1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
188 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
189 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
190 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
191 /// serving historical announcements.
193 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
194 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
195 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
196 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
199 chain_access: Option<C>,
200 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
201 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
205 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
206 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
208 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
209 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
210 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
211 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
212 /// channel owners' keys.
213 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
216 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
218 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
223 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
224 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
225 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
226 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
227 self.chain_access = chain_access;
230 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
231 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
233 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
234 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
238 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
239 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
240 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
241 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
242 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
243 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
251 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
252 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
253 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
254 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
255 match *network_update {
256 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
257 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
258 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
259 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
261 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
263 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
264 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
265 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
266 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
268 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
269 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
270 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
271 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
279 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
280 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
281 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
284 return Err(LightningError {
285 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
286 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
287 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
289 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
291 log_level: Level::Trace,
299 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
300 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
302 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
303 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
304 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
305 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
306 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
309 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
310 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
311 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
312 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
315 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
316 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
317 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
320 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
321 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
322 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
323 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
324 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
325 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
326 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
327 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
328 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
329 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
330 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
331 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
333 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
334 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
336 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
338 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
339 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
348 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
349 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
350 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
351 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
352 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
356 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
358 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
359 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
360 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
361 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
362 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
372 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
373 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
374 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
376 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
377 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
378 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
379 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
380 /// tracking this directly.
381 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
382 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
383 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
387 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
389 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
390 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
391 // updates from all our peers normally.
393 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
394 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
395 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
398 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
399 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
400 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
401 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
402 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
404 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
405 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
406 // relying on it useless.
408 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
409 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
410 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
412 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
413 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
414 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
415 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
416 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
419 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
420 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
421 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
422 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
423 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
424 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
425 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
427 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
428 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
429 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
430 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
432 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
433 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
434 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
436 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
437 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
438 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
439 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
440 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
442 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
443 if should_request_full_sync {
444 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
446 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
450 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
451 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
452 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
453 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
454 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
455 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
456 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
461 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
462 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
463 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
464 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
468 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
469 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
470 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
471 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
475 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
476 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
477 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
478 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
479 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
480 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
481 /// memory constrained systems.
482 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
483 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
485 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
487 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
488 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
489 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
491 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
492 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
493 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
494 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
495 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
496 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
497 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
498 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
499 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
501 short_channel_ids: vec![],
504 return Err(LightningError {
505 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
506 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
510 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
511 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
512 // exists even if its not yet routable.
513 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
514 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
515 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
516 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
517 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
518 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
519 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
522 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
523 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
529 let batch_count = batches.len();
530 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
531 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
532 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
533 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
535 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
536 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
537 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
538 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
539 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
540 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
541 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
543 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
544 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
545 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
547 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
548 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
549 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
551 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
552 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
553 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
554 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
556 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
557 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
559 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
562 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
564 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
565 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
566 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
567 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
571 short_channel_ids: batch,
579 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
582 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
583 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
588 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
590 C::Target: chain::Access,
593 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
594 let mut ret = Vec::new();
595 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
596 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
602 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
603 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
604 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
605 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
606 pub last_update: u32,
607 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
609 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
610 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
611 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
612 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
613 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
614 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
615 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
616 pub fees: RoutingFees,
617 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
618 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
619 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
620 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
621 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
624 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
626 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
631 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
632 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
633 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
634 (0, self.last_update, required),
635 (2, self.enabled, required),
636 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
637 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
638 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
639 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
640 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
641 (10, self.fees, required),
642 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
648 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
649 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
650 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
651 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
652 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
653 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
654 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
655 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
656 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
658 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
659 (0, last_update, required),
660 (2, enabled, required),
661 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
662 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
663 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
664 (10, fees, required),
665 (12, last_update_message, required)
668 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
669 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
670 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
671 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
672 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
673 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
675 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
676 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
679 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
684 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
685 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
686 /// Received within a channel announcement.
687 pub struct ChannelInfo {
688 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
689 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
690 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
691 pub node_one: NodeId,
692 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
693 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
694 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
695 pub node_two: NodeId,
696 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
697 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
698 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
699 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
700 /// An initial announcement of the channel
701 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
702 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
703 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
704 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
705 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
706 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
707 /// network graph in memory!).
708 announcement_received_time: u64,
712 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
713 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
714 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
715 let (direction, source) = {
716 if target == &self.node_one {
717 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
718 } else if target == &self.node_two {
719 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
724 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
727 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
728 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
729 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
730 let (direction, target) = {
731 if source == &self.node_one {
732 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
733 } else if source == &self.node_two {
734 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
739 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
742 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
743 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
744 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
746 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
748 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
753 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
754 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
755 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
756 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
761 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
762 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
763 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
764 (0, self.features, required),
765 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
766 (2, self.node_one, required),
767 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
768 (6, self.node_two, required),
769 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
770 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
771 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
777 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
778 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
779 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
780 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
781 // channel updates via the gossip network.
782 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
784 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
785 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
786 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
787 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
788 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
789 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
790 Err(err) => Err(err),
795 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
796 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
797 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
798 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
799 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
800 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
801 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
802 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
803 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
804 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
805 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
806 (0, features, required),
807 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
808 (2, node_one, required),
809 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
810 (6, node_two, required),
811 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
812 (10, capacity_sats, required),
813 (12, announcement_message, required),
817 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
818 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
819 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
820 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
821 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
822 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
823 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
824 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
829 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
830 /// source node to a target node.
832 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
833 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
834 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
835 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
836 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
839 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
841 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
842 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
843 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
845 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
846 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
847 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
848 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
850 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
851 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
853 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
854 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
856 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
860 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
864 /// Returns information for the channel.
865 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
867 /// Returns information for the direction.
868 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
870 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
871 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
872 self.htlc_maximum_msat
875 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
877 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
878 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
880 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
881 self.effective_capacity
884 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
885 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
886 match self.direction {
887 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
893 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
894 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
895 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
896 .field("channel", &self.channel)
901 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
903 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
904 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
907 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
908 /// Returns information for the channel.
910 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
912 /// Returns information for the direction.
914 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
916 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
918 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
921 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
922 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
927 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
929 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
930 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
931 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
932 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
933 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
936 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
940 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
942 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
945 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
947 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
949 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
950 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
952 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
955 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
956 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
960 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
961 /// use when making routing decisions.
962 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
964 impl EffectiveCapacity {
965 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
966 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
968 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
969 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
970 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
971 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
972 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
977 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
978 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
979 pub struct RoutingFees {
980 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
982 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
983 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
984 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
987 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
988 (0, base_msat, required),
989 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
992 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
993 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
994 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
995 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
996 pub features: NodeFeatures,
997 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
998 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
999 pub last_update: u32,
1000 /// Color assigned to the node
1002 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1003 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1004 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1005 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1006 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1007 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1008 /// An initial announcement of the node
1009 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1010 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1011 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1012 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1015 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1016 (0, features, required),
1017 (2, last_update, required),
1019 (6, alias, required),
1020 (8, announcement_message, option),
1021 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1024 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1026 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1027 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1028 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1029 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1031 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1032 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1033 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1034 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1035 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1036 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1038 for c in alias.chars() {
1039 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1040 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1041 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1045 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1046 // Display printable ASCII characters
1047 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1048 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1049 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1057 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1058 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1063 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1064 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1065 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1069 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1070 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1071 pub struct NodeInfo {
1072 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1073 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1074 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1075 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1076 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1077 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1078 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1079 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1080 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1081 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1084 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1085 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1086 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1087 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1092 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1093 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1094 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1095 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1096 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1097 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1103 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1104 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1105 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1106 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1107 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1109 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1110 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1111 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1112 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1114 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1121 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1122 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1123 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1124 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1125 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1127 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1128 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1129 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1130 (4, channels, vec_type),
1134 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1135 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1136 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1141 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1142 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1144 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1146 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1148 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1149 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1150 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1151 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1152 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1153 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1155 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1156 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1157 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1158 node_id.write(writer)?;
1159 node_info.write(writer)?;
1162 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1163 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1164 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1170 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1171 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1172 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1174 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1175 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1176 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1177 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1178 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1179 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1182 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1183 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1184 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1185 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1186 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1187 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1190 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1191 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1192 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1196 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1199 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1200 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1201 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1206 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1207 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1208 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1209 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1210 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1212 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1213 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1214 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1220 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1221 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1222 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1223 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1224 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1228 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1229 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1230 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1235 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1236 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1237 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1241 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1242 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1243 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1244 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1245 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1251 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1252 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1253 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1254 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1257 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1258 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1259 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1260 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1263 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1266 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1267 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1268 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1272 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1273 /// given node announcement.
1275 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1276 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1277 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1278 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1279 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1280 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1281 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1284 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1285 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1286 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1288 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1289 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1292 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1293 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1294 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1296 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1297 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1298 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1299 // that it be at least the current time.
1300 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1301 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1302 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1303 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1308 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1309 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1310 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1311 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1312 features: msg.features.clone(),
1313 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1315 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1316 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1317 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1325 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1327 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1328 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1329 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1331 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1332 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1333 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1334 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1335 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1337 C::Target: chain::Access,
1339 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1340 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1341 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1342 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1343 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1344 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1347 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1348 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1349 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1351 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1352 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1353 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1354 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1355 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1357 C::Target: chain::Access,
1359 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1362 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1364 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1365 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1367 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1368 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1369 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1370 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1373 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1374 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1375 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1377 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1379 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1381 capacity_sats: None,
1382 announcement_message: None,
1383 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1386 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1389 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1390 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1391 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1393 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1394 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1396 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1397 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1398 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1399 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1401 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1402 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1403 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1404 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1406 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1407 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1409 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1410 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1411 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1413 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1416 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1417 entry.insert(channel_info);
1421 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1422 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1423 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1424 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1426 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1427 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1428 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1429 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1430 announcement_info: None,
1439 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1440 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1441 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1443 C::Target: chain::Access,
1445 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1446 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1449 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1451 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1454 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1455 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1456 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1457 let expected_script =
1458 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1459 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1460 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1462 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1463 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1466 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1467 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1469 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1470 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1476 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1477 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1478 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1480 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1483 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1484 features: msg.features.clone(),
1485 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1487 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1489 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1490 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1491 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1492 announcement_received_time,
1495 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1498 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1499 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1500 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1501 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1502 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1503 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1505 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1506 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1507 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1510 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1511 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1512 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1514 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1515 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1521 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1522 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1524 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1526 // TODO: downgrade the node
1530 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1531 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1532 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1535 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1536 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1537 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1539 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1540 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1542 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1543 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1544 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1545 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1546 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1549 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1550 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1553 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1554 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1555 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1557 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1558 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1559 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1560 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1561 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1562 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1563 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1564 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1565 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1567 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1568 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1569 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1570 info.one_to_two = None;
1572 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1573 info.two_to_one = None;
1575 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1576 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1577 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1578 // channel_update for.
1579 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1580 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1584 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1585 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1586 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1587 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1588 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1593 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1596 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1597 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1598 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1600 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1601 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1602 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1603 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1606 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1607 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1608 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1610 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1611 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1612 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1613 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1616 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1618 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1619 let chan_was_enabled;
1621 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1623 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1624 // disable this check during tests!
1625 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1626 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1627 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1629 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1630 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1634 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1635 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1636 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1638 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1639 return Err(LightningError{err:
1640 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1641 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1644 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1645 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1646 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1647 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1648 return Err(LightningError{err:
1649 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1650 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1653 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1654 ($target: expr) => {
1655 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1656 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1657 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1658 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1659 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1660 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1661 // but only in the non-normative section.
1662 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1663 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1664 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1665 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1667 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1669 chan_was_enabled = false;
1674 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1676 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1677 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1679 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1680 enabled: chan_enabled,
1681 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1682 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1683 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1684 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1686 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1687 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1691 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1695 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1696 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1697 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1698 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1699 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1700 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1701 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1702 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1703 })?, "channel_update");
1705 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1707 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1708 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1709 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1710 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1711 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1712 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1713 })?, "channel_update");
1715 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1720 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1722 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1723 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1724 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1725 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1726 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1727 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1729 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1731 proportional_millionths
1733 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1734 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1735 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1737 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1738 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1740 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1741 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1743 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1745 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1746 if chan_info.enabled {
1747 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1748 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1749 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1750 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1755 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1761 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1762 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1763 ($node_id: expr) => {
1764 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1765 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1766 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1768 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1769 entry.remove_entry();
1772 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1777 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1778 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1782 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1783 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1785 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1786 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1790 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1791 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1792 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1795 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1796 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1797 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1798 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1801 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1803 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1804 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1808 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1809 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1810 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1813 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1814 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1815 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1816 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1819 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1820 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1821 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1822 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1823 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1824 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1825 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1835 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1836 use ln::PaymentHash;
1837 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1838 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1839 use ln::msgs::{Init, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1840 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1841 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1842 use util::test_utils;
1843 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1844 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1845 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1847 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1849 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1850 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1851 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1852 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1853 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1854 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1858 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1859 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1862 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1866 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1867 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1868 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1869 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1872 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1873 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1874 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1876 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1877 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1878 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1879 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1883 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1884 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1885 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1886 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1888 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1889 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1890 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1891 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1892 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1893 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1896 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1897 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1898 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1899 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1904 addresses: Vec::new(),
1905 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1906 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1908 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1909 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1911 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1912 contents: unsigned_announcement
1916 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1917 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1918 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1919 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1920 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1922 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1923 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1924 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1925 short_channel_id: 0,
1928 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1929 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1930 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1932 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1933 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1934 ChannelAnnouncement {
1935 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1936 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1937 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1938 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1939 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1943 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1944 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1945 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1946 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
1947 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
1950 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1951 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1952 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1953 short_channel_id: 0,
1956 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1957 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1958 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
1959 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1960 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1961 excess_data: Vec::new()
1963 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1964 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1966 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1967 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1972 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1973 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1974 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1976 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1977 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1978 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1980 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1981 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1983 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1987 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1988 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1989 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1990 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1995 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1996 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2000 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2001 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2003 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2004 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2007 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2010 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2011 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2012 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2013 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2014 // Return false because contains excess data.
2015 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2016 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2020 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2021 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2022 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2023 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2024 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2025 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2027 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2032 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2033 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2034 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2036 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2037 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2039 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2040 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2042 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2043 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2044 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2045 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2046 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2047 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2052 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2058 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2059 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2060 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2062 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
2065 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2066 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2067 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2068 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2069 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2071 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2072 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2073 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2074 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2076 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2079 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2080 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2081 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2082 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2083 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2084 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2085 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2090 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2096 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
2097 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2098 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2099 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2101 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2104 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
2105 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2106 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2107 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2108 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2109 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2110 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2111 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2115 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2116 Some(channel_entry) => {
2117 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
2123 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2124 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2125 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2126 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2127 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2128 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2129 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2133 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2134 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2135 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2137 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2140 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2141 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2143 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2148 fn handling_channel_update() {
2149 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2150 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2151 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2152 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2153 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2154 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2156 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2157 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2159 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2160 let short_channel_id;
2163 // Announce a channel we will update
2164 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2165 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2167 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2168 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2169 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2176 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2177 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2178 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2183 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2185 Some(channel_info) => {
2186 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2187 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2192 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2193 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2194 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2195 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2196 // Return false because contains excess data
2197 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2198 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2202 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2203 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2204 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2205 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2206 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2208 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2211 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2212 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2213 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2214 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2215 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2217 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2220 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2221 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2222 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2223 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2224 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2226 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2229 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2230 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2231 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2232 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2233 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2234 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2236 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2239 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2240 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2241 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2242 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2243 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2244 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2245 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2247 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2252 fn handling_network_update() {
2253 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2254 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2255 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2256 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2258 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2259 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2262 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2263 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2266 let short_channel_id;
2268 // Announce a channel we will update
2269 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2270 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2271 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2272 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2273 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2275 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2276 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2278 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2280 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2281 rejected_by_dest: false,
2282 all_paths_failed: true,
2284 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2285 msg: valid_channel_update,
2287 short_channel_id: None,
2293 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2296 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2298 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2300 Some(channel_info) => {
2301 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2305 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2307 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2308 rejected_by_dest: false,
2309 all_paths_failed: true,
2311 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2313 is_permanent: false,
2315 short_channel_id: None,
2321 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2323 Some(channel_info) => {
2324 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2329 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2330 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2332 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2333 rejected_by_dest: false,
2334 all_paths_failed: true,
2336 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2340 short_channel_id: None,
2346 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2347 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2348 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2349 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2353 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2354 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2355 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2356 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2357 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2358 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2359 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2360 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2362 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2363 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2365 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2366 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2367 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2368 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2369 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2371 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2372 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2373 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2375 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2376 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2377 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2379 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2380 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2382 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2383 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2384 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2385 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2386 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2387 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2388 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2390 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2391 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2392 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2395 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2396 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2400 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2401 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2402 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2403 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2404 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2406 // Channels were not announced yet.
2407 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2408 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2410 let short_channel_id;
2412 // Announce a channel we will update
2413 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2414 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2415 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2421 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2422 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2423 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2424 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2425 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2426 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2427 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2434 // Valid channel update
2435 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2436 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2437 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2438 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2444 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2445 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2446 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2447 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2448 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2449 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2450 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2456 // Channel update with excess data.
2457 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2458 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2459 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2460 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2461 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2467 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2468 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2469 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2470 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2471 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2472 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2473 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2478 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2479 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2480 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2484 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2485 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2486 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2487 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2488 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2489 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2492 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2493 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2496 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2497 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2498 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2505 // Nodes were never announced
2506 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2507 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2510 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2511 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2516 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2517 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2523 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2524 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2526 // Skip the first node.
2527 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2528 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2531 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2532 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2533 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2534 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2535 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2536 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2537 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2542 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2543 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2547 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2548 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2549 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2551 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2552 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2554 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2555 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2556 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2557 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2561 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2562 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2567 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2568 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2569 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2570 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2572 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2573 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2577 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2578 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2579 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2581 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2582 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2584 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2585 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2586 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2587 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2591 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2592 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2593 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2595 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2596 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2597 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2598 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2600 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2602 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2604 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2605 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2606 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2610 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2612 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2613 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2614 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2617 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2618 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2619 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2620 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2621 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2622 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2623 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2625 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2631 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2632 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2633 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2635 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2636 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2637 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2638 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2640 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2641 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2642 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2645 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2646 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2647 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2650 // used for testing resumption on same block
2651 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2654 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2655 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2656 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2657 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2663 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2664 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2668 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2670 number_of_blocks: 0,
2673 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2674 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2676 number_of_blocks: 0,
2677 sync_complete: true,
2678 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2682 // Error when wrong chain
2683 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2687 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2689 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2692 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2693 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2695 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2696 sync_complete: true,
2697 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2701 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2702 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2706 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2707 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2708 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2711 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2712 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2713 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2714 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2715 sync_complete: true,
2716 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2720 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2721 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2725 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2726 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2727 number_of_blocks: 1,
2732 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2733 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2734 number_of_blocks: 1,
2735 sync_complete: true,
2736 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2741 // No results in valid query range
2742 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2746 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2747 first_blocknum: 1000,
2748 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2753 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2754 first_blocknum: 1000,
2755 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2756 sync_complete: true,
2757 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2762 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2763 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2767 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2768 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2769 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2774 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2775 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2776 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2777 sync_complete: true,
2778 short_channel_ids: vec![
2779 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2785 // Single block exactly full
2786 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2790 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2791 first_blocknum: 100000,
2792 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2797 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2798 first_blocknum: 100000,
2799 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2800 sync_complete: true,
2801 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2802 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2808 // Multiple split on new block
2809 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2813 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2814 first_blocknum: 100000,
2815 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2820 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2821 first_blocknum: 100000,
2822 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2823 sync_complete: false,
2824 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2825 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2829 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2830 first_blocknum: 107999,
2831 number_of_blocks: 2,
2832 sync_complete: true,
2833 short_channel_ids: vec![
2834 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2840 // Multiple split on same block
2841 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2845 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2846 first_blocknum: 100002,
2847 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2852 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2853 first_blocknum: 100002,
2854 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2855 sync_complete: false,
2856 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2857 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2861 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2862 first_blocknum: 108001,
2863 number_of_blocks: 1,
2864 sync_complete: true,
2865 short_channel_ids: vec![
2866 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2873 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2874 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2875 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2876 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2878 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2880 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2881 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2882 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2883 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2886 assert!(result.is_ok());
2888 assert!(result.is_err());
2891 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2892 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2894 for i in 0..events.len() {
2895 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2897 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2898 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2899 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2900 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2901 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2902 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2903 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2905 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2906 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2907 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2908 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2909 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2911 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2912 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2913 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2916 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2922 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2923 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2924 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2925 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2926 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2928 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2930 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2932 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2934 assert!(result.is_err());
2938 fn displays_node_alias() {
2939 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
2940 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2941 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
2942 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2945 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
2946 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
2947 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
2949 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
2950 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2951 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
2952 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2955 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
2956 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
2957 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
2961 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
2962 let chanmon_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2963 let node_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2964 let node_chanmgrs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
2965 let nodes = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2967 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
2968 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2971 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
2972 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
2973 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
2974 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
2975 last_update_message: None,
2978 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
2979 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
2981 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
2982 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
2983 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
2985 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
2986 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2987 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
2989 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
2990 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
2991 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
2992 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
2993 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
2995 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2996 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
2997 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
2999 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3000 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3001 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3002 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3003 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3005 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3007 capacity_sats: None,
3008 announcement_message: None,
3009 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3012 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3013 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3015 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3016 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3018 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3019 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3020 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3021 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3022 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3023 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3024 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3025 capacity_sats: None,
3026 announcement_message: None,
3027 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3030 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3031 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3033 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3034 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3036 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3037 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3038 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3040 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3041 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3042 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3043 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3044 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3045 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3046 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3048 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3049 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3050 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3051 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3052 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3056 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3057 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3059 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3060 let valid_netaddr = ::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: ::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3061 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3062 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3065 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3066 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3067 announcement_message: None,
3070 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3071 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3072 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3073 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3075 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3076 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3077 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3079 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3080 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3081 channels: Vec::new(),
3082 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3083 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3086 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3087 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3088 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3089 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3091 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3092 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3093 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3097 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3105 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3106 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3107 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3108 let mut v = Vec::new();
3109 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3111 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3116 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3117 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3118 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3119 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3121 let _ = net_graph.encode();