1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
188 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
189 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
190 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
191 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
192 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
198 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
199 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
200 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
201 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
202 /// serving historical announcements.
204 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
205 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
206 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
207 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
210 chain_access: Option<C>,
211 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
212 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
216 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
217 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
219 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
220 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
221 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
222 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
223 /// channel owners' keys.
224 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
227 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
229 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
234 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
235 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
236 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
237 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
238 self.chain_access = chain_access;
241 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
242 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
244 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
245 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
249 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
250 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
251 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
252 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
253 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
254 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
261 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
262 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
264 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
265 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
266 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
267 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
268 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
269 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg);
271 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
272 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
273 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
274 self.network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
276 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
277 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
278 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
279 self.network_graph.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
285 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
286 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
287 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
290 return Err(LightningError {
291 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
292 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
293 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
295 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
297 log_level: Level::Trace,
305 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
306 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
308 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
309 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
310 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
311 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
312 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
315 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
316 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
317 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
318 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
321 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
322 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
323 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
326 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
327 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
328 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
329 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
330 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
331 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
332 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
333 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
334 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
335 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
336 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
337 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
339 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
340 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
342 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
344 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
345 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
354 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
355 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
356 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
357 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
358 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
362 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
364 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
365 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
366 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
367 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
368 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
378 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
379 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
380 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
382 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
383 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
384 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
385 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
386 /// tracking this directly.
387 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
388 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
389 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
393 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
395 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
396 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
397 // updates from all our peers normally.
399 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
400 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
401 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
404 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
405 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
406 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
407 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
408 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
410 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
411 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
412 // relying on it useless.
414 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
415 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
416 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
418 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
419 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
420 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
421 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
422 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
425 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
426 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
427 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
428 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
429 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
430 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
431 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
433 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
434 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
435 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
436 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
438 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
439 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
440 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
442 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
443 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
444 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
445 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
446 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
448 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
449 if should_request_full_sync {
450 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
452 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
456 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
457 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
458 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
459 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
460 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
461 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
462 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
467 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
468 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
469 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
470 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
474 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
475 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
476 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
477 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
481 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
482 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
483 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
484 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
485 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
486 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
487 /// memory constrained systems.
488 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
489 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
491 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
493 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
494 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
495 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
497 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
498 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
499 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
500 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
501 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
502 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
503 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
504 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
505 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
507 short_channel_ids: vec![],
510 return Err(LightningError {
511 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
512 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
516 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
517 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
518 // exists even if its not yet routable.
519 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
520 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
521 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
522 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
523 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
524 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
525 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
528 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
529 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
534 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
535 let batch_count = batches.len();
536 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
537 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
538 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
539 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
541 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
542 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
543 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
544 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
545 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
546 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
547 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
549 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
550 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
551 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
553 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
554 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
555 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
557 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
558 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
559 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
560 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
562 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
563 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
565 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
568 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
570 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
571 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
572 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
573 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
577 short_channel_ids: batch,
585 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
588 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
589 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
594 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
596 C::Target: chain::Access,
599 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
600 let mut ret = Vec::new();
601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
602 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
607 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
608 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
609 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
610 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
611 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
612 pub last_update: u32,
613 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
615 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
616 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
617 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
618 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
619 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
620 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
621 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
622 pub fees: RoutingFees,
623 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
624 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
625 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
626 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
627 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
630 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
631 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
632 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
637 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
638 (0, last_update, required),
639 (2, enabled, required),
640 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
641 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
642 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
643 (10, fees, required),
644 (12, last_update_message, required),
647 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
648 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
649 /// Received within a channel announcement.
650 pub struct ChannelInfo {
651 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
652 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
653 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
654 pub node_one: NodeId,
655 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
656 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
657 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
658 pub node_two: NodeId,
659 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
660 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
661 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
662 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
663 /// An initial announcement of the channel
664 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
665 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
666 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
667 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
668 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
669 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
670 /// network graph in memory!).
671 announcement_received_time: u64,
675 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
676 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
677 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
678 let (direction, source) = {
679 if target == &self.node_one {
680 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
681 } else if target == &self.node_two {
682 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
687 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
690 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
691 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
692 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
693 let (direction, target) = {
694 if source == &self.node_one {
695 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
696 } else if source == &self.node_two {
697 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
702 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
705 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
706 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
707 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
709 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
711 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
716 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
718 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
719 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
724 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
725 (0, features, required),
726 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
727 (2, node_one, required),
728 (4, one_to_two, required),
729 (6, node_two, required),
730 (8, two_to_one, required),
731 (10, capacity_sats, required),
732 (12, announcement_message, required),
735 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
736 /// source node to a target node.
738 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
739 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
740 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
741 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
742 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
745 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
747 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
748 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
749 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
751 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
752 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
753 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
754 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
756 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
757 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
759 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
760 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
762 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
766 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
770 /// Returns information for the channel.
771 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
773 /// Returns information for the direction.
774 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
776 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
777 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
778 self.htlc_maximum_msat
781 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
783 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
784 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
786 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
787 self.effective_capacity
790 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
791 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
792 match self.direction {
793 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
799 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
800 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
801 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
802 .field("channel", &self.channel)
807 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
809 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
810 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
813 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
814 /// Returns information for the channel.
816 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
818 /// Returns information for the direction.
820 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
822 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
824 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
826 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
828 pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() }
831 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
832 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
837 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
839 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
840 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
841 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
842 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
843 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
846 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
850 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
852 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
855 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
857 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
860 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
863 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
864 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
868 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
869 /// use when making routing decisions.
870 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
872 impl EffectiveCapacity {
873 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
874 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
876 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
877 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
878 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
879 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
880 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
885 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
886 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
887 pub struct RoutingFees {
888 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
890 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
891 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
892 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
895 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
896 (0, base_msat, required),
897 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
900 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
901 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
902 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
903 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
904 pub features: NodeFeatures,
905 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
906 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
907 pub last_update: u32,
908 /// Color assigned to the node
910 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
911 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
912 /// should not be exposed to the user.
914 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
915 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
916 /// An initial announcement of the node
917 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
918 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
919 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
920 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
923 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
924 (0, features, required),
925 (2, last_update, required),
927 (6, alias, required),
928 (8, announcement_message, option),
929 (10, addresses, vec_type),
932 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
933 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
934 pub struct NodeInfo {
935 /// All valid channels a node has announced
936 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
937 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
938 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
939 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
940 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
941 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
942 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
943 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
944 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
947 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
948 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
949 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
950 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
955 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
956 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
957 (2, announcement_info, option),
958 (4, channels, vec_type),
961 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
962 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
964 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
965 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
966 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
968 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
969 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
970 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
971 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
972 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
973 chan_info.write(writer)?;
975 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
976 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
977 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
978 node_id.write(writer)?;
979 node_info.write(writer)?;
982 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
983 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
984 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
990 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
991 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, _logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
992 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
994 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
995 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
996 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
997 for _ in 0..channels_count {
998 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
999 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1000 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1002 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1003 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1004 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1005 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1006 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1007 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1010 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1011 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1012 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1016 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1019 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1020 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1021 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1026 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1027 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1028 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1029 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1030 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1032 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1033 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1034 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1040 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1041 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1042 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1043 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1044 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1048 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1049 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1050 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, _logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1052 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1055 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1056 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1057 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1061 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1062 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1063 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1064 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1065 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1071 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1072 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1073 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1074 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1077 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1078 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1079 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1080 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1083 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1086 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1087 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1088 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1092 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1093 /// given node announcement.
1095 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1096 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1097 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1098 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1099 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1100 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1101 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1104 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1105 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1106 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1108 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1109 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1112 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1113 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1114 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1116 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1117 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1118 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1119 // that it be at least the current time.
1120 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1121 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1122 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1123 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1128 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1129 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1130 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1131 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1132 features: msg.features.clone(),
1133 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1136 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1137 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1145 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1147 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1148 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1149 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1151 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1152 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1153 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1154 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1155 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1157 C::Target: chain::Access,
1159 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1160 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1161 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1162 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1163 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1164 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1167 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1168 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1169 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1171 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1172 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1173 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1174 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1175 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1177 C::Target: chain::Access,
1179 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1182 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1184 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1185 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1187 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1188 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1189 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1190 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1193 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1194 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1195 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1197 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1199 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1201 capacity_sats: None,
1202 announcement_message: None,
1203 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1206 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1209 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1210 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1211 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1213 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1214 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1216 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1217 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1218 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1219 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1221 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1222 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1223 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1224 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1226 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1227 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1229 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1230 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1231 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1233 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1236 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1237 entry.insert(channel_info);
1241 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1242 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1243 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1244 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1246 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1247 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1248 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1249 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1250 announcement_info: None,
1259 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1260 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1261 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1263 C::Target: chain::Access,
1265 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1266 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1269 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1271 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1274 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1275 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1276 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1277 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1278 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1279 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1280 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1281 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1282 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1283 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1285 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1286 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1289 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1290 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1292 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1293 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1299 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1300 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1301 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1303 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1306 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1307 features: msg.features.clone(),
1308 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1310 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1312 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1313 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1314 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1315 announcement_received_time,
1318 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1321 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1322 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1323 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1324 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1325 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1326 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1328 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1329 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1330 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1333 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1334 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1335 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1337 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1338 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1344 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1345 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1347 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1349 // TODO: downgrade the node
1353 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1354 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1355 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1358 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1359 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1360 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1362 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1363 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1365 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1366 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1367 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1368 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1369 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1372 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1373 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1376 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1377 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1378 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1380 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1381 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1382 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1383 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1384 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1385 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1386 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1387 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1388 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1390 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1391 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1392 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1393 info.one_to_two = None;
1395 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1396 info.two_to_one = None;
1398 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1399 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1400 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1401 // channel_update for.
1402 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1403 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1407 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1408 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1409 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1410 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1411 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1416 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1419 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1420 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1421 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1423 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1424 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1425 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1426 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1429 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1430 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1431 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1433 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1434 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1435 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1436 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1439 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1441 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1442 let chan_was_enabled;
1444 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1446 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1447 // disable this check during tests!
1448 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1449 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1450 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1452 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1453 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1457 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1458 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1459 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1461 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1462 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1463 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1466 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1467 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1468 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1469 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1470 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1474 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1475 ($target: expr) => {
1476 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1477 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1478 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1479 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1480 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1481 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1482 // but only in the non-normative section.
1483 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1484 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1485 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1486 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1488 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1490 chan_was_enabled = false;
1495 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1497 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1498 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1500 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1501 enabled: chan_enabled,
1502 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1503 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1504 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1505 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1507 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1508 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1512 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1516 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1517 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1518 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1519 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1520 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1521 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1522 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1523 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1524 })?, "channel_update");
1526 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1528 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1529 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1530 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1531 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1532 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1533 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1534 })?, "channel_update");
1536 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1541 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1543 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1544 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1545 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1546 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1547 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1548 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1550 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1552 proportional_millionths
1554 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1555 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1556 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1558 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1559 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1561 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1562 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1564 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1566 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1567 if chan_info.enabled {
1568 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1569 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1570 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1571 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1576 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1582 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1583 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1584 ($node_id: expr) => {
1585 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1586 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1587 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1589 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1590 entry.remove_entry();
1593 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1598 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1599 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1603 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1604 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1606 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1607 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1611 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1613 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1614 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1618 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1619 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1620 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1621 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1622 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1623 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1624 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1634 use ln::PaymentHash;
1635 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1636 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1637 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1638 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1639 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1640 use util::test_utils;
1641 use util::logger::Logger;
1642 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1643 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1644 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1646 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1648 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1649 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1650 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1651 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1652 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1653 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1654 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1658 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1659 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1662 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1666 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1667 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1668 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1669 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1672 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1673 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1674 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1676 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1677 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1678 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1679 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1683 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1684 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1685 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1686 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1688 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1689 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1690 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1691 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1692 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1693 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1696 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1697 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1698 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1699 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1704 addresses: Vec::new(),
1705 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1706 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1708 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1709 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1711 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1712 contents: unsigned_announcement
1716 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1717 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1718 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1719 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1720 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1722 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1723 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1724 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1725 short_channel_id: 0,
1728 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1729 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1730 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1732 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1733 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1734 ChannelAnnouncement {
1735 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1736 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1737 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1738 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1739 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1743 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1744 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1745 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1746 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1747 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1748 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1749 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1750 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1754 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1755 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1756 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1757 short_channel_id: 0,
1760 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1761 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1762 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1763 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1764 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1765 excess_data: Vec::new()
1767 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1768 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1770 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1771 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1776 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1777 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1778 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1780 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1781 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1782 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1784 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1785 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1787 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1791 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1792 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1793 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1794 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1799 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1800 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1804 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1805 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
1807 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1808 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1811 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1814 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1815 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1816 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1817 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1818 // Return false because contains excess data.
1819 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1820 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1824 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1825 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1826 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1827 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1828 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1829 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1831 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1836 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1837 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1838 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1840 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1841 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1843 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1844 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1846 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1847 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1848 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, Arc::clone(&logger));
1849 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1850 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1851 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1856 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1862 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1863 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1864 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1866 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1869 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1870 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1871 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1872 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, Arc::clone(&logger));
1873 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1875 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1876 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1877 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1878 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1880 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1883 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1884 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1885 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1886 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1887 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1888 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1889 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1894 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1900 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1901 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1902 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1903 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1905 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1908 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1909 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1910 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1911 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1912 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1913 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1914 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1915 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1919 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1920 Some(channel_entry) => {
1921 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1927 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1928 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1929 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1930 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1931 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1932 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1933 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1937 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1938 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1939 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1941 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1944 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1945 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1947 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1952 fn handling_channel_update() {
1953 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1954 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1955 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1956 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1957 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, Arc::clone(&logger));
1958 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1960 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1961 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1963 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1964 let short_channel_id;
1967 // Announce a channel we will update
1968 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1969 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1971 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1972 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1973 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1980 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1981 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1982 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1987 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1989 Some(channel_info) => {
1990 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1991 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1996 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1997 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1998 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1999 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2000 // Return false because contains excess data
2001 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2002 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2006 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2007 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2008 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2009 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2010 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2012 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2015 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2016 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
2017 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2018 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2019 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2021 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2024 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2025 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
2026 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2027 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2028 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2030 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2033 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2034 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2035 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2036 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2037 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2038 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2040 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2043 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2044 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2045 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2046 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2047 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2048 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2049 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2051 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2056 fn handling_network_update() {
2057 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2058 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2059 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2060 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2061 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2062 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2064 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2065 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2068 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2069 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2072 let short_channel_id;
2074 // Announce a channel we will update
2075 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2076 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2077 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2078 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2079 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2081 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2082 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2084 gossip_sync.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2087 rejected_by_dest: false,
2088 all_paths_failed: true,
2090 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2091 msg: valid_channel_update,
2093 short_channel_id: None,
2099 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2102 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2104 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2106 Some(channel_info) => {
2107 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2111 gossip_sync.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2113 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2114 rejected_by_dest: false,
2115 all_paths_failed: true,
2117 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2119 is_permanent: false,
2121 short_channel_id: None,
2127 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2129 Some(channel_info) => {
2130 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2135 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2136 gossip_sync.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2138 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2139 rejected_by_dest: false,
2140 all_paths_failed: true,
2142 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2146 short_channel_id: None,
2152 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2153 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2154 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2155 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2159 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2160 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2161 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2162 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2163 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2164 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2165 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2166 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2168 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2169 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2171 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2172 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2173 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2174 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2175 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2177 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2178 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2179 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2181 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2182 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2183 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2185 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2186 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2188 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2189 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2190 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2191 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2192 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2193 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2194 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2196 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2197 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2198 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2201 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2202 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2206 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2207 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2208 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2209 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2210 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2212 // Channels were not announced yet.
2213 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2214 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2216 let short_channel_id;
2218 // Announce a channel we will update
2219 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2220 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2221 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2227 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2228 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2229 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2230 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2231 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2232 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2233 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2240 // Valid channel update
2241 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2242 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2243 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2244 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2250 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2251 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2252 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2253 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2254 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2255 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2256 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2262 // Channel update with excess data.
2263 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2264 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2265 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2266 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2267 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2273 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2274 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2275 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2276 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2277 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2278 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2279 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2284 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2285 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2286 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2290 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2291 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2292 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2293 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2294 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2295 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2298 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2299 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2302 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2303 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2304 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2311 // Nodes were never announced
2312 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2313 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2316 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2317 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2322 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2323 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2329 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2330 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2332 // Skip the first node.
2333 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2334 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2337 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2338 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2339 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2340 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2341 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2342 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2343 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2348 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2349 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2353 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2354 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2355 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2357 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2358 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2360 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2361 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2362 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2363 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2367 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2368 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2373 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2374 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2375 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2376 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2378 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2379 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2383 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2384 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2385 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2387 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2388 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2390 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2391 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2392 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2393 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2397 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2398 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2399 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2401 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2402 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2403 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2404 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2406 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2408 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2410 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2411 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2412 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2416 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2418 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2419 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2420 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2421 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2423 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2424 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2425 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2426 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2427 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2428 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2429 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2431 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2437 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2438 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2439 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2441 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2442 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2443 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2444 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2446 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2447 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2448 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2451 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2452 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2453 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2456 // used for testing resumption on same block
2457 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2460 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2461 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2462 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2463 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2469 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2470 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2474 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2476 number_of_blocks: 0,
2479 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2480 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2482 number_of_blocks: 0,
2483 sync_complete: true,
2484 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2488 // Error when wrong chain
2489 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2493 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2495 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2498 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2499 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2501 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2502 sync_complete: true,
2503 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2507 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2508 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2512 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2513 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2514 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2517 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2518 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2519 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2520 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2521 sync_complete: true,
2522 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2526 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2527 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2531 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2532 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2533 number_of_blocks: 1,
2538 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2539 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2540 number_of_blocks: 1,
2541 sync_complete: true,
2542 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2547 // No results in valid query range
2548 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2552 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2553 first_blocknum: 1000,
2554 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2559 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2560 first_blocknum: 1000,
2561 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2562 sync_complete: true,
2563 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2568 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2569 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2573 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2574 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2575 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2580 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2581 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2582 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2583 sync_complete: true,
2584 short_channel_ids: vec![
2585 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2591 // Single block exactly full
2592 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2596 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2597 first_blocknum: 100000,
2598 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2603 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2604 first_blocknum: 100000,
2605 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2606 sync_complete: true,
2607 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2608 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2614 // Multiple split on new block
2615 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2619 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2620 first_blocknum: 100000,
2621 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2626 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2627 first_blocknum: 100000,
2628 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2629 sync_complete: false,
2630 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2631 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2635 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2636 first_blocknum: 107999,
2637 number_of_blocks: 2,
2638 sync_complete: true,
2639 short_channel_ids: vec![
2640 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2646 // Multiple split on same block
2647 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2651 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2652 first_blocknum: 100002,
2653 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2658 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2659 first_blocknum: 100002,
2660 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2661 sync_complete: false,
2662 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2663 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2667 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2668 first_blocknum: 108001,
2669 number_of_blocks: 1,
2670 sync_complete: true,
2671 short_channel_ids: vec![
2672 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2679 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2680 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2681 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2682 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2684 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2686 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2687 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2688 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2689 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2692 assert!(result.is_ok());
2694 assert!(result.is_err());
2697 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2698 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2700 for i in 0..events.len() {
2701 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2703 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2704 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2705 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2706 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2707 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2708 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2709 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2711 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2712 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2713 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2714 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2715 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2717 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2718 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2719 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2722 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2728 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2729 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2730 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2731 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2732 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2734 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2736 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2738 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2740 assert!(result.is_err());
2744 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2752 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2753 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2754 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2755 let mut v = Vec::new();
2756 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2758 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
2763 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2764 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2765 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2766 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
2768 let _ = net_graph.encode();