1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
188 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
189 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
190 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
191 /// serving historical announcements.
193 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
194 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
195 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
196 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
199 chain_access: Option<C>,
200 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
201 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
202 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
206 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
207 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
209 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
210 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
211 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
212 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
213 /// channel owners' keys.
214 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
217 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
218 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
220 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
225 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
226 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
227 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
228 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
229 self.chain_access = chain_access;
232 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
233 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
235 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
236 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
241 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
242 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
243 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
244 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
245 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
246 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
254 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
255 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
256 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
257 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
258 match *network_update {
259 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
260 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
261 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
262 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
263 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
264 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
266 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
267 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
268 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
269 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
271 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
272 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
273 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
274 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
282 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
283 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
284 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
287 return Err(LightningError {
288 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
289 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
290 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
292 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
294 log_level: Level::Trace,
302 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
303 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
305 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
306 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
307 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
308 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
309 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
312 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
313 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
314 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
315 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
318 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
319 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
320 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
323 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
324 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
325 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
326 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
327 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
328 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
329 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
330 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
331 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
333 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
334 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
336 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
338 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
339 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
345 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
346 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
347 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
348 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
352 for (_, ref node) in iter {
353 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
354 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
362 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
363 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
364 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
366 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
367 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
368 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
369 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
370 /// tracking this directly.
371 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
372 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
373 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
374 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
375 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
379 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
381 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
382 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
383 // updates from all our peers normally.
385 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
386 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
387 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
390 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
391 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
392 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
393 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
394 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
396 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
397 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
398 // relying on it useless.
400 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
401 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
402 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
404 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
405 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
406 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
407 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
408 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
411 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
412 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
413 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
414 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
415 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
416 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
417 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
419 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
420 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
421 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
422 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
424 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
425 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
426 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
428 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
429 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
430 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
431 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
433 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
434 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
435 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
437 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
441 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
442 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
443 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
444 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
445 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
446 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
447 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
453 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
454 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
455 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
456 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
460 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
461 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
462 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
463 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
467 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
468 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
469 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
470 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
471 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
472 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
473 /// memory constrained systems.
474 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
475 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
477 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
479 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
480 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
481 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
483 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
484 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
485 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
486 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
487 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
488 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
489 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
490 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
491 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
493 short_channel_ids: vec![],
496 return Err(LightningError {
497 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
498 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
502 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
503 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
504 // exists even if its not yet routable.
505 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
506 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
507 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
508 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
509 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
510 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
511 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
514 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
515 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
520 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
521 let batch_count = batches.len();
522 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
523 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
524 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
525 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
527 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
528 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
529 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
530 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
531 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
532 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
533 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
535 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
536 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
537 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
539 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
540 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
541 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
543 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
544 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
545 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
546 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
548 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
549 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
551 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
554 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
556 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
557 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
558 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
559 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
563 short_channel_ids: batch,
571 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
574 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
575 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
579 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
580 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
581 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
585 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
586 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
587 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
592 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
594 C::Target: chain::Access,
597 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
598 let mut ret = Vec::new();
599 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
600 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
605 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
606 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
607 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
608 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
609 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
610 pub last_update: u32,
611 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
613 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
614 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
615 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
616 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
617 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
618 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
619 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
620 pub fees: RoutingFees,
621 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
622 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
623 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
624 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
625 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
628 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
629 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
630 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
635 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
636 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
637 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
638 (0, self.last_update, required),
639 (2, self.enabled, required),
640 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
641 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
642 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
643 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
644 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
645 (10, self.fees, required),
646 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
652 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
653 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
654 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
655 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
656 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
657 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
658 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
659 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
660 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
662 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
663 (0, last_update, required),
664 (2, enabled, required),
665 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
666 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
667 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
668 (10, fees, required),
669 (12, last_update_message, required)
672 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
673 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
674 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
675 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
676 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
677 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
679 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
680 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
683 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
688 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
689 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
690 /// Received within a channel announcement.
691 pub struct ChannelInfo {
692 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
693 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
694 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
695 pub node_one: NodeId,
696 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
697 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
698 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
699 pub node_two: NodeId,
700 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
701 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
702 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
703 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
704 /// An initial announcement of the channel
705 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
706 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
707 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
708 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
709 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
710 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
711 /// network graph in memory!).
712 announcement_received_time: u64,
716 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
717 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
718 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
719 let (direction, source) = {
720 if target == &self.node_one {
721 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
722 } else if target == &self.node_two {
723 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
728 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
731 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
732 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
733 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
734 let (direction, target) = {
735 if source == &self.node_one {
736 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
737 } else if source == &self.node_two {
738 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
743 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
746 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
747 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
748 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
750 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
752 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
757 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
758 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
759 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
760 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
765 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
766 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
767 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
768 (0, self.features, required),
769 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
770 (2, self.node_one, required),
771 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
772 (6, self.node_two, required),
773 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
774 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
775 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
781 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
782 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
783 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
784 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
785 // channel updates via the gossip network.
786 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
788 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
789 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
790 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
791 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
792 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
793 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
794 Err(err) => Err(err),
799 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
800 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
801 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
802 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
803 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
804 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
805 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
806 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
807 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
808 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
809 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
810 (0, features, required),
811 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
812 (2, node_one, required),
813 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
814 (6, node_two, required),
815 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
816 (10, capacity_sats, required),
817 (12, announcement_message, required),
821 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
822 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
823 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
824 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
825 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
826 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
827 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
828 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
833 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
834 /// source node to a target node.
836 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
837 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
838 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
839 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
840 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
843 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
845 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
846 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
847 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
849 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
850 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
851 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
852 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
854 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
855 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
857 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
858 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
860 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
864 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
868 /// Returns information for the channel.
869 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
871 /// Returns information for the direction.
872 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
874 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
875 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
876 self.htlc_maximum_msat
879 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
881 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
882 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
884 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
885 self.effective_capacity
888 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
889 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
890 match self.direction {
891 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
897 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
898 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
899 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
900 .field("channel", &self.channel)
905 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
907 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
908 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
911 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
912 /// Returns information for the channel.
914 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
916 /// Returns information for the direction.
918 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
920 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
922 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
925 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
926 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
931 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
933 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
934 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
935 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
936 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
937 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
940 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
944 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
946 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
949 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
951 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
953 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
954 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
956 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
959 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
960 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
964 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
965 /// use when making routing decisions.
966 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
968 impl EffectiveCapacity {
969 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
970 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
972 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
973 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
974 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
975 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
976 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
981 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
982 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
983 pub struct RoutingFees {
984 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
986 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
987 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
988 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
991 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
992 (0, base_msat, required),
993 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
996 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
997 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
998 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
999 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1000 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1001 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1002 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1003 pub last_update: u32,
1004 /// Color assigned to the node
1006 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1007 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1008 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1009 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1010 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1011 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1012 /// An initial announcement of the node
1013 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1014 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1015 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1016 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1019 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1020 (0, features, required),
1021 (2, last_update, required),
1023 (6, alias, required),
1024 (8, announcement_message, option),
1025 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1028 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1030 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1031 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1032 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1033 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1035 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1036 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1037 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1038 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1039 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1040 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1042 for c in alias.chars() {
1043 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1044 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1045 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1049 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1050 // Display printable ASCII characters
1051 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1052 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1053 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1061 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1062 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1067 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1068 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1069 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1073 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1074 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1075 pub struct NodeInfo {
1076 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1077 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1078 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1079 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1080 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1081 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1082 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1083 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1084 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1085 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1088 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1089 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1090 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1091 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1096 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1097 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1098 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1099 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1100 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1101 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1107 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1108 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1109 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1110 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1111 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1113 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1114 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1115 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1116 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1118 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1125 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1126 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1127 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1128 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1129 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1131 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1132 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1133 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1134 (4, channels, vec_type),
1138 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1139 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1140 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1145 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1146 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1148 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1149 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1150 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1152 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1153 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1154 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1155 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1156 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1157 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1159 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1160 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1161 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1162 node_id.write(writer)?;
1163 node_info.write(writer)?;
1166 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1167 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1168 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1174 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1175 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1176 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1178 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1179 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1181 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1182 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1183 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1184 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1186 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1187 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1188 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1189 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1190 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1191 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1194 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1195 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1196 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1200 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1203 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1204 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1205 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1210 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1211 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1212 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1213 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1214 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1216 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1217 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1218 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1224 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1225 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1226 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1227 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1228 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1232 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1233 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1234 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1239 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1240 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1241 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1245 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1246 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1247 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1248 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1249 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1255 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1256 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1257 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1258 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1261 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1262 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1263 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1264 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1267 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1270 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1271 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1272 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1276 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1277 /// given node announcement.
1279 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1280 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1281 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1282 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1283 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1284 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1285 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1288 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1289 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1290 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1292 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1293 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1296 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1297 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1298 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1300 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1301 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1302 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1303 // that it be at least the current time.
1304 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1305 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1306 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1307 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1312 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1313 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1314 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1315 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1316 features: msg.features.clone(),
1317 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1319 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1320 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1321 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1329 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1331 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1332 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1333 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1335 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1336 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1337 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1338 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1339 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1341 C::Target: chain::Access,
1343 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1344 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1345 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1346 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1347 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1348 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1351 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1352 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1353 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1355 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1356 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1357 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1358 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1359 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1361 C::Target: chain::Access,
1363 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1366 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1368 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1369 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1371 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1372 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1373 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1374 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1377 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1378 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1379 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1381 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1383 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1385 capacity_sats: None,
1386 announcement_message: None,
1387 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1390 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1393 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1394 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1395 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1397 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1398 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1400 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1401 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1402 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1403 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1405 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1406 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1407 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1408 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1410 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1411 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1413 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1414 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1415 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1417 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1420 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1421 entry.insert(channel_info);
1425 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1426 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1427 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1428 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1430 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1431 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1432 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1433 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1434 announcement_info: None,
1443 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1444 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1445 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1447 C::Target: chain::Access,
1449 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1450 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1454 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1456 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1457 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1458 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1459 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1461 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1462 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1463 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1464 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1466 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1467 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1468 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1469 if NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1) == chan.node_one && NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2) == chan.node_two {
1470 return Err(LightningError {
1471 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1472 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1475 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1476 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1477 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1478 return Err(LightningError {
1479 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1480 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1486 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1488 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1491 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1492 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1493 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1494 let expected_script =
1495 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1496 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1497 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1499 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1500 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1503 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1504 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1506 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1507 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1513 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1514 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1515 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1517 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1520 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1521 features: msg.features.clone(),
1522 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1524 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1526 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1527 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1528 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1529 announcement_received_time,
1532 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1535 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1536 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1537 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1538 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1539 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1540 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1542 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1543 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1544 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1547 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1548 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1549 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1551 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1552 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1558 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1559 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1561 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1563 // TODO: downgrade the node
1567 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1568 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1569 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1572 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1573 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1574 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1576 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1577 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1579 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1580 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1581 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1582 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1583 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1586 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1587 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1590 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1591 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1592 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1594 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1595 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1596 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1597 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1598 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1599 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1600 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1601 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1602 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1604 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1605 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1606 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1607 info.one_to_two = None;
1609 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1610 info.two_to_one = None;
1612 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1613 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1614 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1615 // channel_update for.
1616 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1617 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1621 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1622 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1623 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1624 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1625 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1630 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1633 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1634 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1635 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1637 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1638 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1639 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1640 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1643 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1644 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1645 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1647 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1648 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1649 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1650 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1653 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1655 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1656 let chan_was_enabled;
1658 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1660 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1661 // disable this check during tests!
1662 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1663 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1664 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1666 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1667 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1671 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1672 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1673 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1675 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1676 return Err(LightningError{err:
1677 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1678 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1681 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1682 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1683 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1684 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1685 return Err(LightningError{err:
1686 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1687 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1690 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1691 ($target: expr) => {
1692 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1693 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1694 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1695 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1696 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1697 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1698 // but only in the non-normative section.
1699 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1700 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1701 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1702 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1704 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1706 chan_was_enabled = false;
1711 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1713 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1714 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1716 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1717 enabled: chan_enabled,
1718 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1719 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1720 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1721 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1723 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1724 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1728 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1732 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1733 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1734 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1735 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1736 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1737 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1738 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1739 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1740 })?, "channel_update");
1742 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1744 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1745 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1746 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1747 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1748 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1749 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1750 })?, "channel_update");
1752 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1757 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1759 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1760 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1761 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1762 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1763 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1764 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1766 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1768 proportional_millionths
1770 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1771 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1772 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1774 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1775 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1777 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1778 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1780 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1782 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1783 if chan_info.enabled {
1784 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1785 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1786 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1787 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1792 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1798 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1799 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1800 ($node_id: expr) => {
1801 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1802 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1803 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1805 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1806 entry.remove_entry();
1809 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1814 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1815 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1819 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1820 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1822 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1823 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1827 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1828 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1829 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1832 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1833 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1834 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1835 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1838 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1840 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1841 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1845 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1846 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1847 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1850 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1851 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1852 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1853 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1856 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1857 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1858 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1859 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1860 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1861 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1862 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1872 use ln::channelmanager;
1873 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1874 use ln::PaymentHash;
1875 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
1876 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1877 use ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1878 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1879 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1880 use util::test_utils;
1881 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1882 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1883 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1885 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1887 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1888 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1889 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1890 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1891 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1892 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1896 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1897 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1900 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1904 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1905 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1906 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1907 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1910 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1911 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1912 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1914 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1915 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1916 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1917 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1921 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1922 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1923 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1924 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1925 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1927 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1928 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1929 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1930 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1931 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1932 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1935 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1936 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1937 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1938 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1943 addresses: Vec::new(),
1944 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1945 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1947 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1948 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1950 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1951 contents: unsigned_announcement
1955 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1956 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1957 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1958 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1959 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1961 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1962 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1963 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1964 short_channel_id: 0,
1967 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1968 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1969 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1971 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1972 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1973 ChannelAnnouncement {
1974 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1975 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1976 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1977 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1978 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1982 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1983 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1984 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1985 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
1986 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
1989 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1990 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1991 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1992 short_channel_id: 0,
1995 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1996 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1997 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
1998 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1999 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2000 excess_data: Vec::new()
2002 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2003 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2005 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2006 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2011 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2012 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2013 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2015 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2016 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2017 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2019 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2020 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2022 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2026 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2027 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2028 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2029 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2034 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2035 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2039 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2040 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2042 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2043 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2046 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2049 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2050 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2051 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2052 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2053 // Return false because contains excess data.
2054 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2055 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2059 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2060 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2061 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2062 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2063 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2064 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2066 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2071 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2072 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2073 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2075 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2076 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2078 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2079 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2081 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2082 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2083 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2084 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2085 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2086 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2091 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2097 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2098 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2099 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2101 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2104 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2105 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2106 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2107 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2108 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2110 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2111 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2112 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2113 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2115 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2118 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2119 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2120 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2121 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2122 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2123 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2124 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2129 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2135 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2136 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2137 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2138 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2140 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2143 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2144 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2145 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2146 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2147 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2148 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2149 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2153 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2154 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2155 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2157 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2160 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2161 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2163 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2168 fn handling_channel_update() {
2169 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2170 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2171 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2172 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2173 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2174 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2176 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2177 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2179 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2180 let short_channel_id;
2183 // Announce a channel we will update
2184 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2185 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2187 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2188 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2189 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2196 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2197 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2198 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2203 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2205 Some(channel_info) => {
2206 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2207 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2212 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2213 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2214 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2215 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2216 // Return false because contains excess data
2217 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2218 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2222 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2223 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2224 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2225 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2226 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2228 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2231 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2232 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2233 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2234 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2235 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2237 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2240 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2241 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2242 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2243 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2244 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2246 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2249 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2250 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2251 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2252 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2253 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2254 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2256 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2259 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2260 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2261 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2262 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2263 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2264 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2265 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2267 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2272 fn handling_network_update() {
2273 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2274 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2275 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2278 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2279 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2282 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2283 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2286 let short_channel_id;
2288 // Announce a channel we will update
2289 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2290 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2291 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2292 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2293 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2295 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2296 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2298 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2300 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2301 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2302 all_paths_failed: true,
2304 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2305 msg: valid_channel_update,
2307 short_channel_id: None,
2313 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2316 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2318 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2320 Some(channel_info) => {
2321 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2325 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2327 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2328 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2329 all_paths_failed: true,
2331 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2333 is_permanent: false,
2335 short_channel_id: None,
2341 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2343 Some(channel_info) => {
2344 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2349 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2350 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2352 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2353 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2354 all_paths_failed: true,
2356 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2360 short_channel_id: None,
2366 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2367 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2368 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2369 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2373 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2374 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2375 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2376 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2377 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2378 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2379 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2380 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2382 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2383 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2385 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2386 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2387 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2388 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2389 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2391 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2392 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2393 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2395 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2396 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2397 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2399 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2400 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2402 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2403 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2404 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2405 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2406 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2407 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2408 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2410 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2411 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2412 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2415 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2416 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2420 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2421 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2422 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2423 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2424 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2426 // Channels were not announced yet.
2427 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2428 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2430 let short_channel_id;
2432 // Announce a channel we will update
2433 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2434 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2435 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2441 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2442 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2443 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2444 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2445 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2446 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2452 // Valid channel update
2453 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2454 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2455 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2456 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2462 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2463 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2464 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2465 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2466 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2467 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2473 // Channel update with excess data.
2474 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2475 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2476 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2477 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2478 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2484 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2485 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2486 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2487 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2488 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2489 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2494 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2495 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2496 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2500 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2501 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2502 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2503 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2504 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2505 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2508 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2509 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2512 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2513 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2514 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2520 // Nodes were never announced
2521 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2522 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2525 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2526 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2531 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2532 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2538 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2539 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2541 // Skip the first node.
2542 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2543 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2546 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2547 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2548 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2549 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2550 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2551 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2552 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2557 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2558 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2562 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2563 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2564 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2566 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2567 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2569 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2570 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2571 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2572 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2576 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2577 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2582 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2583 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2584 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2585 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2587 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2588 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2592 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2593 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2594 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2596 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2597 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2599 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2600 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2601 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2602 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2606 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2607 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2608 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2611 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2612 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2613 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2614 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2616 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2618 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2620 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2621 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2622 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2626 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2628 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2629 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2630 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2631 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2632 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2635 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2636 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2637 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2638 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2639 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2640 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2641 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2643 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2649 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2650 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2651 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2653 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2654 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2655 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2656 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2658 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2659 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2660 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2663 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2664 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2665 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2668 // used for testing resumption on same block
2669 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2672 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2673 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2674 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2675 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2681 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2682 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2686 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2688 number_of_blocks: 0,
2691 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2692 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2694 number_of_blocks: 0,
2695 sync_complete: true,
2696 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2700 // Error when wrong chain
2701 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2705 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2707 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2710 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2711 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2713 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2714 sync_complete: true,
2715 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2719 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2720 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2724 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2725 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2726 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2729 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2730 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2731 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2732 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2733 sync_complete: true,
2734 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2738 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2739 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2743 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2744 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2745 number_of_blocks: 1,
2750 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2751 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2752 number_of_blocks: 1,
2753 sync_complete: true,
2754 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2759 // No results in valid query range
2760 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2764 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2765 first_blocknum: 1000,
2766 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2771 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2772 first_blocknum: 1000,
2773 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2774 sync_complete: true,
2775 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2780 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2781 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2785 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2786 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2787 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2792 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2793 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2794 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2795 sync_complete: true,
2796 short_channel_ids: vec![
2797 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2803 // Single block exactly full
2804 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2808 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2809 first_blocknum: 100000,
2810 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2815 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2816 first_blocknum: 100000,
2817 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2818 sync_complete: true,
2819 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2820 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2826 // Multiple split on new block
2827 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2831 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2832 first_blocknum: 100000,
2833 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2838 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2839 first_blocknum: 100000,
2840 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2841 sync_complete: false,
2842 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2843 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2847 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2848 first_blocknum: 107999,
2849 number_of_blocks: 2,
2850 sync_complete: true,
2851 short_channel_ids: vec![
2852 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2858 // Multiple split on same block
2859 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2863 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2864 first_blocknum: 100002,
2865 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2870 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2871 first_blocknum: 100002,
2872 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2873 sync_complete: false,
2874 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2875 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2879 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2880 first_blocknum: 108001,
2881 number_of_blocks: 1,
2882 sync_complete: true,
2883 short_channel_ids: vec![
2884 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2891 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2892 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2893 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2894 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2896 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2898 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2899 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2900 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2901 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2904 assert!(result.is_ok());
2906 assert!(result.is_err());
2909 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2910 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2912 for i in 0..events.len() {
2913 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2915 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2916 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2917 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2918 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2919 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2920 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2921 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2923 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2924 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2925 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2926 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2927 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2929 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2930 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2931 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2934 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2940 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2941 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2942 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2943 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2944 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2946 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2948 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2950 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2952 assert!(result.is_err());
2956 fn displays_node_alias() {
2957 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
2958 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2959 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
2960 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2963 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
2964 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
2965 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
2967 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
2968 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2969 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
2970 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2973 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
2974 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
2975 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
2979 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
2980 let chanmon_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2981 let node_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2982 let node_chanmgrs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
2983 let nodes = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2985 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
2986 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2989 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
2990 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
2991 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
2992 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
2993 last_update_message: None,
2996 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
2997 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
2999 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3000 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3001 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3003 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3004 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3005 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3007 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3008 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3009 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3010 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3011 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3013 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3014 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3015 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3017 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3018 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3019 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3020 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3021 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3023 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3025 capacity_sats: None,
3026 announcement_message: None,
3027 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3030 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3031 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3033 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3034 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3036 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3037 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3038 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3039 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3040 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3041 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3042 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3043 capacity_sats: None,
3044 announcement_message: None,
3045 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3048 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3049 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3051 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3052 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3054 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3055 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3056 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3058 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3059 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3060 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3061 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3062 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3063 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3064 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3066 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3067 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3068 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3069 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3070 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3074 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3075 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3077 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3078 let valid_netaddr = ::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: ::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3079 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3080 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
3083 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3084 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3085 announcement_message: None,
3088 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3089 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3090 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3091 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3093 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3094 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3095 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3097 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3098 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3099 channels: Vec::new(),
3100 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3101 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3104 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3105 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3106 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3107 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3109 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3110 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3111 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3115 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3123 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3124 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3125 let mut d = ::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3126 let mut v = Vec::new();
3127 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3129 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3134 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3135 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3136 let mut d = ::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3137 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3139 let _ = net_graph.encode();