1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
43 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
44 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
45 use crate::sync::Mutex;
46 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
47 use core::str::FromStr;
49 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
50 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
52 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
54 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
56 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
57 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
59 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
60 /// refuse to relay the message.
61 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
63 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
64 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
65 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
67 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
68 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
69 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
72 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
73 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
74 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
77 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
78 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
82 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
83 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
87 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
88 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
89 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
93 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
94 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
95 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
98 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
99 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
100 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
104 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
105 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
110 impl Eq for NodeId {}
112 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
113 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
114 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
118 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
119 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
120 Some(self.cmp(other))
124 impl Ord for NodeId {
125 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
126 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
130 impl Writeable for NodeId {
131 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
132 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
137 impl Readable for NodeId {
138 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
139 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
140 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
145 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
146 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
147 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
151 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
152 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
154 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
159 impl FromStr for NodeId {
160 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
162 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
163 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
168 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
169 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
170 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
171 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
172 chain_hash: ChainHash,
174 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
175 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
176 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
177 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
179 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
180 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
181 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
182 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
183 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
184 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
185 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
188 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
189 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
190 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
191 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
192 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
193 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
194 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
195 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
196 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
197 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
200 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
201 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
202 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
203 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
206 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
207 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
209 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
210 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
212 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
213 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
214 ChannelUpdateMessage {
215 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
218 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
219 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
221 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
222 short_channel_id: u64,
223 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
224 /// `channel_update` message is received.
227 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
228 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
230 /// The node id of the failed node.
232 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
233 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
238 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
239 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
242 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
243 (0, short_channel_id, required),
244 (2, is_permanent, required),
246 (4, NodeFailure) => {
247 (0, node_id, required),
248 (2, is_permanent, required),
252 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
253 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
254 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
255 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
256 /// serving historical announcements.
257 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
258 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
261 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
262 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
263 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
264 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
268 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
269 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
271 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
272 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
273 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
274 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
275 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
278 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
279 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
280 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
281 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
286 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
287 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
288 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
289 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
290 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
293 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
294 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
296 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
297 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
301 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
302 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
303 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
304 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
305 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
306 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
307 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
314 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
316 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
318 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
321 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
322 if update_msg.as_ref()
323 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
328 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
329 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
331 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
332 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
333 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
334 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
341 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
345 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
346 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
348 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
349 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
351 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
352 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
353 match *network_update {
354 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
355 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
356 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
357 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
358 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
360 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
362 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
363 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
366 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
368 log_debug!(self.logger,
369 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
370 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
376 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
377 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
382 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
383 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
384 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
387 return Err(LightningError {
388 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
389 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
390 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
391 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
392 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
394 log_level: Level::Trace,
402 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
403 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
404 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
405 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
406 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
407 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
408 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
409 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
410 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
412 log_level: Level::Trace
418 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
419 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
420 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
421 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
424 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
426 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
427 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
428 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
429 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
434 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
436 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
437 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
438 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
439 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
440 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
441 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
442 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
447 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
448 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
450 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
451 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
452 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
453 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
454 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
457 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
458 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
459 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
462 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
463 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
464 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
467 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
468 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
469 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
470 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
471 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
472 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
473 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
474 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
475 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
477 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
478 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
480 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
482 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
483 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
489 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
490 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
491 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
492 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
496 for (_, ref node) in iter {
497 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
498 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
506 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
507 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
508 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
510 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
511 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
512 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
513 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
514 /// tracking this directly.
516 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
517 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
518 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
519 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
520 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
521 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
522 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
523 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
524 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
525 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
529 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
531 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
532 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
533 // updates from all our peers normally.
535 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
536 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
537 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
540 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
541 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
542 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
543 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
544 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
546 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
547 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
548 // relying on it useless.
550 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
551 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
552 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
554 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
555 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
556 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
557 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
558 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
561 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
562 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
563 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
564 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
565 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
566 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
567 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
569 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
570 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
571 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
572 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
574 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
575 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
576 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
578 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
579 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
580 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
581 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
583 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
584 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
585 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
587 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
591 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
592 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
593 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
594 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
595 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
596 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
597 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
603 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
604 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
605 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
606 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
610 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
611 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
612 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
613 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
617 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
618 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
619 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
620 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
621 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
622 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
623 /// memory constrained systems.
624 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
625 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
627 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
629 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
630 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
631 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
633 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
634 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
635 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
636 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
637 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
638 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
639 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
640 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
641 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
643 short_channel_ids: vec![],
646 return Err(LightningError {
647 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
648 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
652 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
653 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
654 // exists even if its not yet routable.
655 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
656 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
657 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
658 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
659 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
660 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
661 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
664 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
665 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
670 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
671 let batch_count = batches.len();
672 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
673 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
674 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
675 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
677 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
678 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
679 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
680 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
681 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
682 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
683 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
685 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
686 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
687 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
689 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
690 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
691 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
693 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
694 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
695 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
696 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
698 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
699 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
701 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
704 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
706 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
707 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
708 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
709 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
713 short_channel_ids: batch,
721 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
724 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
725 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
729 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
730 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
731 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
735 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
736 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
737 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
741 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
742 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
746 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
748 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
751 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
752 let mut ret = Vec::new();
753 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
754 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
759 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
760 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
761 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
762 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
763 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
764 pub last_update: u32,
765 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
767 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
768 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
769 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
770 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
771 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
772 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
773 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
774 pub fees: RoutingFees,
775 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
776 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
777 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
778 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
779 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
782 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
783 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
784 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
789 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
790 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
791 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
792 (0, self.last_update, required),
793 (2, self.enabled, required),
794 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
795 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
796 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
797 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
798 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
799 (10, self.fees, required),
800 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
806 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
807 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
808 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
809 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
810 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
811 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
812 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
813 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
814 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
816 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
817 (0, last_update, required),
818 (2, enabled, required),
819 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
820 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
821 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
822 (10, fees, required),
823 (12, last_update_message, required)
826 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
827 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
828 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
829 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
830 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
831 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
833 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
834 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
837 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
842 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
843 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
844 /// Received within a channel announcement.
845 pub struct ChannelInfo {
846 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
847 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
848 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
849 pub node_one: NodeId,
850 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
851 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
852 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
853 pub node_two: NodeId,
854 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
855 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
856 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
857 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
858 /// An initial announcement of the channel
859 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
860 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
861 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
862 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
863 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
864 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
865 /// network graph in memory!).
866 announcement_received_time: u64,
870 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
871 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
872 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
873 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
874 if target == &self.node_one {
875 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
876 } else if target == &self.node_two {
877 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
882 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
885 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
886 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
887 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
888 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
889 if source == &self.node_one {
890 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
891 } else if source == &self.node_two {
892 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
897 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
900 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
901 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
902 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
904 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
906 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
911 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
912 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
913 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
914 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
919 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
920 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
921 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
922 (0, self.features, required),
923 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
924 (2, self.node_one, required),
925 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
926 (6, self.node_two, required),
927 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
928 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
929 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
935 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
936 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
937 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
938 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
939 // channel updates via the gossip network.
940 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
942 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
943 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
944 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
945 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
946 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
947 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
948 Err(err) => Err(err),
953 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
954 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
955 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
956 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
957 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
958 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
959 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
960 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
961 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
962 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
963 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
964 (0, features, required),
965 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
966 (2, node_one, required),
967 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
968 (6, node_two, required),
969 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
970 (10, capacity_sats, required),
971 (12, announcement_message, required),
975 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
976 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
977 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
978 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
979 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
980 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
981 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
982 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
987 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
988 /// source node to a target node.
990 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
991 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
992 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
993 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
994 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
995 /// Outbound from the perspective of `node_one`.
997 /// If true, the channel is considered to be outbound from `node_one` perspective.
998 /// If false, the channel is considered to be outbound from `node_two` perspective.
1000 /// [`ChannelInfo::node_one`]
1001 /// [`ChannelInfo::node_two`]
1005 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1007 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, outbound: bool) -> Self {
1008 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = direction.htlc_maximum_msat;
1009 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1011 let effective_capacity = match capacity_msat {
1012 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1013 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1014 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1016 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1020 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity, outbound
1024 /// Returns information for the channel.
1026 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1028 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
1030 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1031 self.htlc_maximum_msat
1034 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1036 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1037 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1039 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1040 self.effective_capacity
1043 /// Returns information for the direction.
1045 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1047 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1049 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1050 pub(super) fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.outbound { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1052 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1054 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1055 pub(super) fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.outbound { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1058 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1059 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1060 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1061 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1066 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1068 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1069 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1070 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1071 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1072 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1075 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1077 liquidity_msat: u64,
1079 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1081 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1084 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1086 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1088 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1089 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1091 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1094 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1096 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1099 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1100 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1104 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1105 /// use when making routing decisions.
1106 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1108 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1109 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1110 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1112 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1113 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1114 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1115 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1116 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1117 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1122 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1123 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1124 pub struct RoutingFees {
1125 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1127 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1128 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1129 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1132 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1133 (0, base_msat, required),
1134 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1138 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1139 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1140 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1141 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1142 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1143 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1144 pub last_update: u32,
1145 /// Color assigned to the node
1147 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1148 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1149 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1150 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1151 /// An initial announcement of the node
1152 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1153 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1154 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1155 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1158 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1159 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1160 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1161 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1162 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1163 .unwrap_or_default()
1167 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1168 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1169 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1170 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1171 (0, self.features, required),
1172 (2, self.last_update, required),
1173 (4, self.rgb, required),
1174 (6, self.alias, required),
1175 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1176 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1182 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1183 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1184 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1185 (0, features, required),
1186 (2, last_update, required),
1188 (6, alias, required),
1189 (8, announcement_message, option),
1190 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1192 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1193 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1194 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1198 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1200 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1201 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1202 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1203 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1205 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1206 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1207 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1208 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1209 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1210 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1212 use core::fmt::Write;
1213 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1214 // Display printable ASCII characters
1215 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1216 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1225 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1231 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1232 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1233 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1237 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1238 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1239 pub struct NodeInfo {
1240 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1241 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1242 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1243 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1244 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1245 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1248 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1249 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1250 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1251 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1256 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1257 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1258 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1259 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1260 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1261 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1267 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1268 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1269 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1270 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1271 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1273 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1274 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1275 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1276 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1278 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1285 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1286 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1287 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1288 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1289 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1290 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1291 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1292 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1293 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1294 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1295 (4, channels, required_vec),
1297 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1298 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1301 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1307 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1308 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1310 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1311 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1312 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1314 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1315 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1316 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1317 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1318 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1319 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1321 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1322 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1323 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1324 node_id.write(writer)?;
1325 node_info.write(writer)?;
1328 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1329 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1330 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1336 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1337 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1338 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1340 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1341 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1342 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1343 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1344 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1345 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1346 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1347 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1349 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1350 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1351 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1352 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1353 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1354 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1355 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1358 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1359 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1360 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1364 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1367 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1368 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1369 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1370 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1371 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1372 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1377 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1378 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1379 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1380 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1381 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1383 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1384 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1385 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1391 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1392 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1393 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1394 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1395 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1396 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1397 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1398 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1399 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1400 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1401 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1405 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1406 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1407 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1409 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1410 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1412 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1413 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1414 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1415 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1416 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1417 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1421 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1422 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1423 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1424 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1425 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1431 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1432 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1433 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1434 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1437 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1438 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1439 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1440 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1443 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1446 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1447 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1448 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1452 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1453 /// given node announcement.
1455 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1456 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1457 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1458 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1459 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1460 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1463 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1464 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1465 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1467 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1468 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1471 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1472 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1473 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1475 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1476 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1477 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1480 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1481 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1482 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1483 // that it be at least the current time.
1484 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1485 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1486 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1487 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1492 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1493 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1494 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1495 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1496 features: msg.features.clone(),
1497 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1500 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1508 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1510 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1511 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1512 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1514 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1515 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1516 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1517 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1518 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1520 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1522 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1523 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1526 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1528 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1529 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1530 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1532 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1533 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1534 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1535 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1536 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1539 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1540 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1541 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1543 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1544 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1545 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1546 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1547 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1549 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1551 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1554 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1556 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1557 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1559 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1560 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1561 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1562 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1565 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1566 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1567 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1569 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1571 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1573 capacity_sats: None,
1574 announcement_message: None,
1575 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1578 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1581 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1582 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1583 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1585 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1586 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1588 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1590 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1591 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1592 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1593 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1595 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1596 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1597 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1598 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1600 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1601 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1603 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1604 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1605 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1607 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1610 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1611 entry.insert(channel_info);
1615 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1616 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1617 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1618 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1620 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1621 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1622 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1623 announcement_info: None,
1632 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1633 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1634 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1636 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1638 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1639 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1642 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1643 return Err(LightningError {
1644 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1645 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1650 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1652 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1653 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1654 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1655 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1657 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1658 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1659 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1660 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1662 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1663 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1664 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1665 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1666 return Err(LightningError {
1667 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1668 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1671 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1672 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1673 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1674 return Err(LightningError {
1675 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1676 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1683 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1684 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1685 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1686 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1687 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1688 return Err(LightningError{
1689 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1690 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1694 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1695 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1697 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1698 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1699 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1701 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1704 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1705 features: msg.features.clone(),
1706 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1708 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1710 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1711 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1712 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1713 announcement_received_time,
1716 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1718 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1722 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1724 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1725 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1726 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1727 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1728 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1729 let current_time_unix = None;
1731 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1734 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1736 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1737 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1738 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1739 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1740 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1741 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1742 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1746 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1747 /// from local storage.
1748 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1749 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1750 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1751 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1752 let current_time_unix = None;
1754 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1755 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1756 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1757 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1758 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1760 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1761 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1762 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1763 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1764 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1765 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1768 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1769 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1772 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1775 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1779 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1780 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1781 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1784 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1785 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1786 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1788 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1789 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1791 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1792 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1794 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1795 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1796 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1797 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1798 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1801 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1802 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1805 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1806 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1807 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1809 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1810 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1812 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1813 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1814 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1815 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1816 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1817 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1818 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1819 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1820 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1822 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1823 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1824 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1825 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1826 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1827 info.one_to_two = None;
1829 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1830 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1831 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1832 info.two_to_one = None;
1834 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1835 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1836 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1837 // channel_update for.
1838 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1839 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1840 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1841 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1842 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1846 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1847 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1848 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1849 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1850 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1851 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1855 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1856 if let Some(time) = time {
1857 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1859 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1860 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1861 // of this function.
1862 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1864 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1865 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1868 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1872 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1873 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1876 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1879 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1880 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1881 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1883 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1884 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1885 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1886 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1889 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1890 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1891 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1893 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1894 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1895 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1896 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1899 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1901 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1903 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1904 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1905 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1906 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1909 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1910 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
1911 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1913 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1915 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1916 return Err(LightningError {
1917 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1918 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1922 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1924 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1925 // disable this check during tests!
1926 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1927 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1928 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1930 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1931 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1935 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
1937 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1938 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1940 core::mem::drop(channels);
1941 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1942 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1945 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1946 return Err(LightningError{err:
1947 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1948 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1951 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1952 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1953 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1954 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1955 return Err(LightningError{err:
1956 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1957 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1960 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1961 ($target: expr) => {
1962 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1963 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1964 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1965 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1966 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1967 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1968 // but only in the non-normative section.
1969 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1970 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1971 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1972 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1978 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1980 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1981 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1983 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1984 enabled: chan_enabled,
1985 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1986 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1987 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1988 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1990 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1991 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1995 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1999 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2000 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2001 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2002 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2003 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2004 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2005 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2006 })?, "channel_update");
2009 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2012 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2013 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2014 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2015 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2016 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2017 })?, "channel_update");
2020 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2029 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2030 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2031 ($node_id: expr) => {
2032 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2033 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2034 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2036 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2037 entry.remove_entry();
2040 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2045 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2046 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2050 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2051 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2053 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2054 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2058 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2059 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2060 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2063 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2064 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2065 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2066 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2069 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2071 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2072 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2076 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2077 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2078 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2081 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2082 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2083 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2084 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2087 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2088 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2089 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2090 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2091 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2092 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2097 pub(crate) mod tests {
2098 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2099 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2100 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2101 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2102 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2103 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2104 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2105 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2106 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2107 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2108 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2109 use crate::util::test_utils;
2110 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2111 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2113 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2114 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2116 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2117 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2118 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2119 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2120 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2121 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2122 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2123 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2124 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2127 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2128 use crate::prelude::*;
2129 use crate::sync::Arc;
2131 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2132 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2133 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2136 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2137 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2138 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2140 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2141 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2142 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2143 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2147 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2148 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2149 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2150 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2151 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2153 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2154 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2155 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2156 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2157 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2158 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2161 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2162 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2163 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2164 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2168 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2169 addresses: Vec::new(),
2170 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2171 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2173 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2174 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2176 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2177 contents: unsigned_announcement
2181 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2182 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2183 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2184 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2185 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2187 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2188 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2189 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2190 short_channel_id: 0,
2191 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2192 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2193 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2194 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2195 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2197 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2198 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2199 ChannelAnnouncement {
2200 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2201 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2202 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2203 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2204 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2208 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2209 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2210 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2211 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2212 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2215 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2216 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2217 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2218 short_channel_id: 0,
2221 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2222 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2223 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2224 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2225 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2226 excess_data: Vec::new()
2228 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2229 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2231 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2232 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2237 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2238 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2239 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2241 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2242 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2243 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2245 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2246 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2248 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2252 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2253 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2254 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2255 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2260 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2261 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2265 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2266 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2268 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2269 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2272 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2275 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2276 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2277 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2278 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2279 // Return false because contains excess data.
2280 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2281 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2285 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2286 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2287 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2288 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2289 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2290 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2292 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2297 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2298 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2299 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2301 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2302 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2304 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2305 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2307 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2308 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2309 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2310 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2311 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2316 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2322 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2323 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2324 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2326 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2329 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2330 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2331 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2332 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2333 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2335 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2336 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2337 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2338 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2340 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2343 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2344 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2345 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2346 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2347 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2348 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2349 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2350 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2355 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2361 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2362 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2363 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2364 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2365 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2367 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2370 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2372 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2374 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2375 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2376 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2378 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2379 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2380 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2381 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2382 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2384 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2387 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2389 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2390 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2391 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2396 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2397 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2398 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2399 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2400 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2401 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2402 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2406 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2407 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2408 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2410 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2413 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2414 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2416 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2419 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2420 // announcement is mainnet).
2421 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2422 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2423 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2424 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2426 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2431 fn handling_channel_update() {
2432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2433 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2434 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2435 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2436 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2438 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2439 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2441 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2442 let short_channel_id;
2445 // Announce a channel we will update
2446 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2447 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2448 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2450 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2451 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2452 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2459 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2460 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2461 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2462 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2467 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2469 Some(channel_info) => {
2470 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2471 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2476 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2477 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2478 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2479 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2480 // Return false because contains excess data
2481 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2482 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2486 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2487 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2488 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2489 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2490 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2492 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2495 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2496 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2497 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2498 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2499 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2501 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2504 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2505 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2506 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2507 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2508 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2510 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2513 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2514 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2515 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2516 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2517 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2518 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2520 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2523 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2524 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2525 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2526 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2527 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2528 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2529 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2531 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2534 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2535 // update is mainet).
2536 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2537 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2538 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2540 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2542 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2547 fn handling_network_update() {
2548 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2549 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2550 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2552 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2553 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2554 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2557 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2558 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2561 let short_channel_id;
2563 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2564 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2565 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2566 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2567 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2568 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2569 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2571 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2572 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2574 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2575 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2578 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2579 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2582 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2584 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2586 Some(channel_info) => {
2587 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2591 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2593 is_permanent: false,
2596 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2598 Some(channel_info) => {
2599 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2604 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2605 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2610 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2611 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2612 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2615 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2616 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2618 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2619 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2620 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2621 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2622 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2623 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2625 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2626 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2628 is_permanent: false,
2631 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2632 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2634 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2635 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2640 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2641 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2642 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2648 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2649 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2650 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2651 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2652 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2653 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2655 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2656 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2658 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2659 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2660 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2661 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2662 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2664 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2665 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2666 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2667 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2669 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2670 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2671 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2673 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2674 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2675 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2677 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2678 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2679 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2680 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2682 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2683 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2685 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2687 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2688 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2689 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2690 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2691 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2693 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2694 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2695 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2696 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2697 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2698 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2699 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2700 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2701 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2702 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2703 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2704 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2705 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2706 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2707 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2708 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2709 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2712 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2713 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2714 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2716 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2718 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2720 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2722 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2723 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2724 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2726 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2727 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2728 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2729 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2731 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2732 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2733 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2735 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2736 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2737 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2738 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2740 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2741 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2742 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2743 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2744 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2747 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2749 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2750 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2751 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2753 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2755 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2756 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2757 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2759 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2760 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2761 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2762 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2764 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2765 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2766 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2768 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2769 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2770 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2772 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2773 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2774 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2775 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2776 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2781 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2782 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2783 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2784 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2785 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2787 // Channels were not announced yet.
2788 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2789 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2791 let short_channel_id;
2793 // Announce a channel we will update
2794 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2795 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2796 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2802 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2803 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2804 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2805 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2806 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2807 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2813 // Valid channel update
2814 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2815 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2816 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2817 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2823 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2824 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2825 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2826 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2827 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2828 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2834 // Channel update with excess data.
2835 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2836 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2837 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2838 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2839 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2845 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2846 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2847 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2848 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2849 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2850 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2855 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2856 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2857 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2861 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2862 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2863 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2864 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2865 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2866 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2869 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2870 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2873 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2874 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2875 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2881 // Nodes were never announced
2882 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2883 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2886 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2887 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2892 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2893 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2899 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2900 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2902 // Skip the first node.
2903 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2904 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2907 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2908 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2909 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2910 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2911 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2912 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2913 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2918 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2919 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2923 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2924 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2925 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2927 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2928 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2930 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2931 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2932 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2933 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2937 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2938 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2943 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2944 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2945 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2946 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2948 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2949 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2953 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2954 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2955 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2957 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2958 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2960 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2961 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2962 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2963 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2967 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2968 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2969 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2970 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2972 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2973 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2974 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2975 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2977 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
2979 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2981 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2982 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2983 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2987 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2989 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2990 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2991 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
2992 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
2993 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2996 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2997 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2998 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2999 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3000 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3001 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3002 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3004 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3010 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3011 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3012 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3014 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3015 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3016 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3017 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3019 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3020 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3021 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3024 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3025 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3026 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3029 // used for testing resumption on same block
3030 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3033 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3034 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3035 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3036 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3042 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3043 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3047 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3049 number_of_blocks: 0,
3052 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3053 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3055 number_of_blocks: 0,
3056 sync_complete: true,
3057 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3061 // Error when wrong chain
3062 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3066 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3068 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3071 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3072 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3074 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3075 sync_complete: true,
3076 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3080 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3081 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3085 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3086 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3087 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3090 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3091 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3092 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3093 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3094 sync_complete: true,
3095 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3099 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3100 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3104 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3105 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3106 number_of_blocks: 1,
3111 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3112 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3113 number_of_blocks: 1,
3114 sync_complete: true,
3115 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3120 // No results in valid query range
3121 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3125 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3126 first_blocknum: 1000,
3127 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3132 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3133 first_blocknum: 1000,
3134 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3135 sync_complete: true,
3136 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3141 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3142 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3146 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3147 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3148 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3153 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3154 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3155 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3156 sync_complete: true,
3157 short_channel_ids: vec![
3158 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3164 // Single block exactly full
3165 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3169 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3170 first_blocknum: 100000,
3171 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3176 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3177 first_blocknum: 100000,
3178 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3179 sync_complete: true,
3180 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3181 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3187 // Multiple split on new block
3188 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3192 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3193 first_blocknum: 100000,
3194 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3199 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3200 first_blocknum: 100000,
3201 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3202 sync_complete: false,
3203 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3204 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3208 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3209 first_blocknum: 107999,
3210 number_of_blocks: 2,
3211 sync_complete: true,
3212 short_channel_ids: vec![
3213 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3219 // Multiple split on same block
3220 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3224 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3225 first_blocknum: 100002,
3226 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3231 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3232 first_blocknum: 100002,
3233 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3234 sync_complete: false,
3235 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3236 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3240 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3241 first_blocknum: 108001,
3242 number_of_blocks: 1,
3243 sync_complete: true,
3244 short_channel_ids: vec![
3245 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3252 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3253 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3254 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3255 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3257 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3259 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3260 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3261 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3262 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3265 assert!(result.is_ok());
3267 assert!(result.is_err());
3270 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3271 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3273 for i in 0..events.len() {
3274 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3276 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3277 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3278 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3279 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3280 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3281 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3282 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3284 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3285 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3286 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3287 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3288 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3290 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3291 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3292 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3295 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3301 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3302 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3303 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3304 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3305 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3307 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3309 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3311 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3313 assert!(result.is_err());
3317 fn displays_node_alias() {
3318 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3319 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3320 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3321 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3324 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3325 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3326 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3328 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3329 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3330 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3331 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3334 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3335 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3336 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3340 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3341 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3342 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3343 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3344 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3345 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3347 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3348 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3351 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3352 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3353 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3354 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3355 last_update_message: None,
3358 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3359 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3361 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3362 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3363 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3365 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3366 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3367 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3369 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3370 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3371 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3372 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3373 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3375 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3376 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3377 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3379 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3380 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3381 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3382 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3383 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3385 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3387 capacity_sats: None,
3388 announcement_message: None,
3389 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3392 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3393 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3395 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3396 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3398 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3399 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3400 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3401 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3402 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3403 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3404 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3405 capacity_sats: None,
3406 announcement_message: None,
3407 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3410 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3411 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3413 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3414 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3416 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3417 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3418 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3420 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3421 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3422 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3423 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3424 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3425 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3426 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3428 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3429 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3430 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3431 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3432 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3436 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3437 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3438 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3439 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3440 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3441 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3444 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3445 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3448 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3449 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3450 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3451 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3452 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3454 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3455 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3456 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3458 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3459 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3460 channels: Vec::new(),
3461 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3464 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3465 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3466 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3467 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3469 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3470 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3471 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3475 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3476 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3477 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3478 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3479 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3480 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3484 fn test_node_id_display() {
3485 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3486 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3494 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3496 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3497 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3498 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3499 let mut v = Vec::new();
3500 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3501 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3502 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3506 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3507 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3508 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3509 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3510 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3511 black_box(&net_graph).encode()