1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
26 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
32 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
33 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
34 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
35 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
37 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
40 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
41 use crate::prelude::*;
43 use core::convert::TryFrom;
44 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
45 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
46 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
47 use crate::sync::Mutex;
48 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
49 use core::str::FromStr;
51 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
52 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
54 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
56 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
58 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
59 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
61 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
62 /// refuse to relay the message.
63 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
65 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
66 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
67 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
69 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
70 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
71 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
74 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
75 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
76 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
79 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
80 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
84 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
85 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
86 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
90 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
91 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
92 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
95 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
96 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
97 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
101 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
102 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
107 impl Eq for NodeId {}
109 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
110 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
111 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
115 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
116 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
117 Some(self.cmp(other))
121 impl Ord for NodeId {
122 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
123 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
127 impl Writeable for NodeId {
128 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
129 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
134 impl Readable for NodeId {
135 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
136 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
137 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
142 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
143 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
144 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
148 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
149 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
151 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
156 impl FromStr for NodeId {
157 type Err = bitcoin::hashes::hex::Error;
159 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
160 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
165 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
166 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
167 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
168 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
169 chain_hash: ChainHash,
171 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
172 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
173 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
174 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
176 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
177 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
178 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
179 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
180 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
181 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
182 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
185 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
186 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
187 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
188 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
189 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
190 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
191 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
192 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
193 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
194 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
197 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
198 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
199 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
200 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
203 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
204 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
206 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
207 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
209 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
210 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
211 ChannelUpdateMessage {
212 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
215 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
216 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
218 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
219 short_channel_id: u64,
220 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
221 /// `channel_update` message is received.
224 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
225 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
227 /// The node id of the failed node.
229 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
230 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
236 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
239 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
240 (0, short_channel_id, required),
241 (2, is_permanent, required),
243 (4, NodeFailure) => {
244 (0, node_id, required),
245 (2, is_permanent, required),
249 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
250 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
251 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
252 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
253 /// serving historical announcements.
254 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
255 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
258 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
259 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
260 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
261 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
265 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
266 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
268 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
269 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
270 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
271 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
272 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
275 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
276 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
277 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
278 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
283 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
284 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
285 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
286 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
287 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
290 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
291 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
293 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
294 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
298 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
299 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
300 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
301 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
302 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
303 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
304 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
311 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
313 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
315 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
317 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
318 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
319 if update_msg.as_ref()
320 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
326 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
328 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
329 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
330 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
331 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
338 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
342 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
343 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
345 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
346 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
348 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
349 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
350 match *network_update {
351 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
352 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
353 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
354 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
355 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
357 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
359 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
360 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
363 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
365 log_debug!(self.logger,
366 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
367 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
373 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
374 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
379 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
380 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
381 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
384 return Err(LightningError {
385 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
386 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
387 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
388 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
389 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
391 log_level: Level::Trace,
399 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
400 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
401 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
402 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
403 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
404 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
405 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
406 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
407 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
409 log_level: Level::Trace
415 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
416 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
417 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
418 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
421 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
423 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
424 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
425 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
426 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
431 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
433 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
434 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
435 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
436 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
437 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
438 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
439 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
444 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
445 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
447 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
448 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
449 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
450 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
451 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
454 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
455 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
456 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
459 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
460 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
461 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
464 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
465 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
466 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
467 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
468 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
469 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
470 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
471 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
472 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
474 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
475 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
477 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
479 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
480 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
486 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
487 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
488 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
489 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
493 for (_, ref node) in iter {
494 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
495 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
503 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
504 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
505 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
507 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
508 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
509 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
510 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
511 /// tracking this directly.
513 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
514 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
515 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
516 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
517 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
518 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
519 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
520 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
521 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
522 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
526 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
528 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
529 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
530 // updates from all our peers normally.
532 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
533 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
534 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
537 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
538 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
539 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
540 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
541 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
543 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
544 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
545 // relying on it useless.
547 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
548 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
549 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
551 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
552 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
553 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
554 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
555 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
558 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
559 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
560 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
561 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
562 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
563 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
564 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
566 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
567 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
568 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
569 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
571 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
572 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
573 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
575 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
576 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
577 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
578 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
580 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
581 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
582 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
584 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
588 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
589 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
590 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
591 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
592 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
593 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
594 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
600 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
601 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
602 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
603 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
607 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
608 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
609 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
610 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
614 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
615 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
616 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
617 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
618 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
619 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
620 /// memory constrained systems.
621 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
622 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
624 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
626 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
627 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
628 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
630 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
631 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
632 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
633 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
634 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
635 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
636 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
637 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
638 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
640 short_channel_ids: vec![],
643 return Err(LightningError {
644 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
645 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
649 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
650 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
651 // exists even if its not yet routable.
652 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
653 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
654 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
655 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
656 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
657 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
658 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
661 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
662 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
667 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
668 let batch_count = batches.len();
669 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
670 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
671 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
672 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
674 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
675 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
676 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
677 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
678 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
679 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
680 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
682 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
683 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
684 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
686 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
687 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
688 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
690 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
691 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
692 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
693 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
695 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
696 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
698 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
701 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
703 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
704 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
705 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
706 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
710 short_channel_ids: batch,
718 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
721 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
722 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
726 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
727 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
728 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
732 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
733 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
734 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
738 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
739 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
743 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
745 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
748 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
749 let mut ret = Vec::new();
750 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
751 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
756 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
757 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
758 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
759 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
760 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
761 pub last_update: u32,
762 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
764 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
765 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
766 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
767 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
768 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
769 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
770 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
771 pub fees: RoutingFees,
772 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
773 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
774 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
775 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
776 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
779 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
780 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
781 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
786 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
787 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
788 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
789 (0, self.last_update, required),
790 (2, self.enabled, required),
791 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
792 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
793 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
794 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
795 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
796 (10, self.fees, required),
797 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
803 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
804 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
805 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
806 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
807 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
808 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
809 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
810 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
811 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
813 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
814 (0, last_update, required),
815 (2, enabled, required),
816 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
817 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
818 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
819 (10, fees, required),
820 (12, last_update_message, required)
823 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
824 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
825 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
826 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
827 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
828 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
830 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
831 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
834 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
839 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
840 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
841 /// Received within a channel announcement.
842 pub struct ChannelInfo {
843 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
844 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
845 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
846 pub node_one: NodeId,
847 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
848 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
849 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
850 pub node_two: NodeId,
851 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
852 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
853 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
854 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
855 /// An initial announcement of the channel
856 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
857 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
858 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
859 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
860 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
861 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
862 /// network graph in memory!).
863 announcement_received_time: u64,
867 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
868 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
869 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
870 let (direction, source) = {
871 if target == &self.node_one {
872 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
873 } else if target == &self.node_two {
874 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
879 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
882 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
883 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
884 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
885 let (direction, target) = {
886 if source == &self.node_one {
887 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
888 } else if source == &self.node_two {
889 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
894 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
897 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
898 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
899 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
901 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
903 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
908 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
909 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
910 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
911 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
916 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
917 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
918 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
919 (0, self.features, required),
920 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
921 (2, self.node_one, required),
922 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
923 (6, self.node_two, required),
924 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
925 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
926 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
932 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
933 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
934 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
935 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
936 // channel updates via the gossip network.
937 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
939 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
940 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
941 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
942 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
943 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
944 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
945 Err(err) => Err(err),
950 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
951 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
952 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
953 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
954 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
955 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
956 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
957 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
958 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
959 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
960 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
961 (0, features, required),
962 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
963 (2, node_one, required),
964 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
965 (6, node_two, required),
966 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
967 (10, capacity_sats, required),
968 (12, announcement_message, required),
972 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
973 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
974 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
975 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
976 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
977 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
978 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
979 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
984 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
985 /// source node to a target node.
987 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
988 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
989 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
990 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
991 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
994 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
996 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
997 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
998 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1000 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
1001 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1002 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1003 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
1005 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1009 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
1013 /// Returns information for the channel.
1015 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1017 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
1019 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1020 self.htlc_maximum_msat
1023 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1025 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1026 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1028 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1029 self.effective_capacity
1032 /// Returns information for the direction.
1034 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1037 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1038 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1039 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1040 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1045 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1047 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1048 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1049 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1050 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1051 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1054 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1056 liquidity_msat: u64,
1058 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1060 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1063 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1065 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1067 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1068 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1070 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1073 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1075 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1078 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1079 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1083 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1084 /// use when making routing decisions.
1085 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1087 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1088 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1089 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1091 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1092 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1093 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1094 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1095 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1096 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1101 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1102 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1103 pub struct RoutingFees {
1104 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1106 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1107 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1108 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1111 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1112 (0, base_msat, required),
1113 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1116 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1117 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1118 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1119 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1120 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1121 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1122 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1123 pub last_update: u32,
1124 /// Color assigned to the node
1126 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1127 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1128 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1129 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1130 /// An initial announcement of the node
1131 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1132 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1133 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1134 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1137 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1138 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1139 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1140 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1141 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1142 .unwrap_or_default()
1146 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1147 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1148 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1149 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1150 (0, self.features, required),
1151 (2, self.last_update, required),
1152 (4, self.rgb, required),
1153 (6, self.alias, required),
1154 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1155 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1161 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1162 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1163 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1164 (0, features, required),
1165 (2, last_update, required),
1167 (6, alias, required),
1168 (8, announcement_message, option),
1169 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1171 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1172 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1173 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1177 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1179 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1180 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1181 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1182 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1184 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1185 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1186 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1187 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1188 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1189 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1191 use core::fmt::Write;
1192 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1193 // Display printable ASCII characters
1194 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1195 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1204 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1205 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1210 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1211 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1212 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1216 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1217 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1218 pub struct NodeInfo {
1219 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1220 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1221 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1222 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1223 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1224 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1227 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1228 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1229 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1230 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1235 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1236 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1237 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1238 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1239 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1240 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1246 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1247 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1248 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1249 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1250 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1252 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1253 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1254 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1255 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1257 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1264 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1265 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1266 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1267 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1268 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1269 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1270 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1271 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1272 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1273 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1274 (4, channels, required_vec),
1276 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1277 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1280 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1286 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1287 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1289 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1290 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1291 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1293 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1294 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1295 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1296 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1297 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1298 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1300 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1301 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1302 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1303 node_id.write(writer)?;
1304 node_info.write(writer)?;
1307 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1308 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1309 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1315 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1316 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1317 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1319 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1320 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1321 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1322 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1323 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1324 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1325 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1326 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1328 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1329 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1330 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1331 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1332 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1333 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1334 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1337 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1338 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1339 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1343 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1346 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1347 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1348 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1349 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1350 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1351 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1356 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1357 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1358 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1359 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1360 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1362 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1363 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1364 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1370 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1371 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1372 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1373 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1374 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1375 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1376 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1377 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1378 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1379 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1380 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1384 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1385 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1386 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1388 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1389 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1391 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1392 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1393 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1394 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1395 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1396 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1400 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1401 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1402 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1403 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1404 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1410 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1411 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1412 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1413 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1416 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1417 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1418 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1419 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1422 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1425 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1426 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1427 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1431 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1432 /// given node announcement.
1434 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1435 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1436 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1437 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1438 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1439 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1442 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1443 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1444 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1446 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1447 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1450 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1451 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1452 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1454 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1455 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1456 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1459 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1460 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1461 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1462 // that it be at least the current time.
1463 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1464 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1465 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1466 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1471 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1472 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1473 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1474 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1475 features: msg.features.clone(),
1476 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1479 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1487 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1489 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1490 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1491 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1493 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1494 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1495 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1496 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1497 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1499 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1501 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1502 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1505 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1507 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1508 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1509 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1511 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1512 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1513 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1514 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1515 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1518 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1519 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1520 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1522 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1523 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1524 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1525 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1526 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1528 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1530 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1533 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1535 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1536 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1538 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1539 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1540 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1541 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1544 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1545 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1546 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1548 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1550 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1552 capacity_sats: None,
1553 announcement_message: None,
1554 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1557 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1560 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1561 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1562 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1564 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1565 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1567 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1569 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1570 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1571 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1572 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1574 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1575 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1576 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1577 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1579 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1580 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1582 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1583 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1584 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1586 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1589 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1590 entry.insert(channel_info);
1594 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1595 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1596 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1597 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1599 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1600 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1601 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1602 announcement_info: None,
1611 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1612 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1613 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1615 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1617 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1618 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1621 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1622 return Err(LightningError {
1623 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1624 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1629 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1631 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1632 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1633 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1634 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1636 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1637 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1638 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1639 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1641 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1642 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1643 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1644 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1645 return Err(LightningError {
1646 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1647 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1650 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1651 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1652 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1653 return Err(LightningError {
1654 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1655 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1662 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1663 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1664 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1665 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1666 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1667 return Err(LightningError{
1668 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1669 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1673 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1674 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1676 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1677 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1678 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1680 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1683 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1684 features: msg.features.clone(),
1685 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1687 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1689 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1690 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1691 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1692 announcement_received_time,
1695 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1697 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1701 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1703 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1704 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1705 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1706 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1707 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1708 let current_time_unix = None;
1710 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1713 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1715 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1716 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1717 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1718 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1719 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1720 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1721 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1725 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1726 /// from local storage.
1727 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1728 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1729 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1730 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1731 let current_time_unix = None;
1733 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1734 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1735 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1736 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1737 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1739 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1740 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1741 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1742 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1743 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1744 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1747 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1748 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1751 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1754 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1758 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1759 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1760 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1763 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1764 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1765 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1767 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1768 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1770 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1771 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1773 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1774 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1775 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1776 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1777 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1780 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1781 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1784 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1785 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1786 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1788 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1789 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1791 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1792 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1793 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1794 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1795 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1796 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1797 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1798 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1799 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1801 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1802 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1803 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1804 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1805 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1806 info.one_to_two = None;
1808 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1809 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1810 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1811 info.two_to_one = None;
1813 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1814 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1815 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1816 // channel_update for.
1817 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1818 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1819 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1820 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1821 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1825 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1826 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1827 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1828 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1829 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1830 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1834 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1835 if let Some(time) = time {
1836 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1838 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1839 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1840 // of this function.
1841 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1843 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1844 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1847 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1851 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1852 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1855 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1858 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1859 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1860 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1862 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1863 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1864 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1865 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1868 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1869 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1870 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1872 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1873 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1874 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1875 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1878 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1880 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1882 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1883 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1884 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1885 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1888 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1889 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
1890 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1892 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1894 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1895 return Err(LightningError {
1896 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1897 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1901 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1903 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1904 // disable this check during tests!
1905 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1906 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1907 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1909 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1910 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1914 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
1916 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1917 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1919 core::mem::drop(channels);
1920 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1921 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1924 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1925 return Err(LightningError{err:
1926 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1927 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1930 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1931 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1932 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1933 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1934 return Err(LightningError{err:
1935 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1936 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1939 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1940 ($target: expr) => {
1941 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1942 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1943 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1944 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1945 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1946 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1947 // but only in the non-normative section.
1948 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1949 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1950 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1951 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1957 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1959 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1960 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1962 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1963 enabled: chan_enabled,
1964 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1965 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1966 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1967 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1969 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1970 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1974 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1978 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
1979 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1980 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1981 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1982 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1983 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1984 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1985 })?, "channel_update");
1988 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1991 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1992 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1993 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1994 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1995 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1996 })?, "channel_update");
1999 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2008 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2009 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2010 ($node_id: expr) => {
2011 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2012 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2013 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2015 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2016 entry.remove_entry();
2019 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2024 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2025 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2029 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2030 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2032 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2033 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2037 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2038 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2039 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2042 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2043 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2044 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2045 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2048 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2050 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2051 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2055 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2056 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2057 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2060 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2061 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2062 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2063 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2066 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2067 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2068 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2069 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2070 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2071 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2076 pub(crate) mod tests {
2077 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2078 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2079 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2080 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2081 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2082 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2083 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2084 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2085 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2086 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2087 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2088 use crate::util::test_utils;
2089 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2090 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2092 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2093 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2095 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2096 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2097 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2098 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2099 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2100 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2104 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2105 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2108 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2109 use crate::prelude::*;
2110 use crate::sync::Arc;
2112 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2113 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2114 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2117 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2118 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2119 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2121 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2122 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2123 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2124 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2128 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2129 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2130 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2131 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2132 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2134 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2135 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2136 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2137 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2138 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2139 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2142 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2143 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2144 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2145 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2149 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2150 addresses: Vec::new(),
2151 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2152 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2154 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2155 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2157 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2158 contents: unsigned_announcement
2162 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2163 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2164 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2165 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2166 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2168 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2169 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2170 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2171 short_channel_id: 0,
2172 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2173 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2174 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2175 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2176 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2178 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2179 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2180 ChannelAnnouncement {
2181 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2182 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2183 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2184 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2185 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2189 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2190 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2191 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2192 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2193 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2196 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2197 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2198 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2199 short_channel_id: 0,
2202 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2203 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2204 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2205 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2206 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2207 excess_data: Vec::new()
2209 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2210 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2212 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2213 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2218 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2219 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2220 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2222 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2223 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2224 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2226 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2227 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2229 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2233 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2234 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2235 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2236 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2241 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2242 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2246 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2247 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2249 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2250 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2253 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2256 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2257 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2258 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2259 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2260 // Return false because contains excess data.
2261 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2262 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2266 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2267 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2268 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2269 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2270 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2271 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2273 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2278 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2279 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2280 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2282 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2283 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2285 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2286 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2288 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2289 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2290 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2291 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2292 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2297 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2303 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2304 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2305 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2307 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2310 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2311 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2312 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2313 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2314 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2316 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2317 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2318 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2319 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2321 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2324 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2325 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2326 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2327 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2328 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2329 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2330 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2331 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2336 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2342 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2343 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2344 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2345 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2346 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2348 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2351 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2353 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2355 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2356 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2357 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2359 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2360 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2361 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2362 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2363 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2365 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2368 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2370 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2371 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2372 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2377 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2378 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2379 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2380 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2381 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2382 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2383 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2387 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2388 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2389 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2391 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2394 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2395 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2397 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2400 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2401 // announcement is mainnet).
2402 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2403 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2404 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2405 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2407 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2412 fn handling_channel_update() {
2413 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2414 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2415 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2416 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2417 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2419 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2420 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2422 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2423 let short_channel_id;
2426 // Announce a channel we will update
2427 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2428 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2429 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2431 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2432 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2433 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2440 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2441 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2442 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2443 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2448 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2450 Some(channel_info) => {
2451 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2452 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2457 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2458 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2459 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2460 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2461 // Return false because contains excess data
2462 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2463 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2467 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2468 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2469 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2470 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2471 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2473 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2476 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2477 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2478 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2479 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2480 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2482 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2485 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2486 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2487 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2488 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2489 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2491 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2494 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2495 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2496 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2497 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2498 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2499 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2501 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2504 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2505 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2506 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2507 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2508 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2509 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2510 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2512 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2515 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2516 // update is mainet).
2517 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2518 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2519 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2521 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2523 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2528 fn handling_network_update() {
2529 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2530 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2531 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2533 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2534 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2535 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2538 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2539 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2542 let short_channel_id;
2544 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2545 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2546 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2547 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2548 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2549 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2550 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2552 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2553 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2555 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2556 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2559 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2560 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2563 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2565 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2567 Some(channel_info) => {
2568 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2572 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2574 is_permanent: false,
2577 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2579 Some(channel_info) => {
2580 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2585 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2586 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2591 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2592 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2593 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2596 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2597 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2599 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2600 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2601 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2602 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2603 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2604 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2606 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2607 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2609 is_permanent: false,
2612 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2613 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2615 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2616 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2621 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2622 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2623 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2628 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2629 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2630 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2631 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2632 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2633 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2636 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2637 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2639 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2640 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2641 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2642 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2643 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2645 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2646 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2647 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2648 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2650 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2651 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2652 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2654 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2655 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2656 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2658 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2659 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2660 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2661 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2663 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2664 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2666 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2668 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2669 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2670 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2671 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2672 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2674 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2675 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2676 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2677 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2678 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2679 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2680 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2681 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2682 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2683 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2684 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2685 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2686 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2687 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2688 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2689 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2690 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2693 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2694 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2695 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2697 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2699 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2701 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2703 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2704 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2705 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2707 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2708 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2709 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2710 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2712 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2713 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2714 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2716 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2717 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2718 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2719 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2721 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2722 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2723 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2724 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2725 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2728 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2730 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2731 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2732 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2734 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2736 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2737 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2738 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2740 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2741 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2742 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2743 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2745 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2746 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2747 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2749 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2750 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2751 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2753 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2754 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2755 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2756 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2757 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2762 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2763 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2764 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2765 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2766 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2768 // Channels were not announced yet.
2769 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2770 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2772 let short_channel_id;
2774 // Announce a channel we will update
2775 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2776 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2777 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2783 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2784 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2785 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2786 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2787 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2788 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2794 // Valid channel update
2795 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2796 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2797 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2798 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2804 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2805 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2806 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2807 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2808 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2809 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2815 // Channel update with excess data.
2816 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2817 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2818 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2819 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2820 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2826 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2827 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2828 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2829 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2830 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2831 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2836 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2837 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2838 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2842 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2843 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2844 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2845 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2846 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2847 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2850 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2851 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2854 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2855 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2856 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2862 // Nodes were never announced
2863 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2864 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2867 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2868 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2873 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2874 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2880 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2881 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2883 // Skip the first node.
2884 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2885 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2888 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2889 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2890 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2891 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2892 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2893 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2894 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2899 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2900 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2904 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2905 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2906 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2908 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2909 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2911 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2912 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2913 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2914 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2918 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2919 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2924 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2925 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2926 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2927 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2929 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2930 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2934 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2935 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2936 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2938 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2939 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2941 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2942 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2943 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2944 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2948 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2949 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2950 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2951 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2953 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2954 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2955 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2956 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2958 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
2960 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2962 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2963 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2964 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2968 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2970 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2971 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2972 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2973 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2974 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2977 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2978 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2979 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2980 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2981 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2982 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2983 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2985 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2991 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2992 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2993 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2995 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
2996 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2997 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2998 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3000 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3001 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3002 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3005 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3006 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3007 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3010 // used for testing resumption on same block
3011 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3014 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3015 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3016 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3017 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3023 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3024 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3028 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3030 number_of_blocks: 0,
3033 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3034 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3036 number_of_blocks: 0,
3037 sync_complete: true,
3038 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3042 // Error when wrong chain
3043 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3047 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3049 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3052 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3053 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3055 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3056 sync_complete: true,
3057 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3061 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3062 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3066 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3067 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3068 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3071 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3072 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3073 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3074 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3075 sync_complete: true,
3076 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3080 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3081 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3085 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3086 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3087 number_of_blocks: 1,
3092 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3093 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3094 number_of_blocks: 1,
3095 sync_complete: true,
3096 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3101 // No results in valid query range
3102 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3106 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3107 first_blocknum: 1000,
3108 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3113 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3114 first_blocknum: 1000,
3115 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3116 sync_complete: true,
3117 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3122 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3123 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3127 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3128 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3129 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3134 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3135 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3136 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3137 sync_complete: true,
3138 short_channel_ids: vec![
3139 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3145 // Single block exactly full
3146 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3150 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3151 first_blocknum: 100000,
3152 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3157 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3158 first_blocknum: 100000,
3159 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3160 sync_complete: true,
3161 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3162 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3168 // Multiple split on new block
3169 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3173 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3174 first_blocknum: 100000,
3175 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3180 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3181 first_blocknum: 100000,
3182 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3183 sync_complete: false,
3184 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3185 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3189 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3190 first_blocknum: 107999,
3191 number_of_blocks: 2,
3192 sync_complete: true,
3193 short_channel_ids: vec![
3194 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3200 // Multiple split on same block
3201 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3205 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3206 first_blocknum: 100002,
3207 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3212 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3213 first_blocknum: 100002,
3214 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3215 sync_complete: false,
3216 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3217 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3221 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3222 first_blocknum: 108001,
3223 number_of_blocks: 1,
3224 sync_complete: true,
3225 short_channel_ids: vec![
3226 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3233 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3234 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3235 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3236 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3238 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3240 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3241 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3242 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3243 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3246 assert!(result.is_ok());
3248 assert!(result.is_err());
3251 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3252 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3254 for i in 0..events.len() {
3255 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3257 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3258 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3259 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3260 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3261 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3262 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3263 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3265 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3266 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3267 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3268 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3269 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3271 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3272 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3273 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3276 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3282 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3283 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3284 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3285 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3286 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3288 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3290 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3292 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3294 assert!(result.is_err());
3298 fn displays_node_alias() {
3299 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3300 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3301 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3302 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3305 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3306 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3307 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3309 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3310 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3311 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3312 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3315 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3316 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3317 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3321 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3322 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3323 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3324 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3325 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3326 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3328 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3329 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3332 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3333 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3334 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3335 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3336 last_update_message: None,
3339 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3340 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3342 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3343 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3344 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3346 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3347 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3348 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3350 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3351 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3352 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3353 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3354 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3356 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3357 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3358 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3360 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3361 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3362 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3363 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3364 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3366 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3368 capacity_sats: None,
3369 announcement_message: None,
3370 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3373 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3374 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3376 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3377 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3379 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3380 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3381 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3382 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3383 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3384 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3385 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3386 capacity_sats: None,
3387 announcement_message: None,
3388 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3391 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3392 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3394 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3395 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3397 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3398 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3399 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3401 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3402 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3403 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("fd01ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce8804b6b6b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f4240000027100000001406210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c2308b6b6b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f424000002710000000140a01000c0100").unwrap();
3404 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3405 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3406 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3407 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3409 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3410 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3411 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3412 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3413 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3417 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3418 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3419 let announcement_message = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3420 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3421 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3422 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3425 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3426 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3429 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3430 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3431 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3432 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3433 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3435 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3436 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3437 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3439 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3440 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3441 channels: Vec::new(),
3442 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3445 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3446 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3447 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3448 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3450 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3451 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3452 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3456 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3457 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = hex::decode("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3458 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3459 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3460 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3461 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3465 fn test_node_id_display() {
3466 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3467 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3475 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3477 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3478 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3479 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3480 let mut v = Vec::new();
3481 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3482 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3483 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3487 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3488 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3489 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3490 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3491 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3492 black_box(&net_graph).encode()