1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
188 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
189 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
190 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
191 /// serving historical announcements.
193 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
194 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
195 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
196 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
199 chain_access: Option<C>,
200 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
201 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
205 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
206 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
208 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
209 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
210 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
211 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
212 /// channel owners' keys.
213 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
216 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
218 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
223 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
224 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
225 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
226 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
227 self.chain_access = chain_access;
230 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
231 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
233 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
234 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
238 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
239 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
240 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
241 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
242 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
243 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
251 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
252 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
253 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
254 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
255 match *network_update {
256 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
257 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
258 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
259 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
261 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
263 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
264 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
265 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
266 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
268 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
269 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
270 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
271 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
279 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
280 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
281 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
284 return Err(LightningError {
285 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
286 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
287 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
289 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
291 log_level: Level::Trace,
299 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
300 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
302 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
303 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
304 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
305 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
306 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
309 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
310 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
311 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
312 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
315 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
316 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
317 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
320 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
321 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
322 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
323 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
324 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
325 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
326 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
327 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
328 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
329 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
330 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
331 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
333 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
334 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
336 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
338 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
339 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
348 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
349 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
350 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
351 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
352 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
356 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
358 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
359 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
360 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
361 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
362 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
372 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
373 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
374 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
376 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
377 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
378 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
379 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
380 /// tracking this directly.
381 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
382 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
383 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
387 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
389 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
390 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
391 // updates from all our peers normally.
393 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
394 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
395 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
398 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
399 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
400 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
401 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
402 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
404 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
405 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
406 // relying on it useless.
408 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
409 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
410 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
412 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
413 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
414 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
415 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
416 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
419 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
420 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
421 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
422 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
423 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
424 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
425 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
427 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
428 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
429 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
430 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
432 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
433 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
434 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
436 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
437 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
438 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
439 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
440 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
442 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
443 if should_request_full_sync {
444 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
446 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
450 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
451 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
452 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
453 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
454 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
455 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
456 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
461 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
462 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
463 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
464 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
468 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
469 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
470 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
471 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
475 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
476 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
477 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
478 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
479 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
480 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
481 /// memory constrained systems.
482 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
483 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
485 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
487 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
488 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
489 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
491 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
492 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
493 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
494 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
495 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
496 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
497 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
498 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
499 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
501 short_channel_ids: vec![],
504 return Err(LightningError {
505 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
506 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
510 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
511 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
512 // exists even if its not yet routable.
513 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
514 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
515 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
516 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
517 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
518 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
519 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
522 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
523 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
529 let batch_count = batches.len();
530 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
531 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
532 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
533 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
535 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
536 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
537 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
538 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
539 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
540 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
541 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
543 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
544 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
545 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
547 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
548 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
549 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
551 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
552 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
553 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
554 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
556 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
557 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
559 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
562 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
564 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
565 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
566 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
567 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
571 short_channel_ids: batch,
579 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
582 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
583 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
588 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
590 C::Target: chain::Access,
593 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
594 let mut ret = Vec::new();
595 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
596 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
602 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
603 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
604 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
605 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
606 pub last_update: u32,
607 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
609 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
610 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
611 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
612 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
613 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
614 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
615 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
616 pub fees: RoutingFees,
617 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
618 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
619 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
620 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
621 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
624 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
626 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
631 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
632 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
633 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
634 (0, self.last_update, required),
635 (2, self.enabled, required),
636 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
637 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
638 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
639 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
640 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
641 (10, self.fees, required),
642 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
648 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
649 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
650 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
651 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
652 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
653 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
654 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
655 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
656 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
658 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
659 (0, last_update, required),
660 (2, enabled, required),
661 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
662 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
663 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
664 (10, fees, required),
665 (12, last_update_message, required)
668 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
669 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
670 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
671 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
672 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
673 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
675 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
676 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
679 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
684 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
685 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
686 /// Received within a channel announcement.
687 pub struct ChannelInfo {
688 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
689 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
690 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
691 pub node_one: NodeId,
692 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
693 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
694 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
695 pub node_two: NodeId,
696 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
697 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
698 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
699 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
700 /// An initial announcement of the channel
701 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
702 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
703 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
704 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
705 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
706 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
707 /// network graph in memory!).
708 announcement_received_time: u64,
712 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
713 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
714 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
715 let (direction, source) = {
716 if target == &self.node_one {
717 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
718 } else if target == &self.node_two {
719 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
724 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
727 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
728 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
729 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
730 let (direction, target) = {
731 if source == &self.node_one {
732 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
733 } else if source == &self.node_two {
734 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
739 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
742 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
743 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
744 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
746 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
748 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
753 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
754 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
755 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
756 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
761 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
762 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
763 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
764 (0, self.features, required),
765 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
766 (2, self.node_one, required),
767 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
768 (6, self.node_two, required),
769 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
770 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
771 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
777 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
778 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
779 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
780 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
781 // channel updates via the gossip network.
782 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
784 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
785 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
786 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
787 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
788 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
789 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
790 Err(err) => Err(err),
795 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
796 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
797 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
798 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
799 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
800 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
801 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
802 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
803 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
804 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
805 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
806 (0, features, required),
807 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
808 (2, node_one, required),
809 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
810 (6, node_two, required),
811 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
812 (10, capacity_sats, required),
813 (12, announcement_message, required),
817 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
818 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
819 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
820 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
821 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
822 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
823 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
824 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
829 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
830 /// source node to a target node.
832 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
833 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
834 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
835 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
836 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
839 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
841 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
842 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
843 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
845 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
846 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
847 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
848 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
850 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
851 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
853 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
854 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
856 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
860 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
864 /// Returns information for the channel.
865 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
867 /// Returns information for the direction.
868 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
870 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
871 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
872 self.htlc_maximum_msat
875 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
877 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
878 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
880 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
881 self.effective_capacity
884 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
885 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
886 match self.direction {
887 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
893 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
894 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
895 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
896 .field("channel", &self.channel)
901 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
903 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
904 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
907 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
908 /// Returns information for the channel.
910 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
912 /// Returns information for the direction.
914 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
916 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
918 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
921 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
922 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
927 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
929 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
930 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
931 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
932 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
933 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
936 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
940 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
942 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
945 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
947 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
949 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
950 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
952 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
955 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
956 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
960 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
961 /// use when making routing decisions.
962 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
964 impl EffectiveCapacity {
965 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
966 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
968 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
969 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
970 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
971 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
972 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
977 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
978 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
979 pub struct RoutingFees {
980 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
982 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
983 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
984 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
987 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
988 (0, base_msat, required),
989 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
992 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
993 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
994 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
995 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
996 pub features: NodeFeatures,
997 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
998 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
999 pub last_update: u32,
1000 /// Color assigned to the node
1002 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1003 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1004 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1005 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1006 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1007 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1008 /// An initial announcement of the node
1009 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1010 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1011 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1012 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1015 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1016 (0, features, required),
1017 (2, last_update, required),
1019 (6, alias, required),
1020 (8, announcement_message, option),
1021 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1024 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1026 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1027 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1028 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1029 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1031 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1032 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1033 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1034 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1035 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1036 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1038 for c in alias.chars() {
1039 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1040 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1041 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1045 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1046 // Display printable ASCII characters
1047 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1048 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1049 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1057 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1058 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1063 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1064 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1065 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1069 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1070 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1071 pub struct NodeInfo {
1072 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1073 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1074 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1075 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1076 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1077 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1078 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1079 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1080 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1081 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1084 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1085 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1086 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1087 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1092 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
1093 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1094 (2, announcement_info, option),
1095 (4, channels, vec_type),
1098 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1099 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1101 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1102 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1103 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1105 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1106 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1107 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1108 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1109 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1110 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1112 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1113 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1114 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1115 node_id.write(writer)?;
1116 node_info.write(writer)?;
1119 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1120 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1121 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1127 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1128 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1129 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1131 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1132 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1133 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1134 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1135 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1136 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1137 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1139 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1140 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1141 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1142 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1143 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1144 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1147 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1148 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1149 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1153 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1156 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1157 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1158 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1163 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1164 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1165 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1166 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1167 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1169 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1170 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1171 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1177 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1178 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1179 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1180 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1181 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1185 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1186 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1187 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1189 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1192 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1193 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1194 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1198 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1199 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1200 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1201 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1202 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1208 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1209 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1210 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1211 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1214 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1215 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1216 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1217 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1220 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1223 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1224 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1225 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1229 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1230 /// given node announcement.
1232 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1233 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1234 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1235 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1236 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1237 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1238 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1241 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1242 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1243 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1245 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1246 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1249 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1250 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1251 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1253 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1254 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1255 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1256 // that it be at least the current time.
1257 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1258 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1259 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1260 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1265 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1266 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1267 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1268 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1269 features: msg.features.clone(),
1270 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1272 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1273 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1274 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1282 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1284 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1285 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1286 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1288 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1289 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1290 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1291 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1292 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1294 C::Target: chain::Access,
1296 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1297 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1298 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1299 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1300 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1301 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1304 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1305 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1306 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1308 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1309 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1310 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1311 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1312 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1314 C::Target: chain::Access,
1316 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1319 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1321 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1322 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1324 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1325 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1326 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1327 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1330 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1331 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1332 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1334 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1336 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1338 capacity_sats: None,
1339 announcement_message: None,
1340 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1343 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1346 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1347 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1348 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1350 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1351 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1353 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1354 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1355 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1356 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1358 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1359 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1360 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1361 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1363 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1364 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1366 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1367 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1368 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1370 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1373 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1374 entry.insert(channel_info);
1378 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1379 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1380 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1381 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1383 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1384 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1385 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1386 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1387 announcement_info: None,
1396 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1397 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1398 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1400 C::Target: chain::Access,
1402 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1403 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1406 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1408 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1411 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1412 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1413 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1414 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1415 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1416 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1418 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1419 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1420 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1422 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1423 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1426 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1427 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1429 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1430 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1436 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1437 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1438 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1440 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1443 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1444 features: msg.features.clone(),
1445 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1447 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1449 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1450 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1451 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1452 announcement_received_time,
1455 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1458 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1459 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1460 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1461 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1462 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1463 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1465 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1466 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1467 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1470 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1471 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1472 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1474 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1475 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1481 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1482 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1484 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1486 // TODO: downgrade the node
1490 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1491 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1492 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1495 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1496 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1497 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1499 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1500 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1502 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1503 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1504 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1505 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1506 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1509 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1510 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1513 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1514 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1515 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1517 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1518 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1519 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1520 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1521 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1522 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1523 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1524 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1525 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1527 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1528 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1529 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1530 info.one_to_two = None;
1532 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1533 info.two_to_one = None;
1535 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1536 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1537 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1538 // channel_update for.
1539 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1540 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1544 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1545 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1546 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1547 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1548 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1553 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1556 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1557 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1558 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1560 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1561 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1562 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1563 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1566 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1567 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1568 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1570 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1571 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1572 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1573 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1576 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1578 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1579 let chan_was_enabled;
1581 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1583 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1584 // disable this check during tests!
1585 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1586 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1587 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1589 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1590 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1594 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1595 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1596 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1598 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1599 return Err(LightningError{err:
1600 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1601 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1604 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1605 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1606 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1607 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1608 return Err(LightningError{err:
1609 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1610 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1613 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1614 ($target: expr) => {
1615 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1616 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1617 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1618 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1619 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1620 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1621 // but only in the non-normative section.
1622 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1623 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1624 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1625 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1627 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1629 chan_was_enabled = false;
1634 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1636 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1637 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1639 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1640 enabled: chan_enabled,
1641 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1642 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1643 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1644 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1646 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1647 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1651 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1655 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1656 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1657 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1658 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1659 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1660 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1661 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1662 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1663 })?, "channel_update");
1665 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1667 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1668 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1669 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1670 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1671 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1672 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1673 })?, "channel_update");
1675 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1680 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1682 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1683 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1684 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1685 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1686 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1687 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1689 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1691 proportional_millionths
1693 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1694 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1695 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1697 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1698 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1700 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1701 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1703 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1705 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1706 if chan_info.enabled {
1707 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1708 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1709 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1710 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1715 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1721 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1722 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1723 ($node_id: expr) => {
1724 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1725 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1726 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1728 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1729 entry.remove_entry();
1732 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1737 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1738 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1742 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1743 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1745 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1746 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1750 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1751 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1752 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1755 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1757 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1758 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1762 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1763 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1764 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1767 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1768 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1769 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1770 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1771 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1772 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1773 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1783 use ln::PaymentHash;
1784 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1785 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1786 use ln::msgs::{Init, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1787 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1788 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1789 use util::test_utils;
1790 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1791 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1792 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1794 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1796 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1797 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1798 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1799 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1800 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1801 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1802 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1806 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1807 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1810 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1814 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1815 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1816 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1817 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1820 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1821 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1822 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1825 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1826 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1827 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1831 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1832 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1833 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1834 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1836 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1837 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1838 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1839 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1840 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1841 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1844 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1845 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1846 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1847 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1852 addresses: Vec::new(),
1853 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1854 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1856 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1857 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1859 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1860 contents: unsigned_announcement
1864 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1865 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1866 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1867 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1868 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1870 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1871 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1872 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1873 short_channel_id: 0,
1876 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1877 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1878 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1880 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1881 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1882 ChannelAnnouncement {
1883 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1884 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1885 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1886 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1887 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1891 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1892 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1893 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1894 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1895 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1896 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1897 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1898 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1902 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1903 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1904 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1905 short_channel_id: 0,
1908 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1909 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1910 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
1911 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1912 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1913 excess_data: Vec::new()
1915 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1916 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1918 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1919 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1924 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1925 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1926 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1928 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1929 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1930 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1932 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1933 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1935 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1939 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1940 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1941 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1942 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1947 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1948 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1952 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1953 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
1955 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1956 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1959 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1962 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1963 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1964 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1965 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1966 // Return false because contains excess data.
1967 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1968 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1972 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1973 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1974 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1975 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1976 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1977 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1979 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1984 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1985 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1986 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1988 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1989 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1991 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1992 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1994 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1995 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1996 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
1997 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
1998 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1999 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2004 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2010 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2011 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2012 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2014 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
2017 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2018 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2019 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2020 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2021 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2023 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2024 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2025 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2026 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2028 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2031 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2032 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2033 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2034 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2035 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2036 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2037 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2042 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2048 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
2049 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2050 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2051 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2053 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2056 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
2057 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2058 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2059 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2060 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2061 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2062 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2063 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2067 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2068 Some(channel_entry) => {
2069 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
2075 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2076 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2077 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2078 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2079 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2080 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2081 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2085 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2086 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2087 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2089 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2092 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2093 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2095 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2100 fn handling_channel_update() {
2101 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2102 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2103 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2104 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2105 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2106 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2108 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2109 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2111 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2112 let short_channel_id;
2115 // Announce a channel we will update
2116 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2117 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2119 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2120 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2121 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2128 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2129 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2130 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2135 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2137 Some(channel_info) => {
2138 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2139 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2144 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2145 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2146 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2147 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2148 // Return false because contains excess data
2149 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2150 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2154 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2155 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2156 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2157 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2158 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2160 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2163 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2164 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2165 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2166 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2167 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2169 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2172 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2173 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2174 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2175 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2176 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2178 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2181 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2182 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2183 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2184 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2185 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2186 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2188 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2191 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2192 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2193 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2194 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2195 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2196 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2197 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2199 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2204 fn handling_network_update() {
2205 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2206 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2207 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2210 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2211 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2214 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2215 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2218 let short_channel_id;
2220 // Announce a channel we will update
2221 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2222 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2223 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2224 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2225 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2227 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2228 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2230 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2232 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2233 rejected_by_dest: false,
2234 all_paths_failed: true,
2236 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2237 msg: valid_channel_update,
2239 short_channel_id: None,
2245 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2248 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2250 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2252 Some(channel_info) => {
2253 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2257 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2259 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2260 rejected_by_dest: false,
2261 all_paths_failed: true,
2263 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2265 is_permanent: false,
2267 short_channel_id: None,
2273 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2275 Some(channel_info) => {
2276 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2281 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2282 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2284 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2285 rejected_by_dest: false,
2286 all_paths_failed: true,
2288 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2292 short_channel_id: None,
2298 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2299 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2300 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2301 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2305 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2306 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2307 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2308 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2309 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2310 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2311 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2312 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2314 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2315 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2317 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2318 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2319 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2320 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2321 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2323 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2324 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2325 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2327 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2328 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2329 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2331 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2332 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2334 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2335 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2336 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2337 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2338 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2339 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2340 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2342 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2343 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2344 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2347 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2348 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2352 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2353 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2354 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2355 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2356 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2358 // Channels were not announced yet.
2359 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2360 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2362 let short_channel_id;
2364 // Announce a channel we will update
2365 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2366 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2367 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2373 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2374 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2375 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2376 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2377 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2378 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2379 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2386 // Valid channel update
2387 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2388 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2389 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2390 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2396 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2397 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2398 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2399 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2400 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2401 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2402 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2408 // Channel update with excess data.
2409 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2410 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2411 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2412 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2413 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2419 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2420 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2421 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2422 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2423 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2424 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2425 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2430 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2431 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2432 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2436 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2437 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2438 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2439 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2440 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2441 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2444 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2445 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2448 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2449 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2450 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2457 // Nodes were never announced
2458 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2459 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2462 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2463 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2468 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2469 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2475 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2476 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2478 // Skip the first node.
2479 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2480 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2483 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2484 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2485 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2486 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2487 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2488 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2489 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2494 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2495 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2499 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2500 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2501 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2503 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2504 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2506 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2507 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2508 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2509 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2513 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2514 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2519 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2520 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2521 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2522 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2524 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2525 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2529 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2530 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2531 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2533 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2534 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2536 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2537 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2538 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2539 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2543 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2544 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2545 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2547 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2548 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2549 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2550 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2552 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2554 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2556 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2557 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2558 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2562 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2564 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2565 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2566 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2569 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2570 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2571 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2572 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2573 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2574 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2575 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2577 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2583 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2584 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2585 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2587 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2588 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2589 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2590 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2592 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2593 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2594 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2597 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2598 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2599 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2602 // used for testing resumption on same block
2603 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2606 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2607 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2608 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2609 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2615 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2616 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2620 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2622 number_of_blocks: 0,
2625 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2626 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2628 number_of_blocks: 0,
2629 sync_complete: true,
2630 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2634 // Error when wrong chain
2635 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2639 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2641 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2644 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2645 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2647 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2648 sync_complete: true,
2649 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2653 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2654 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2658 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2659 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2660 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2663 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2664 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2665 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2666 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2667 sync_complete: true,
2668 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2672 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2673 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2677 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2678 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2679 number_of_blocks: 1,
2684 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2685 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2686 number_of_blocks: 1,
2687 sync_complete: true,
2688 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2693 // No results in valid query range
2694 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2698 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2699 first_blocknum: 1000,
2700 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2705 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2706 first_blocknum: 1000,
2707 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2708 sync_complete: true,
2709 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2714 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2715 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2719 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2720 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2721 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2726 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2727 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2728 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2729 sync_complete: true,
2730 short_channel_ids: vec![
2731 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2737 // Single block exactly full
2738 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2742 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2743 first_blocknum: 100000,
2744 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2749 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2750 first_blocknum: 100000,
2751 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2752 sync_complete: true,
2753 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2754 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2760 // Multiple split on new block
2761 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2765 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2766 first_blocknum: 100000,
2767 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2772 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2773 first_blocknum: 100000,
2774 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2775 sync_complete: false,
2776 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2777 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2781 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2782 first_blocknum: 107999,
2783 number_of_blocks: 2,
2784 sync_complete: true,
2785 short_channel_ids: vec![
2786 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2792 // Multiple split on same block
2793 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2797 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2798 first_blocknum: 100002,
2799 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2804 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2805 first_blocknum: 100002,
2806 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2807 sync_complete: false,
2808 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2809 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2813 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2814 first_blocknum: 108001,
2815 number_of_blocks: 1,
2816 sync_complete: true,
2817 short_channel_ids: vec![
2818 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2825 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2826 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2827 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2828 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2830 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2832 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2833 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2834 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2835 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2838 assert!(result.is_ok());
2840 assert!(result.is_err());
2843 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2844 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2846 for i in 0..events.len() {
2847 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2849 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2850 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2851 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2852 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2853 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2854 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2855 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2857 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2858 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2859 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2860 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2861 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2863 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2864 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2865 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2868 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2874 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2875 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2876 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2877 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2878 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2880 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2882 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2884 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2886 assert!(result.is_err());
2890 fn displays_node_alias() {
2891 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
2892 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2893 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
2894 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2897 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
2898 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
2899 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
2901 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
2902 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2903 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
2904 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2907 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
2908 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
2909 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
2913 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2921 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2922 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2923 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2924 let mut v = Vec::new();
2925 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2927 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
2932 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2933 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2934 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2935 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
2937 let _ = net_graph.encode();