1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
21 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
22 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
23 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
24 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
26 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup};
27 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
28 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
29 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
30 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
31 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
32 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
35 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
36 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
39 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
40 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
41 use crate::sync::Mutex;
42 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
45 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
47 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
49 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
51 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
52 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
54 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
55 /// refuse to relay the message.
56 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
58 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
59 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
60 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
62 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
63 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
64 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
67 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
68 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
69 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
72 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
73 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
78 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
79 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
80 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
84 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
85 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
89 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
90 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
97 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
98 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
99 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
103 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
104 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
105 Some(self.cmp(other))
109 impl Ord for NodeId {
110 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
111 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
115 impl Writeable for NodeId {
116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
117 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
122 impl Readable for NodeId {
123 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
124 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
125 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
130 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
131 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
132 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
133 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
134 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
136 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
137 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
139 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
141 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
142 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
143 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
144 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
145 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
146 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
147 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
150 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
151 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
152 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
153 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
154 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
155 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
156 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
157 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
160 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
161 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
162 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
163 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
166 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
167 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
169 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
170 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
172 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
173 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
174 ChannelUpdateMessage {
175 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
178 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
179 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
181 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
182 short_channel_id: u64,
183 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
184 /// `channel_update` message is received.
187 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
188 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
190 /// The node id of the failed node.
192 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
193 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
198 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
199 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
202 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
203 (0, short_channel_id, required),
204 (2, is_permanent, required),
206 (4, NodeFailure) => {
207 (0, node_id, required),
208 (2, is_permanent, required),
212 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
213 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
214 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
215 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
216 /// serving historical announcements.
217 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
218 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
221 utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
222 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
223 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
224 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
228 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
229 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
231 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
232 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
233 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
234 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
235 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
238 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
239 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
241 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
246 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
247 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
248 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
249 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
250 self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
253 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
254 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
256 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
257 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
261 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
262 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
263 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
264 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
265 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
266 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
267 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
275 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
276 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
278 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
279 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
280 match *network_update {
281 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
282 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
283 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
284 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
285 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
286 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
288 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
289 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
291 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
293 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
295 log_debug!(self.logger,
296 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
297 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
304 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
305 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
306 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
309 return Err(LightningError {
310 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
311 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
312 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
314 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
316 log_level: Level::Trace,
324 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
325 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
326 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
327 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
328 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
329 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
330 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
332 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
334 log_level: Level::Trace
340 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
341 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
343 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
344 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
345 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
346 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
347 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
350 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
351 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
352 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
353 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
356 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
357 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
358 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
361 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
362 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
363 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
364 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
365 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
366 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
367 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
368 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
369 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
371 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
372 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
374 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
376 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
377 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
383 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
384 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
385 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
386 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
390 for (_, ref node) in iter {
391 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
392 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
400 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
401 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
402 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
404 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
405 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
406 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
407 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
408 /// tracking this directly.
409 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
410 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
411 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
412 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
413 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
417 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
419 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
420 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
421 // updates from all our peers normally.
423 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
424 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
425 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
428 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
429 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
430 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
431 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
432 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
434 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
435 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
436 // relying on it useless.
438 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
439 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
440 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
442 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
443 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
444 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
445 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
446 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
449 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
450 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
451 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
452 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
453 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
454 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
455 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
457 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
458 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
459 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
460 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
462 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
463 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
464 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
466 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
467 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
468 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
469 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
471 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
472 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
473 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
475 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
479 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
480 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
481 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
482 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
483 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
484 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
485 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
491 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
492 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
493 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
494 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
498 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
499 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
500 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
501 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
505 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
506 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
507 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
508 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
509 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
510 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
511 /// memory constrained systems.
512 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
513 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
515 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
517 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
518 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
519 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
521 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
522 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
523 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
524 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
525 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
526 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
527 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
528 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
529 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
531 short_channel_ids: vec![],
534 return Err(LightningError {
535 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
536 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
540 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
541 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
542 // exists even if its not yet routable.
543 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
544 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
545 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
546 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
547 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
548 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
549 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
552 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
553 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
558 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
559 let batch_count = batches.len();
560 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
561 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
562 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
563 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
565 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
566 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
567 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
568 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
569 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
570 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
571 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
573 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
574 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
575 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
577 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
578 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
579 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
581 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
582 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
583 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
584 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
586 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
587 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
589 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
592 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
594 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
595 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
596 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
597 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
601 short_channel_ids: batch,
609 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
612 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
613 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
618 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
619 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
623 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
624 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
625 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
630 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
632 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
635 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
636 let mut ret = Vec::new();
637 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
638 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
643 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
644 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
645 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
646 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
647 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
648 pub last_update: u32,
649 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
651 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
652 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
653 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
654 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
655 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
656 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
657 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
658 pub fees: RoutingFees,
659 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
660 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
661 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
662 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
663 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
666 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
667 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
668 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
673 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
674 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
675 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
676 (0, self.last_update, required),
677 (2, self.enabled, required),
678 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
679 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
680 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
681 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
682 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
683 (10, self.fees, required),
684 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
690 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
691 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
692 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
693 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
694 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
695 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
696 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
697 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
698 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
700 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
701 (0, last_update, required),
702 (2, enabled, required),
703 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
704 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
705 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
706 (10, fees, required),
707 (12, last_update_message, required)
710 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
711 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
712 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
713 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
714 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
715 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
717 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
718 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
721 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
726 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
727 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
728 /// Received within a channel announcement.
729 pub struct ChannelInfo {
730 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
731 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
732 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
733 pub node_one: NodeId,
734 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
735 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
736 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
737 pub node_two: NodeId,
738 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
739 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
740 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
741 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
742 /// An initial announcement of the channel
743 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
744 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
745 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
746 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
747 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
748 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
749 /// network graph in memory!).
750 announcement_received_time: u64,
754 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
755 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
756 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
757 let (direction, source) = {
758 if target == &self.node_one {
759 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
760 } else if target == &self.node_two {
761 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
766 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
769 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
770 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
771 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
772 let (direction, target) = {
773 if source == &self.node_one {
774 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
775 } else if source == &self.node_two {
776 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
781 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
784 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
785 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
786 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
788 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
790 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
795 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
796 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
797 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
798 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
803 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
804 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
805 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
806 (0, self.features, required),
807 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
808 (2, self.node_one, required),
809 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
810 (6, self.node_two, required),
811 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
812 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
813 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
819 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
820 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
821 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
822 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
823 // channel updates via the gossip network.
824 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
826 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
827 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
828 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
829 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
830 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
831 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
832 Err(err) => Err(err),
837 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
838 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
839 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
840 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
841 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
842 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
843 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
844 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
845 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
846 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
847 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
848 (0, features, required),
849 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
850 (2, node_one, required),
851 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
852 (6, node_two, required),
853 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
854 (10, capacity_sats, required),
855 (12, announcement_message, required),
859 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
860 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
861 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
862 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
863 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
864 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
865 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
866 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
871 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
872 /// source node to a target node.
874 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
875 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
876 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
877 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
878 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
881 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
883 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
884 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
885 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
887 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
888 Some(capacity_msat) => {
889 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
890 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
892 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
896 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
900 /// Returns information for the channel.
902 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
904 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
906 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
907 self.htlc_maximum_msat
910 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
912 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
913 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
915 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
916 self.effective_capacity
919 /// Returns information for the direction.
921 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
924 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
925 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
926 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
927 .field("channel", &self.channel)
932 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
934 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
935 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
936 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
937 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
938 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
941 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
945 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
947 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
950 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
952 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
954 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
955 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
957 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
960 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
961 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
965 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
966 /// use when making routing decisions.
967 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
969 impl EffectiveCapacity {
970 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
971 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
973 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
974 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
975 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
976 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
977 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
982 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
983 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
984 pub struct RoutingFees {
985 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
987 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
988 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
989 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
992 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
993 (0, base_msat, required),
994 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
997 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
998 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
999 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1000 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1001 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1002 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1003 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1004 pub last_update: u32,
1005 /// Color assigned to the node
1007 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1008 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1009 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1010 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1011 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1012 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1013 /// An initial announcement of the node
1014 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1015 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1016 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1017 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1020 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1021 (0, features, required),
1022 (2, last_update, required),
1024 (6, alias, required),
1025 (8, announcement_message, option),
1026 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1029 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1031 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1032 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1033 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1034 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1036 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1037 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1038 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1039 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1040 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1041 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1043 use core::fmt::Write;
1044 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1045 // Display printable ASCII characters
1046 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1047 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1056 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1057 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1062 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1063 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1064 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1068 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1069 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1070 pub struct NodeInfo {
1071 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1072 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1073 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1074 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1075 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1076 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1079 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1080 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1081 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1082 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1087 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1088 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1089 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1090 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1091 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1092 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1098 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1099 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1100 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1101 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1102 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1104 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1105 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1106 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1107 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1109 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1116 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1118 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1119 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1120 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1121 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1122 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1123 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1124 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1125 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1127 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1128 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1129 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1130 (4, channels, vec_type),
1134 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1135 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1140 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1141 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1143 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1144 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1145 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1147 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1148 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1149 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1150 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1151 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1152 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1154 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1155 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1156 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1157 node_id.write(writer)?;
1158 node_info.write(writer)?;
1161 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1162 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1163 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1169 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1170 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1171 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1173 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1174 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1175 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1176 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1177 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1178 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1179 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1181 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1182 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1183 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1184 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1185 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1186 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1189 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1190 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1191 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1195 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1198 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1199 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1200 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1201 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1202 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1207 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1208 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1209 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1210 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1211 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1213 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1214 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1215 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1221 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1222 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1223 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1224 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1225 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1226 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1230 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1231 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1232 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1234 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1237 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1238 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1239 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1240 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1241 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1245 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1246 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1247 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1248 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1249 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1255 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1256 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1257 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1258 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1261 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1262 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1263 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1264 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1267 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1270 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1271 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1272 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1276 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1277 /// given node announcement.
1279 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1280 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1281 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1282 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1283 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1284 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
1285 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1288 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1289 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1290 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1292 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1293 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1296 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1297 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1298 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1300 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1301 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1302 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1303 // that it be at least the current time.
1304 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1305 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1306 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1307 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1312 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1313 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1314 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1315 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1316 features: msg.features.clone(),
1317 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1319 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1320 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1321 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1329 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1331 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1332 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1333 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1335 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1336 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1337 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1338 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1339 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1341 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1343 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1344 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1345 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1346 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1347 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1348 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1351 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1352 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1353 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1355 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1356 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1357 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1358 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1359 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1361 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1363 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1366 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1368 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1369 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1371 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1372 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1373 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1374 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1377 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1378 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1379 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1381 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1383 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1385 capacity_sats: None,
1386 announcement_message: None,
1387 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1390 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1393 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1394 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1395 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1397 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1398 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1400 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1401 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1402 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1403 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1405 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1406 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1407 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1408 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1410 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1411 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1413 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1414 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1415 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1417 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1420 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1421 entry.insert(channel_info);
1425 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1426 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1427 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1428 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1430 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1431 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1432 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1433 announcement_info: None,
1442 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1443 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1444 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1446 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1448 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1449 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1453 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1455 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1456 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1457 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1458 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1460 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1461 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1462 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1463 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1465 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1466 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1467 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1468 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1469 return Err(LightningError {
1470 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1471 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1474 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1475 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1476 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1477 return Err(LightningError {
1478 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1479 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1486 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1487 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1488 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1489 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1490 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1491 return Err(LightningError{
1492 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1493 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1497 let utxo_value = utxo::check_channel_announcement(utxo_lookup, msg)?;
1499 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1500 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1501 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1503 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1506 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1507 features: msg.features.clone(),
1508 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1510 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1512 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1513 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1514 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1515 announcement_received_time,
1518 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1521 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1522 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1523 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1524 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1525 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1526 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1527 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1528 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1529 let current_time_unix = None;
1531 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1534 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1535 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1536 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1537 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1538 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1539 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1541 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1542 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1543 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1544 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1547 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1548 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1549 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1551 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1552 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1558 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1559 /// from local storage.
1560 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1561 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1562 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1563 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1564 let current_time_unix = None;
1566 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1567 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1568 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1569 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1570 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1572 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1573 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1574 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1575 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1576 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1577 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1580 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1581 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1584 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1587 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1591 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1592 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1593 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1596 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1597 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1598 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1600 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1601 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1603 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1604 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1606 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1607 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1608 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1609 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1610 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1613 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1614 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1617 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1618 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1619 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1621 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1622 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1624 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1625 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1626 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1627 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1628 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1629 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1630 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1631 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1632 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1634 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1635 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1636 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1637 info.one_to_two = None;
1639 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1640 info.two_to_one = None;
1642 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1643 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1644 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1645 // channel_update for.
1646 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1647 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1651 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1652 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1653 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1654 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1655 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1656 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1660 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1661 if let Some(time) = time {
1662 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1664 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1665 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1666 // of this function.
1667 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1669 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1670 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1673 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1677 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1678 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1681 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1684 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1685 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1686 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1688 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1689 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1690 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1691 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1694 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1695 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1696 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1698 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1699 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1700 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1701 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1704 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1705 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1707 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1709 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1710 // disable this check during tests!
1711 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1712 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1713 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1715 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1716 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1720 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1721 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1722 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1724 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1725 return Err(LightningError{err:
1726 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1727 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1730 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1731 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1732 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1733 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1734 return Err(LightningError{err:
1735 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1736 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1739 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1740 ($target: expr) => {
1741 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1742 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1743 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1744 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1745 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1746 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1747 // but only in the non-normative section.
1748 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1749 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1750 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1751 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1757 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1759 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1760 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1762 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1763 enabled: chan_enabled,
1764 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1765 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1766 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1767 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1769 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1770 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1774 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1778 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1779 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1780 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1781 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1782 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1783 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1784 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1785 })?, "channel_update");
1787 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1789 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1790 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1791 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1792 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1793 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1794 })?, "channel_update");
1796 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1804 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1805 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1806 ($node_id: expr) => {
1807 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1808 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1809 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1811 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1812 entry.remove_entry();
1815 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1820 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1821 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1825 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1826 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1828 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1829 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1833 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1834 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1835 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1838 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1839 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1840 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1841 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1844 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1846 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1847 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1851 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1852 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1853 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1856 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1857 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1858 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1859 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1862 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1863 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1864 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1865 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1866 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1867 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1868 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1877 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1878 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1879 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1880 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1881 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1882 use crate::routing::utxo::UtxoLookupError;
1883 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1884 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1885 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1886 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1887 use crate::util::test_utils;
1888 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1889 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1890 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1892 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1893 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1895 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1896 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1897 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1898 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1899 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1900 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1904 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1905 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1908 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1909 use crate::prelude::*;
1910 use crate::sync::Arc;
1912 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1913 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1914 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1915 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1918 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1919 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1920 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1922 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1923 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1924 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1925 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1929 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1930 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1931 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1932 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1933 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1935 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1936 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1937 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1938 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1939 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1940 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1943 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1944 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
1945 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1946 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1951 addresses: Vec::new(),
1952 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1953 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1955 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1956 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1958 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1959 contents: unsigned_announcement
1963 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1964 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1965 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1966 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1967 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1969 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1970 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1971 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1972 short_channel_id: 0,
1973 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
1974 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
1975 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
1976 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
1977 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1979 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1980 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1981 ChannelAnnouncement {
1982 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1983 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1984 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1985 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1986 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1990 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1991 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1992 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1993 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
1994 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
1997 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1998 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1999 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2000 short_channel_id: 0,
2003 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2004 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2005 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2006 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2007 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2008 excess_data: Vec::new()
2010 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2011 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2013 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2014 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2019 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2020 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2021 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2023 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2024 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2025 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2027 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2028 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2030 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2034 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2035 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2036 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2037 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2042 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2043 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2047 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2048 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2050 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2051 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2054 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2057 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2058 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2059 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2060 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2061 // Return false because contains excess data.
2062 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2063 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2067 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2068 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2069 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2070 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2071 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2072 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2074 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2079 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2080 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2081 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2083 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2084 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2086 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2087 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2089 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2090 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2091 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2092 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2093 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2094 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2099 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2105 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2106 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2107 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2109 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2112 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2113 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2114 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx);
2115 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2116 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2118 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2119 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2120 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2121 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2123 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2126 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2127 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2128 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2129 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2130 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2131 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2132 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2137 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2143 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2144 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2145 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2146 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2148 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2151 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2153 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2155 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2156 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2157 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2159 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2160 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2161 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2162 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2163 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2165 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2168 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2170 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2171 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2172 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2177 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2178 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2179 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2180 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2181 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2182 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2183 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2187 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2188 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2189 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2191 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2194 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2195 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2197 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2202 fn handling_channel_update() {
2203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2204 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2205 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2206 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2207 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2208 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2210 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2211 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2213 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2214 let short_channel_id;
2217 // Announce a channel we will update
2218 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2219 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2221 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2222 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2223 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2230 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2231 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2232 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2237 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2239 Some(channel_info) => {
2240 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2241 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2246 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2247 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2248 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2249 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2250 // Return false because contains excess data
2251 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2252 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2256 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2257 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2258 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2259 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2260 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2262 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2265 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2266 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2267 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2268 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2269 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2271 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2274 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2275 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2276 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2277 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2278 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2280 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2283 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2284 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2285 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2286 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2287 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2288 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2290 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2293 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2294 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2295 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2296 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2297 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2298 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2299 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2301 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2306 fn handling_network_update() {
2307 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2308 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2309 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2310 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2312 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2313 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2314 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2317 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2318 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2321 let short_channel_id;
2323 // Announce a channel we will update
2324 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2325 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2326 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2327 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2328 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2330 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2331 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2333 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2334 msg: valid_channel_update,
2337 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2340 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2342 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2344 Some(channel_info) => {
2345 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2349 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2351 is_permanent: false,
2354 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2356 Some(channel_info) => {
2357 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2362 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2363 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2368 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2369 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2370 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2373 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2374 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2376 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2377 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2378 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2379 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2380 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2381 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2383 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2384 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2386 is_permanent: false,
2389 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2390 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2392 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2393 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2398 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2399 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2400 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2405 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2406 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2407 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2408 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2409 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2410 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2411 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2412 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2414 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2415 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2417 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2418 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2419 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2420 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2421 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2423 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2424 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2425 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2426 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2428 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2429 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2430 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2432 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2433 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2436 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2437 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2438 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2439 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2441 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2442 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2444 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2446 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2447 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2448 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2449 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2450 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2452 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2453 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2454 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2455 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2456 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2457 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2458 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2459 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2460 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2461 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2462 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2463 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2464 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2465 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2466 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2467 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2468 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2471 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2472 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2473 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2475 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2477 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2479 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2481 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2482 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2483 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2485 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2486 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2487 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2488 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2490 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2491 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2492 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2494 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2495 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2496 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2497 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2499 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2500 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2501 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2502 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2503 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2506 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2508 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2509 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2510 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2512 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2514 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2515 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2516 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2518 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2519 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2520 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2521 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2523 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2524 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2525 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2527 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2528 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2529 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2531 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2532 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2533 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2534 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2535 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2540 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2541 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2542 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2543 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2544 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2546 // Channels were not announced yet.
2547 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2548 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2550 let short_channel_id;
2552 // Announce a channel we will update
2553 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2554 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2555 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2561 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2562 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2563 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2564 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2565 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2566 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2572 // Valid channel update
2573 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2574 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2575 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2576 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2582 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2583 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2584 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2585 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2586 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2587 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2593 // Channel update with excess data.
2594 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2595 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2596 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2597 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2598 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2604 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2605 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2606 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2607 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2608 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2609 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2614 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2615 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2616 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2620 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2621 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2622 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2623 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2624 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2625 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2628 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2629 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2632 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2633 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2634 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2640 // Nodes were never announced
2641 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2642 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2645 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2646 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2651 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2652 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2658 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2659 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2661 // Skip the first node.
2662 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2663 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2666 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2667 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2668 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2669 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2670 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2671 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2672 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2677 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2678 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2682 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2683 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2684 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2686 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2687 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2689 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2690 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2691 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2692 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2696 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2697 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2702 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2703 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2704 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2705 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2707 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2708 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2712 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2713 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2714 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2716 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2717 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2719 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2720 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2721 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2722 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2726 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2727 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2728 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2729 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2731 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2732 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2733 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2734 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2736 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2738 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2740 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2741 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2742 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2743 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2746 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2748 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2749 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2750 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2751 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2752 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2755 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2756 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2757 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2758 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2759 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2760 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2761 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2763 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2769 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2770 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2771 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2773 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2774 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2775 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2776 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2778 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2779 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2780 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2783 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2784 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2785 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2788 // used for testing resumption on same block
2789 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2792 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2793 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2794 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2795 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2801 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2802 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2806 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2808 number_of_blocks: 0,
2811 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2812 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2814 number_of_blocks: 0,
2815 sync_complete: true,
2816 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2820 // Error when wrong chain
2821 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2825 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2827 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2830 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2831 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2833 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2834 sync_complete: true,
2835 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2839 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2840 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2844 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2845 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2846 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2849 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2850 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2851 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2852 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2853 sync_complete: true,
2854 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2858 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2859 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2863 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2864 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2865 number_of_blocks: 1,
2870 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2871 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2872 number_of_blocks: 1,
2873 sync_complete: true,
2874 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2879 // No results in valid query range
2880 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2884 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2885 first_blocknum: 1000,
2886 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2891 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2892 first_blocknum: 1000,
2893 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2894 sync_complete: true,
2895 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2900 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2901 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2905 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2906 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2907 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2912 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2913 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2914 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2915 sync_complete: true,
2916 short_channel_ids: vec![
2917 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2923 // Single block exactly full
2924 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2928 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2929 first_blocknum: 100000,
2930 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2935 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2936 first_blocknum: 100000,
2937 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2938 sync_complete: true,
2939 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2940 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2946 // Multiple split on new block
2947 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2951 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2952 first_blocknum: 100000,
2953 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2958 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2959 first_blocknum: 100000,
2960 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2961 sync_complete: false,
2962 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2963 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2967 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2968 first_blocknum: 107999,
2969 number_of_blocks: 2,
2970 sync_complete: true,
2971 short_channel_ids: vec![
2972 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2978 // Multiple split on same block
2979 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2983 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2984 first_blocknum: 100002,
2985 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2990 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2991 first_blocknum: 100002,
2992 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2993 sync_complete: false,
2994 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2995 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2999 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3000 first_blocknum: 108001,
3001 number_of_blocks: 1,
3002 sync_complete: true,
3003 short_channel_ids: vec![
3004 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3011 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3012 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3013 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3014 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3016 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3018 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3019 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3020 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3021 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3024 assert!(result.is_ok());
3026 assert!(result.is_err());
3029 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3030 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3032 for i in 0..events.len() {
3033 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3035 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3036 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3037 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3038 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3039 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3040 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3041 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3043 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3044 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3045 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3046 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3047 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3049 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3050 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3051 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3054 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3060 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3061 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3062 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3063 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3064 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3066 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3068 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3070 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3072 assert!(result.is_err());
3076 fn displays_node_alias() {
3077 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3078 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3079 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3080 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3083 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3084 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3085 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3087 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3088 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3089 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3090 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3093 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3094 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3095 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3099 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3100 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3101 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3102 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3103 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3104 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3106 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3107 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3110 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3111 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3112 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3113 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3114 last_update_message: None,
3117 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3118 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3120 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3121 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3122 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3124 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3125 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3126 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3128 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3129 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3130 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3131 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3132 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3134 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3135 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3136 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3138 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3139 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3140 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3141 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3142 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3144 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3146 capacity_sats: None,
3147 announcement_message: None,
3148 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3151 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3152 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3154 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3155 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3157 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3158 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3159 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3160 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3161 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3162 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3163 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3164 capacity_sats: None,
3165 announcement_message: None,
3166 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3169 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3170 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3172 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3173 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3175 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3176 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3177 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3179 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3180 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3181 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3182 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3183 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3184 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3185 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3187 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3188 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3189 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3190 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3191 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3195 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3196 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3198 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3199 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3200 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3201 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3204 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3205 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3206 announcement_message: None,
3209 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3210 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3211 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3212 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3214 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3215 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3216 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3218 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3219 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3220 channels: Vec::new(),
3221 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3224 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3225 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3226 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3227 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3229 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3230 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3231 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3235 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3243 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3244 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3245 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3246 let mut v = Vec::new();
3247 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3249 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3254 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3255 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3256 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3257 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3259 let _ = net_graph.encode();