1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
22 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
32 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
33 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
34 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
35 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
36 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
39 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
40 use crate::prelude::*;
42 use core::convert::TryFrom;
43 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
44 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
45 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
46 use crate::sync::Mutex;
47 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
48 use core::str::FromStr;
50 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
51 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
53 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
55 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
57 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
58 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
60 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
61 /// refuse to relay the message.
62 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
64 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
65 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
66 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
68 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
69 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
70 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
73 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
74 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
75 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
78 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
79 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
83 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
84 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
85 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
89 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
90 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
91 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
94 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
95 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
96 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
100 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
101 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
106 impl Eq for NodeId {}
108 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
109 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
110 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
114 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
115 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
116 Some(self.cmp(other))
120 impl Ord for NodeId {
121 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
122 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
126 impl Writeable for NodeId {
127 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
128 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
133 impl Readable for NodeId {
134 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
135 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
136 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
141 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
142 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
143 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
147 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
148 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
150 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
155 impl FromStr for NodeId {
156 type Err = bitcoin::hashes::hex::Error;
158 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
159 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
164 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
165 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
166 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
167 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
168 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
170 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
171 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
172 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
173 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
175 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
176 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
177 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
178 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
179 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
180 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
181 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
184 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
185 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
186 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
187 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
188 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
189 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
190 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
191 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
192 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
193 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
196 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
197 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
198 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
199 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
202 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
203 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
205 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
206 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
207 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
208 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
209 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
210 ChannelUpdateMessage {
211 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
214 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
215 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
217 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
218 short_channel_id: u64,
219 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
220 /// `channel_update` message is received.
223 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
224 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
226 /// The node id of the failed node.
228 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
229 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
234 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
235 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
238 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
239 (0, short_channel_id, required),
240 (2, is_permanent, required),
242 (4, NodeFailure) => {
243 (0, node_id, required),
244 (2, is_permanent, required),
248 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
249 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
250 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
251 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
252 /// serving historical announcements.
253 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
254 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
257 utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
258 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
259 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
260 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
264 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
265 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
267 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
268 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
269 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
270 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
271 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
274 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
275 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
277 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
282 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
283 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
284 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
285 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
286 self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
289 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
290 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
292 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
293 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
297 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
298 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
299 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
300 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
301 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
302 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
303 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
310 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
312 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
314 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
317 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
318 if update_msg.as_ref()
319 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
325 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
327 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
328 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
329 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
330 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
337 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
341 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
342 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
344 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
345 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
346 match *network_update {
347 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
348 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
349 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
350 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
351 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
352 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
354 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
356 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
357 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
360 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
362 log_debug!(self.logger,
363 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
364 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
370 /// Gets the genesis hash for this network graph.
371 pub fn get_genesis_hash(&self) -> BlockHash {
376 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
377 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
378 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
381 return Err(LightningError {
382 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
383 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
384 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
386 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
388 log_level: Level::Trace,
396 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
397 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
398 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
399 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
400 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
401 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
402 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
404 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
406 log_level: Level::Trace
412 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
413 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
415 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
416 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
417 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
418 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
419 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
422 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
423 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
424 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
427 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
428 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
429 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
432 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
433 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
434 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
435 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
436 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
437 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
438 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
439 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
440 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
442 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
443 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
445 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
447 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
448 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
454 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
455 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
456 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
457 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
461 for (_, ref node) in iter {
462 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
463 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
471 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
472 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
473 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
475 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
476 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
477 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
478 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
479 /// tracking this directly.
481 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
482 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
483 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
484 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
485 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
486 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
487 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
488 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
489 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
490 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
494 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
496 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
497 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
498 // updates from all our peers normally.
500 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
501 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
502 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
505 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
506 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
507 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
508 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
509 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
511 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
512 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
513 // relying on it useless.
515 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
516 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
517 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
519 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
520 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
521 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
522 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
523 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
526 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
527 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
528 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
529 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
530 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
531 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
532 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
534 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
535 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
536 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
537 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
539 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
540 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
541 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
543 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
544 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
545 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
546 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
548 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
549 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
550 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
552 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
556 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
557 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
558 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
559 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
560 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
561 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
562 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
568 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
569 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
570 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
571 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
575 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
576 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
577 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
578 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
582 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
583 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
584 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
585 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
586 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
587 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
588 /// memory constrained systems.
589 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
590 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
592 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
594 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
595 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
596 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
598 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
599 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
600 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
601 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
602 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
603 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
604 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
605 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
606 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
608 short_channel_ids: vec![],
611 return Err(LightningError {
612 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
613 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
618 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
619 // exists even if its not yet routable.
620 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
621 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
622 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
623 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
624 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
625 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
626 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
629 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
630 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
635 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
636 let batch_count = batches.len();
637 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
638 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
639 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
640 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
642 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
643 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
644 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
645 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
646 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
647 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
648 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
650 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
651 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
652 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
654 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
655 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
656 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
658 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
659 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
660 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
661 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
663 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
664 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
666 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
669 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
671 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
672 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
673 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
674 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
678 short_channel_ids: batch,
686 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
689 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
690 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
694 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
695 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
696 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
700 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
701 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
702 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
706 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
707 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
711 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
713 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
716 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
717 let mut ret = Vec::new();
718 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
719 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
724 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
725 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
726 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
727 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
728 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
729 pub last_update: u32,
730 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
732 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
733 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
734 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
735 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
736 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
737 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
738 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
739 pub fees: RoutingFees,
740 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
741 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
742 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
743 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
744 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
747 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
748 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
749 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
754 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
755 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
757 (0, self.last_update, required),
758 (2, self.enabled, required),
759 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
760 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
761 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
762 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
763 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
764 (10, self.fees, required),
765 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
771 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
772 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
773 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
774 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
775 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
776 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
777 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
778 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
779 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
781 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
782 (0, last_update, required),
783 (2, enabled, required),
784 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
785 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
786 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
787 (10, fees, required),
788 (12, last_update_message, required)
791 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
792 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
793 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
794 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
795 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
796 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
798 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
799 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
802 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
807 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
808 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
809 /// Received within a channel announcement.
810 pub struct ChannelInfo {
811 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
812 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
813 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
814 pub node_one: NodeId,
815 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
816 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
817 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
818 pub node_two: NodeId,
819 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
820 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
821 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
822 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
823 /// An initial announcement of the channel
824 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
825 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
826 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
827 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
828 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
829 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
830 /// network graph in memory!).
831 announcement_received_time: u64,
835 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
836 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
837 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
838 let (direction, source) = {
839 if target == &self.node_one {
840 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
841 } else if target == &self.node_two {
842 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
847 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
850 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
851 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
852 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
853 let (direction, target) = {
854 if source == &self.node_one {
855 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
856 } else if source == &self.node_two {
857 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
862 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
865 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
866 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
867 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
869 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
871 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
876 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
877 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
878 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
879 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
884 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
885 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
886 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
887 (0, self.features, required),
888 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
889 (2, self.node_one, required),
890 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
891 (6, self.node_two, required),
892 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
893 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
894 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
900 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
901 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
902 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
903 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
904 // channel updates via the gossip network.
905 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
907 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
908 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
909 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
910 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
911 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
912 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
913 Err(err) => Err(err),
918 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
919 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
920 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
921 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
922 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
923 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
924 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
925 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
926 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
927 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
928 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
929 (0, features, required),
930 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
931 (2, node_one, required),
932 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
933 (6, node_two, required),
934 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
935 (10, capacity_sats, required),
936 (12, announcement_message, required),
940 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
941 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
942 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
943 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
944 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
945 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
946 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
947 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
952 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
953 /// source node to a target node.
955 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
956 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
957 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
958 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
959 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
962 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
964 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
965 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
966 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
968 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
969 Some(capacity_msat) => {
970 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
971 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
973 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
977 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
981 /// Returns information for the channel.
983 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
985 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
987 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
988 self.htlc_maximum_msat
991 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
993 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
994 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
996 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
997 self.effective_capacity
1000 /// Returns information for the direction.
1002 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1005 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1006 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1007 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1008 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1013 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1015 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1016 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1017 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1018 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1019 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1022 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1024 liquidity_msat: u64,
1026 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1028 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1031 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1033 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1035 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1036 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1038 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1041 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1042 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1046 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1047 /// use when making routing decisions.
1048 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1050 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1051 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1052 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1054 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1055 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1056 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1057 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1058 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1063 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1064 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1065 pub struct RoutingFees {
1066 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1068 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1069 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1070 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1073 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1074 (0, base_msat, required),
1075 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1078 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1079 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1080 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1081 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1082 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1083 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1084 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1085 pub last_update: u32,
1086 /// Color assigned to the node
1088 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1089 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1090 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1091 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1092 /// An initial announcement of the node
1093 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1094 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1095 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1096 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1099 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1100 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1101 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[NetAddress] {
1102 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1103 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1104 .unwrap_or_default()
1108 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1109 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1110 let empty_addresses = Vec::<NetAddress>::new();
1111 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1112 (0, self.features, required),
1113 (2, self.last_update, required),
1114 (4, self.rgb, required),
1115 (6, self.alias, required),
1116 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1117 (10, empty_addresses, vec_type), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1123 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1124 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1125 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1126 (0, features, required),
1127 (2, last_update, required),
1129 (6, alias, required),
1130 (8, announcement_message, option),
1131 (10, _addresses, vec_type), // deprecated, not used anymore
1133 let _: Option<Vec<NetAddress>> = _addresses;
1134 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1135 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1139 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1141 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1142 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1143 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1144 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1146 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1147 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1148 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1149 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1150 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1151 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1153 use core::fmt::Write;
1154 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1155 // Display printable ASCII characters
1156 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1157 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1166 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1167 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1172 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1173 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1174 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1178 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1179 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1180 pub struct NodeInfo {
1181 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1182 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1183 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1184 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1185 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1186 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1189 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1190 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1191 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1192 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1197 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1198 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1199 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1200 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1201 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1202 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1208 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1209 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1210 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1211 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1212 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1214 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1215 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1216 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1217 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1219 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1226 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1227 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1228 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1229 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1230 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1231 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1232 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1233 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1234 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1235 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1237 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1238 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1239 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1240 (4, channels, vec_type),
1244 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1245 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1250 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1251 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1253 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1255 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1257 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1258 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1259 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1260 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1261 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1262 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1264 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1265 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1266 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1267 node_id.write(writer)?;
1268 node_info.write(writer)?;
1271 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1272 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1273 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1279 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1280 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1281 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1283 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1284 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1285 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1286 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1287 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1288 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1289 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1291 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1292 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1293 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1294 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1295 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1296 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1299 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1300 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1301 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1305 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1308 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1309 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1310 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1311 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1312 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1313 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1318 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1319 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1320 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1321 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1322 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1324 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1325 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1326 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1332 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1333 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1334 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1335 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1336 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1337 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1338 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1339 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1340 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1341 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1342 self.genesis_hash.eq(&other.genesis_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1346 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1347 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1348 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1350 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1351 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
1353 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1354 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1355 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1356 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1357 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1358 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1362 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1363 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1364 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1365 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1366 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1372 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1373 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1374 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1375 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1378 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1379 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1380 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1381 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1384 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1387 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1388 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1389 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1393 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1394 /// given node announcement.
1396 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1397 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1398 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1399 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1400 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1401 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
1402 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1405 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1406 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1407 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1409 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1410 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1413 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1414 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1415 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1417 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1418 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1419 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1422 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1423 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1424 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1425 // that it be at least the current time.
1426 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1427 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1428 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1429 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1434 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1435 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1436 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1437 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1438 features: msg.features.clone(),
1439 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1442 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1450 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1452 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1453 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1454 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1456 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1457 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1458 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1459 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1460 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1462 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1464 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1465 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1466 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1467 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1468 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1469 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1472 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1474 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1475 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1476 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1478 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1479 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1480 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1481 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1482 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1485 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1486 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1487 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1489 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1490 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1491 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1492 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1493 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1495 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1497 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1500 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1502 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1503 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1505 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1506 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1507 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1508 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1511 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1512 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1513 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1515 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1517 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1519 capacity_sats: None,
1520 announcement_message: None,
1521 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1524 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1527 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1528 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1529 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1531 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1532 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1534 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1535 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1536 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1537 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1539 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1540 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1541 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1542 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1544 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1545 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1547 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1548 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1549 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1551 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1554 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1555 entry.insert(channel_info);
1559 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1560 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1561 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1562 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1564 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1565 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1566 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1567 announcement_info: None,
1576 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1577 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1578 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1580 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1582 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1583 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1586 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1587 return Err(LightningError {
1588 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1589 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1594 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1596 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1597 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1598 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1599 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1601 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1602 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1603 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1604 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1606 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1607 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1608 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1609 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1610 return Err(LightningError {
1611 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1612 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1615 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1616 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1617 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1618 return Err(LightningError {
1619 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1620 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1627 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1628 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1629 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1630 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1631 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1632 return Err(LightningError{
1633 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1634 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1638 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1639 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1641 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1642 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1643 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1645 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1648 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1649 features: msg.features.clone(),
1650 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1652 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1654 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1655 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1656 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1657 announcement_received_time,
1660 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1662 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1666 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1668 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1669 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1670 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1671 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1672 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1673 let current_time_unix = None;
1675 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1678 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1680 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1681 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1682 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1683 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1684 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1685 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1686 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1690 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1691 /// from local storage.
1692 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1693 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1694 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1695 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1696 let current_time_unix = None;
1698 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1699 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1700 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1701 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1702 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1704 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1705 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1706 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1707 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1708 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1709 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1712 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1713 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1716 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1719 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1723 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1724 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1725 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1728 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1729 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1730 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1732 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1733 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1735 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1736 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1738 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1739 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1740 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1741 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1742 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1745 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1746 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1749 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1750 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1751 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1753 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1754 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1756 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1757 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1758 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1759 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1760 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1761 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1762 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1763 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1764 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1766 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1767 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1768 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1769 info.one_to_two = None;
1771 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1772 info.two_to_one = None;
1774 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1775 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1776 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1777 // channel_update for.
1778 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1779 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1783 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1784 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1785 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1786 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1787 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1788 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1792 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1793 if let Some(time) = time {
1794 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1796 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1797 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1798 // of this function.
1799 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1801 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1802 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1805 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1809 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1810 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1813 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1816 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1817 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1818 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1820 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1821 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1822 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1823 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1826 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1827 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1828 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1830 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1831 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1832 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1833 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1836 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1837 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1839 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1840 return Err(LightningError {
1841 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1842 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1846 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1848 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1849 // disable this check during tests!
1850 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1851 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1852 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1854 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1855 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1859 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1860 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1862 core::mem::drop(channels);
1863 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1864 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1867 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1868 return Err(LightningError{err:
1869 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1870 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1873 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1874 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1875 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1876 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1877 return Err(LightningError{err:
1878 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1879 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1882 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1883 ($target: expr) => {
1884 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1885 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1886 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1887 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1888 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1889 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1890 // but only in the non-normative section.
1891 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1892 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1893 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1894 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1900 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1902 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1903 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1905 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1906 enabled: chan_enabled,
1907 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1908 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1909 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1910 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1912 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1913 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1917 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1921 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1922 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1923 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1924 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1925 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1926 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1927 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1928 })?, "channel_update");
1930 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1932 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1933 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1934 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1935 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1936 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1937 })?, "channel_update");
1939 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1947 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1948 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1949 ($node_id: expr) => {
1950 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1951 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1952 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1954 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1955 entry.remove_entry();
1958 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1963 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1964 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1968 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1969 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1971 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1972 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1976 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1977 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1978 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1981 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1982 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1983 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1984 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1987 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1989 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1990 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1994 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1995 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1996 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1999 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2000 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2001 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2002 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2005 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2006 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2007 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2008 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
2009 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2010 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2015 pub(crate) mod tests {
2016 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2017 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2018 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2019 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2020 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2021 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2022 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2023 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2024 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2025 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2026 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2027 use crate::util::test_utils;
2028 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2029 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2031 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2032 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2034 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2035 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2036 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2037 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2038 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2039 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2043 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2044 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2047 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2048 use crate::prelude::*;
2049 use crate::sync::Arc;
2051 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2052 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2053 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2056 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2057 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2058 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2060 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2061 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2062 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2063 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2067 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2068 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2069 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2070 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2071 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2073 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2074 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2075 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2076 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2077 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2078 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2081 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2082 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2083 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2084 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2088 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2089 addresses: Vec::new(),
2090 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2091 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2093 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2094 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2096 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2097 contents: unsigned_announcement
2101 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2102 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2103 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2104 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2105 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2107 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2108 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2109 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2110 short_channel_id: 0,
2111 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2112 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2113 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2114 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2115 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2117 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2118 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2119 ChannelAnnouncement {
2120 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2121 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2122 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2123 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2124 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2128 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2129 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2130 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2131 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2132 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2135 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2136 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2137 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2138 short_channel_id: 0,
2141 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2142 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2143 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2144 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2145 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2146 excess_data: Vec::new()
2148 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2149 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2151 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2152 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2157 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2158 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2159 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2161 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2162 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2163 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2165 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2166 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2168 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2172 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2173 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2174 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2175 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2180 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2181 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2185 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2186 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2188 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2189 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2192 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2195 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2196 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2197 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2198 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2199 // Return false because contains excess data.
2200 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2201 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2205 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2206 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2207 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2208 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2209 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2210 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2212 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2217 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2218 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2219 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2221 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2222 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2224 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2225 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2227 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2228 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2229 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2230 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2231 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2236 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2242 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2243 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2244 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2246 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2249 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2250 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2251 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2252 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2253 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2255 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2256 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2257 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2258 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2260 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2263 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2264 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2265 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2266 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2267 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2268 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2269 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2270 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2275 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2281 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2282 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2283 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2284 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2285 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2287 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2290 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2292 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2294 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2295 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2296 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2298 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2299 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2300 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2301 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2302 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2304 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2307 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2309 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2310 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2311 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2316 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2317 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2318 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2319 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2320 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2321 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2322 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2326 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2327 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2328 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2330 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2333 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2334 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2336 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2339 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2340 // announcement is mainnet).
2341 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2342 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash();
2343 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2344 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2346 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2351 fn handling_channel_update() {
2352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2353 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2354 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2355 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2356 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2358 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2359 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2361 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2362 let short_channel_id;
2365 // Announce a channel we will update
2366 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2367 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2368 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2370 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2371 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2372 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2379 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2380 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2381 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2386 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2388 Some(channel_info) => {
2389 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2390 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2395 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2396 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2397 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2398 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2399 // Return false because contains excess data
2400 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2401 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2405 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2406 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2407 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2408 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2409 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2411 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2414 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2415 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2416 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2417 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2418 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2420 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2423 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2424 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2425 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2426 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2427 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2429 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2432 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2433 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2434 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2435 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2436 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2437 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2439 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2442 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2443 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2444 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2445 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2446 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2447 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2448 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2450 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2453 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2454 // update is mainet).
2455 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2456 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash();
2457 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2459 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2461 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2466 fn handling_network_update() {
2467 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2468 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2471 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2472 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2473 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2476 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2477 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2480 let short_channel_id;
2482 // Announce a channel we will update
2483 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2484 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2485 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2486 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2487 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2489 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2490 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2492 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2493 msg: valid_channel_update,
2496 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2499 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2501 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2503 Some(channel_info) => {
2504 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2508 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2510 is_permanent: false,
2513 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2515 Some(channel_info) => {
2516 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2521 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2522 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2527 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2528 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2529 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2532 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2533 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2535 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2536 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2537 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2538 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2539 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2540 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2542 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2543 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2545 is_permanent: false,
2548 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2549 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2551 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2552 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2557 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2558 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2559 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2564 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2565 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2566 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2567 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2568 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2569 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2570 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2572 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2573 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2575 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2576 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2577 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2578 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2579 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2581 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2582 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2583 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2584 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2586 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2587 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2588 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2590 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2591 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2592 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2594 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2595 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2596 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2597 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2599 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2600 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2602 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2604 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2605 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2606 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2607 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2608 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2610 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2611 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2612 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2613 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2614 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2615 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2616 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2617 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2618 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2619 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2620 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2621 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2622 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2623 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2624 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2625 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2626 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2629 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2630 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2631 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2633 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2635 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2637 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2639 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2640 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2641 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2643 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2644 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2645 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2646 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2648 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2649 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2650 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2652 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2653 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2654 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2655 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2657 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2658 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2659 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2660 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2661 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2664 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2666 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2667 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2668 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2670 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2672 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2673 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2674 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2676 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2677 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2678 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2679 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2681 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2682 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2683 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2685 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2686 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2687 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2689 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2690 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2691 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2692 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2693 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2698 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2699 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2700 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2701 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2702 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2704 // Channels were not announced yet.
2705 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2706 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2708 let short_channel_id;
2710 // Announce a channel we will update
2711 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2712 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2713 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2719 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2720 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2721 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2722 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2723 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2724 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2730 // Valid channel update
2731 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2732 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2733 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2734 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2740 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2741 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2742 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2743 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2744 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2745 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2751 // Channel update with excess data.
2752 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2753 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2754 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2755 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2756 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2762 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2763 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2764 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2765 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2766 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2767 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2772 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2773 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2774 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2778 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2779 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2780 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2781 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2782 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2783 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2786 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2787 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2790 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2791 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2792 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2798 // Nodes were never announced
2799 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2800 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2803 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2804 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2809 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2810 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2816 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2817 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2819 // Skip the first node.
2820 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2821 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2824 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2825 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2826 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2827 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2828 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2829 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2830 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2835 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2836 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2840 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2841 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2842 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2844 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2845 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2847 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2848 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2849 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2850 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2854 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2855 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2860 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2861 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2862 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2863 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2865 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2866 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2870 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2871 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2872 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2874 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2875 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2877 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2878 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2879 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2880 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2884 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2885 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2886 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2887 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2889 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2890 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2891 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2892 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2894 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2896 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2898 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2899 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2900 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2904 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2906 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2907 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2908 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2909 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2910 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2913 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2914 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2915 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2916 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2917 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2918 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2919 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2921 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2927 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2928 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2929 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2931 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2932 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2933 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2934 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2936 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2937 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2938 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2941 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2942 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2943 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2946 // used for testing resumption on same block
2947 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2950 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2951 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2952 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2953 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2959 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2960 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2964 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2966 number_of_blocks: 0,
2969 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2970 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2972 number_of_blocks: 0,
2973 sync_complete: true,
2974 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2978 // Error when wrong chain
2979 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2983 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2985 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2988 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2989 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2991 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2992 sync_complete: true,
2993 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2997 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2998 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3002 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3003 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3004 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3007 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3008 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3009 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3010 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3011 sync_complete: true,
3012 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3016 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3017 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3021 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3022 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3023 number_of_blocks: 1,
3028 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3029 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3030 number_of_blocks: 1,
3031 sync_complete: true,
3032 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3037 // No results in valid query range
3038 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3042 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3043 first_blocknum: 1000,
3044 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3049 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3050 first_blocknum: 1000,
3051 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3052 sync_complete: true,
3053 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3058 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3059 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3063 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3064 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3065 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3070 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3071 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3072 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3073 sync_complete: true,
3074 short_channel_ids: vec![
3075 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3081 // Single block exactly full
3082 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3086 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3087 first_blocknum: 100000,
3088 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3093 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3094 first_blocknum: 100000,
3095 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3096 sync_complete: true,
3097 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3098 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3104 // Multiple split on new block
3105 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3109 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3110 first_blocknum: 100000,
3111 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3116 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3117 first_blocknum: 100000,
3118 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3119 sync_complete: false,
3120 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3121 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3125 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3126 first_blocknum: 107999,
3127 number_of_blocks: 2,
3128 sync_complete: true,
3129 short_channel_ids: vec![
3130 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3136 // Multiple split on same block
3137 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3141 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3142 first_blocknum: 100002,
3143 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3148 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3149 first_blocknum: 100002,
3150 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3151 sync_complete: false,
3152 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3153 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3157 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3158 first_blocknum: 108001,
3159 number_of_blocks: 1,
3160 sync_complete: true,
3161 short_channel_ids: vec![
3162 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3169 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3170 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3171 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3172 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3174 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3176 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3177 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3178 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3179 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3182 assert!(result.is_ok());
3184 assert!(result.is_err());
3187 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3188 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3190 for i in 0..events.len() {
3191 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3193 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3194 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3195 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3196 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3197 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3198 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3199 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3201 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3202 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3203 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3204 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3205 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3207 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3208 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3209 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3212 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3218 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3219 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3220 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3221 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3222 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3224 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3226 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3228 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3230 assert!(result.is_err());
3234 fn displays_node_alias() {
3235 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3236 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3237 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3238 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3241 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3242 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3243 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3245 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3246 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3247 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3248 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3251 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3252 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3253 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3257 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3258 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3259 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3260 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3261 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3262 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3264 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3265 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3268 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3269 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3270 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3271 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3272 last_update_message: None,
3275 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3276 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3278 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3279 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3280 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3282 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3283 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3284 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3286 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3287 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3288 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3289 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3290 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3292 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3293 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3294 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3296 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3297 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3298 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3299 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3300 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3302 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3304 capacity_sats: None,
3305 announcement_message: None,
3306 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3309 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3310 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3312 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3313 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3315 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3316 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3317 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3318 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3319 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3320 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3321 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3322 capacity_sats: None,
3323 announcement_message: None,
3324 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3327 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3328 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3330 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3331 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3333 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3334 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3335 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3337 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3338 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3339 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3340 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3341 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3342 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3343 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3345 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3346 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3347 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3348 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3349 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3353 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3354 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3355 let announcement_message = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3356 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3357 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3358 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3361 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3362 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3365 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3366 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3367 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3368 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3369 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3371 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3372 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3373 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3375 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3376 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3377 channels: Vec::new(),
3378 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3381 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3382 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3383 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3384 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3386 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3387 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3388 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3392 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3393 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = hex::decode("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3394 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3395 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3396 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3397 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3405 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3407 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3408 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3409 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3410 let mut v = Vec::new();
3411 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3412 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3413 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3417 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3418 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3419 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3420 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3421 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3422 black_box(&net_graph).encode()