1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
188 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
189 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
190 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
191 /// serving historical announcements.
193 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
194 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
195 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
196 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
199 chain_access: Option<C>,
200 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
201 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
205 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
206 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
208 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
209 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
210 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
211 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
212 /// channel owners' keys.
213 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
216 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
218 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
223 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
224 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
225 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
226 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
227 self.chain_access = chain_access;
230 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
231 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
233 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
234 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
238 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
239 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
240 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
241 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
242 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
243 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
251 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
252 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
253 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
254 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
255 match *network_update {
256 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
257 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
258 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
259 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
261 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
263 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
264 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
265 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
266 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
268 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
269 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
270 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
271 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
279 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
280 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
281 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
284 return Err(LightningError {
285 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
286 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
287 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
289 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
291 log_level: Level::Trace,
299 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
300 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
302 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
303 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
304 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
305 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
306 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
309 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
310 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
311 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
312 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
315 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
316 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
317 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
320 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
321 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
322 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
323 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
324 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
325 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
326 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
327 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
328 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
330 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
331 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
333 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
335 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
336 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
342 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
343 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
344 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
345 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
349 for (_, ref node) in iter {
350 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
351 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
359 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
360 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
361 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
363 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
364 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
365 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
366 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
367 /// tracking this directly.
368 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
369 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
370 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
374 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
376 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
377 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
378 // updates from all our peers normally.
380 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
381 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
382 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
385 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
386 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
387 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
388 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
389 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
391 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
392 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
393 // relying on it useless.
395 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
396 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
397 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
399 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
400 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
401 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
402 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
403 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
406 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
407 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
408 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
409 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
410 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
411 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
412 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
414 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
415 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
416 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
417 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
419 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
420 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
421 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
423 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
424 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
425 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
426 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
427 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
429 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
430 if should_request_full_sync {
431 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
433 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
438 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
439 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
440 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
441 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
442 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
443 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
448 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
449 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
450 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
451 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
455 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
456 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
457 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
458 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
462 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
463 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
464 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
465 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
466 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
467 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
468 /// memory constrained systems.
469 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
470 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
472 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
474 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
475 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
476 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
478 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
479 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
480 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
481 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
482 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
483 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
484 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
485 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
486 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
488 short_channel_ids: vec![],
491 return Err(LightningError {
492 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
493 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
497 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
498 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
499 // exists even if its not yet routable.
500 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
501 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
502 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
503 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
504 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
505 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
506 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
509 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
510 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
515 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
516 let batch_count = batches.len();
517 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
518 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
519 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
520 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
522 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
523 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
524 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
525 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
526 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
527 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
528 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
530 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
531 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
532 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
534 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
535 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
536 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
538 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
539 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
540 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
541 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
543 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
544 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
546 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
549 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
551 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
552 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
553 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
554 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
558 short_channel_ids: batch,
566 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
569 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
570 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
574 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
575 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
576 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
581 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
583 C::Target: chain::Access,
586 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
587 let mut ret = Vec::new();
588 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
589 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
594 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
595 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
596 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
597 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
598 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
599 pub last_update: u32,
600 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
602 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
603 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
604 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
605 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
606 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
607 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
608 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
609 pub fees: RoutingFees,
610 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
611 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
612 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
613 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
614 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
617 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
618 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
619 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
624 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
625 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
626 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
627 (0, self.last_update, required),
628 (2, self.enabled, required),
629 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
630 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
631 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
632 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
633 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
634 (10, self.fees, required),
635 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
641 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
642 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
643 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
644 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
645 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
646 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
647 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
648 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
649 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
651 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
652 (0, last_update, required),
653 (2, enabled, required),
654 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
655 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
656 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
657 (10, fees, required),
658 (12, last_update_message, required)
661 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
662 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
663 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
664 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
665 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
666 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
668 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
669 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
672 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
677 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
678 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
679 /// Received within a channel announcement.
680 pub struct ChannelInfo {
681 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
682 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
683 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
684 pub node_one: NodeId,
685 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
686 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
687 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
688 pub node_two: NodeId,
689 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
690 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
691 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
692 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
693 /// An initial announcement of the channel
694 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
695 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
696 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
697 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
698 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
699 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
700 /// network graph in memory!).
701 announcement_received_time: u64,
705 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
706 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
707 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
708 let (direction, source) = {
709 if target == &self.node_one {
710 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
711 } else if target == &self.node_two {
712 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
717 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
720 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
721 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
722 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
723 let (direction, target) = {
724 if source == &self.node_one {
725 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
726 } else if source == &self.node_two {
727 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
732 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
735 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
736 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
737 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
739 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
741 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
746 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
747 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
748 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
749 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
754 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
755 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
757 (0, self.features, required),
758 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
759 (2, self.node_one, required),
760 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
761 (6, self.node_two, required),
762 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
763 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
764 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
770 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
771 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
772 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
773 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
774 // channel updates via the gossip network.
775 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
777 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
778 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
779 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
780 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
781 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
782 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
783 Err(err) => Err(err),
788 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
789 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
790 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
791 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
792 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
793 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
794 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
795 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
796 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
797 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
798 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
799 (0, features, required),
800 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
801 (2, node_one, required),
802 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
803 (6, node_two, required),
804 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
805 (10, capacity_sats, required),
806 (12, announcement_message, required),
810 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
811 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
812 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
813 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
814 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
815 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
816 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
817 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
822 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
823 /// source node to a target node.
825 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
826 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
827 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
828 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
829 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
832 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
834 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
835 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
836 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
838 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
839 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
840 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
841 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
843 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
844 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
846 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
847 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
849 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
853 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
857 /// Returns information for the channel.
858 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
860 /// Returns information for the direction.
861 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
863 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
864 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
865 self.htlc_maximum_msat
868 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
870 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
871 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
873 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
874 self.effective_capacity
877 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
878 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
879 match self.direction {
880 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
886 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
887 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
888 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
889 .field("channel", &self.channel)
894 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
896 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
897 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
900 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
901 /// Returns information for the channel.
903 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
905 /// Returns information for the direction.
907 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
909 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
911 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
914 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
915 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
920 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
922 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
923 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
924 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
925 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
926 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
929 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
933 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
935 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
938 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
940 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
942 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
943 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
945 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
948 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
949 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
953 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
954 /// use when making routing decisions.
955 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
957 impl EffectiveCapacity {
958 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
959 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
961 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
962 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
963 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
964 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
965 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
970 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
971 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
972 pub struct RoutingFees {
973 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
975 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
976 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
977 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
980 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
981 (0, base_msat, required),
982 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
985 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
986 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
987 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
988 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
989 pub features: NodeFeatures,
990 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
991 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
992 pub last_update: u32,
993 /// Color assigned to the node
995 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
996 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
997 /// should not be exposed to the user.
998 pub alias: NodeAlias,
999 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1000 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1001 /// An initial announcement of the node
1002 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1003 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1004 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1005 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1008 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1009 (0, features, required),
1010 (2, last_update, required),
1012 (6, alias, required),
1013 (8, announcement_message, option),
1014 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1017 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1019 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1020 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1021 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1022 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1024 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1025 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1026 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1027 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1028 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1029 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1031 for c in alias.chars() {
1032 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1033 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1034 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1038 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1039 // Display printable ASCII characters
1040 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1041 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1042 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1050 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1051 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1056 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1057 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1058 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1062 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1063 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1064 pub struct NodeInfo {
1065 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1066 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1067 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1068 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1069 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1070 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1071 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1072 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1073 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1074 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1077 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1078 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1079 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1080 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1085 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1086 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1087 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1088 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1089 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1090 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1096 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1097 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1098 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1099 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1100 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1102 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1103 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1104 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1105 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1107 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1114 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1115 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1116 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1117 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1118 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1120 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1121 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1122 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1123 (4, channels, vec_type),
1127 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1128 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1129 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1134 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1135 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1137 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1138 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1139 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1141 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1142 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1143 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1144 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1145 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1146 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1148 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1149 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1150 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1151 node_id.write(writer)?;
1152 node_info.write(writer)?;
1155 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1156 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1157 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1163 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1164 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1165 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1167 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1168 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1169 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1170 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1171 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1172 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1173 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1175 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1176 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1177 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1178 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1179 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1183 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1184 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1185 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1189 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1192 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1193 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1194 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1199 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1200 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1201 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1202 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1203 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1205 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1206 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1207 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1213 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1214 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1215 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1216 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1217 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1221 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1222 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1223 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1225 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1228 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1229 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1230 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1234 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1235 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1236 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1237 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1238 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1244 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1245 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1246 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1247 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1250 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1251 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1252 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1253 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1256 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1259 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1260 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1261 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1265 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1266 /// given node announcement.
1268 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1269 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1270 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1271 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1272 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1273 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1274 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1277 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1278 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1279 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1281 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1282 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1285 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1286 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1287 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1289 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1290 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1291 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1292 // that it be at least the current time.
1293 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1294 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1295 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1296 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1301 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1302 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1303 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1304 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1305 features: msg.features.clone(),
1306 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1308 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1309 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1310 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1318 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1320 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1321 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1322 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1324 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1325 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1326 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1327 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1328 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1330 C::Target: chain::Access,
1332 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1333 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1334 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1335 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1336 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1337 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1340 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1341 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1342 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1344 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1345 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1346 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1347 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1348 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1350 C::Target: chain::Access,
1352 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1355 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1357 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1358 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1360 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1361 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1362 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1363 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1366 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1367 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1368 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1370 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1372 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1374 capacity_sats: None,
1375 announcement_message: None,
1376 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1379 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1382 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1383 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1384 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1386 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1387 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1389 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1390 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1391 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1392 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1394 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1395 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1396 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1397 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1399 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1400 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1402 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1403 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1404 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1406 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1409 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1410 entry.insert(channel_info);
1414 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1415 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1416 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1417 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1419 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1420 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1421 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1422 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1423 announcement_info: None,
1432 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1433 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1434 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1436 C::Target: chain::Access,
1438 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1439 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1443 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1445 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1446 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1447 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1448 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1450 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1451 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1452 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1453 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1455 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1456 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1457 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1458 if NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1) == chan.node_one && NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2) == chan.node_two {
1459 return Err(LightningError {
1460 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1461 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1464 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1465 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1466 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1467 return Err(LightningError {
1468 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1469 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1475 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1477 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1480 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1481 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1482 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1483 let expected_script =
1484 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1485 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1486 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1488 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1489 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1492 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1493 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1495 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1496 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1502 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1503 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1504 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1506 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1509 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1510 features: msg.features.clone(),
1511 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1513 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1515 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1516 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1517 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1518 announcement_received_time,
1521 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1524 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1525 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1526 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1527 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1528 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1529 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1531 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1532 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1533 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1536 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1537 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1538 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1540 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1541 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1547 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1548 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1550 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1552 // TODO: downgrade the node
1556 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1557 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1558 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1561 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1562 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1563 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1565 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1566 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1568 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1569 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1570 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1571 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1572 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1575 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1576 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1579 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1580 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1581 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1583 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1584 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1585 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1586 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1587 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1588 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1589 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1590 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1591 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1593 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1594 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1595 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1596 info.one_to_two = None;
1598 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1599 info.two_to_one = None;
1601 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1602 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1603 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1604 // channel_update for.
1605 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1606 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1610 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1611 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1612 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1613 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1614 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1619 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1622 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1623 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1624 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1626 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1627 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1628 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1629 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1632 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1633 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1634 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1636 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1637 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1638 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1639 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1642 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1644 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1645 let chan_was_enabled;
1647 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1649 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1650 // disable this check during tests!
1651 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1652 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1653 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1655 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1656 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1660 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1661 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1662 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1664 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1665 return Err(LightningError{err:
1666 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1667 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1670 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1671 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1672 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1673 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1674 return Err(LightningError{err:
1675 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1676 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1679 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1680 ($target: expr) => {
1681 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1682 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1683 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1684 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1685 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1686 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1687 // but only in the non-normative section.
1688 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1689 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1690 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1691 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1693 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1695 chan_was_enabled = false;
1700 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1702 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1703 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1705 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1706 enabled: chan_enabled,
1707 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1708 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1709 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1710 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1712 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1713 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1717 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1721 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1722 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1723 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1724 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1725 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1726 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1727 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1728 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1729 })?, "channel_update");
1731 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1733 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1734 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1735 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1736 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1737 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1738 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1739 })?, "channel_update");
1741 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1746 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1748 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1749 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1750 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1751 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1752 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1753 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1755 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1757 proportional_millionths
1759 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1760 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1761 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1763 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1764 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1766 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1767 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1769 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1771 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1772 if chan_info.enabled {
1773 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1774 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1775 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1776 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1781 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1787 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1788 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1789 ($node_id: expr) => {
1790 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1791 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1792 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1794 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1795 entry.remove_entry();
1798 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1803 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1804 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1808 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1809 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1811 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1812 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1816 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1817 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1818 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1821 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1822 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1823 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1824 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1827 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1829 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1830 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1834 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1835 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1836 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1839 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1840 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1841 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1842 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1845 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1846 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1847 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1848 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1849 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1850 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1851 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1861 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1862 use ln::PaymentHash;
1863 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1864 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1865 use ln::msgs::{Init, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1866 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1867 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1868 use util::test_utils;
1869 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1870 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1871 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1873 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1875 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1876 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1877 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1878 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1879 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1880 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1884 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1885 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1888 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1892 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1893 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1894 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1895 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1898 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1899 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1900 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1902 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1903 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1904 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1905 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1909 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1910 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1911 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1912 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1914 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1915 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1916 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1917 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1918 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1919 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1922 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1923 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1924 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1925 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1930 addresses: Vec::new(),
1931 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1932 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1934 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1935 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1937 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1938 contents: unsigned_announcement
1942 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1943 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1944 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1945 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1946 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1948 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1949 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1950 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1951 short_channel_id: 0,
1954 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1955 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1956 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1958 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1959 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1960 ChannelAnnouncement {
1961 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1962 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1963 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1964 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1965 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1969 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1970 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1971 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1972 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
1973 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
1976 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1977 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1978 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1979 short_channel_id: 0,
1982 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1983 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1984 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
1985 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1986 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1987 excess_data: Vec::new()
1989 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1990 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1992 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1993 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1998 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1999 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2000 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2002 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2003 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2004 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2006 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2007 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2009 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2013 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2014 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2015 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2016 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2021 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2022 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2026 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2027 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2029 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2030 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2033 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2036 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2037 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2038 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2039 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2040 // Return false because contains excess data.
2041 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2042 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2046 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2047 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2048 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2049 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2050 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2051 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2053 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2058 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2059 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2060 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2062 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2063 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2065 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2066 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2068 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2069 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2070 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2071 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2072 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2073 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2078 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2084 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2085 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2086 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2088 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2091 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2092 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2093 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2094 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2095 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2097 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2098 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2099 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2100 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2102 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2105 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2106 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2107 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2108 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2109 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2110 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2111 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2116 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2122 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2123 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2124 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2125 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2127 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2130 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2131 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2132 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2133 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2134 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2135 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2136 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2140 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2141 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2142 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2144 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2147 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2148 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2150 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2155 fn handling_channel_update() {
2156 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2157 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2158 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2159 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2160 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2161 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2163 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2164 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2166 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2167 let short_channel_id;
2170 // Announce a channel we will update
2171 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2172 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2174 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2175 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2176 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2183 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2184 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2185 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2190 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2192 Some(channel_info) => {
2193 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2194 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2199 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2200 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2201 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2202 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2203 // Return false because contains excess data
2204 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2205 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2209 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2210 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2211 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2212 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2213 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2215 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2218 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2219 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2220 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2221 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2222 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2224 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2227 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2228 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2229 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2230 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2231 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2233 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2236 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2237 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2238 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2239 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2240 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2241 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2243 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2246 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2247 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2248 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2249 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2250 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2251 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2252 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2254 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2259 fn handling_network_update() {
2260 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2261 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2262 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2263 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2265 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2266 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2269 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2270 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2273 let short_channel_id;
2275 // Announce a channel we will update
2276 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2277 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2278 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2279 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2280 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2282 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2283 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2285 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2287 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2288 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2289 all_paths_failed: true,
2291 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2292 msg: valid_channel_update,
2294 short_channel_id: None,
2300 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2303 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2305 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2307 Some(channel_info) => {
2308 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2312 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2314 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2315 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2316 all_paths_failed: true,
2318 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2320 is_permanent: false,
2322 short_channel_id: None,
2328 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2330 Some(channel_info) => {
2331 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2336 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2337 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2339 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2340 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2341 all_paths_failed: true,
2343 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2347 short_channel_id: None,
2353 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2354 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2355 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2356 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2360 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2361 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2362 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2363 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2364 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2365 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2366 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2369 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2370 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2372 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2373 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2374 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2375 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2376 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2378 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2379 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2380 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2382 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2383 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2384 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2386 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2387 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2389 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2390 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2391 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2392 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2393 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2394 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2395 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2397 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2398 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2399 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2402 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2403 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2407 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2408 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2409 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2410 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2411 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2413 // Channels were not announced yet.
2414 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2415 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2417 let short_channel_id;
2419 // Announce a channel we will update
2420 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2421 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2422 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2428 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2429 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2430 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2431 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2432 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2433 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2439 // Valid channel update
2440 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2441 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2442 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2443 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2449 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2450 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2451 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2452 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2453 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2454 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2460 // Channel update with excess data.
2461 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2462 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2463 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2464 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2465 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2471 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2472 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2473 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2474 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2475 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2476 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2481 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2482 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2483 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2487 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2488 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2489 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2490 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2491 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2492 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2495 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2496 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2499 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2500 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2501 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2507 // Nodes were never announced
2508 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2509 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2512 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2513 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2518 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2519 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2525 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2526 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2528 // Skip the first node.
2529 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2530 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2533 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2534 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2535 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2536 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2537 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2538 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2539 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2544 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2545 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2549 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2550 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2551 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2553 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2554 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2556 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2557 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2558 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2559 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2563 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2564 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2569 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2570 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2571 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2572 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2574 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2575 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2579 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2580 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2581 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2583 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2584 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2586 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2587 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2588 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2589 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2593 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2594 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2595 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2597 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2598 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2599 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2600 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2602 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2604 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2606 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2607 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2608 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2612 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2614 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2615 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2616 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2619 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2620 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2621 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2622 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2623 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2624 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2625 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2627 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2633 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2634 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2635 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2637 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2638 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2639 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2640 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2642 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2643 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2644 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2647 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2648 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2649 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2652 // used for testing resumption on same block
2653 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2656 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2657 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2658 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2659 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2665 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2666 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2670 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2672 number_of_blocks: 0,
2675 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2676 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2678 number_of_blocks: 0,
2679 sync_complete: true,
2680 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2684 // Error when wrong chain
2685 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2689 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2691 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2694 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2695 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2697 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2698 sync_complete: true,
2699 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2703 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2704 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2708 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2709 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2710 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2713 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2714 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2715 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2716 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2717 sync_complete: true,
2718 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2722 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2723 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2727 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2728 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2729 number_of_blocks: 1,
2734 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2735 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2736 number_of_blocks: 1,
2737 sync_complete: true,
2738 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2743 // No results in valid query range
2744 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2748 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2749 first_blocknum: 1000,
2750 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2755 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2756 first_blocknum: 1000,
2757 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2758 sync_complete: true,
2759 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2764 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2765 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2769 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2770 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2771 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2776 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2777 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2778 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2779 sync_complete: true,
2780 short_channel_ids: vec![
2781 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2787 // Single block exactly full
2788 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2792 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2793 first_blocknum: 100000,
2794 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2799 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2800 first_blocknum: 100000,
2801 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2802 sync_complete: true,
2803 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2804 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2810 // Multiple split on new block
2811 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2815 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2816 first_blocknum: 100000,
2817 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2822 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2823 first_blocknum: 100000,
2824 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2825 sync_complete: false,
2826 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2827 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2831 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2832 first_blocknum: 107999,
2833 number_of_blocks: 2,
2834 sync_complete: true,
2835 short_channel_ids: vec![
2836 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2842 // Multiple split on same block
2843 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2847 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2848 first_blocknum: 100002,
2849 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2854 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2855 first_blocknum: 100002,
2856 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2857 sync_complete: false,
2858 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2859 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2863 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2864 first_blocknum: 108001,
2865 number_of_blocks: 1,
2866 sync_complete: true,
2867 short_channel_ids: vec![
2868 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2875 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2876 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2877 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2878 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2880 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2882 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2883 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2884 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2885 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2888 assert!(result.is_ok());
2890 assert!(result.is_err());
2893 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2894 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2896 for i in 0..events.len() {
2897 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2899 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2900 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2901 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2902 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2903 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2904 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2905 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2907 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2908 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2909 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2910 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2911 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2913 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2914 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2915 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2918 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2924 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2925 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2926 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2927 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2928 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2930 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2932 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2934 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2936 assert!(result.is_err());
2940 fn displays_node_alias() {
2941 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
2942 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2943 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
2944 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2947 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
2948 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
2949 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
2951 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
2952 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2953 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
2954 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2957 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
2958 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
2959 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
2963 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
2964 let chanmon_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2965 let node_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2966 let node_chanmgrs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
2967 let nodes = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2969 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
2970 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2973 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
2974 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
2975 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
2976 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
2977 last_update_message: None,
2980 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
2981 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
2983 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
2984 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
2985 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
2987 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
2988 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2989 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
2991 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
2992 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
2993 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
2994 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
2995 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
2997 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2998 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
2999 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3001 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3002 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3003 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3004 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3005 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3007 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3009 capacity_sats: None,
3010 announcement_message: None,
3011 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3014 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3015 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3017 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3018 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3020 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3021 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3022 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3023 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3024 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3025 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3026 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3027 capacity_sats: None,
3028 announcement_message: None,
3029 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3032 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3033 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3035 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3036 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3038 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3039 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3040 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3042 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3043 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3044 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3045 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3046 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3047 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3048 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3050 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3051 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3052 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3053 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3054 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3058 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3059 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3061 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3062 let valid_netaddr = ::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: ::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3063 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3064 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3067 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3068 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3069 announcement_message: None,
3072 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3073 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3074 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3075 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3077 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3078 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3079 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3081 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3082 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3083 channels: Vec::new(),
3084 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3085 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3088 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3089 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3090 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3091 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3093 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3094 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3095 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3099 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3107 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3108 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3109 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3110 let mut v = Vec::new();
3111 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3113 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3118 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3119 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3120 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3121 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3123 let _ = net_graph.encode();