1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
21 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
22 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
23 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
24 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
26 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup};
27 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
28 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
29 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
30 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
31 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
32 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
35 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
36 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
39 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
40 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
41 use crate::sync::Mutex;
42 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
45 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
47 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
49 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
51 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
52 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
54 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
55 /// refuse to relay the message.
56 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
58 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
59 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
60 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
62 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
63 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
64 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
67 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
68 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
69 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
72 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
73 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
78 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
79 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
80 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
84 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
85 write!(f, "{}", log_bytes!(self.0))
89 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
90 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
97 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
98 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
99 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
103 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
104 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
105 Some(self.cmp(other))
109 impl Ord for NodeId {
110 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
111 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
115 impl Writeable for NodeId {
116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
117 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
122 impl Readable for NodeId {
123 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
124 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
125 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
130 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
131 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
132 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
133 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
134 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
136 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
137 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
139 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
141 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
142 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
143 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
144 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
145 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
146 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
147 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
150 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
151 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
152 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
153 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
154 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
155 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
156 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
157 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
159 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
162 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
163 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
164 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
165 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
168 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
169 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
171 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
172 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
173 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
174 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
175 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
176 ChannelUpdateMessage {
177 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
180 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
181 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
183 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
184 short_channel_id: u64,
185 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
186 /// `channel_update` message is received.
189 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
190 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
192 /// The node id of the failed node.
194 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
195 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
200 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
201 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
204 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
205 (0, short_channel_id, required),
206 (2, is_permanent, required),
208 (4, NodeFailure) => {
209 (0, node_id, required),
210 (2, is_permanent, required),
214 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
215 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
216 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
217 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
218 /// serving historical announcements.
219 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
220 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
223 utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
224 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
225 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
226 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
230 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
231 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
233 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
234 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
235 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
236 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
237 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
241 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
243 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
248 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
249 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
250 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
251 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
252 self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
255 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
256 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
258 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
259 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
263 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
264 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
265 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
266 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
267 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
268 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
269 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
277 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
278 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
280 /// [`Event`]: crate::util::events::Event
281 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
282 match *network_update {
283 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
284 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
285 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
286 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
288 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
290 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
291 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
292 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
293 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
295 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
297 log_debug!(self.logger,
298 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
299 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
306 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
307 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
308 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
311 return Err(LightningError {
312 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
313 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
314 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
316 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
318 log_level: Level::Trace,
326 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
327 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
328 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
329 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
330 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
331 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
332 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
334 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
336 log_level: Level::Trace
342 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
343 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
345 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
346 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
347 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
348 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
349 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
352 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
353 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
354 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
355 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
358 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
359 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
360 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
363 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
364 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
365 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
366 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
367 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
368 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
369 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
370 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
371 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
373 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
374 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
376 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
378 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
379 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
385 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
386 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
387 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
388 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
392 for (_, ref node) in iter {
393 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
394 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
402 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
403 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
404 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
406 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
407 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
408 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
409 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
410 /// tracking this directly.
411 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
412 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
413 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
414 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
415 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
419 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
421 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
422 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
423 // updates from all our peers normally.
425 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
426 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
427 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
430 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
431 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
432 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
433 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
434 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
436 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
437 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
438 // relying on it useless.
440 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
441 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
442 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
444 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
445 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
446 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
447 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
448 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
451 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
452 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
453 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
454 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
455 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
456 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
457 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
459 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
460 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
461 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
462 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
464 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
465 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
466 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
468 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
469 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
470 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
471 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
473 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
474 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
475 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
477 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
482 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
483 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
484 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
485 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
486 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
487 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
493 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
494 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
495 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
496 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
500 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
501 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
502 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
503 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
507 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
508 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
509 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
510 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
511 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
512 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
513 /// memory constrained systems.
514 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
515 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
517 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
519 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
520 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
521 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
523 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
524 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
525 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
526 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
527 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
528 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
529 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
530 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
531 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
533 short_channel_ids: vec![],
536 return Err(LightningError {
537 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
538 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
542 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
543 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
544 // exists even if its not yet routable.
545 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
546 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
547 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
548 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
549 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
550 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
551 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
554 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
555 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
560 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
561 let batch_count = batches.len();
562 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
563 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
564 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
565 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
567 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
568 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
569 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
570 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
571 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
572 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
573 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
575 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
576 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
577 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
579 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
580 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
581 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
583 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
584 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
585 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
586 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
588 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
589 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
591 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
594 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
596 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
597 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
598 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
599 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
603 short_channel_ids: batch,
611 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
614 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
615 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
619 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
620 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
621 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
625 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
626 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
627 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
632 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
634 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
637 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
638 let mut ret = Vec::new();
639 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
640 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
645 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
646 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
647 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
648 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
649 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
650 pub last_update: u32,
651 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
653 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
654 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
655 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
656 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
658 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
659 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
660 pub fees: RoutingFees,
661 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
662 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
663 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
664 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
665 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
668 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
669 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
670 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
675 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
676 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
677 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
678 (0, self.last_update, required),
679 (2, self.enabled, required),
680 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
681 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
682 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
683 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
684 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
685 (10, self.fees, required),
686 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
692 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
693 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
694 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
695 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
696 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
697 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
698 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
699 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
700 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
702 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
703 (0, last_update, required),
704 (2, enabled, required),
705 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
706 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
707 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
708 (10, fees, required),
709 (12, last_update_message, required)
712 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
713 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
714 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
715 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
716 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
717 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
719 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
720 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
723 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
728 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
729 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
730 /// Received within a channel announcement.
731 pub struct ChannelInfo {
732 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
733 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
734 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
735 pub node_one: NodeId,
736 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
737 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
738 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
739 pub node_two: NodeId,
740 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
741 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
742 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
743 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
744 /// An initial announcement of the channel
745 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
746 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
747 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
748 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
749 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
750 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
751 /// network graph in memory!).
752 announcement_received_time: u64,
756 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
757 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
758 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
759 let (direction, source) = {
760 if target == &self.node_one {
761 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
762 } else if target == &self.node_two {
763 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
768 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), source))
771 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
772 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
773 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
774 let (direction, target) = {
775 if source == &self.node_one {
776 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
777 } else if source == &self.node_two {
778 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
783 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir), target))
786 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
787 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
788 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
790 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
792 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
797 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
798 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
799 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
800 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
805 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
806 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
807 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
808 (0, self.features, required),
809 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
810 (2, self.node_one, required),
811 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
812 (6, self.node_two, required),
813 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
814 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
815 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
821 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
822 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
823 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
824 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
825 // channel updates via the gossip network.
826 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
828 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
829 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
830 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
831 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
832 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
833 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
834 Err(err) => Err(err),
839 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
840 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
841 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
842 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
843 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
844 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
845 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
846 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
847 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
848 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
849 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
850 (0, features, required),
851 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
852 (2, node_one, required),
853 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
854 (6, node_two, required),
855 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
856 (10, capacity_sats, required),
857 (12, announcement_message, required),
861 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
862 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
863 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
864 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
865 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
866 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
867 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
868 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
873 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
874 /// source node to a target node.
876 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
877 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
878 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
879 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
880 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
883 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
885 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo) -> Self {
886 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
887 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
889 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
890 Some(capacity_msat) => {
891 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
892 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: htlc_maximum_msat }
894 None => EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
898 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
902 /// Returns information for the channel.
904 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
906 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
908 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
909 self.htlc_maximum_msat
912 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
914 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
915 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
917 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
918 self.effective_capacity
921 /// Returns information for the direction.
923 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
926 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
927 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
928 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
929 .field("channel", &self.channel)
934 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
936 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
937 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
938 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
939 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
940 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
943 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
947 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
949 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
952 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
954 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
956 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
957 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
959 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
962 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
963 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
967 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
968 /// use when making routing decisions.
969 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
971 impl EffectiveCapacity {
972 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
973 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
975 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
976 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
977 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
978 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
979 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
984 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
985 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
986 pub struct RoutingFees {
987 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
989 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
990 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
991 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
994 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
995 (0, base_msat, required),
996 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
999 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1000 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1001 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1002 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1003 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1004 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1005 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1006 pub last_update: u32,
1007 /// Color assigned to the node
1009 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1010 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1011 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1012 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1013 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1014 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1015 /// An initial announcement of the node
1016 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1017 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1018 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1019 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1022 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1023 (0, features, required),
1024 (2, last_update, required),
1026 (6, alias, required),
1027 (8, announcement_message, option),
1028 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1031 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1033 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1034 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1035 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1036 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1038 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1039 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1040 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1041 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1042 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1043 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1045 use core::fmt::Write;
1046 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1047 // Display printable ASCII characters
1048 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1049 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1058 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1064 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1065 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1066 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1070 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1071 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1072 pub struct NodeInfo {
1073 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1074 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1075 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1076 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1077 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1078 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1081 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1082 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1083 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1084 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1089 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1090 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1091 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1092 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1093 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1094 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1100 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1101 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1102 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1103 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1104 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1106 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1107 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1108 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1109 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1111 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1118 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1119 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1120 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1121 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1122 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1123 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1124 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1125 let mut _lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees> = None;
1126 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1127 _init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1129 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1130 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1131 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1132 (4, channels, vec_type),
1136 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1137 channels: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1142 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1143 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1145 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1146 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1147 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1149 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1150 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1151 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1152 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1153 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1154 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1156 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1157 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1158 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1159 node_id.write(writer)?;
1160 node_info.write(writer)?;
1163 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1164 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1165 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1171 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1172 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1173 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1175 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1176 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1177 let mut channels = IndexedMap::new();
1178 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1179 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1181 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1183 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1184 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::new();
1185 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1186 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1187 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1188 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1191 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1192 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1193 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1197 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1200 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1201 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1202 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1203 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1204 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1205 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1210 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1211 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1212 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1213 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1214 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1216 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1217 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1218 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1224 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1225 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1226 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1227 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1228 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1229 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1233 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1234 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1235 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1237 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1240 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1241 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1242 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1243 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1244 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1245 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1249 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1250 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1251 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1252 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1253 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1259 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1260 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1261 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1262 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1265 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1266 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1267 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1268 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1271 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1274 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1275 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1276 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1280 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1281 /// given node announcement.
1283 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1284 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1285 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1286 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1287 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1288 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
1289 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1292 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1293 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1294 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1296 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1297 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1300 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1301 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1302 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1304 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1305 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1306 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1307 // that it be at least the current time.
1308 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1309 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1310 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1311 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1316 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1317 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1318 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1319 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1320 features: msg.features.clone(),
1321 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1323 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1324 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1325 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1333 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1335 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1336 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1337 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1339 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1340 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1341 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1342 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1343 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1345 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1347 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1348 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1349 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1350 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1351 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
1352 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1355 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1356 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1357 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1359 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1360 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1361 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1362 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1363 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1365 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1367 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1370 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1372 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1373 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1375 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1376 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1377 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1378 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1381 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1382 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1383 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1385 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1387 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1389 capacity_sats: None,
1390 announcement_message: None,
1391 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1394 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1397 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1398 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1399 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1401 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1402 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1404 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1405 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1406 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1407 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1409 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1410 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1411 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1412 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1414 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1415 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1417 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1418 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1419 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1421 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1424 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1425 entry.insert(channel_info);
1429 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1430 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1431 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1432 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1434 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1435 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1436 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1437 announcement_info: None,
1446 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1447 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1448 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1450 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1452 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1453 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1457 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1459 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1460 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1461 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1462 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1464 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1465 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1466 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1467 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1469 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1470 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1471 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1472 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1473 return Err(LightningError {
1474 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1475 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1478 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1479 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1480 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1481 return Err(LightningError {
1482 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1483 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1490 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1491 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1492 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1493 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1494 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1495 return Err(LightningError{
1496 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1497 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1501 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1502 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1504 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1505 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1506 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1508 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1511 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1512 features: msg.features.clone(),
1513 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1515 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1517 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1518 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1519 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1520 announcement_received_time,
1523 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1526 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1527 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1528 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1529 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1530 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1531 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1532 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1533 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1534 let current_time_unix = None;
1536 self.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, is_permanent, current_time_unix)
1539 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1540 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1541 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1542 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1543 fn channel_failed_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1544 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1546 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1547 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1548 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1549 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1552 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1553 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1554 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1556 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1557 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1563 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1564 /// from local storage.
1565 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1566 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1567 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1568 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1569 let current_time_unix = None;
1571 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1572 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1573 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1574 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1575 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1577 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1578 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1579 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1580 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1581 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1582 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1585 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1586 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1589 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1592 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1596 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1597 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1598 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1601 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1602 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1603 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1605 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1606 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1608 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1609 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1611 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1612 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1613 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1614 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1615 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1618 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1619 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1622 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1623 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1624 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1626 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1627 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1629 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1630 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1631 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1632 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1633 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1634 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1635 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1636 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1637 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1639 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1640 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1641 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1642 info.one_to_two = None;
1644 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1645 info.two_to_one = None;
1647 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1648 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1649 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1650 // channel_update for.
1651 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1652 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1656 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1657 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1658 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1659 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1660 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1661 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1665 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1666 if let Some(time) = time {
1667 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1669 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1670 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1671 // of this function.
1672 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1674 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1675 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1678 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1682 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1683 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1686 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1689 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1690 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1691 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1693 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1694 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1695 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1696 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1699 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1700 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1701 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1703 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1704 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1705 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1706 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1709 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1710 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1712 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1714 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1715 // disable this check during tests!
1716 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1717 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1718 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1720 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1721 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1725 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1726 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1727 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1729 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1730 return Err(LightningError{err:
1731 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1732 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1735 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1736 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1737 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1738 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1739 return Err(LightningError{err:
1740 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1741 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1744 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1745 ($target: expr) => {
1746 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1747 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1748 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1749 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1750 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1751 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1752 // but only in the non-normative section.
1753 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1754 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1755 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1756 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1762 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1764 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1765 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1767 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1768 enabled: chan_enabled,
1769 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1770 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1771 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1772 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1774 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1775 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1779 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1783 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1784 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1785 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1786 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1787 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1788 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1789 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1790 })?, "channel_update");
1792 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1794 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1795 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1796 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1797 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1798 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1799 })?, "channel_update");
1801 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1809 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1810 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1811 ($node_id: expr) => {
1812 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1813 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1814 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1816 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1817 entry.remove_entry();
1820 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1825 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1826 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1830 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1831 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1833 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1834 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1838 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1839 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1840 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1843 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1844 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1845 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1846 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1849 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1851 /// (C-not exported) because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
1852 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1856 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1857 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1858 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1861 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1862 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1863 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1864 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1867 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1868 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1869 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1870 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1871 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1872 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1873 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1882 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1883 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1884 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1885 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1886 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1887 use crate::routing::utxo::UtxoLookupError;
1888 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1889 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1890 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1891 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
1892 use crate::util::test_utils;
1893 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1894 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1895 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1897 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1898 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1900 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1901 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1902 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1903 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1904 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1905 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1909 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1910 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1913 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1914 use crate::prelude::*;
1915 use crate::sync::Arc;
1917 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1918 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1919 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1920 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1923 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1924 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1925 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1927 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1928 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1929 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1930 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1934 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1935 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1936 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1937 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1938 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1940 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1941 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1942 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1943 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1944 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1945 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1948 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1949 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
1950 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1951 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1956 addresses: Vec::new(),
1957 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1958 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1960 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1961 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1963 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1964 contents: unsigned_announcement
1968 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1969 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1970 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1971 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1972 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1974 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1975 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
1976 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1977 short_channel_id: 0,
1978 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
1979 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
1980 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
1981 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
1982 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1984 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1985 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1986 ChannelAnnouncement {
1987 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1988 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1989 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1990 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1991 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1995 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1996 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1997 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1998 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
1999 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2002 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2003 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2004 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2005 short_channel_id: 0,
2008 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2009 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2010 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2011 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2012 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2013 excess_data: Vec::new()
2015 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2016 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2018 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2019 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2024 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2025 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2026 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2028 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2029 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2030 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2032 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2033 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2035 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2039 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2040 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2041 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2042 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2047 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2048 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2052 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2053 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2055 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2056 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2059 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2062 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2063 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2064 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2065 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2066 // Return false because contains excess data.
2067 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2068 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2072 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2073 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2074 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2075 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2076 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2077 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2079 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2084 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2085 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2086 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2088 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2089 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2091 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2092 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2094 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2095 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2096 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2097 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2098 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2099 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2104 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2110 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2111 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2112 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2114 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2117 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2118 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2119 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx);
2120 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2121 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2123 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2124 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2125 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2126 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2128 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2131 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2132 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2133 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2134 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2135 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2136 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2137 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2142 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2148 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2149 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2150 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2151 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2153 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2156 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2158 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2160 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2161 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2162 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2164 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2165 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2166 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2167 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2168 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2170 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2173 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2175 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2176 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2177 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2182 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2183 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2184 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2185 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2186 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2187 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2188 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2192 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2193 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2194 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2196 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2199 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2200 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2202 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2207 fn handling_channel_update() {
2208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2209 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2210 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2211 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2212 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2213 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2215 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2216 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2218 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2219 let short_channel_id;
2222 // Announce a channel we will update
2223 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2224 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2226 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2227 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2228 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2235 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2236 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2237 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2242 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2244 Some(channel_info) => {
2245 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2246 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2251 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2252 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2253 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2254 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2255 // Return false because contains excess data
2256 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2257 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2261 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2262 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2263 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2264 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2265 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2267 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2270 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2271 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2272 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2273 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2274 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2276 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2279 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2280 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2281 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2282 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2283 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2285 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2288 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2289 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2290 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2291 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2292 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2293 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2295 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2298 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2299 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2300 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2301 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2302 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2303 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2304 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2306 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2311 fn handling_network_update() {
2312 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2313 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2314 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2315 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2317 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2318 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2319 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2322 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2323 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2326 let short_channel_id;
2328 // Announce a channel we will update
2329 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2330 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2331 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2332 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2333 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2335 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2336 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2338 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2339 msg: valid_channel_update,
2342 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2345 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2347 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2349 Some(channel_info) => {
2350 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2354 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2356 is_permanent: false,
2359 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2361 Some(channel_info) => {
2362 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2367 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2368 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2373 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2374 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2375 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2378 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2379 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2381 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2382 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2383 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2384 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2385 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2386 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2388 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2389 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2391 is_permanent: false,
2394 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2395 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2397 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2398 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2403 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2404 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2405 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2410 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2411 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2412 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2413 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2414 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2415 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2416 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2419 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2420 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2422 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2423 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2424 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2425 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2426 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2428 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2429 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2430 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2431 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2433 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2434 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2435 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2437 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2438 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2439 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2441 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2442 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2443 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2444 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2446 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2447 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2449 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2451 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2452 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2453 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2454 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2455 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2457 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2458 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2459 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2460 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2461 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2462 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2463 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2464 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2465 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2466 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2467 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2468 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2469 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2470 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2471 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2472 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2473 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2476 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2477 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2478 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2480 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2482 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2484 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2486 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2487 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2488 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2490 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2491 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2492 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2493 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2495 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2496 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2497 network_graph.channel_failed_with_time(short_channel_id, true, Some(tracking_time));
2499 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2500 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2501 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2502 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2504 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2505 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2506 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2507 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2508 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2511 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2513 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2514 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2515 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2517 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2519 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2520 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2521 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2523 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2524 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2525 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2526 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2528 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2529 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2530 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2532 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2533 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2534 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2536 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2537 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2538 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2539 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2540 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2545 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2546 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2547 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2548 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2549 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2551 // Channels were not announced yet.
2552 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2553 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2555 let short_channel_id;
2557 // Announce a channel we will update
2558 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2559 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2560 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2566 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2567 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2568 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2569 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2570 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2571 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2577 // Valid channel update
2578 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2579 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2580 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2581 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2587 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2588 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2589 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2590 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2591 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2592 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2598 // Channel update with excess data.
2599 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2600 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2601 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2602 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2603 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2609 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2610 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2611 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2612 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2613 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2614 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2619 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2620 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2621 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2625 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2626 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2627 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2628 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2629 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2630 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2633 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2634 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2637 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2638 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2639 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2645 // Nodes were never announced
2646 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2647 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2650 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2651 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2656 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2657 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2663 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2664 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2666 // Skip the first node.
2667 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2668 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2671 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2672 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2673 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2674 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2675 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2676 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2677 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2682 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2683 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2687 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2688 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2689 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2691 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2692 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2694 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2695 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2696 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2697 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2701 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2702 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2707 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2708 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2709 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2710 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2712 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2713 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2717 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2718 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2719 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2721 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2722 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2724 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2725 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2726 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2727 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2731 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2732 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2733 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2734 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2736 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2737 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2738 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2739 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2741 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2743 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2745 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2746 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2747 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2751 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2753 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2754 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2755 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2756 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2757 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2760 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2761 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2762 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2763 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2764 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2765 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2766 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2768 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2774 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2775 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2776 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2778 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2779 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2780 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2781 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2783 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2784 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2785 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2788 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2789 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2790 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2793 // used for testing resumption on same block
2794 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2797 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2798 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2799 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2800 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2806 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2807 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2811 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2813 number_of_blocks: 0,
2816 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2817 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2819 number_of_blocks: 0,
2820 sync_complete: true,
2821 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2825 // Error when wrong chain
2826 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2830 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2832 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2835 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2836 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2838 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2839 sync_complete: true,
2840 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2844 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2845 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2849 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2850 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2851 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2854 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2855 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2856 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2857 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2858 sync_complete: true,
2859 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2863 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2864 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2868 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2869 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2870 number_of_blocks: 1,
2875 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2876 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2877 number_of_blocks: 1,
2878 sync_complete: true,
2879 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2884 // No results in valid query range
2885 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2889 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2890 first_blocknum: 1000,
2891 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2896 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2897 first_blocknum: 1000,
2898 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2899 sync_complete: true,
2900 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2905 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2906 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2910 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2911 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2912 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2917 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2918 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2919 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2920 sync_complete: true,
2921 short_channel_ids: vec![
2922 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2928 // Single block exactly full
2929 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2933 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2934 first_blocknum: 100000,
2935 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2940 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2941 first_blocknum: 100000,
2942 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2943 sync_complete: true,
2944 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2945 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2951 // Multiple split on new block
2952 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2956 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2957 first_blocknum: 100000,
2958 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2963 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2964 first_blocknum: 100000,
2965 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2966 sync_complete: false,
2967 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2968 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2972 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2973 first_blocknum: 107999,
2974 number_of_blocks: 2,
2975 sync_complete: true,
2976 short_channel_ids: vec![
2977 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2983 // Multiple split on same block
2984 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2988 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2989 first_blocknum: 100002,
2990 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2995 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2996 first_blocknum: 100002,
2997 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2998 sync_complete: false,
2999 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3000 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3004 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3005 first_blocknum: 108001,
3006 number_of_blocks: 1,
3007 sync_complete: true,
3008 short_channel_ids: vec![
3009 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3016 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3017 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3018 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3019 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3021 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3023 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3024 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3025 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3026 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3029 assert!(result.is_ok());
3031 assert!(result.is_err());
3034 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3035 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3037 for i in 0..events.len() {
3038 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3040 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3041 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3042 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3043 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3044 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3045 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3046 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3048 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3049 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3050 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3051 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3052 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3054 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3055 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3056 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3059 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3065 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3066 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3067 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3068 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3069 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3071 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3073 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3075 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3077 assert!(result.is_err());
3081 fn displays_node_alias() {
3082 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3083 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3084 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3085 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3088 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3089 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3090 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3092 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3093 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3094 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3095 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3098 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3099 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3100 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3104 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3105 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3106 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3108 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3109 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3111 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3112 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3115 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3116 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3117 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3118 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3119 last_update_message: None,
3122 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3123 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3125 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3126 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3127 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3129 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3130 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3131 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3133 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3134 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3135 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3136 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3137 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3139 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3140 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3141 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3143 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3144 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3145 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3146 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3147 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3149 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3151 capacity_sats: None,
3152 announcement_message: None,
3153 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3156 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3157 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3159 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3160 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3162 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3163 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3164 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3165 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3166 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3167 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3168 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3169 capacity_sats: None,
3170 announcement_message: None,
3171 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3174 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3175 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3177 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3178 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3180 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3181 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3182 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3184 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3185 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3186 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3187 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3188 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3189 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3190 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3192 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3193 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3194 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3195 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3196 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3200 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3201 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3203 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3204 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3205 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3206 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3209 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3210 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3211 announcement_message: None,
3214 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3215 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3216 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3217 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3219 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3220 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3221 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3223 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3224 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3225 channels: Vec::new(),
3226 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3229 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3230 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3231 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3232 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3234 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3235 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3236 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3240 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3248 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3249 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3250 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3251 let mut v = Vec::new();
3252 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3254 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3259 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3260 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3261 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3262 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3264 let _ = net_graph.encode();