1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
188 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
189 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
190 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
191 /// serving historical announcements.
193 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
194 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
195 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
196 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
199 chain_access: Option<C>,
200 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
201 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
205 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
206 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
208 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
209 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
210 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
211 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
212 /// channel owners' keys.
213 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
216 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
218 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
223 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
224 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
225 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
226 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
227 self.chain_access = chain_access;
230 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
231 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
233 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
234 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
238 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
239 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
240 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
241 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
242 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
243 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
251 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
252 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
253 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
254 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
255 match *network_update {
256 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
257 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
258 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
259 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
261 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
263 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
264 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
265 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
266 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
268 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
269 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
270 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
271 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
279 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
280 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
281 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
284 return Err(LightningError {
285 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
286 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
287 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
289 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
291 log_level: Level::Trace,
299 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
300 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
302 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
303 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
304 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
305 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
306 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
309 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
310 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
311 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
312 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
315 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
316 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
317 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
320 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
321 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
322 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
323 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
324 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
325 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
326 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
327 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
328 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
329 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
330 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
331 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
333 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
334 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
336 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
338 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
339 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
348 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
349 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
350 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
351 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
352 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
356 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
358 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
359 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
360 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
361 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
362 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
372 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
373 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
374 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
376 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
377 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
378 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
379 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
380 /// tracking this directly.
381 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
382 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
383 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
387 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
389 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
390 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
391 // updates from all our peers normally.
393 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
394 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
395 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
398 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
399 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
400 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
401 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
402 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
404 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
405 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
406 // relying on it useless.
408 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
409 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
410 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
412 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
413 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
414 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
415 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
416 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
419 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
420 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
421 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
422 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
423 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
424 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
425 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
427 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
428 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
429 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
430 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
432 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
433 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
434 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
436 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
437 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
438 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
439 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
440 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
442 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
443 if should_request_full_sync {
444 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
446 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
450 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
451 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
452 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
453 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
454 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
455 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
456 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
461 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
462 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
463 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
464 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
468 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
469 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
470 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
471 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
475 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
476 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
477 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
478 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
479 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
480 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
481 /// memory constrained systems.
482 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
483 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
485 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
487 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
488 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
489 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
491 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
492 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
493 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
494 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
495 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
496 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
497 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
498 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
499 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
501 short_channel_ids: vec![],
504 return Err(LightningError {
505 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
506 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
510 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
511 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
512 // exists even if its not yet routable.
513 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
514 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
515 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
516 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
517 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
518 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
519 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
522 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
523 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
529 let batch_count = batches.len();
530 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
531 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
532 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
533 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
535 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
536 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
537 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
538 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
539 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
540 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
541 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
543 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
544 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
545 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
547 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
548 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
549 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
551 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
552 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
553 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
554 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
556 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
557 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
559 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
562 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
564 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
565 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
566 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
567 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
571 short_channel_ids: batch,
579 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
582 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
583 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
588 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
590 C::Target: chain::Access,
593 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
594 let mut ret = Vec::new();
595 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
596 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
602 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
603 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
604 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
605 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
606 pub last_update: u32,
607 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
609 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
610 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
611 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
612 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
613 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
614 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
615 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
616 pub fees: RoutingFees,
617 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
618 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
619 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
620 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
621 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
624 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
626 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
631 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
632 (0, last_update, required),
633 (2, enabled, required),
634 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
635 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
636 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
637 (10, fees, required),
638 (12, last_update_message, required),
641 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
642 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
643 /// Received within a channel announcement.
644 pub struct ChannelInfo {
645 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
646 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
647 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
648 pub node_one: NodeId,
649 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
650 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
651 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
652 pub node_two: NodeId,
653 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
654 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
655 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
656 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
657 /// An initial announcement of the channel
658 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
659 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
660 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
661 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
662 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
663 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
664 /// network graph in memory!).
665 announcement_received_time: u64,
669 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
670 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
671 pub(crate) fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
672 let (direction, source) = {
673 if target == &self.node_one {
674 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
675 } else if target == &self.node_two {
676 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
681 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
684 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
685 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
686 pub(crate) fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
687 let (direction, target) = {
688 if source == &self.node_one {
689 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
690 } else if source == &self.node_two {
691 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
696 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
699 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
700 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
701 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
703 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
705 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
710 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
711 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
712 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
713 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
718 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
719 (0, features, required),
720 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
721 (2, node_one, required),
722 (4, one_to_two, required),
723 (6, node_two, required),
724 (8, two_to_one, required),
725 (10, capacity_sats, required),
726 (12, announcement_message, required),
729 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
730 /// source node to a target node.
732 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
733 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
734 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
735 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
736 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
739 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
741 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
742 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
743 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
745 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
746 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
747 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
748 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
750 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
751 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
753 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
754 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
756 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
760 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
764 /// Returns information for the channel.
765 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
767 /// Returns information for the direction.
768 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
770 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
771 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
772 self.htlc_maximum_msat
775 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
777 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
778 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
780 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
781 self.effective_capacity
784 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
785 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
786 match self.direction {
787 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
793 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
794 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
795 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
796 .field("channel", &self.channel)
801 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
803 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
804 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
807 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
808 /// Returns information for the channel.
810 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
812 /// Returns information for the direction.
814 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
816 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
818 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
820 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
822 pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() }
825 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
826 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
831 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
833 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
834 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
835 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
836 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
837 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
840 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
844 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
846 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
849 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
851 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
854 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
857 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
858 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
862 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
863 /// use when making routing decisions.
864 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
866 impl EffectiveCapacity {
867 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
868 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
870 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
871 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
872 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
873 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
874 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
879 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
880 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
881 pub struct RoutingFees {
882 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
884 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
885 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
886 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
889 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
890 (0, base_msat, required),
891 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
894 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
895 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
896 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
897 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
898 pub features: NodeFeatures,
899 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
900 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
901 pub last_update: u32,
902 /// Color assigned to the node
904 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
905 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
906 /// should not be exposed to the user.
908 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
909 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
910 /// An initial announcement of the node
911 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
912 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
913 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
914 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
917 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
918 (0, features, required),
919 (2, last_update, required),
921 (6, alias, required),
922 (8, announcement_message, option),
923 (10, addresses, vec_type),
926 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
927 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
928 pub struct NodeInfo {
929 /// All valid channels a node has announced
930 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
931 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
932 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
933 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
934 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
935 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
936 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
937 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
938 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
941 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
942 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
943 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
944 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
949 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
950 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
951 (2, announcement_info, option),
952 (4, channels, vec_type),
955 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
956 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
958 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
959 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
960 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
962 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
963 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
964 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
965 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
966 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
967 chan_info.write(writer)?;
969 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
970 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
971 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
972 node_id.write(writer)?;
973 node_info.write(writer)?;
976 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
977 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
978 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
984 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
985 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
986 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
988 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
989 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
990 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
991 for _ in 0..channels_count {
992 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
993 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
994 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
996 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
997 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
998 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
999 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1000 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1001 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1004 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1005 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1006 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1010 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1013 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1014 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1015 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1020 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1021 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1022 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1023 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1024 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1026 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1027 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1028 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1034 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1035 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1036 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1037 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1038 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1042 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1043 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1044 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1046 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1049 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1050 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1051 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1055 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1056 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1057 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1058 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1059 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1065 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1066 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1067 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1068 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1071 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1072 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1073 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1074 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1077 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1080 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1081 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1082 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1086 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1087 /// given node announcement.
1089 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1090 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1091 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1092 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1093 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1094 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1095 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1098 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1099 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1100 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1102 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1103 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1106 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1107 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1108 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1110 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1111 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1112 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1113 // that it be at least the current time.
1114 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1115 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1116 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1117 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1122 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1123 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1124 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1125 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1126 features: msg.features.clone(),
1127 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1130 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1131 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1139 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1141 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1142 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1143 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1145 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1146 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1147 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1148 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1149 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1151 C::Target: chain::Access,
1153 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1154 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1155 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1156 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1157 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1158 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1161 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1162 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1163 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1165 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1166 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1167 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1168 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1169 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1171 C::Target: chain::Access,
1173 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1176 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1178 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1179 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1181 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1182 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1183 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1184 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1187 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1188 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1189 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1191 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1193 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1195 capacity_sats: None,
1196 announcement_message: None,
1197 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1200 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1203 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1204 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1205 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1207 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1208 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1210 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1211 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1212 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1213 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1215 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1216 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1217 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1218 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1220 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1221 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1223 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1224 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1225 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1227 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1230 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1231 entry.insert(channel_info);
1235 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1236 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1237 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1238 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1240 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1241 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1242 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1243 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1244 announcement_info: None,
1253 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1254 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1255 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1257 C::Target: chain::Access,
1259 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1260 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1263 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1265 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1268 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1269 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1270 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1271 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1272 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1273 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1274 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1275 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1276 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1277 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1279 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1280 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1283 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1284 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1286 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1287 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1293 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1294 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1295 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1297 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1300 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1301 features: msg.features.clone(),
1302 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1304 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1306 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1307 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1308 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1309 announcement_received_time,
1312 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1315 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1316 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1317 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1318 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1319 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1320 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1322 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1323 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1324 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1327 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1328 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1329 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1331 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1332 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1338 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1339 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1341 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1343 // TODO: downgrade the node
1347 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1348 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1349 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1352 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1353 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1354 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1356 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1357 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1359 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1360 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1361 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1362 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1363 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1366 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1367 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1370 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1371 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1372 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1374 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1375 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1376 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1377 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1378 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1379 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1380 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1381 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1382 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1384 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1385 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1386 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1387 info.one_to_two = None;
1389 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1390 info.two_to_one = None;
1392 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1393 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1394 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1395 // channel_update for.
1396 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1397 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1401 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1402 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1403 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1404 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1405 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1410 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1413 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1414 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1415 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1417 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1418 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1419 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1420 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1423 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1424 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1425 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1427 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1428 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1429 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1430 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1433 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1435 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1436 let chan_was_enabled;
1438 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1440 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1441 // disable this check during tests!
1442 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1443 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1444 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1446 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1447 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1451 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1452 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1453 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1455 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1456 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1457 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1460 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1461 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1462 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1463 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1464 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1468 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1469 ($target: expr) => {
1470 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1471 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1472 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1473 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1474 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1475 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1476 // but only in the non-normative section.
1477 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1478 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1479 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1480 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1482 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1484 chan_was_enabled = false;
1489 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1491 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1492 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1494 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1495 enabled: chan_enabled,
1496 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1497 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1498 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1499 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1501 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1502 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1506 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1510 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1511 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1512 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1513 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1514 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1515 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1516 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1517 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1518 })?, "channel_update");
1520 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1522 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1523 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1524 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1525 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1526 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1527 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1528 })?, "channel_update");
1530 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1535 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1537 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1538 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1539 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1540 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1541 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1542 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1544 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1546 proportional_millionths
1548 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1549 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1550 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1552 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1553 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1555 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1556 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1558 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1560 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1561 if chan_info.enabled {
1562 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1563 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1564 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1565 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1570 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1576 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1577 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1578 ($node_id: expr) => {
1579 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1580 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1581 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1583 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1584 entry.remove_entry();
1587 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1592 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1593 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1597 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1598 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1600 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1601 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1605 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1607 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1608 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1612 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1613 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1614 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1615 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1616 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1617 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1618 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1628 use ln::PaymentHash;
1629 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1630 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1631 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1632 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1633 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1634 use util::test_utils;
1635 use util::logger::Logger;
1636 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1637 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1638 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1640 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1642 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1643 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1644 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1645 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1646 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1647 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1648 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1652 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1653 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1656 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1660 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1661 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1662 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1663 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1666 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1667 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1668 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1670 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1671 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1672 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1673 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1677 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1678 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1679 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1680 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1682 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1683 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1684 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1685 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1686 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1687 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1690 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1691 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1692 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1693 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1698 addresses: Vec::new(),
1699 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1700 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1702 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1703 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1705 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1706 contents: unsigned_announcement
1710 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1711 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1712 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1713 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1714 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1716 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1717 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1718 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1719 short_channel_id: 0,
1722 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1723 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1724 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1726 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1727 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1728 ChannelAnnouncement {
1729 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1730 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1731 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1732 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1733 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1737 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1738 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1739 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1740 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1741 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1742 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1743 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1744 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1748 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1749 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1750 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1751 short_channel_id: 0,
1754 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1755 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1756 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1757 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1758 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1759 excess_data: Vec::new()
1761 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1762 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1764 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1765 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1770 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1771 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1772 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1774 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1775 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1776 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1778 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1779 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1781 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1785 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1786 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1787 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1788 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1793 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1794 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1798 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1799 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
1801 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1802 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1805 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1808 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1809 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1810 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1811 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1812 // Return false because contains excess data.
1813 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1814 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1818 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1819 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1820 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1821 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1822 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1823 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1825 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1830 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1831 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1832 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1834 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1835 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1837 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1838 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1840 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1841 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1842 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, Arc::clone(&logger));
1843 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1844 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1845 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1850 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1856 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1857 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1858 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1860 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1863 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1864 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1865 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1866 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, Arc::clone(&logger));
1867 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1869 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1870 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1871 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1872 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1874 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1877 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1878 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1879 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1880 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1881 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1882 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1883 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1888 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1894 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1895 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1896 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1897 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1899 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1902 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1903 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1904 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1905 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1906 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1907 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1908 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1909 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1913 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1914 Some(channel_entry) => {
1915 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1921 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1922 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1923 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1924 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1925 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1926 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1927 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1931 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1932 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1933 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1935 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1938 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1939 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1941 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1946 fn handling_channel_update() {
1947 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1948 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1949 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1950 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1951 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, Arc::clone(&logger));
1952 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1954 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1955 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1957 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1958 let short_channel_id;
1961 // Announce a channel we will update
1962 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1963 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1965 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1966 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1967 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1974 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1975 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1976 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1981 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1983 Some(channel_info) => {
1984 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1985 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1990 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1991 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1992 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1993 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1994 // Return false because contains excess data
1995 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1996 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2000 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2001 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2002 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2003 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2004 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2006 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2009 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2010 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
2011 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2012 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2013 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2015 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2018 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2019 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
2020 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2021 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2022 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2024 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2027 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2028 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2029 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2030 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2031 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2032 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2034 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2037 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2038 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2039 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2040 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2041 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2042 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2043 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2045 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2050 fn handling_network_update() {
2051 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2052 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2053 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2054 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2056 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2057 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2060 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2061 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2064 let short_channel_id;
2066 // Announce a channel we will update
2067 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2068 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2069 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2070 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2071 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2073 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2074 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2076 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2078 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2079 rejected_by_dest: false,
2080 all_paths_failed: true,
2082 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2083 msg: valid_channel_update,
2085 short_channel_id: None,
2091 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2094 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2096 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2098 Some(channel_info) => {
2099 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2103 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2105 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2106 rejected_by_dest: false,
2107 all_paths_failed: true,
2109 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2111 is_permanent: false,
2113 short_channel_id: None,
2119 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2121 Some(channel_info) => {
2122 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2127 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2128 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2131 rejected_by_dest: false,
2132 all_paths_failed: true,
2134 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2138 short_channel_id: None,
2144 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2145 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2146 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2147 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2151 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2152 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2153 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2154 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2155 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2156 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2157 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2158 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2160 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2161 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2163 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2164 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2165 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2166 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2167 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2169 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2170 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2171 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2173 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2174 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2175 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2177 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2178 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2180 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2181 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2182 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2183 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2184 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2185 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2186 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2188 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2189 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2190 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2193 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2194 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2198 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2199 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2200 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2201 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2202 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2204 // Channels were not announced yet.
2205 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2206 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2208 let short_channel_id;
2210 // Announce a channel we will update
2211 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2212 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2213 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2219 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2220 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2221 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2222 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2223 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2224 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2225 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2232 // Valid channel update
2233 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2234 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2235 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2236 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2242 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2243 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2244 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2245 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2246 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2247 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2248 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2254 // Channel update with excess data.
2255 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2256 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2257 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2258 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2259 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2265 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2266 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2267 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2268 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2269 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2270 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2271 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2276 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2277 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2278 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2282 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2283 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2284 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2285 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2286 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2287 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2290 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2291 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2294 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2295 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2296 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2303 // Nodes were never announced
2304 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2305 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2308 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2309 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2314 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2315 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2321 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2322 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2324 // Skip the first node.
2325 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2326 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2329 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2330 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2331 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2332 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2333 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2334 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2335 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2340 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2341 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2345 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2346 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2347 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2349 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2350 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2352 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2353 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2354 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2355 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2359 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2360 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2365 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2366 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2367 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2368 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2370 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2371 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2375 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2376 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2377 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2379 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2380 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2382 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2383 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2384 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2385 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2389 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2390 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2391 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2393 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2394 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2395 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2396 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2398 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2400 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2402 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2403 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2404 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2408 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2410 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2411 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2412 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2415 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2416 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2417 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2418 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2419 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2420 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2421 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2423 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2429 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2430 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2431 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2433 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2434 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2435 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2436 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2438 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2439 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2440 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2443 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2444 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2445 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2448 // used for testing resumption on same block
2449 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2452 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2453 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2454 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2455 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2461 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2462 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2466 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2468 number_of_blocks: 0,
2471 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2472 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2474 number_of_blocks: 0,
2475 sync_complete: true,
2476 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2480 // Error when wrong chain
2481 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2485 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2487 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2490 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2491 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2493 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2494 sync_complete: true,
2495 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2499 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2500 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2504 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2505 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2506 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2509 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2510 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2511 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2512 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2513 sync_complete: true,
2514 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2518 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2519 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2523 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2524 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2525 number_of_blocks: 1,
2530 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2531 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2532 number_of_blocks: 1,
2533 sync_complete: true,
2534 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2539 // No results in valid query range
2540 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2544 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2545 first_blocknum: 1000,
2546 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2551 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2552 first_blocknum: 1000,
2553 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2554 sync_complete: true,
2555 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2560 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2561 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2565 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2566 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2567 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2572 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2573 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2574 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2575 sync_complete: true,
2576 short_channel_ids: vec![
2577 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2583 // Single block exactly full
2584 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2588 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2589 first_blocknum: 100000,
2590 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2595 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2596 first_blocknum: 100000,
2597 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2598 sync_complete: true,
2599 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2600 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2606 // Multiple split on new block
2607 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2611 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2612 first_blocknum: 100000,
2613 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2618 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2619 first_blocknum: 100000,
2620 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2621 sync_complete: false,
2622 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2623 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2627 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2628 first_blocknum: 107999,
2629 number_of_blocks: 2,
2630 sync_complete: true,
2631 short_channel_ids: vec![
2632 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2638 // Multiple split on same block
2639 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2643 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2644 first_blocknum: 100002,
2645 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2650 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2651 first_blocknum: 100002,
2652 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2653 sync_complete: false,
2654 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2655 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2659 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2660 first_blocknum: 108001,
2661 number_of_blocks: 1,
2662 sync_complete: true,
2663 short_channel_ids: vec![
2664 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2671 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2672 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2673 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2674 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2676 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2678 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2679 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2680 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2681 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2684 assert!(result.is_ok());
2686 assert!(result.is_err());
2689 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2690 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2692 for i in 0..events.len() {
2693 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2695 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2696 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2697 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2698 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2699 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2700 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2701 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2703 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2704 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2705 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2706 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2707 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2709 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2710 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2711 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2714 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2720 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2721 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2722 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2723 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2724 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2726 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2728 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2730 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2732 assert!(result.is_err());
2736 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2744 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2745 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2746 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2747 let mut v = Vec::new();
2748 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2750 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
2755 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2756 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2757 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2758 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
2760 let _ = net_graph.encode();