees, required),
748 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
754 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
755 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
756 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
757 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
758 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
759 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
760 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
761 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
762 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
764 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
765 (0, last_update, required),
766 (2, enabled, required),
767 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
768 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
769 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
770 (10, fees, required),
771 (12, last_update_message, required)
774 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
775 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
776 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
777 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
778 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
779 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
781 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
782 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
785 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
791 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
792 /// Received within a channel announcement.
793 pub struct ChannelInfo {
794 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
795 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
796 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
797 pub node_one: NodeId,
798 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
799 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
800 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
801 pub node_two: NodeId,
802 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
803 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
804 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
805 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
806 /// An initial announcement of the channel
807 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
808 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
809 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
810 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
811 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
812 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
813 /// network graph in memory!).
814 announcement_received_time: u64,
818 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
819 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
820 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
821 let (direction, source) = {
822 if target == &self.node_one {
823 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
824 } else if target == &self.node_two {
825 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
830 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
833 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
834 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
835 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
836 let (direction, target) = {
837 if source == &self.node_one {
838 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
839 } else if source == &self.node_two {
840 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
845 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
848 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
849 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
850 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
852 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
854 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
859 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
860 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
861 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
862 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
867 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
868 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
869 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
870 (0, self.features, required),
871 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
872 (2, self.node_one, required),
873 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
874 (6, self.node_two, required),
875 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
876 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
877 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
883 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
884 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
885 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
886 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
887 // channel updates via the gossip network.
888 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
890 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
891 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
892 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
893 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
894 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
895 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
896 Err(err) => Err(err),
901 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
902 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
903 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
904 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
905 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
906 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
907 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
908 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
909 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
910 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
911 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
912 (0, features, required),
913 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
914 (2, node_one, required),
915 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
916 (6, node_two, required),
917 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
918 (10, capacity_sats, required),
919 (12, announcement_message, required),
923 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
924 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
925 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
926 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
927 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
928 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
929 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
930 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
935 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
936 /// source node to a target node.
938 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
939 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
940 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
941 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
942 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
945 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
947 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
948 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
949 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
951 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
952 Some(capacity_msat) => {
953 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
954 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
956 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
960 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
964 /// Returns information for the channel.
966 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
968 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
970 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
971 self.htlc_maximum_msat
974 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
976 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
977 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
979 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
980 self.effective_capacity
983 /// Returns information for the direction.
985 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
988 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
989 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
990 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
991 .field("channel", &self.channel)
996 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
998 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
999 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1000 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1001 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1002 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1005 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1007 liquidity_msat: u64,
1009 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1011 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1014 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1016 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1018 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1019 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1021 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1024 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1025 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1029 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1030 /// use when making routing decisions.
1031 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1033 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1034 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1035 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1037 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1038 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1039 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1040 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1041 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1046 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1047 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
1048 pub struct RoutingFees {
1049 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1051 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1052 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1053 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1056 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1057 (0, base_msat, required),
1058 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1061 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1062 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1063 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1064 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1065 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1066 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1067 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1068 pub last_update: u32,
1069 /// Color assigned to the node
1071 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1072 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1073 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1074 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1075 /// An initial announcement of the node
1076 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1077 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1078 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1079 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1082 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1083 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1084 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[NetAddress] {
1085 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1086 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1087 .unwrap_or_default()
1091 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1092 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1093 let empty_addresses = Vec::<NetAddress>::new();
1094 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1095 (0, self.features, required),
1096 (2, self.last_update, required),
1097 (4, self.rgb, required),
1098 (6, self.alias, required),
1099 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1100 (10, empty_addresses, vec_type), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1106 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1107 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1108 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1109 (0, features, required),
1110 (2, last_update, required),
1112 (6, alias, required),
1113 (8, announcement_message, option),
1114 (10, _addresses, vec_type), // deprecated, not used anymore
1116 let _: Option<Vec<NetAddress>> = _addresses;
1117 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1118 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1122 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1124 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1125 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1126 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1127 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1129 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1130 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1131 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1132 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1133 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1134 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1136 use core::fmt::Write;
1137 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1138 // Display printable ASCII characters
1139 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1140 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1149 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1150 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1155 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1156 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1157 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1161 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1162 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1163 pub struct NodeInfo {
1164 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1165 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1166 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1167 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1168 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1169 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1172 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1173 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1174 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1175 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1180 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1181 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1182 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1183 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1184 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1185 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1191 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1192 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1193 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1194 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1195 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1197 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1198 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1199 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1200 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1202 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1209 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1210 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1211 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1212 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1213 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1214 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1215 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1216 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1217 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1218 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1220 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1221 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1222 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1223 (4, channels, vec_type),
1227 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1228 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1233 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1234 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1236 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1237 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1238 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1240 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1241 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1242 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1243 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1244 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1245 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1247 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1248 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1249 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1250 node_id.write(writer)?;
1251 node_info.write(writer)?;
1254 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1255 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1256 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1262 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1263 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1264 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1266 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1267 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1268 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1269 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1270 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1271 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1272 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1274 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1275 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1276 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1277 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1278 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1279 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1282 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1283 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1284 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1288 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1291 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1292 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1293 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1294 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1295 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1296 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1301 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1302 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1303 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1304 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1305 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1307 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1308 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1309 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1315 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1316 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1317 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1318 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1319 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1320 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1324 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1325 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1326 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1328 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1329 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
1331 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1332 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1333 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1334 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1335 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1336 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1340 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1341 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1342 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1343 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1344 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1350 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1351 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1352 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1353 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1356 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1357 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1358 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1359 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1362 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1365 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1366 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1367 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1371 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1372 /// given node announcement.
1374 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1375 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1376 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1377 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1378 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1379 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
1380 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1383 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1384 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1385 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1387 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1388 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1391 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1392 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1393 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1395 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1396 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1397 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1400 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1401 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1402 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1403 // that it be at least the current time.
1404 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1405 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1406 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1407 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1412 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1413 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1414 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1415 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1416 features: msg.features.clone(),
1417 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1419 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1420 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1428 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1430 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1431 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1432 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1434 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1435 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1436 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1437 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1438 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1440 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1442 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1443 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1444 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1445 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1446 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1447 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1450 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1451 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1452 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1454 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1455 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1456 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1457 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1458 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1460 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1462 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1465 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1467 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1468 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1470 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1471 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1472 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1473 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1476 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1477 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1478 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1480 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1482 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1484 capacity_sats: None,
1485 announcement_message: None,
1486 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1489 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1492 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1493 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1494 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1496 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1497 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1499 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1500 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1501 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1502 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1504 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1505 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1506 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1507 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1509 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1510 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1512 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1513 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1514 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1516 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1519 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1520 entry.insert(channel_info);
1524 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1525 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1526 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1527 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1529 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1530 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1531 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1532 announcement_info: None,
1541 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1542 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1543 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1545 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1547 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1548 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1552 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1554 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1555 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1556 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1557 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1559 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1560 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1561 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1562 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1564 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1565 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1566 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1567 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1568 return Err(LightningError {
1569 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1570 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1573 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1574 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1575 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1576 return Err(LightningError {
1577 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1578 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1585 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1586 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1587 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1588 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1589 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1590 return Err(LightningError{
1591 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1592 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1596 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1597 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1599 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1600 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1601 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1603 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1606 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1607 features: msg.features.clone(),
1608 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1610 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1612 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1613 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1614 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1615 announcement_received_time,
1618 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1620 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1624 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1625 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1626 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1627 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1628 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1629 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1630 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1631 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1632 let current_time_unix = None;
1634 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1637 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1638 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1639 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1640 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1641 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1642 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1644 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1645 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1646 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1647 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1650 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1651 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1652 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1654 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1655 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1661 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1662 /// from local storage.
1663 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1664 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1665 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1666 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1667 let current_time_unix = None;
1669 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1670 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1671 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1672 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1673 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1675 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1676 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1677 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1678 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1679 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1680 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1683 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1684 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1687 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1690 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1694 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1695 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1696 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1699 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1700 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1701 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1703 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1704 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1706 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1707 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1709 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1710 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1711 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1712 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1713 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1716 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1717 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1720 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1721 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1722 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1724 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1725 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1727 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1728 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1729 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1730 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1731 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1732 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1733 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1734 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1735 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1737 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1738 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1739 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1740 info.one_to_two = None;
1742 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1743 info.two_to_one = None;
1745 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1746 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1747 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1748 // channel_update for.
1749 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1750 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1754 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1755 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1756 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1757 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1758 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1759 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1763 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1764 if let Some(time) = time {
1765 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1767 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1768 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1769 // of this function.
1770 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1772 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1773 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1776 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1780 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1781 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1784 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1787 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1788 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1789 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1791 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1792 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1793 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1794 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1797 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1798 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1799 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1801 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1802 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1803 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1804 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1807 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1808 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1810 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1812 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1813 // disable this check during tests!
1814 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1815 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1816 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1818 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1819 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1823 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1824 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1826 core::mem::drop(channels);
1827 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1828 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1831 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1832 return Err(LightningError{err:
1833 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1834 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1837 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1838 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1839 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1840 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1841 return Err(LightningError{err:
1842 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1843 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1846 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1847 ($target: expr) => {
1848 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1849 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1850 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1851 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1852 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1853 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1854 // but only in the non-normative section.
1855 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1856 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1857 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1858 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1864 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1866 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1867 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1869 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1870 enabled: chan_enabled,
1871 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1872 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1873 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1874 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1876 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1877 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1881 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1885 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1886 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1887 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1888 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1889 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1890 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1891 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1892 })?, "channel_update");
1894 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1896 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1897 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1898 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1899 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1900 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1901 })?, "channel_update");
1903 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1911 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1912 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1913 ($node_id: expr) => {
1914 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1915 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1916 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1918 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1919 entry.remove_entry();
1922 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1927 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1928 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1932 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1933 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1935 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1936 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1940 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1941 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1942 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1945 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1946 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1947 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1948 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1951 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1953 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1954 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1958 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1959 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1960 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1963 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1964 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1965 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1966 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1969 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1970 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1971 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1972 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1973 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
1974 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
1979 pub(crate) mod tests {
1980 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1981 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1982 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1983 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1984 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1985 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1986 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
1987 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1988 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1989 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1990 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1991 use crate::util::test_utils;
1992 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
1993 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1995 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1996 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1998 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1999 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2000 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2001 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2002 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2003 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2007 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2008 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2011 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2012 use crate::prelude::*;
2013 use crate::sync::Arc;
2015 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2016 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2017 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2020 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2021 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2022 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2024 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2025 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2026 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2027 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2031 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2032 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2033 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2034 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2035 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2037 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2038 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2039 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2040 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2041 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2042 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2045 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2046 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2047 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2048 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2053 addresses: Vec::new(),
2054 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2055 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2057 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2058 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2060 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2061 contents: unsigned_announcement
2065 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2066 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2067 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2068 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2069 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2071 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2072 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2073 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2074 short_channel_id: 0,
2075 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2076 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2077 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2078 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2079 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2081 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2082 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2083 ChannelAnnouncement {
2084 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2085 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2086 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2087 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2088 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2092 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2093 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2094 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2095 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2096 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2099 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2100 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2101 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2102 short_channel_id: 0,
2105 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2106 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2107 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2108 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2109 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2110 excess_data: Vec::new()
2112 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2113 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2115 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2116 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2121 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2122 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2123 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2125 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2126 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2127 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2129 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2130 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2132 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2136 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2137 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2138 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2139 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2144 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2145 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2149 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2150 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2152 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2153 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2156 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2159 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2160 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2161 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2162 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2163 // Return false because contains excess data.
2164 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2165 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2169 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2170 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2171 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2172 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2173 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2174 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2176 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2181 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2182 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2183 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2185 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2186 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2188 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2189 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2191 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2192 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2193 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2194 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2195 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2200 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2206 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2207 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2208 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2210 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2213 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2214 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2215 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2216 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2217 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2219 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2220 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2221 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2222 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2224 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2227 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2228 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2229 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2230 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2231 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2232 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2233 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2234 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2239 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2245 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2246 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2247 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2248 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2249 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2251 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2254 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2256 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2258 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2259 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2260 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2262 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2263 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2264 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2265 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2266 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2268 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2271 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2273 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2274 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2275 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2280 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2281 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2282 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2283 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2284 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2285 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2286 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2290 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2291 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2292 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2294 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2297 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2298 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2300 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2305 fn handling_channel_update() {
2306 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2307 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2308 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2309 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2310 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2312 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2313 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2315 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2316 let short_channel_id;
2319 // Announce a channel we will update
2320 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2321 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2322 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2324 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2325 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2326 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2333 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2334 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2335 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2340 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2342 Some(channel_info) => {
2343 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2344 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2349 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2350 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2351 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2352 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2353 // Return false because contains excess data
2354 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2355 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2359 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2360 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2361 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2362 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2363 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2365 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2368 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2369 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2370 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2371 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2372 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2374 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2377 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2378 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2379 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2380 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2381 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2383 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2386 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2387 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2388 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2389 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2390 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2391 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2393 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2396 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2397 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2398 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2399 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2400 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2401 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2402 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2404 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2409 fn handling_network_update() {
2410 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2411 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2412 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2414 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2415 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2416 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2419 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2420 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2423 let short_channel_id;
2425 // Announce a channel we will update
2426 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2427 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2428 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2429 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2430 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2432 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2433 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2435 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2436 msg: valid_channel_update,
2439 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2442 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2444 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2446 Some(channel_info) => {
2447 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2451 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2453 is_permanent: false,
2456 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2458 Some(channel_info) => {
2459 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2464 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2465 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2470 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2471 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2472 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2475 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2476 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2478 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2479 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2480 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2481 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2482 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2483 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2485 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2486 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2488 is_permanent: false,
2491 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2492 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2494 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2495 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2500 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2501 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2502 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2507 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2508 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2509 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2510 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2511 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2512 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2515 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2516 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2518 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2519 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2520 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2521 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2522 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2524 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2525 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2526 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2527 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2529 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2530 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2531 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2533 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2534 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2535 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2537 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2538 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2539 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2540 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2542 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2543 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2545 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2547 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2548 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2549 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2550 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2551 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2553 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2554 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2555 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2556 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2557 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2558 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2559 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2560 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2561 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2562 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2563 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2564 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2565 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2566 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2567 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2568 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2569 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2572 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2573 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2574 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2576 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2578 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2580 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2582 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2583 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2584 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2586 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2587 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2588 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2589 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2591 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2592 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2593 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2595 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2596 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2597 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2598 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2600 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2601 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2602 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2603 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2604 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2607 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2609 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2610 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2611 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2613 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2615 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2616 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2617 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2619 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2620 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2621 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2622 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2624 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2625 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2626 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2628 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2629 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2630 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2632 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2633 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2634 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2635 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2636 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2641 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2642 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2643 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2644 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2645 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2647 // Channels were not announced yet.
2648 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2649 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2651 let short_channel_id;
2653 // Announce a channel we will update
2654 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2655 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2656 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2662 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2663 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2664 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2665 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2666 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2667 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2673 // Valid channel update
2674 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2675 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2676 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2677 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2683 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2684 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2685 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2686 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2687 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2688 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2694 // Channel update with excess data.
2695 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2696 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2697 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2698 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2699 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2705 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2706 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2707 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2708 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2709 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2710 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2715 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2716 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2717 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2721 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2722 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2723 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2724 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2725 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2726 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2729 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2730 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2733 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2734 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2735 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2741 // Nodes were never announced
2742 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2743 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2746 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2747 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2752 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2753 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2759 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2760 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2762 // Skip the first node.
2763 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2764 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2767 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2768 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2769 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2770 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2771 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2772 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2773 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2778 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2779 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2783 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2784 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2785 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2787 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2788 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2790 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2791 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2792 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2793 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2797 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2798 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2803 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2804 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2805 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2806 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2808 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2809 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2813 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2814 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2815 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2817 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2818 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2820 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2821 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2822 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2823 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2827 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2828 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2829 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2830 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2832 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2833 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2834 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2835 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2837 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2839 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2841 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2842 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2843 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2847 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2849 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2850 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2851 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2852 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2853 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2856 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2857 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2858 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2859 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2860 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2861 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2862 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2864 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2870 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2871 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2872 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2874 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2875 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2876 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2877 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2879 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2880 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2881 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2884 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2885 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2886 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2889 // used for testing resumption on same block
2890 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2893 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2894 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2895 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2896 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2902 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2903 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2907 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2909 number_of_blocks: 0,
2912 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2913 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2915 number_of_blocks: 0,
2916 sync_complete: true,
2917 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2921 // Error when wrong chain
2922 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2926 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2928 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2931 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2932 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2934 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2935 sync_complete: true,
2936 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2940 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2941 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2945 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2946 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2947 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2950 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2951 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2952 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2953 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2954 sync_complete: true,
2955 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2959 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2960 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2964 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2965 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2966 number_of_blocks: 1,
2971 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2972 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2973 number_of_blocks: 1,
2974 sync_complete: true,
2975 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2980 // No results in valid query range
2981 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2985 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2986 first_blocknum: 1000,
2987 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2992 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2993 first_blocknum: 1000,
2994 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2995 sync_complete: true,
2996 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3001 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3002 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3006 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3007 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3008 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3013 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3014 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3015 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3016 sync_complete: true,
3017 short_channel_ids: vec![
3018 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3024 // Single block exactly full
3025 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3029 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3030 first_blocknum: 100000,
3031 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3036 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3037 first_blocknum: 100000,
3038 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3039 sync_complete: true,
3040 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3041 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3047 // Multiple split on new block
3048 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3052 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3053 first_blocknum: 100000,
3054 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3059 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3060 first_blocknum: 100000,
3061 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3062 sync_complete: false,
3063 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3064 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3068 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3069 first_blocknum: 107999,
3070 number_of_blocks: 2,
3071 sync_complete: true,
3072 short_channel_ids: vec![
3073 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3079 // Multiple split on same block
3080 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3084 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3085 first_blocknum: 100002,
3086 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3091 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3092 first_blocknum: 100002,
3093 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3094 sync_complete: false,
3095 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3096 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3100 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3101 first_blocknum: 108001,
3102 number_of_blocks: 1,
3103 sync_complete: true,
3104 short_channel_ids: vec![
3105 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3112 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3113 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3114 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3115 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3117 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3119 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3120 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3121 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3122 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3125 assert!(result.is_ok());
3127 assert!(result.is_err());
3130 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3131 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3133 for i in 0..events.len() {
3134 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3136 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3137 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3138 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3139 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3140 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3141 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3142 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3144 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3145 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3146 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3147 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3148 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3150 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3151 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3152 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3155 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3161 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3162 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3163 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3164 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3165 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3167 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3169 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3171 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3173 assert!(result.is_err());
3177 fn displays_node_alias() {
3178 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3179 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3180 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3181 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3184 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3185 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3186 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3188 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3189 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3190 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3191 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3194 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3195 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3196 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3200 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3201 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3202 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3203 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3204 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3205 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3207 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3208 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3211 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3212 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3213 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3214 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3215 last_update_message: None,
3218 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3219 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3221 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3222 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3223 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3225 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3226 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3227 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3229 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3230 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3231 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3232 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3233 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3235 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3236 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3237 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3239 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3240 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3241 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3242 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3243 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3245 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3247 capacity_sats: None,
3248 announcement_message: None,
3249 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3252 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3253 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3255 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3256 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3258 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3259 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3260 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3261 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3262 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3263 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3264 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3265 capacity_sats: None,
3266 announcement_message: None,
3267 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3270 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3271 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3273 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3274 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3276 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3277 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3278 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3280 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3281 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3282 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3283 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3284 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3285 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3286 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3288 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3289 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3290 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3291 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3292 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3296 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3297 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3298 let announcement_message = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3299 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3300 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3301 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3304 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3305 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3308 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3309 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3310 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3311 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3312 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3314 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3315 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3316 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3318 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3319 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3320 channels: Vec::new(),
3321 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3324 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3325 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3326 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3327 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3329 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3330 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3331 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3335 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3336 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = hex::decode("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3337 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3338 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3339 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3340 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3344 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3352 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3353 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3354 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3355 let mut v = Vec::new();
3356 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3358 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3363 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3364 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3365 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3366 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3368 let _ = net_graph.encode();