1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
26 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
32 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
33 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
34 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
35 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
37 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
40 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
41 use crate::prelude::*;
43 use core::convert::TryFrom;
44 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
45 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
46 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
47 use crate::sync::Mutex;
48 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
49 use core::str::FromStr;
51 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
52 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
54 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
56 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
58 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
59 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
61 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
62 /// refuse to relay the message.
63 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
65 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
66 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
67 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
69 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
70 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
71 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
74 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
75 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
76 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
79 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
80 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
84 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
85 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
86 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
90 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
91 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
92 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
95 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
96 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
97 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
101 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
102 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
107 impl Eq for NodeId {}
109 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
110 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
111 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
115 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
116 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
117 Some(self.cmp(other))
121 impl Ord for NodeId {
122 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
123 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
127 impl Writeable for NodeId {
128 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
129 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
134 impl Readable for NodeId {
135 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
136 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
137 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
142 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
143 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
144 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
148 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
149 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
151 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
156 impl FromStr for NodeId {
157 type Err = bitcoin::hashes::hex::Error;
159 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
160 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
165 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
166 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
167 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
168 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
169 chain_hash: ChainHash,
171 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
172 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
173 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
174 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
176 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
177 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
178 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
179 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
180 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
181 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
182 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
185 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
186 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
187 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
188 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
189 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
190 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
191 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
192 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
193 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
194 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
197 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
198 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
199 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
200 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
203 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
204 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
206 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
207 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
209 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
210 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
211 ChannelUpdateMessage {
212 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
215 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
216 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
218 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
219 short_channel_id: u64,
220 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
221 /// `channel_update` message is received.
224 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
225 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
227 /// The node id of the failed node.
229 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
230 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
236 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
239 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
240 (0, short_channel_id, required),
241 (2, is_permanent, required),
243 (4, NodeFailure) => {
244 (0, node_id, required),
245 (2, is_permanent, required),
249 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
250 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
251 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
252 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
253 /// serving historical announcements.
254 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
255 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
258 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
259 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
260 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
261 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
265 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
266 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
268 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
269 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
270 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
271 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
272 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
275 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
276 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
277 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
278 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
283 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
284 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
285 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
286 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
287 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
290 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
291 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
293 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
294 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
298 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
299 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
300 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
301 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
302 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
303 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
304 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
311 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
313 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
315 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
317 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
318 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
319 if update_msg.as_ref()
320 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
326 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
328 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
329 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
330 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
331 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
338 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
342 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
343 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
345 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
346 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
348 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
349 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
350 match *network_update {
351 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
352 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
353 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
354 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
355 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
357 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
359 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
360 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
363 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
365 log_debug!(self.logger,
366 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
367 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
373 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
374 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
379 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
380 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
381 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
384 return Err(LightningError {
385 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
386 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
387 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
388 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
389 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
391 log_level: Level::Trace,
399 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
400 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
401 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
402 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
403 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
404 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
405 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
406 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
407 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
409 log_level: Level::Trace
415 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
417 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
418 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
419 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
420 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
425 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
427 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
428 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
429 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
430 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
431 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
432 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
433 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
438 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
439 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
441 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
442 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
443 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
444 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
445 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
448 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
449 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
450 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
453 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
454 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
455 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
458 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
459 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
460 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
461 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
462 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
463 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
464 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
465 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
466 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
468 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
469 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
471 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
473 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
474 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
480 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
481 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
482 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
483 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
487 for (_, ref node) in iter {
488 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
489 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
497 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
498 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
499 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
501 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
502 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
503 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
504 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
505 /// tracking this directly.
507 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
508 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
509 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
510 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
511 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
512 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
513 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
514 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
515 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
516 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
520 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
522 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
523 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
524 // updates from all our peers normally.
526 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
527 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
528 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
531 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
532 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
533 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
534 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
535 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
537 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
538 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
539 // relying on it useless.
541 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
542 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
543 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
545 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
546 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
547 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
548 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
549 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
552 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
553 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
554 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
555 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
556 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
557 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
558 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
560 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
561 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
562 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
563 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
565 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
566 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
567 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
569 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
570 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
571 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
572 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
574 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
575 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
576 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
578 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
582 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
583 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
584 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
585 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
586 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
587 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
588 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
594 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
595 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
596 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
597 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
601 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
602 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
603 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
604 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
608 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
609 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
610 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
611 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
612 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
613 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
614 /// memory constrained systems.
615 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
616 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
618 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
620 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
621 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
622 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
624 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
625 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
626 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
627 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
628 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
629 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
630 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
631 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
632 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
634 short_channel_ids: vec![],
637 return Err(LightningError {
638 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
639 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
643 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
644 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
645 // exists even if its not yet routable.
646 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
647 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
648 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
649 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
650 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
651 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
652 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
655 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
656 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
661 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
662 let batch_count = batches.len();
663 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
664 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
665 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
666 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
668 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
669 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
670 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
671 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
672 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
673 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
674 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
676 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
677 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
678 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
680 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
681 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
682 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
684 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
685 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
686 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
687 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
689 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
690 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
692 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
695 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
697 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
698 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
699 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
700 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
704 short_channel_ids: batch,
712 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
715 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
716 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
720 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
721 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
722 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
726 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
727 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
728 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
732 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
733 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
737 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
739 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
742 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
743 let mut ret = Vec::new();
744 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
745 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
750 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
751 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
752 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
753 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
754 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
755 pub last_update: u32,
756 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
758 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
759 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
760 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
761 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
763 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
764 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
765 pub fees: RoutingFees,
766 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
767 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
768 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
769 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
770 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
773 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
774 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
775 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
780 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
781 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
782 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
783 (0, self.last_update, required),
784 (2, self.enabled, required),
785 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
786 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
787 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
788 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
789 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
790 (10, self.fees, required),
791 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
797 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
798 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
799 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
800 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
801 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
802 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
803 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
804 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
805 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
807 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
808 (0, last_update, required),
809 (2, enabled, required),
810 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
811 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
812 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
813 (10, fees, required),
814 (12, last_update_message, required)
817 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
818 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
819 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
820 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
821 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
822 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
824 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
825 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
828 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
833 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
834 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
835 /// Received within a channel announcement.
836 pub struct ChannelInfo {
837 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
838 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
839 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
840 pub node_one: NodeId,
841 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
842 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
843 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
844 pub node_two: NodeId,
845 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
846 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
847 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
848 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
849 /// An initial announcement of the channel
850 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
851 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
852 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
853 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
854 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
855 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
856 /// network graph in memory!).
857 announcement_received_time: u64,
861 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
862 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
863 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
864 let (direction, source) = {
865 if target == &self.node_one {
866 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
867 } else if target == &self.node_two {
868 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
873 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
876 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
877 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
878 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
879 let (direction, target) = {
880 if source == &self.node_one {
881 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
882 } else if source == &self.node_two {
883 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
888 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
891 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
892 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
893 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
895 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
897 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
902 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
904 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
905 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
910 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
911 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
912 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
913 (0, self.features, required),
914 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
915 (2, self.node_one, required),
916 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
917 (6, self.node_two, required),
918 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
919 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
920 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
926 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
927 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
928 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
929 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
930 // channel updates via the gossip network.
931 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
933 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
934 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
935 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
936 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
937 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
938 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
939 Err(err) => Err(err),
944 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
945 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
946 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
947 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
948 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
949 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
950 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
951 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
952 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
953 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
954 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
955 (0, features, required),
956 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
957 (2, node_one, required),
958 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
959 (6, node_two, required),
960 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
961 (10, capacity_sats, required),
962 (12, announcement_message, required),
966 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
967 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
968 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
969 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
970 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
971 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
972 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
973 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
978 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
979 /// source node to a target node.
981 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
982 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
983 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
984 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
985 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
988 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
990 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
991 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
992 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
994 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
995 Some(capacity_msat) => {
996 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
997 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
999 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1003 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
1007 /// Returns information for the channel.
1009 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1011 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
1013 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1014 self.htlc_maximum_msat
1017 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1019 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1020 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1022 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1023 self.effective_capacity
1026 /// Returns information for the direction.
1028 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1031 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1032 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1033 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1034 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1039 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1041 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1042 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1043 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1044 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1045 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1048 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1050 liquidity_msat: u64,
1052 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1054 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1057 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1059 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1061 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1062 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1064 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1067 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1069 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1072 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1073 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1077 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1078 /// use when making routing decisions.
1079 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1081 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1082 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1083 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1085 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1086 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1087 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1088 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1089 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1090 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1095 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1096 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1097 pub struct RoutingFees {
1098 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1100 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1101 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1102 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1105 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1106 (0, base_msat, required),
1107 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1110 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1111 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1112 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1113 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1114 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1115 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1116 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1117 pub last_update: u32,
1118 /// Color assigned to the node
1120 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1121 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1122 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1123 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1124 /// An initial announcement of the node
1125 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1126 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1127 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1128 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1131 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1132 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1133 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1134 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1135 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1136 .unwrap_or_default()
1140 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1142 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1143 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1144 (0, self.features, required),
1145 (2, self.last_update, required),
1146 (4, self.rgb, required),
1147 (6, self.alias, required),
1148 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1149 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1155 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1156 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1157 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1158 (0, features, required),
1159 (2, last_update, required),
1161 (6, alias, required),
1162 (8, announcement_message, option),
1163 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1165 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1166 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1167 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1171 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1173 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1174 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1175 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1176 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1178 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1179 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1180 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1181 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1182 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1183 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1185 use core::fmt::Write;
1186 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1187 // Display printable ASCII characters
1188 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1189 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1198 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1204 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1205 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1206 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1210 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1211 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1212 pub struct NodeInfo {
1213 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1214 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1215 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1216 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1217 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1218 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1221 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1222 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1223 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1224 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1229 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1230 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1231 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1232 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1233 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1234 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1240 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1241 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1242 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1243 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1244 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1246 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1247 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1248 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1249 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1251 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1258 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1259 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1260 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1261 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1262 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1263 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1264 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1265 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1266 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1267 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1268 (4, channels, required_vec),
1270 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1271 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1274 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1280 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1281 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1283 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1284 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1285 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1287 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1288 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1289 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1290 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1291 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1292 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1294 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1295 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1296 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1297 node_id.write(writer)?;
1298 node_info.write(writer)?;
1301 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1302 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1303 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1309 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1310 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1311 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1313 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1314 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1315 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1316 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1317 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1318 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1319 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1321 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1322 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1323 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1324 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1325 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1326 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1329 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1330 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1331 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1335 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1338 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1339 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1340 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1341 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1342 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1343 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1348 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1349 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1350 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1351 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1352 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1354 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1355 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1356 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1362 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1363 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1364 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1365 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1366 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1367 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1368 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1369 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1370 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1371 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1372 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1376 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1377 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1378 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1380 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1381 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1383 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1384 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1385 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1386 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1387 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1388 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1392 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1393 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1394 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1395 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1396 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1402 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1403 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1404 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1405 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1408 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1409 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1410 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1411 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1414 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1417 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1418 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1419 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1423 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1424 /// given node announcement.
1426 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1427 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1428 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1429 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1430 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1431 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1434 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1435 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1436 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1438 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1439 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1442 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1443 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1444 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1446 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1447 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1448 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1451 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1452 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1453 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1454 // that it be at least the current time.
1455 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1456 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1457 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1458 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1463 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1464 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1465 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1466 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1467 features: msg.features.clone(),
1468 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1471 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1479 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1481 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1482 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1483 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1485 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1486 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1487 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1488 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1489 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1491 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1493 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1494 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1497 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1499 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1500 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1501 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1503 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1504 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1505 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1506 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1507 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1510 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1511 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1512 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1514 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1515 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1516 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1517 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1518 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1520 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1522 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1525 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1527 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1528 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1530 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1531 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1532 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1533 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1536 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1537 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1538 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1540 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1542 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1544 capacity_sats: None,
1545 announcement_message: None,
1546 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1549 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1552 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1553 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1554 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1556 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1557 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1559 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1561 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1562 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1563 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1564 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1566 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1567 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1568 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1569 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1571 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1572 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1574 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1575 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1576 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1578 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1581 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1582 entry.insert(channel_info);
1586 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1587 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1588 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1589 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1591 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1592 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1593 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1594 announcement_info: None,
1603 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1604 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1605 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1607 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1609 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1610 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1613 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1614 return Err(LightningError {
1615 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1616 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1621 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1623 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1624 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1625 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1626 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1628 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1629 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1630 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1631 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1633 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1634 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1635 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1636 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1637 return Err(LightningError {
1638 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1639 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1642 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1643 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1644 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1645 return Err(LightningError {
1646 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1647 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1654 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1655 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1656 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1657 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1658 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1659 return Err(LightningError{
1660 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1661 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1665 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1666 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1668 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1669 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1670 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1672 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1675 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1676 features: msg.features.clone(),
1677 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1679 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1681 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1682 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1683 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1684 announcement_received_time,
1687 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1689 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1693 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1695 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1696 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1697 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1698 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1699 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1700 let current_time_unix = None;
1702 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1705 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1707 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1708 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1709 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1710 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1711 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1712 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1713 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1717 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1718 /// from local storage.
1719 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1720 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1721 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1722 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1723 let current_time_unix = None;
1725 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1726 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1727 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1728 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1729 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1731 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1732 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1733 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1734 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1735 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1736 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1739 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1740 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1743 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1746 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1750 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1751 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1752 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1755 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1756 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1757 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1759 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1760 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1762 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1763 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1765 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1766 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1767 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1768 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1769 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1772 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1773 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1776 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1777 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1778 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1780 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1781 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1783 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1784 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1785 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1786 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1787 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1788 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1789 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1790 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1791 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1793 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1794 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1795 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1796 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1797 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1798 info.one_to_two = None;
1800 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1801 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1802 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1803 info.two_to_one = None;
1805 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1806 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1807 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1808 // channel_update for.
1809 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1810 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1811 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1812 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1813 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1817 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1818 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1819 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1820 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1821 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1822 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1826 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1827 if let Some(time) = time {
1828 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1830 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1831 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1832 // of this function.
1833 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1835 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1836 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1839 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1843 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1844 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1847 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1850 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1851 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1852 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1854 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1855 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1856 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1857 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1860 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1861 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1862 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1864 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1865 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1866 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1867 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1870 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1872 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1874 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1875 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1876 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1877 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1880 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1881 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
1882 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1884 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1886 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1887 return Err(LightningError {
1888 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1889 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1893 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1895 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1896 // disable this check during tests!
1897 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1898 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1899 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1901 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1902 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1906 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
1908 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1909 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1911 core::mem::drop(channels);
1912 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1913 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1916 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1917 return Err(LightningError{err:
1918 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1919 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1922 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1923 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1924 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1925 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1926 return Err(LightningError{err:
1927 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1928 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1931 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1932 ($target: expr) => {
1933 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1934 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1935 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1936 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1937 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1938 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1939 // but only in the non-normative section.
1940 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1941 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1942 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1943 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1949 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1951 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1952 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1954 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1955 enabled: chan_enabled,
1956 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1957 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1958 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1959 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1961 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1962 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1966 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1970 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1971 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1972 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1973 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1974 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1975 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1976 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1977 })?, "channel_update");
1980 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1983 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1984 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1985 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1986 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1987 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1988 })?, "channel_update");
1991 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2000 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2001 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2002 ($node_id: expr) => {
2003 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2004 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2005 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2007 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2008 entry.remove_entry();
2011 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2016 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2017 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2021 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2022 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2024 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2025 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2029 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2030 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2031 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2034 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2035 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2036 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2037 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2040 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2042 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2043 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2047 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2048 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2049 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2052 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2053 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2054 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2055 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2058 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2059 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2060 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2061 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2062 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2063 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2068 pub(crate) mod tests {
2069 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2070 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2071 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2072 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2073 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2074 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2075 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2076 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2077 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2078 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2079 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2080 use crate::util::test_utils;
2081 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2082 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2084 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2085 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2087 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2088 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2089 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2090 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2091 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2092 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2096 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2097 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2100 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2101 use crate::prelude::*;
2102 use crate::sync::Arc;
2104 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2105 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2106 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2109 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2110 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2111 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2113 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2114 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2115 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2116 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2120 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2121 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2122 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2123 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2124 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2126 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2127 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2128 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2129 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2130 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2131 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2134 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2135 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2136 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2137 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2141 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2142 addresses: Vec::new(),
2143 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2144 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2146 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2147 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2149 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2150 contents: unsigned_announcement
2154 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2155 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2156 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2157 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2158 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2160 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2161 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2162 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2163 short_channel_id: 0,
2164 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2165 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2166 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2167 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2168 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2170 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2171 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2172 ChannelAnnouncement {
2173 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2174 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2175 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2176 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2177 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2181 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2182 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2183 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2184 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2185 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2188 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2189 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2190 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2191 short_channel_id: 0,
2194 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2195 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2196 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2197 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2198 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2199 excess_data: Vec::new()
2201 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2202 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2204 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2205 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2210 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2211 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2212 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2214 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2215 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2216 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2218 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2219 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2221 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2225 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2226 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2227 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2228 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2233 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2234 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2238 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2239 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2241 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2242 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2245 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2248 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2249 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2250 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2251 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2252 // Return false because contains excess data.
2253 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2254 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2258 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2259 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2260 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2261 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2262 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2263 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2265 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2270 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2271 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2272 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2274 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2275 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2277 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2278 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2280 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2281 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2282 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2283 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2284 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2289 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2295 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2296 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2297 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2299 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2302 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2303 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2304 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2305 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2306 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2308 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2309 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2310 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2311 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2313 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2316 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2317 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2318 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2319 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2320 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2321 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2322 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2323 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2328 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2334 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2335 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2336 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2337 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2338 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2340 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2343 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2345 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2347 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2348 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2349 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2351 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2352 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2353 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2354 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2355 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2357 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2360 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2362 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2363 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2364 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2369 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2370 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2371 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2372 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2373 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2374 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2375 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2379 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2380 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2381 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2383 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2386 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2387 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2389 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2392 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2393 // announcement is mainnet).
2394 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2395 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2396 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2397 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2399 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2404 fn handling_channel_update() {
2405 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2406 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2407 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2408 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2409 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2411 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2412 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2414 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2415 let short_channel_id;
2418 // Announce a channel we will update
2419 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2420 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2421 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2423 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2424 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2425 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2432 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2433 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2434 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2435 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2440 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2442 Some(channel_info) => {
2443 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2444 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2449 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2450 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2451 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2452 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2453 // Return false because contains excess data
2454 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2455 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2459 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2460 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2461 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2462 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2463 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2465 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2468 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2469 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2470 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2471 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2472 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2474 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2477 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2478 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2479 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2480 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2481 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2483 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2486 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2487 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2488 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2489 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2490 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2491 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2493 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2496 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2497 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2498 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2499 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2500 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2501 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2502 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2504 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2507 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2508 // update is mainet).
2509 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2510 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2511 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2513 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2515 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2520 fn handling_network_update() {
2521 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2522 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2525 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2526 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2527 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2530 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2531 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2534 let short_channel_id;
2536 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2537 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2538 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2539 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2540 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2541 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2542 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2544 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2545 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2547 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2548 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2551 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2552 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2555 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2557 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2559 Some(channel_info) => {
2560 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2564 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2566 is_permanent: false,
2569 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2571 Some(channel_info) => {
2572 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2577 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2578 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2583 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2584 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2585 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2588 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2589 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2591 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2592 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2593 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2594 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2595 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2596 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2598 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2599 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2601 is_permanent: false,
2604 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2605 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2607 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2608 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2613 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2614 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2615 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2620 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2621 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2622 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2623 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2624 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2625 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2626 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2628 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2629 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2631 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2632 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2633 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2634 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2635 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2637 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2638 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2639 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2640 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2642 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2643 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2644 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2646 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2647 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2648 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2650 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2651 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2652 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2653 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2655 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2656 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2658 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2660 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2661 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2662 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2663 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2664 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2666 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2667 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2668 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2669 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2670 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2671 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2672 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2673 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2674 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2675 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2676 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2677 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2678 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2679 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2680 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2681 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2682 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2685 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2686 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2687 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2689 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2691 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2693 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2695 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2696 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2697 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2699 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2700 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2701 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2702 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2704 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2705 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2706 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2708 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2709 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2710 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2711 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2713 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2714 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2715 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2716 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2717 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2720 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2722 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2723 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2724 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2726 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2728 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2729 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2730 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2732 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2733 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2734 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2735 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2737 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2738 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2739 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2741 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2742 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2743 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2745 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2746 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2747 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2748 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2749 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2754 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2755 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2756 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2757 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2758 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2760 // Channels were not announced yet.
2761 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2762 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2764 let short_channel_id;
2766 // Announce a channel we will update
2767 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2768 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2769 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2775 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2776 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2777 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2778 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2779 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2780 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2786 // Valid channel update
2787 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2788 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2789 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2790 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2796 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2797 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2798 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2799 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2800 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2801 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2807 // Channel update with excess data.
2808 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2809 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2810 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2811 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2812 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2818 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2819 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2820 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2821 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2822 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2823 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2828 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2829 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2830 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2834 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2835 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2836 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2837 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2838 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2839 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2842 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2843 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2846 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2847 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2848 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2854 // Nodes were never announced
2855 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2856 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2859 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2860 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2865 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2866 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2872 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2873 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2875 // Skip the first node.
2876 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2877 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2880 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2881 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2882 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2883 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2884 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2885 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2886 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2891 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2892 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2896 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2897 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2898 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2900 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2901 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2903 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2904 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2905 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2906 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2910 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2911 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2916 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2917 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2918 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2919 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2921 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2922 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2926 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2927 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2928 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2930 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2931 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2933 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2934 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2935 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2936 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2940 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2941 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2942 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2943 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2945 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2946 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2947 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2948 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2950 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
2952 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2954 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2955 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2956 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2960 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2962 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2963 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2964 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2965 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2966 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2969 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2970 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2971 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2972 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2973 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2974 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2975 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2977 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2983 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2984 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2985 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2987 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
2988 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2989 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2990 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2992 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2993 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2994 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2997 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2998 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2999 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3002 // used for testing resumption on same block
3003 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3006 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3007 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3008 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3009 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3015 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3016 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3020 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3022 number_of_blocks: 0,
3025 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3026 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3028 number_of_blocks: 0,
3029 sync_complete: true,
3030 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3034 // Error when wrong chain
3035 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3039 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3041 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3044 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3045 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3047 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3048 sync_complete: true,
3049 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3053 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3054 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3058 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3059 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3060 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3063 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3064 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3065 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3066 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3067 sync_complete: true,
3068 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3072 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3073 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3077 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3078 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3079 number_of_blocks: 1,
3084 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3085 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3086 number_of_blocks: 1,
3087 sync_complete: true,
3088 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3093 // No results in valid query range
3094 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3098 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3099 first_blocknum: 1000,
3100 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3105 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3106 first_blocknum: 1000,
3107 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3108 sync_complete: true,
3109 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3114 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3115 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3119 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3120 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3121 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3126 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3127 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3128 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3129 sync_complete: true,
3130 short_channel_ids: vec![
3131 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3137 // Single block exactly full
3138 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3142 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3143 first_blocknum: 100000,
3144 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3149 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3150 first_blocknum: 100000,
3151 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3152 sync_complete: true,
3153 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3154 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3160 // Multiple split on new block
3161 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3165 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3166 first_blocknum: 100000,
3167 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3172 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3173 first_blocknum: 100000,
3174 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3175 sync_complete: false,
3176 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3177 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3181 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3182 first_blocknum: 107999,
3183 number_of_blocks: 2,
3184 sync_complete: true,
3185 short_channel_ids: vec![
3186 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3192 // Multiple split on same block
3193 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3197 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3198 first_blocknum: 100002,
3199 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3204 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3205 first_blocknum: 100002,
3206 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3207 sync_complete: false,
3208 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3209 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3213 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3214 first_blocknum: 108001,
3215 number_of_blocks: 1,
3216 sync_complete: true,
3217 short_channel_ids: vec![
3218 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3225 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3226 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3227 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3228 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3230 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3232 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3233 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3234 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3235 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3238 assert!(result.is_ok());
3240 assert!(result.is_err());
3243 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3244 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3246 for i in 0..events.len() {
3247 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3249 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3250 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3251 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3252 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3253 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3254 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3255 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3257 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3258 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3259 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3260 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3261 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3263 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3264 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3265 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3268 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3274 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3275 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3276 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3277 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3278 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3280 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3282 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3284 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3286 assert!(result.is_err());
3290 fn displays_node_alias() {
3291 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3292 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3293 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3294 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3297 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3298 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3299 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3301 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3302 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3303 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3304 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3307 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3308 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3309 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3313 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3314 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3315 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3316 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3317 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3318 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3320 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3321 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3324 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3325 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3326 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3327 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3328 last_update_message: None,
3331 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3332 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3334 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3335 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3336 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3338 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3339 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3340 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3342 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3343 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3344 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3345 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3346 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3348 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3349 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3350 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3352 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3353 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3354 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3355 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3356 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3358 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3360 capacity_sats: None,
3361 announcement_message: None,
3362 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3365 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3366 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3368 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3369 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3371 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3372 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3373 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3374 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3375 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3376 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3377 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3378 capacity_sats: None,
3379 announcement_message: None,
3380 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3383 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3384 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3386 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3387 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3389 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3390 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3391 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3393 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3394 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3395 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3396 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3397 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3398 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3399 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3401 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3402 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3403 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3404 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3405 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3409 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3410 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3411 let announcement_message = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3412 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3413 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3414 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3417 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3418 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3421 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3422 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3423 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3424 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3425 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3427 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3428 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3429 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3431 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3432 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3433 channels: Vec::new(),
3434 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3437 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3438 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3439 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3440 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3442 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3443 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3444 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3448 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3449 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = hex::decode("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3450 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3451 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3452 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3453 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3457 fn test_node_id_display() {
3458 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3459 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3467 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3469 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3470 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3471 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3472 let mut v = Vec::new();
3473 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3474 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3475 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3479 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3480 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3481 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3482 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3483 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3484 black_box(&net_graph).encode()