1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use core::str::FromStr;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Create a new NodeId from a slice of bytes
77 pub fn from_slice(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
78 if bytes.len() != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE {
79 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
81 let mut data = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
82 data.copy_from_slice(bytes);
86 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
91 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
92 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
96 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
97 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
98 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
102 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
103 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
104 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
107 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
108 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
109 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
113 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
114 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
119 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
120 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
121 Some(self.cmp(other))
125 impl Ord for NodeId {
126 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
127 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
131 impl Writeable for NodeId {
132 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
133 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
138 impl Readable for NodeId {
139 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
140 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
141 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
146 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
147 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
148 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
152 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
153 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
155 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
160 impl FromStr for NodeId {
161 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
163 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
164 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
169 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
170 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
171 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
172 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
173 chain_hash: ChainHash,
175 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
176 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
177 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
178 removed_node_counters: Mutex<Vec<u32>>,
179 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize,
180 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
182 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
183 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
184 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
185 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
186 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
187 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
188 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
191 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
192 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
193 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
194 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
195 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
196 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
197 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
198 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
199 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
200 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
203 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
204 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
205 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
206 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
207 max_node_counter: u32,
210 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
211 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
213 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
216 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
217 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
218 ChannelUpdateMessage {
219 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
222 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
223 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
225 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
226 short_channel_id: u64,
227 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
228 /// `channel_update` message is received.
231 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
232 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
234 /// The node id of the failed node.
236 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
237 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
242 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
243 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
246 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
247 (0, short_channel_id, required),
248 (2, is_permanent, required),
250 (4, NodeFailure) => {
251 (0, node_id, required),
252 (2, is_permanent, required),
256 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
257 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
258 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
259 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
260 /// serving historical announcements.
261 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
262 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
265 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
267 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
268 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
272 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
273 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
275 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
276 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
277 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
278 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
279 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
282 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
283 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
284 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
285 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
290 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
291 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
292 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
293 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
294 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
297 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
298 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
300 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
301 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
305 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
306 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
307 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
308 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
309 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
310 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
311 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
318 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
320 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
322 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
324 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
325 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
326 if update_msg.as_ref()
327 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
333 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
335 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
336 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
337 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
338 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
345 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
349 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
350 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
352 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
353 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
355 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
356 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
357 match *network_update {
358 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
359 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
360 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
361 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
362 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
364 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
366 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
367 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
370 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
372 log_debug!(self.logger,
373 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
374 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
380 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
381 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
386 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
387 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
388 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
391 return Err(LightningError {
392 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
393 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
394 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
395 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
396 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
398 log_level: Level::Trace,
406 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
407 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
408 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
409 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
410 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
411 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
412 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
413 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
414 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
416 log_level: Level::Trace
422 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
423 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
424 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
425 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
428 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
430 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
431 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
432 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
433 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
438 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
440 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
441 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
442 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
443 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
444 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
445 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
446 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
451 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
452 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
454 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
455 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
456 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
457 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
458 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
461 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
462 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
463 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
466 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
467 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
468 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
471 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
472 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
473 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
474 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
475 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
476 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
477 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
478 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
479 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
481 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
482 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
484 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
486 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
487 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
493 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
494 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
495 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
496 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
500 for (_, ref node) in iter {
501 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
502 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
510 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
511 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
512 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
514 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
515 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
516 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
517 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
518 /// tracking this directly.
520 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
521 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
522 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
523 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
524 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
525 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
526 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
527 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
528 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
529 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
533 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
535 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
536 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
537 // updates from all our peers normally.
539 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
540 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
541 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
544 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
545 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
546 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
547 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
548 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
550 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
551 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
552 // relying on it useless.
554 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
555 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
556 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
558 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
559 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
560 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
561 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
562 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
565 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
566 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
567 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
568 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
569 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
570 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
571 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
573 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
574 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
575 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
576 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
578 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
579 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
580 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
582 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
583 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
584 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
585 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
587 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
588 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
589 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
591 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
595 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
596 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
597 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
598 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
599 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
600 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
601 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
607 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
608 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
609 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
610 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
614 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
615 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
616 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
617 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
621 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
622 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
623 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
624 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
625 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
626 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
627 /// memory constrained systems.
628 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
629 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
631 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
633 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
634 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
635 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
637 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
638 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
639 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
640 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
641 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
642 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
643 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
644 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
645 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
647 short_channel_ids: vec![],
650 return Err(LightningError {
651 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
652 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
656 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
657 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
658 // exists even if its not yet routable.
659 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
660 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
661 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
662 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
663 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
664 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
665 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
668 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
669 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
674 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
675 let batch_count = batches.len();
676 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
677 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
678 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
679 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
681 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
682 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
683 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
684 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
685 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
686 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
687 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
689 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
690 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
691 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
693 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
694 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
695 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
697 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
698 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
699 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
700 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
702 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
703 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
705 (false, block_from_scid(*batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
708 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
710 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
711 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
712 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
713 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
717 short_channel_ids: batch,
725 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
728 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
729 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
733 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
734 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
735 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
739 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
740 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
741 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
745 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
746 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
750 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
752 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
755 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
756 let mut ret = Vec::new();
757 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
758 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
763 // Fetching values from this struct is very performance sensitive during routefinding. Thus, we
764 // want to ensure that all of the fields we care about (all of them except `last_update_message`)
765 // sit on the same cache line.
767 // We do this by using `repr(C)`, which forces the struct to be laid out in memory the way we write
768 // it (ensuring `last_update_message` hangs off the end and no fields are reordered after it), and
769 // `align(32)`, ensuring the struct starts either at the start, or in the middle, of a 64b x86-64
770 // cache line. This ensures the beginning fields (which are 31 bytes) all sit in the same cache
772 #[repr(C, align(32))]
773 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
774 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
775 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
776 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
777 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
778 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
779 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
780 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
781 pub fees: RoutingFees,
782 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
783 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
784 pub last_update: u32,
785 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
786 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
787 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
789 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
790 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
791 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
792 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
793 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
796 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
797 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
798 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
803 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
804 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
805 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
806 (0, self.last_update, required),
807 (2, self.enabled, required),
808 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
809 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
810 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
811 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
812 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
813 (10, self.fees, required),
814 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
820 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
821 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
822 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
823 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
824 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
825 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
826 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
827 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
828 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
830 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
831 (0, last_update, required),
832 (2, enabled, required),
833 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
834 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
835 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
836 (10, fees, required),
837 (12, last_update_message, required)
840 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
841 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
842 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
843 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
844 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
845 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
847 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
848 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
851 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
856 // Fetching values from this struct is very performance sensitive during routefinding. Thus, we
857 // want to ensure that all of the fields we care about (all of them except `last_update_message`
858 // and `announcement_received_time`) sit on the same cache line.
860 // Sadly, this is not possible, however we can still do okay - all of the fields before
861 // `one_to_two` and `two_to_one` are just under 128 bytes long, so we can ensure they sit on
862 // adjacent cache lines (which are generally fetched together in x86_64 processors).
864 // This leaves only the two directional channel info structs on separate cache lines.
866 // We accomplish this using `repr(C)`, which forces the struct to be laid out in memory the way we
867 // write it (ensuring the fields we care about are at the start of the struct) and `align(128)`,
868 // ensuring the struct starts at the beginning of two adjacent 64b x86-64 cache lines.
869 #[repr(align(128), C)]
870 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
871 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
872 /// Received within a channel announcement.
873 pub struct ChannelInfo {
874 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
875 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
877 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
878 pub node_one: NodeId,
880 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
881 pub node_two: NodeId,
883 /// The [`NodeInfo::node_counter`] of the node pointed to by [`Self::node_one`].
884 pub(crate) node_one_counter: u32,
885 /// The [`NodeInfo::node_counter`] of the node pointed to by [`Self::node_two`].
886 pub(crate) node_two_counter: u32,
888 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
889 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
891 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
892 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
893 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
894 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
896 /// An initial announcement of the channel
897 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
898 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
899 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
900 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
901 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
902 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
903 /// network graph in memory!).
904 announcement_received_time: u64,
907 impl PartialEq for ChannelInfo {
908 fn eq(&self, o: &ChannelInfo) -> bool {
909 self.features == o.features &&
910 self.node_one == o.node_one &&
911 self.one_to_two == o.one_to_two &&
912 self.node_two == o.node_two &&
913 self.two_to_one == o.two_to_one &&
914 self.capacity_sats == o.capacity_sats &&
915 self.announcement_message == o.announcement_message &&
916 self.announcement_received_time == o.announcement_received_time
921 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
922 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
923 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
924 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
925 if target == &self.node_one {
926 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
927 } else if target == &self.node_two {
928 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
933 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
936 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
937 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
938 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
939 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
940 if source == &self.node_one {
941 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
942 } else if source == &self.node_two {
943 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
948 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
951 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
952 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
953 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
955 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
957 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
962 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
963 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
964 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
965 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
970 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
971 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
972 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
973 (0, self.features, required),
974 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
975 (2, self.node_one, required),
976 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
977 (6, self.node_two, required),
978 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
979 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
980 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
986 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
987 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
988 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
989 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
990 // channel updates via the gossip network.
991 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
993 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
994 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
995 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
996 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
997 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
998 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
999 Err(err) => Err(err),
1004 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
1005 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1006 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
1007 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
1008 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
1009 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1010 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
1011 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1012 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
1013 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
1014 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1015 (0, features, required),
1016 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1017 (2, node_one, required),
1018 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
1019 (6, node_two, required),
1020 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
1021 (10, capacity_sats, required),
1022 (12, announcement_message, required),
1026 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
1027 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
1028 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1029 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
1030 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1031 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
1032 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
1033 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1034 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1035 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1040 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
1041 /// source node to a target node.
1043 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1044 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
1045 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
1046 source_counter: u32,
1047 target_counter: u32,
1048 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
1049 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
1050 from_node_one: bool,
1053 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1055 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1056 let (source_counter, target_counter) = if from_node_one {
1057 (channel.node_one_counter, channel.node_two_counter)
1059 (channel.node_two_counter, channel.node_one_counter)
1061 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one, source_counter, target_counter }
1064 /// Returns information for the channel.
1066 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1068 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1070 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1071 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1074 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1075 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1076 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1078 match capacity_msat {
1079 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1080 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1081 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1083 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1087 /// Returns information for the direction.
1089 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1091 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1093 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1095 pub fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1097 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1099 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1101 pub fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1103 /// Returns the source node's counter
1105 pub(super) fn source_counter(&self) -> u32 { self.source_counter }
1107 /// Returns the target node's counter
1109 pub(super) fn target_counter(&self) -> u32 { self.target_counter }
1112 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1113 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1114 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1115 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1120 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1122 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1123 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1124 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1125 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1126 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1129 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1131 liquidity_msat: u64,
1133 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1135 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1138 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1140 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1142 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1143 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1145 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1148 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1150 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1153 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1154 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1158 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1159 /// use when making routing decisions.
1160 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1162 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1163 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1164 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1166 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1167 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1168 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1169 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1170 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1171 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1176 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1177 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1178 pub struct RoutingFees {
1179 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1181 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1182 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1183 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1186 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1187 (0, base_msat, required),
1188 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1191 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1192 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1193 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1194 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1195 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1196 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1197 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1198 pub last_update: u32,
1199 /// Color assigned to the node
1201 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1202 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1203 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1204 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1205 /// An initial announcement of the node
1206 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1207 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1208 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1209 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1212 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1213 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1214 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1215 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1216 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1217 .unwrap_or_default()
1221 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1223 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1224 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1225 (0, self.features, required),
1226 (2, self.last_update, required),
1227 (4, self.rgb, required),
1228 (6, self.alias, required),
1229 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1230 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1236 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1237 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1238 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1239 (0, features, required),
1240 (2, last_update, required),
1242 (6, alias, required),
1243 (8, announcement_message, option),
1244 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1246 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1247 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1248 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1252 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1254 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1255 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1256 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1257 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1259 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1260 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1261 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1262 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1263 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1264 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1266 use core::fmt::Write;
1267 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1268 // Display printable ASCII characters
1269 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1270 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1279 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1280 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1285 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1286 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1287 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1291 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
1292 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1293 pub struct NodeInfo {
1294 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1295 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1296 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1297 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1298 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1299 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>,
1300 /// In memory, each node is assigned a unique ID. They are eagerly reused, ensuring they remain
1301 /// relatively dense.
1303 /// These IDs allow the router to avoid a `HashMap` lookup by simply using this value as an
1304 /// index in a `Vec`, skipping a big step in some of the hottest code when routing.
1305 pub(crate) node_counter: u32,
1308 impl PartialEq for NodeInfo {
1309 fn eq(&self, o: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
1310 self.channels == o.channels && self.announcement_info == o.announcement_info
1315 /// Returns whether the node has only announced Tor addresses.
1316 pub fn is_tor_only(&self) -> bool {
1317 self.announcement_info
1319 .map(|info| info.addresses())
1320 .and_then(|addresses| (!addresses.is_empty()).then(|| addresses))
1321 .map(|addresses| addresses.iter().all(|address| address.is_tor()))
1326 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1327 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1328 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1329 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1334 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1335 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1336 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1337 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1338 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1339 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1345 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1346 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1347 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1348 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1349 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1351 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1352 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1353 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1354 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1356 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1363 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1364 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1365 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1366 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1367 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1368 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1369 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1370 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1371 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1372 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1373 (4, channels, required_vec),
1375 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1376 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1379 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1381 node_counter: u32::max_value(),
1386 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1387 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1389 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1390 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1391 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1393 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1395 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1396 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1397 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1398 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1399 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1400 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1402 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1403 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1404 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1405 node_id.write(writer)?;
1406 node_info.write(writer)?;
1409 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1410 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1411 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1417 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1418 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1419 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1421 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1422 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1423 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1424 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1425 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1426 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1427 let chan_info: ChannelInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1428 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1430 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1431 if nodes_count > u32::max_value() as u64 / 2 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1432 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1433 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1434 for i in 0..nodes_count {
1435 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1436 let mut node_info: NodeInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1437 node_info.node_counter = i as u32;
1438 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1441 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1442 chan.node_one_counter =
1443 nodes.get(&chan.node_one).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1444 chan.node_two_counter =
1445 nodes.get(&chan.node_two).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1448 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1449 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1450 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1454 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1457 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1458 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1459 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1460 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(nodes_count as usize),
1461 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1462 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1463 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1464 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1469 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1470 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1471 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1472 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1473 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1475 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1476 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1477 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1483 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1484 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1485 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1486 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1487 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1488 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1489 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1490 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1491 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1492 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1493 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1497 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1498 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1499 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1501 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1502 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1504 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1505 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1506 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1507 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1508 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1509 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1510 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1511 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1515 fn test_node_counter_consistency(&self) {
1516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1517 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1518 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1519 let removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1520 let next_counter = self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
1521 assert!(next_counter < (u32::max_value() as usize) / 2);
1522 let mut used_node_counters = vec![0u8; next_counter / 8 + 1];
1524 for counter in removed_node_counters.iter() {
1525 let pos = (*counter as usize) / 8;
1526 let bit = 1 << (counter % 8);
1527 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1528 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1530 for (_, node) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1531 assert!((node.node_counter as usize) < next_counter);
1532 let pos = (node.node_counter as usize) / 8;
1533 let bit = 1 << (node.node_counter % 8);
1534 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1535 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1538 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1539 assert_eq!(chan.node_one_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_one).unwrap().node_counter);
1540 assert_eq!(chan.node_two_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_two).unwrap().node_counter);
1545 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1546 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1547 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1548 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1549 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1550 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1553 max_node_counter: (self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).saturating_sub(1),
1557 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1558 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1559 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1560 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1563 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1564 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1565 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1566 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1569 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1572 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1573 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1574 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1578 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1579 /// given node announcement.
1581 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1582 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1583 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1584 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1585 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1586 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1589 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1590 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1591 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1593 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1594 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1597 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1598 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1599 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1601 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1602 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1603 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1606 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1607 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1608 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1609 // that it be at least the current time.
1610 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1611 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1612 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1613 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1618 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1619 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1620 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1621 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1622 features: msg.features.clone(),
1623 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1626 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1634 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1636 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1637 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1638 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1640 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1641 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1642 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1643 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1644 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1646 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1648 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1649 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1652 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1654 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1655 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1656 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1658 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1659 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1660 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1661 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1662 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1665 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1666 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1667 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1669 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1670 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1671 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1672 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1673 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1675 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1677 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1680 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1682 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1683 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1685 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1686 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1687 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1688 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1691 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1692 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1693 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1695 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1697 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1699 capacity_sats: None,
1700 announcement_message: None,
1701 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1702 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1703 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1706 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1709 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1710 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1711 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1713 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1714 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1716 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1718 let channel_entry = channels.entry(short_channel_id);
1719 let channel_info = match channel_entry {
1720 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1721 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1722 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1724 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1725 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1726 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1727 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1729 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1730 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1732 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1733 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1734 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1737 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1740 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1741 entry.insert(channel_info)
1745 let mut node_counter_id = [
1746 (&mut channel_info.node_one_counter, node_id_a),
1747 (&mut channel_info.node_two_counter, node_id_b)
1749 for (node_counter, current_node_id) in node_counter_id.iter_mut() {
1750 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1751 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1752 let node = node_entry.into_mut();
1753 node.channels.push(short_channel_id);
1754 **node_counter = node.node_counter;
1756 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1757 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1758 **node_counter = removed_node_counters.pop()
1759 .unwrap_or(self.next_node_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u32);
1760 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1761 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1762 announcement_info: None,
1763 node_counter: **node_counter,
1772 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1773 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1774 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1776 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1778 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1779 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1782 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1783 return Err(LightningError {
1784 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1785 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1790 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1792 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1793 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1794 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1795 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1797 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1798 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1799 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1800 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1802 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1803 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1804 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1805 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1806 return Err(LightningError {
1807 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1808 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1811 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1812 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1813 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1814 return Err(LightningError {
1815 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1816 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1823 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1824 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1825 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1826 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1827 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1828 return Err(LightningError{
1829 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1830 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1834 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1835 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1837 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1838 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1839 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1841 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1844 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1845 features: msg.features.clone(),
1846 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1848 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1850 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1851 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1852 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1853 announcement_received_time,
1854 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1855 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1858 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1860 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1864 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1866 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1867 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1868 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1869 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1870 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1871 let current_time_unix = None;
1873 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1876 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1878 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1879 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1880 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1881 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1882 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1883 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1884 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1888 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1889 /// from local storage.
1890 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1891 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1892 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1893 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1894 let current_time_unix = None;
1896 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1897 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1898 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1899 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1900 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1902 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1903 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1904 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1905 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1906 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1907 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1908 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1911 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1912 removed_node_counters.push(other_node_entry.get().node_counter);
1913 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1916 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1919 removed_node_counters.push(node.node_counter);
1920 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1924 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1925 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1926 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1929 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1930 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1931 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1933 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1934 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1936 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1937 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1939 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1940 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1941 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1942 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1943 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1946 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1947 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1950 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1951 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1952 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1954 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1955 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1957 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1958 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1959 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1960 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1961 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1962 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1963 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1964 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1965 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1967 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1968 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1969 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1970 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1971 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1972 info.one_to_two = None;
1974 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1975 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1976 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1977 info.two_to_one = None;
1979 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1980 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1981 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1982 // channel_update for.
1983 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1984 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1985 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1986 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1987 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1991 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1992 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1993 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1994 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1995 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1996 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
2000 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
2001 if let Some(time) = time {
2002 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
2004 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
2005 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
2006 // of this function.
2007 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2009 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
2010 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
2013 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
2017 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
2018 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
2021 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
2024 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
2025 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
2026 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
2028 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2029 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2030 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2031 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
2034 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
2035 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
2036 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
2038 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2039 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2040 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2041 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
2044 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
2046 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
2048 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2049 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2050 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2051 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
2054 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
2055 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
2056 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
2058 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
2060 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
2061 return Err(LightningError {
2062 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
2063 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
2067 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
2069 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
2070 // disable this check during tests!
2071 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2072 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
2073 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2075 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
2076 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2080 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
2082 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
2083 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
2085 core::mem::drop(channels);
2086 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
2087 return Err(LightningError {
2088 err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
2089 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
2093 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2094 return Err(LightningError{err:
2095 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
2096 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2099 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
2100 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
2101 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
2102 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
2103 return Err(LightningError{err:
2104 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
2105 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2108 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
2109 ($target: expr) => {
2110 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
2111 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
2112 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
2113 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
2114 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
2115 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
2116 // but only in the non-normative section.
2117 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
2118 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2119 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
2120 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2126 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
2128 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
2129 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
2131 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2132 enabled: chan_enabled,
2133 last_update: msg.timestamp,
2134 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
2135 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2136 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2138 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2139 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2143 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2147 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2148 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2149 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2150 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2151 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2152 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2153 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2154 })?, "channel_update");
2157 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2160 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2161 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2162 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2163 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2164 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2165 })?, "channel_update");
2168 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2177 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2178 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2179 ($node_id: expr) => {
2180 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2181 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2182 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2184 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2185 self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().push(entry.get().node_counter);
2186 entry.remove_entry();
2189 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2194 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2195 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2199 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2200 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2202 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2203 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2207 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2208 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2209 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2212 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2213 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2214 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2215 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2218 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2220 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2221 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2225 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2226 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2227 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2230 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2231 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2232 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2233 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2236 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2237 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2238 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2239 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2240 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2241 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2244 /// Gets the maximum possible node_counter for a node in this graph
2245 pub(crate) fn max_node_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2246 self.max_node_counter
2251 pub(crate) mod tests {
2252 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2253 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2254 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2255 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2256 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2257 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2258 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2259 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2260 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2261 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2262 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2263 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2264 use crate::util::test_utils;
2265 use crate::util::ser::{Hostname, ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2266 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2268 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2269 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2271 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2272 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2273 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2274 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2275 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2276 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2277 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2278 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2279 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2282 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2283 use crate::prelude::*;
2284 use crate::sync::Arc;
2286 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2287 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2288 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2291 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2292 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2293 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2295 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2296 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2297 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2298 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2302 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2303 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2304 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2305 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2306 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2308 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2309 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2310 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2311 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2312 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2313 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2316 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2317 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2318 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2319 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2323 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2324 addresses: Vec::new(),
2325 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2326 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2328 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2329 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2331 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2332 contents: unsigned_announcement
2336 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2337 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2338 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2339 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2340 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2342 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2343 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2344 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2345 short_channel_id: 0,
2346 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2347 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2348 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2349 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2350 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2352 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2353 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2354 ChannelAnnouncement {
2355 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2356 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2357 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2358 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2359 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2363 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2364 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2365 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2366 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2367 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2370 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2371 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2372 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2373 short_channel_id: 0,
2376 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2377 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2378 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2379 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2380 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2381 excess_data: Vec::new()
2383 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2384 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2386 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2387 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2392 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2393 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2394 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2396 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2397 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2398 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2400 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2401 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2403 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2407 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2408 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2409 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2410 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2415 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2416 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2420 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2421 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2423 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2424 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2427 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2430 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2431 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2432 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2433 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2434 // Return false because contains excess data.
2435 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2436 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2440 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2441 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2442 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2443 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2444 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2445 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2447 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2452 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2453 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2454 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2456 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2457 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2459 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2460 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2462 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2463 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2464 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2465 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2466 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2471 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2477 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2478 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2479 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2481 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2484 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2485 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2486 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2487 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2488 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2490 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2491 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2492 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2493 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2495 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2498 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2499 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2500 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2501 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2502 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2503 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2504 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2505 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2510 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2516 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2517 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2518 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2519 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2520 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2522 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2525 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2527 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2529 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2530 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2531 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2533 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2534 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2535 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2536 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2537 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2539 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2542 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2544 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2545 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2546 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2551 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2552 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2553 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2554 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2555 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2556 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2557 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2561 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2562 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2563 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2565 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2568 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2569 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2571 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2574 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2575 // announcement is mainnet).
2576 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2577 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2578 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2579 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2581 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2586 fn handling_channel_update() {
2587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2588 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2589 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2590 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2591 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2593 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2594 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2596 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2597 let short_channel_id;
2600 // Announce a channel we will update
2601 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2602 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2603 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2605 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2606 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2607 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2614 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2615 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2616 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2617 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2622 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2624 Some(channel_info) => {
2625 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2626 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2631 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2632 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2633 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2634 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2635 // Return false because contains excess data
2636 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2637 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2641 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2642 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2643 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2644 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2645 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2647 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2650 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2651 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2652 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2653 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2654 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2656 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2659 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2660 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2661 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2662 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2663 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2665 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2668 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2669 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2670 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2671 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2672 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2673 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2675 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2678 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2679 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2680 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2681 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2682 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2683 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2684 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2686 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2689 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2690 // update is mainet).
2691 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2692 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2693 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2695 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2697 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2702 fn handling_network_update() {
2703 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2704 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2705 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2707 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2708 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2709 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2712 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2713 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2716 let short_channel_id;
2718 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2719 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2720 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2721 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2722 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2723 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2724 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2726 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2727 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2729 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2730 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2733 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2734 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2737 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2739 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2741 Some(channel_info) => {
2742 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2746 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2748 is_permanent: false,
2751 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2753 Some(channel_info) => {
2754 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2759 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2760 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2765 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2766 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2767 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2770 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2771 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2773 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2774 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2775 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2776 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2777 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2778 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2780 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2781 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2783 is_permanent: false,
2786 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2787 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2789 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2790 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2795 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2796 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2797 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2802 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2803 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2805 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2806 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2807 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2808 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2810 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2811 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2813 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2814 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2815 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2816 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2817 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2819 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2820 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2821 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2822 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2824 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2825 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2826 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2828 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2829 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2830 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2832 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2833 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2834 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2835 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2837 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2838 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2840 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2842 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2843 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2844 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2845 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2846 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2848 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2849 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2850 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2851 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2852 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2853 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2854 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2855 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2856 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2857 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2858 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2859 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2860 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2861 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2862 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2863 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2864 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2867 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2868 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2869 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2871 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2873 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2875 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2877 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2878 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2879 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2881 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2882 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2883 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2884 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2886 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2887 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2888 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2890 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2891 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2892 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2893 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2895 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2896 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2897 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2898 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2899 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2902 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2904 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2905 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2906 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2908 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2910 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2911 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2912 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2914 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2915 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2916 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2917 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2919 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2920 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2921 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2923 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2924 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2925 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2927 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2928 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2929 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2930 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2931 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2936 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2937 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2938 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2939 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2940 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2942 // Channels were not announced yet.
2943 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2944 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2946 let short_channel_id;
2948 // Announce a channel we will update
2949 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2950 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2951 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2957 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2958 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2959 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2960 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2961 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2962 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2968 // Valid channel update
2969 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2970 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2971 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2972 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2978 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2979 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2980 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2981 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2982 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2983 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2989 // Channel update with excess data.
2990 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2991 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2992 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2993 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2994 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
3000 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
3001 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
3002 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
3003 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
3004 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
3005 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
3010 // Further starting point have no channels after it
3011 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
3012 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
3016 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
3017 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3018 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3019 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3020 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3021 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
3024 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3025 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3028 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
3029 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3030 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
3036 // Nodes were never announced
3037 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3038 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3041 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3042 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3047 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3048 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3054 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3055 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3057 // Skip the first node.
3058 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3059 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3062 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
3063 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3064 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
3065 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
3066 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3067 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3068 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
3073 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3074 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3078 fn network_graph_serialization() {
3079 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3080 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3082 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3083 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3085 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
3086 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3087 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3088 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
3092 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3093 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3098 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3099 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
3100 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
3101 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3103 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3104 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
3108 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
3109 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3110 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
3112 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3113 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3115 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3116 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
3117 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
3118 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
3122 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
3123 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
3124 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
3125 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
3127 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3128 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3129 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3130 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
3132 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3134 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
3136 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3137 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3138 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3142 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3144 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3145 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3146 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3147 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3148 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3151 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3152 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3153 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3154 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3155 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3156 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3157 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3159 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3165 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3166 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3167 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3169 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3170 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3171 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3172 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3174 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3175 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3176 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3179 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3180 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3181 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3184 // used for testing resumption on same block
3185 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3188 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3189 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3190 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3191 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3197 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3198 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3202 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3204 number_of_blocks: 0,
3207 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3208 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3210 number_of_blocks: 0,
3211 sync_complete: true,
3212 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3216 // Error when wrong chain
3217 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3221 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3223 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3226 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3227 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3229 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3230 sync_complete: true,
3231 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3235 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3236 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3240 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3241 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3242 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3245 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3246 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3247 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3248 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3249 sync_complete: true,
3250 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3254 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3255 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3259 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3260 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3261 number_of_blocks: 1,
3266 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3267 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3268 number_of_blocks: 1,
3269 sync_complete: true,
3270 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3275 // No results in valid query range
3276 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3280 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3281 first_blocknum: 1000,
3282 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3287 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3288 first_blocknum: 1000,
3289 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3290 sync_complete: true,
3291 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3296 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3297 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3301 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3302 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3303 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3308 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3309 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3310 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3311 sync_complete: true,
3312 short_channel_ids: vec![
3313 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3319 // Single block exactly full
3320 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3324 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3325 first_blocknum: 100000,
3326 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3331 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3332 first_blocknum: 100000,
3333 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3334 sync_complete: true,
3335 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3336 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3342 // Multiple split on new block
3343 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3347 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3348 first_blocknum: 100000,
3349 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3354 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3355 first_blocknum: 100000,
3356 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3357 sync_complete: false,
3358 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3359 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3363 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3364 first_blocknum: 107999,
3365 number_of_blocks: 2,
3366 sync_complete: true,
3367 short_channel_ids: vec![
3368 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3374 // Multiple split on same block
3375 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3379 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3380 first_blocknum: 100002,
3381 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3386 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3387 first_blocknum: 100002,
3388 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3389 sync_complete: false,
3390 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3391 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3395 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3396 first_blocknum: 108001,
3397 number_of_blocks: 1,
3398 sync_complete: true,
3399 short_channel_ids: vec![
3400 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3407 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3408 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3409 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3410 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3412 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3414 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3415 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3416 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3417 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3420 assert!(result.is_ok());
3422 assert!(result.is_err());
3425 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3426 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3428 for i in 0..events.len() {
3429 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3431 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3432 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3433 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3434 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3435 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3436 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3437 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3439 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3440 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3441 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3442 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3443 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3445 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3446 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3447 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3450 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3456 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3457 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3458 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3459 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3460 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3462 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3464 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3466 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3468 assert!(result.is_err());
3472 fn displays_node_alias() {
3473 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3474 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3475 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3476 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3479 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3480 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3481 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3483 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3484 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3485 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3486 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3489 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3490 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3491 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3495 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3496 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3497 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3498 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3499 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3500 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3502 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3503 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3506 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3507 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3508 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3509 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3510 last_update_message: None,
3513 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3514 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3516 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3517 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3518 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3520 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3521 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3522 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3524 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3525 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3526 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3527 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3528 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3530 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3531 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3532 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3534 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3535 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3536 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3537 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3538 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3540 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3542 capacity_sats: None,
3543 announcement_message: None,
3544 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3545 node_one_counter: 0,
3546 node_two_counter: 1,
3549 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3550 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3552 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3553 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3555 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3556 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3557 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3558 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3559 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3560 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3561 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3562 capacity_sats: None,
3563 announcement_message: None,
3564 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3565 node_one_counter: 0,
3566 node_two_counter: 1,
3569 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3570 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3572 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3573 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3575 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3576 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3577 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3579 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3580 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3581 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("fd01ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce8804b6b6b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f4240000027100000001406210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c2308b6b6b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f424000002710000000140a01000c0100").unwrap();
3582 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3583 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3584 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3585 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3587 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3588 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3589 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3590 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3591 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3595 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3596 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3597 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3598 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3599 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3600 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3603 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3604 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3607 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3608 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3609 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3610 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3611 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3613 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3614 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3615 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3617 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3618 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3619 channels: Vec::new(),
3620 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3624 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3625 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3626 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3627 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3629 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3630 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3631 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3635 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3636 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3637 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3638 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3639 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3640 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3644 fn test_node_id_display() {
3645 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3646 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3650 fn is_tor_only_node() {
3651 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3652 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3654 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3655 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3656 let node_1_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
3658 let announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3659 gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3661 let tcp_ip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3662 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3665 let tcp_ip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3666 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3669 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2([255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]);
3670 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3671 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3676 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
3677 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3681 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3683 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3684 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3685 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3687 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3689 announcement.addresses = vec![
3690 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone(),
3693 announcement.timestamp += 1000;
3695 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3697 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3698 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3700 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3702 announcement.addresses = vec![
3703 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3705 announcement.timestamp += 2000;
3707 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3709 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3710 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3712 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3714 announcement.addresses = vec![
3715 tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3717 announcement.timestamp += 3000;
3719 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3721 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3722 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3724 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3726 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
3727 announcement.timestamp += 4000;
3729 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3731 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3732 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3734 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3736 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone()];
3737 announcement.timestamp += 5000;
3739 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3741 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3742 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3744 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3746 announcement.addresses = vec![tcp_ip_v4.clone()];
3747 announcement.timestamp += 6000;
3749 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3751 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3752 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3760 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3762 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3763 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3764 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3765 let mut v = Vec::new();
3766 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3767 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3768 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3772 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3773 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3774 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3775 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3776 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3777 black_box(&net_graph).encode()