1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use crate::chain::Access;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
82 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
83 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
84 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
87 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
88 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
89 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
93 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
94 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
101 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
102 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
103 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
107 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
108 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
109 Some(self.cmp(other))
113 impl Ord for NodeId {
114 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
115 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
119 impl Writeable for NodeId {
120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
121 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
126 impl Readable for NodeId {
127 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
128 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
129 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
134 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
135 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
136 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
137 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
138 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
140 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
141 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
142 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
143 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
145 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
146 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
147 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
148 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
149 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
150 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
151 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
154 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
155 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
156 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
157 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
159 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
160 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
161 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
164 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
165 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
166 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
167 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
170 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
171 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
173 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
175 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
176 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
177 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
178 ChannelUpdateMessage {
179 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
182 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
183 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
185 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
186 short_channel_id: u64,
187 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
188 /// `channel_update` message is received.
191 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
192 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
194 /// The node id of the failed node.
196 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
197 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
202 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
203 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
206 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
207 (0, short_channel_id, required),
208 (2, is_permanent, required),
210 (4, NodeFailure) => {
211 (0, node_id, required),
212 (2, is_permanent, required),
216 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
217 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
218 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
219 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
220 /// serving historical announcements.
221 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
222 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
225 chain_access: Option<C>,
226 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
227 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
228 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
232 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
233 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
235 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
236 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
237 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
238 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
239 /// channel owners' keys.
240 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
243 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
244 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
246 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
251 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
252 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
253 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
254 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
255 self.chain_access = chain_access;
258 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
259 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
261 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
262 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
266 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
267 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
268 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
269 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
270 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
271 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
272 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
280 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
281 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
283 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
284 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
285 match *network_update {
286 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
287 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
288 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
289 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
291 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
293 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
294 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
295 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
296 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
298 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
300 log_debug!(self.logger,
301 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
302 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
309 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
310 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
311 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
314 return Err(LightningError {
315 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
316 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
317 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
319 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
321 log_level: Level::Trace,
329 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
330 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
331 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
332 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
333 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
334 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
335 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
337 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
339 log_level: Level::Trace
345 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
346 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
348 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
349 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
350 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
351 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
352 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
355 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
356 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
357 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
358 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
361 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
362 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
363 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
366 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
367 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
368 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
369 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
370 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
371 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
372 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
373 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
374 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
376 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
377 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
379 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
381 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
382 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
388 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
389 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
390 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
391 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
395 for (_, ref node) in iter {
396 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
397 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
405 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
406 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
407 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
409 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
410 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
411 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
412 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
413 /// tracking this directly.
414 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
415 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
416 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
417 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
418 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
422 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
424 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
425 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
426 // updates from all our peers normally.
428 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
429 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
430 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
433 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
434 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
435 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
436 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
437 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
439 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
440 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
441 // relying on it useless.
443 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
444 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
445 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
447 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
448 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
449 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
450 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
451 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
454 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
455 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
456 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
457 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
458 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
459 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
460 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
462 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
463 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
464 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
465 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
467 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
468 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
469 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
471 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
472 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
473 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
474 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
476 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
477 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
478 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
480 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
484 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
485 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
486 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
487 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
488 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
489 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
490 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
496 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
497 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
498 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
499 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
503 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
504 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
505 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
506 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
510 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
511 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
512 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
513 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
514 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
515 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
516 /// memory constrained systems.
517 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
518 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
520 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
522 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
523 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
524 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
526 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
527 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
529 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
530 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
531 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
532 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
533 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
534 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
536 short_channel_ids: vec![],
539 return Err(LightningError {
540 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
541 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
545 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
546 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
547 // exists even if its not yet routable.
548 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
549 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
550 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
551 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
552 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
553 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
554 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
557 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
558 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
563 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
564 let batch_count = batches.len();
565 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
566 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
567 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
568 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
570 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
571 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
572 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
573 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
574 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
575 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
576 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
578 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
579 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
580 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
582 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
583 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
584 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
586 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
587 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
588 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
589 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
591 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
592 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
594 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
597 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
599 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
600 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
601 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
602 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
606 short_channel_ids: batch,
614 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
617 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
618 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
622 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
623 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
624 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
628 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
629 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
630 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
635 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
637 C::Target: chain::Access,
640 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
641 let mut ret = Vec::new();
642 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
643 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
648 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
649 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
650 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
651 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
652 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
653 pub last_update: u32,
654 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
656 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
657 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
658 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
659 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
661 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
662 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
663 pub fees: RoutingFees,
664 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
665 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
666 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
667 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
668 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
671 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
672 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
673 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
678 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
679 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
680 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
681 (0, self.last_update, required),
682 (2, self.enabled, required),
683 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
684 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
685 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
686 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
687 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
688 (10, self.fees, required),
689 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
695 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
696 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
697 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
698 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
699 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
700 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
701 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
702 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
703 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
705 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
706 (0, last_update, required),
707 (2, enabled, required),
708 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
709 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
710 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
711 (10, fees, required),
712 (12, last_update_message, required)
715 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
716 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
717 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
718 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
719 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
720 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
722 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
723 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
726 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
731 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
732 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
733 /// Received within a channel announcement.
734 pub struct ChannelInfo {
735 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
736 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
737 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
738 pub node_one: NodeId,
739 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
740 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
741 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
742 pub node_two: NodeId,
743 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
744 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
745 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
746 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
747 /// An initial announcement of the channel
748 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
749 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
750 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
751 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
752 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
753 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
754 /// network graph in memory!).
755 announcement_received_time: u64,
759 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
760 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
761 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
762 let (direction, source) = {
763 if target == &self.node_one {
764 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
765 } else if target == &self.node_two {
766 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
771 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
774 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
775 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
776 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
777 let (direction, target) = {
778 if source == &self.node_one {
779 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
780 } else if source == &self.node_two {
781 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
786 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
789 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
790 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
791 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
793 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
795 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
800 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
801 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
802 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
803 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
808 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
809 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
810 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
811 (0, self.features, required),
812 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
813 (2, self.node_one, required),
814 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
815 (6, self.node_two, required),
816 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
817 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
818 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
824 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
825 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
826 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
827 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
828 // channel updates via the gossip network.
829 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
831 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
832 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
833 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
834 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
835 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
836 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
837 Err(err) => Err(err),
842 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
843 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
844 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
845 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
846 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
847 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
848 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
849 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
850 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
851 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
852 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
853 (0, features, required),
854 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
855 (2, node_one, required),
856 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
857 (6, node_two, required),
858 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
859 (10, capacity_sats, required),
860 (12, announcement_message, required),
864 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
865 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
866 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
867 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
868 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
869 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
870 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
871 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
876 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
877 /// source node to a target node.
879 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
880 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
881 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
882 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
883 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
886 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
888 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
889 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
890 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
892 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
893 Some(capacity_msat) => {
894 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
895 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
897 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
901 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
905 /// Returns information for the channel.
907 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
909 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
911 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
912 self.htlc_maximum_msat
915 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
917 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
918 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
920 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
921 self.effective_capacity
924 /// Returns information for the direction.
926 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
929 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
930 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
931 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
932 .field("channel", &self.channel)
937 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
939 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
940 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
941 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
942 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
943 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
946 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
950 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
952 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
955 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
957 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
959 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
960 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
962 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
965 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
966 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
970 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
971 /// use when making routing decisions.
972 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
974 impl EffectiveCapacity {
975 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
976 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
978 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
979 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
980 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
981 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
982 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
987 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
988 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
989 pub struct RoutingFees {
990 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
992 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
993 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
994 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
997 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
998 (0, base_msat, required),
999 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1002 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1003 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1004 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1005 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1006 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1007 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1008 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1009 pub last_update: u32,
1010 /// Color assigned to the node
1012 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1013 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1014 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1015 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1016 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1017 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1018 /// An initial announcement of the node
1019 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1020 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1021 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1022 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1025 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1026 (0, features, required),
1027 (2, last_update, required),
1029 (6, alias, required),
1030 (8, announcement_message, option),
1031 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1034 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1036 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1037 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1038 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1039 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1041 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1042 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1043 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1044 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1045 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1046 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1048 use core::fmt::Write;
1049 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1050 // Display printable ASCII characters
1051 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1052 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1061 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1062 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1067 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1068 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1069 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1073 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1074 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1075 pub struct NodeInfo {
1076 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1077 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1078 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1079 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1080 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1081 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1084 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1085 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1086 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1087 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1092 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1093 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1094 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1095 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1096 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1097 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1103 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1104 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1105 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1106 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1107 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1109 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1110 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1111 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1112 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1114 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1121 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1122 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1123 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1124 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1125 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1126 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1127 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1128 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1129 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1130 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1132 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1133 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1134 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1135 (4, channels, vec_type),
1139 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1140 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1145 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1146 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1148 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1149 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1150 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1152 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1153 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1154 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1155 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1156 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1157 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1159 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1160 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1161 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1162 node_id.write(writer)?;
1163 node_info.write(writer)?;
1166 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1167 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1168 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1174 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1175 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1176 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1178 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1179 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1181 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1182 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1183 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1184 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1186 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1187 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1188 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1189 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1190 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1191 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1194 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1195 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1196 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1200 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1203 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1204 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1205 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1206 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1207 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1212 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1213 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1214 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1215 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1216 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1218 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1219 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1220 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1226 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1227 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1228 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1229 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1230 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1231 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1235 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1236 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1237 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1239 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1242 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1243 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1244 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1245 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1246 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1250 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1251 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1252 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1253 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1254 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1260 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1261 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1262 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1263 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1266 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1267 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1268 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1269 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1272 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1275 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1276 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1277 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1281 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1282 /// given node announcement.
1284 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1285 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1286 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1287 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1288 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1289 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
1290 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1293 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1294 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1295 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1297 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1298 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1301 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1302 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1303 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1305 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1306 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1307 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1308 // that it be at least the current time.
1309 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1310 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1311 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1312 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1317 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1318 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1319 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1320 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1321 features: msg.features.clone(),
1322 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1324 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1325 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1326 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1334 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1336 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1337 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1338 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1340 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1341 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1342 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1343 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1344 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1346 C::Target: chain::Access,
1348 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1349 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1350 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1351 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1352 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1353 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1356 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1357 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1358 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1360 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1361 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1362 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1363 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1364 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1366 C::Target: chain::Access,
1368 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1371 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1373 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1374 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1376 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1377 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1378 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1379 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1382 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1383 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1384 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1386 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1388 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1390 capacity_sats: None,
1391 announcement_message: None,
1392 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1395 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1398 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1399 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1400 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1402 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1403 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1405 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1406 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1407 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1408 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1410 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1411 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1412 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1413 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1415 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1416 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1418 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1419 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1420 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1422 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1425 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1426 entry.insert(channel_info);
1430 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1431 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1432 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1433 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1435 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1436 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1437 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1438 announcement_info: None,
1447 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1448 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1449 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1451 C::Target: chain::Access,
1453 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1454 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1458 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1460 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1461 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1462 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1463 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1465 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1466 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1467 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1468 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1470 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1471 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1472 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1473 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1474 return Err(LightningError {
1475 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1476 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1479 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1480 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1481 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1482 return Err(LightningError {
1483 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1484 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1491 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1492 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1493 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1494 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1495 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1496 return Err(LightningError{
1497 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1498 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1502 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1504 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1507 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1508 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1509 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1510 let expected_script =
1511 make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(msg.bitcoin_key_1.as_slice(), msg.bitcoin_key_2.as_slice()).to_v0_p2wsh();
1512 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1513 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1515 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1516 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1519 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1520 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1522 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1523 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1529 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1530 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1531 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1533 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1536 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1537 features: msg.features.clone(),
1538 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1540 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1542 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1543 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1544 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1545 announcement_received_time,
1548 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1551 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1552 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1553 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1554 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1555 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1556 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1557 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1558 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1559 let current_time_unix = None;
1561 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1564 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1565 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1566 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1567 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1568 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1569 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1571 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1572 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1573 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1574 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1577 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1578 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1579 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1581 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1582 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1588 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1589 /// from local storage.
1590 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1591 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1592 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1593 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1594 let current_time_unix = None;
1596 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1597 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1598 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1599 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1600 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1602 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1603 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1604 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1605 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1606 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1607 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1610 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1611 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1614 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1617 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1621 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1622 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1623 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1626 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1627 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1628 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1630 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1631 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1633 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1634 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1636 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1637 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1638 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1639 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1640 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1643 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1644 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1647 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1648 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1649 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1651 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1652 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1654 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1655 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1656 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1657 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1658 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1659 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1660 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1661 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1662 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1664 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1665 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1666 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1667 info.one_to_two = None;
1669 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1670 info.two_to_one = None;
1672 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1673 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1674 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1675 // channel_update for.
1676 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1677 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1681 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1682 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1683 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1684 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1685 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1686 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1690 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1691 if let Some(time) = time {
1692 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1694 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1695 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1696 // of this function.
1697 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1699 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1700 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1703 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1707 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1708 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1711 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1714 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1715 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1716 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1718 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1719 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1720 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1721 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1724 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1725 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1726 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1728 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1729 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1730 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1731 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1734 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1735 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1737 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1739 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1740 // disable this check during tests!
1741 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1742 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1743 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1745 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1746 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1750 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1751 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1752 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1754 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1755 return Err(LightningError{err:
1756 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1757 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1760 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1761 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1762 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1763 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1764 return Err(LightningError{err:
1765 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1766 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1769 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1770 ($target: expr) => {
1771 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1772 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1773 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1774 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1775 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1776 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1777 // but only in the non-normative section.
1778 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1779 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1780 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1781 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1787 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1789 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1790 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1792 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1793 enabled: chan_enabled,
1794 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1795 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1796 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1797 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1799 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1800 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1804 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1808 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1809 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1810 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1811 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1812 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1813 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1814 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1815 })?, "channel_update");
1817 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1819 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1820 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1821 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1822 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1823 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1824 })?, "channel_update");
1826 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1834 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1835 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1836 ($node_id: expr) => {
1837 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1838 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1839 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1841 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1842 entry.remove_entry();
1845 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1850 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1851 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1855 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1856 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1858 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1859 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1863 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1864 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1865 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1868 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1869 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1870 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1871 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1874 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1876 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1877 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1881 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1882 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1883 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1886 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1887 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1888 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1889 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1892 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1893 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1894 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1895 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1896 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1897 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1898 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1908 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1909 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1910 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1911 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1912 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1913 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1914 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1915 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1916 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1917 use crate::util::test_utils;
1918 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1919 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1920 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1922 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1923 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1925 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1926 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1927 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1928 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1929 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1930 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1934 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1935 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1938 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1939 use crate::prelude::*;
1940 use crate::sync::Arc;
1942 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1943 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1944 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1945 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1948 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1949 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1950 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1952 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1953 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1954 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1955 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1959 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1960 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1961 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1962 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1963 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1965 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1966 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1967 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1968 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1969 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1970 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1973 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1974 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
1975 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1976 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1981 addresses: Vec::new(),
1982 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1983 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1985 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1986 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1988 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1989 contents: unsigned_announcement
1993 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1994 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1995 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1996 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1997 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1999 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2000 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2001 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2002 short_channel_id: 0,
2003 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2004 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2005 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2006 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2007 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2009 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2010 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2011 ChannelAnnouncement {
2012 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2013 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2014 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2015 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2016 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2020 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2021 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2022 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2023 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2024 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2027 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2028 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2029 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2030 short_channel_id: 0,
2033 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2034 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2035 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2036 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2037 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2038 excess_data: Vec::new()
2040 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2041 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2043 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2044 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2049 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2050 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2051 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2053 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2054 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2055 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2057 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2058 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2060 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2064 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2065 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2066 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2067 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2072 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2073 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2077 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2078 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2080 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2081 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2084 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2087 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2088 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2089 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2090 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2091 // Return false because contains excess data.
2092 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2093 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2097 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2098 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2099 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2100 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2101 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2102 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2104 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2109 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2110 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2111 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2113 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2114 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2116 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2117 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2119 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2120 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2121 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2122 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2123 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2124 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2129 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2135 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2136 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2137 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2139 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2142 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2143 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2144 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2145 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2146 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2148 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2149 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2150 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2151 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2153 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2156 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2157 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2158 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2159 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2160 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2161 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2162 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2167 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2173 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2174 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2175 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2176 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2178 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2181 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2183 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2185 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2186 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2187 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2189 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2190 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2191 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2192 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2193 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2195 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2198 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2200 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2201 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2202 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2207 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2208 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2209 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2210 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2211 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2212 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2213 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2217 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2218 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2219 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2221 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2224 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2225 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2227 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2232 fn handling_channel_update() {
2233 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2234 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2235 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2236 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2237 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2238 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2240 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2241 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2243 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2244 let short_channel_id;
2247 // Announce a channel we will update
2248 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2249 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2251 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2252 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2253 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2260 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2261 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2262 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2267 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2269 Some(channel_info) => {
2270 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2271 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2276 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2277 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2278 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2279 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2280 // Return false because contains excess data
2281 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2282 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2286 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2287 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2288 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2289 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2290 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2292 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2295 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2296 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2297 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2298 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2299 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2301 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2304 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2305 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2306 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2307 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2308 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2310 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2313 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2314 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2315 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2316 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2317 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2318 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2320 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2323 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2324 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2325 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2326 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2327 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2328 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2329 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2331 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2336 fn handling_network_update() {
2337 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2338 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2339 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2340 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2342 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2343 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2344 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2347 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2348 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2351 let short_channel_id;
2353 // Announce a channel we will update
2354 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2355 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2356 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2357 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2358 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2360 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2361 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2363 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2364 msg: valid_channel_update,
2367 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2370 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2372 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2374 Some(channel_info) => {
2375 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2379 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2381 is_permanent: false,
2384 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2386 Some(channel_info) => {
2387 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2392 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2393 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2398 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2399 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2400 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2403 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2404 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2406 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2407 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2408 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2409 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2410 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2411 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2413 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2414 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2416 is_permanent: false,
2419 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2420 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2422 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2423 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2428 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2429 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2430 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2435 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2436 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2437 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2438 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2439 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2440 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2441 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2442 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2444 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2445 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2447 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2448 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2449 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2450 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2451 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2453 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2454 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2455 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2456 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2458 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2459 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2460 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2462 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2463 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2464 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2466 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2467 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2468 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2469 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2471 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2472 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2474 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2476 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2477 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2478 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2479 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2480 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2482 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2483 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2484 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2485 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2486 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2487 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2488 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2489 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2490 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2491 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2492 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2493 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2494 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2495 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2496 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2497 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2498 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2501 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2502 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2503 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2505 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2507 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2509 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2511 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2512 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2513 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2515 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2516 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2517 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2518 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2520 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2521 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2522 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2524 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2525 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2526 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2527 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2529 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2530 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2531 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2532 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2533 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2536 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2538 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2539 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2540 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2542 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2544 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2545 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2546 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2548 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2549 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2550 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2551 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2553 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2554 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2555 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2557 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2558 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2559 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2561 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2562 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2563 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2564 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2565 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2570 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2571 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2572 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2573 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2574 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2576 // Channels were not announced yet.
2577 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2578 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2580 let short_channel_id;
2582 // Announce a channel we will update
2583 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2584 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2585 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2591 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2592 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2593 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2594 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2595 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2596 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2602 // Valid channel update
2603 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2604 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2605 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2606 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2612 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2613 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2614 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2615 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2616 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2617 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2623 // Channel update with excess data.
2624 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2625 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2626 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2627 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2628 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2634 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2635 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2636 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2637 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2638 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2639 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2644 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2645 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2646 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2650 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2651 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2652 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2653 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2654 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2655 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2658 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2659 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2662 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2663 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2664 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2670 // Nodes were never announced
2671 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2672 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2675 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2676 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2681 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2682 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2688 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2689 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2691 // Skip the first node.
2692 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2693 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2696 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2697 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2698 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2699 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2700 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2701 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2702 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2707 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2708 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2712 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2713 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2714 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2716 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2717 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2719 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2720 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2721 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2722 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2726 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2727 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2732 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2733 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2734 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2735 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2737 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2738 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2742 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2743 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2744 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2746 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2747 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2749 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2750 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2751 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2752 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2756 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2757 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2758 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2759 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2761 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2762 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2763 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2764 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2766 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2768 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2770 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2771 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2772 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2773 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2776 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2778 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2779 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2780 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2781 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2782 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2785 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2786 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2787 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2788 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2789 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2790 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2791 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2793 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2799 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2800 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2801 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2803 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2804 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2805 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2806 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2808 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2809 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2810 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2813 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2814 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2815 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2818 // used for testing resumption on same block
2819 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2822 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2823 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2824 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2825 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2831 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2832 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2836 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2838 number_of_blocks: 0,
2841 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2842 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2844 number_of_blocks: 0,
2845 sync_complete: true,
2846 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2850 // Error when wrong chain
2851 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2855 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2857 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2860 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2861 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2863 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2864 sync_complete: true,
2865 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2869 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2870 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2874 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2875 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2876 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2879 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2880 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2881 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2882 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2883 sync_complete: true,
2884 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2888 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2889 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2893 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2894 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2895 number_of_blocks: 1,
2900 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2901 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2902 number_of_blocks: 1,
2903 sync_complete: true,
2904 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2909 // No results in valid query range
2910 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2914 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2915 first_blocknum: 1000,
2916 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2921 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2922 first_blocknum: 1000,
2923 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2924 sync_complete: true,
2925 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2930 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2931 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2935 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2936 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2937 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2942 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2943 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2944 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2945 sync_complete: true,
2946 short_channel_ids: vec![
2947 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2953 // Single block exactly full
2954 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2958 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2959 first_blocknum: 100000,
2960 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2965 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2966 first_blocknum: 100000,
2967 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2968 sync_complete: true,
2969 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2970 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2976 // Multiple split on new block
2977 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2981 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2982 first_blocknum: 100000,
2983 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2988 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2989 first_blocknum: 100000,
2990 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2991 sync_complete: false,
2992 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2993 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2997 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2998 first_blocknum: 107999,
2999 number_of_blocks: 2,
3000 sync_complete: true,
3001 short_channel_ids: vec![
3002 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3008 // Multiple split on same block
3009 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3013 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3014 first_blocknum: 100002,
3015 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3020 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3021 first_blocknum: 100002,
3022 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3023 sync_complete: false,
3024 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3025 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3029 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3030 first_blocknum: 108001,
3031 number_of_blocks: 1,
3032 sync_complete: true,
3033 short_channel_ids: vec![
3034 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3041 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3042 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3043 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3044 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3046 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3048 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3049 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3050 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3051 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3054 assert!(result.is_ok());
3056 assert!(result.is_err());
3059 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3060 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3062 for i in 0..events.len() {
3063 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3065 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3066 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3067 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3068 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3069 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3070 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3071 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3073 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3074 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3075 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3076 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3077 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3079 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3080 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3081 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3084 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3090 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3091 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3092 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3093 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3094 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3096 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3098 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3100 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3102 assert!(result.is_err());
3106 fn displays_node_alias() {
3107 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3108 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3109 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3110 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3113 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3114 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3115 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3117 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3118 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3119 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3120 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3123 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3124 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3125 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3129 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3130 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3131 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3132 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3133 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3134 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3136 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3137 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3140 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3141 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3142 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3143 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3144 last_update_message: None,
3147 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3148 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3150 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3151 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3152 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3154 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3155 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3156 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3158 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3159 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3160 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3161 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3162 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3164 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3165 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3166 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3168 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3169 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3170 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3171 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3172 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3174 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3176 capacity_sats: None,
3177 announcement_message: None,
3178 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3181 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3182 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3184 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3185 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3187 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3188 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3189 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3190 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3191 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3192 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3193 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3194 capacity_sats: None,
3195 announcement_message: None,
3196 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3199 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3200 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3202 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3203 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3205 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3206 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3207 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3209 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3210 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3211 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3212 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3213 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3214 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3215 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3217 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3218 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3219 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3220 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3221 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3225 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3226 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3228 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3229 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3230 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3231 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3234 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3235 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3236 announcement_message: None,
3239 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3240 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3241 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3242 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3244 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3245 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3246 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3248 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3249 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3250 channels: Vec::new(),
3251 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3254 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3255 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3256 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3257 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3259 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3260 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3261 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3265 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3273 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3274 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3275 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3276 let mut v = Vec::new();
3277 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3279 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3284 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3285 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3286 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3287 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3289 let _ = net_graph.encode();