1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, GossipTimestampFilter, NodeAnnouncement};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
29 use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::indexed_map::{Entry as IndexedMapEntry, IndexedMap};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::ser::{MaybeReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer};
35 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::sync::Mutex;
41 use crate::sync::{LockTestExt, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
42 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
43 use core::str::FromStr;
44 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
45 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Create a new NodeId from a slice of bytes
77 pub fn from_slice(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
78 if bytes.len() != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE {
79 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
81 let mut data = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
82 data.copy_from_slice(bytes);
86 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
91 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
92 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
96 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
97 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
98 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
102 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
103 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
104 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
107 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
108 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
109 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
113 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
114 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
119 impl Eq for NodeId {}
121 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
122 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
123 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
127 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
128 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
129 Some(self.cmp(other))
133 impl Ord for NodeId {
134 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
135 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
139 impl Writeable for NodeId {
140 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
141 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
146 impl Readable for NodeId {
147 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
148 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
149 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
154 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
155 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
156 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
160 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
161 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
163 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
168 impl FromStr for NodeId {
169 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
171 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
172 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
177 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
178 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
179 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
180 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
181 chain_hash: ChainHash,
183 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
184 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
185 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
186 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
188 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
189 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
190 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
191 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
192 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
193 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
194 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
197 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
198 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
199 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
200 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
201 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
202 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
203 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
204 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
205 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
206 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
209 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
210 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
211 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
212 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
215 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
216 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
218 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
219 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
220 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
221 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
222 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
224 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
225 short_channel_id: u64,
226 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
227 /// `channel_update` message is received.
230 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
231 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
233 /// The node id of the failed node.
235 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
236 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
241 impl Writeable for NetworkUpdate {
242 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 Self::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
246 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
247 (0, short_channel_id, required),
248 (2, is_permanent, required),
251 Self::NodeFailure { node_id, is_permanent } => {
253 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
254 (0, node_id, required),
255 (2, is_permanent, required),
263 impl MaybeReadable for NetworkUpdate {
264 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
265 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
268 // 0 was previously used for network updates containing a channel update, subsequently
269 // removed in LDK version 0.0.124.
270 let mut msg: RequiredWrapper<ChannelUpdate> = RequiredWrapper(None);
271 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
274 Ok(Some(Self::ChannelFailure {
275 short_channel_id: msg.0.unwrap().contents.short_channel_id,
280 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
281 (0, short_channel_id, required),
282 (2, is_permanent, required),
284 Ok(Some(Self::ChannelFailure {
285 short_channel_id: short_channel_id.0.unwrap(),
286 is_permanent: is_permanent.0.unwrap(),
290 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
291 (0, node_id, required),
292 (2, is_permanent, required),
294 Ok(Some(Self::NodeFailure {
295 node_id: node_id.0.unwrap(),
296 is_permanent: is_permanent.0.unwrap(),
299 t if t % 2 == 0 => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
305 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
306 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
307 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
308 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
309 /// serving historical announcements.
310 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
311 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
314 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
315 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
316 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
317 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
321 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
322 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
324 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
325 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
326 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
327 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
328 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
331 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
332 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
333 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
334 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
339 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
340 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
341 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
342 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
343 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
346 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
347 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
349 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
350 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
354 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
355 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
356 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
357 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
358 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
359 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
360 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
367 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
369 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
371 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
373 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
374 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
375 if update_msg.as_ref()
376 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
382 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
384 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
385 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
386 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
387 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
394 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
398 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
399 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
401 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
402 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
403 match *network_update {
404 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
406 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
407 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
410 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
412 log_debug!(self.logger,
413 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
414 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
420 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
421 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
426 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
427 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
428 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
431 return Err(LightningError {
432 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
433 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
434 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
435 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
436 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
438 log_level: Level::Trace,
446 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
447 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
448 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
449 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
450 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
451 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
452 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
453 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
454 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
456 log_level: Level::Trace
462 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
463 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
464 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
465 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
468 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
470 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
471 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
472 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
473 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
478 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
480 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
481 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
482 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
483 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
484 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
485 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
486 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
491 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
492 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
494 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
495 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
496 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
497 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
498 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
501 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
502 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
503 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
506 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
507 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
508 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
511 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
512 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
513 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
514 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
515 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
516 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
517 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
518 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
519 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
521 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
522 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
524 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
526 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
527 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
533 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
534 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
535 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
536 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
540 for (_, ref node) in iter {
541 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
542 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
550 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
551 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
552 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
554 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
555 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
556 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
557 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
558 /// tracking this directly.
560 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
561 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
562 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
563 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
564 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
565 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
566 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
567 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
568 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
569 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
573 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
575 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
576 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
577 // updates from all our peers normally.
579 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
580 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
581 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
584 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
585 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
586 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
587 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
588 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
590 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
591 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
592 // relying on it useless.
594 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
595 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
596 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
598 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
599 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
600 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
601 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
602 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
605 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
606 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
607 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
608 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
609 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
610 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
611 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
613 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
614 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
615 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
616 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
618 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
619 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
620 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
622 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
623 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
624 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
625 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
627 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
628 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
629 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
631 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
635 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
636 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
637 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
638 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
639 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
640 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
641 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
647 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
648 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
649 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
650 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
654 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
655 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
656 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
657 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
661 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
662 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
663 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
664 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
665 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
666 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
667 /// memory constrained systems.
668 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
669 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
671 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
673 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
674 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
675 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
677 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
678 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
679 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
680 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
681 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
682 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
683 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
684 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
685 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
687 short_channel_ids: vec![],
690 return Err(LightningError {
691 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
692 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
696 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
697 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
698 // exists even if its not yet routable.
699 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
700 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
701 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
702 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
703 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
704 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
705 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
708 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
709 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
714 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
715 let batch_count = batches.len();
716 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
717 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
718 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
719 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
721 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
722 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
723 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
724 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
725 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
726 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
727 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
729 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
730 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
731 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
733 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
734 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
735 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
737 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
738 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
739 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
740 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
742 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
743 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
745 (false, block_from_scid(*batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
748 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
750 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
751 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
752 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
753 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
757 short_channel_ids: batch,
765 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
768 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
769 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
773 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
774 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
775 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
779 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
780 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
781 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
785 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
786 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
790 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
792 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
795 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
796 let mut ret = Vec::new();
797 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
798 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
803 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
804 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
805 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
806 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
807 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
808 pub last_update: u32,
809 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
811 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
812 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
813 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
814 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
815 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
816 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
817 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
818 pub fees: RoutingFees,
819 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
820 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
821 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
822 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
823 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
826 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
827 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
828 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
833 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
834 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
835 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
836 (0, self.last_update, required),
837 (2, self.enabled, required),
838 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
839 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
840 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
841 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
842 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
843 (10, self.fees, required),
844 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
850 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
851 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
852 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
853 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
854 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
855 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
856 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
857 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
858 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
860 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
861 (0, last_update, required),
862 (2, enabled, required),
863 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
864 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
865 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
866 (10, fees, required),
867 (12, last_update_message, required)
870 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
871 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
872 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
873 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
874 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
875 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
877 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
878 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
881 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
886 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
887 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
888 /// Received within a channel announcement.
889 pub struct ChannelInfo {
890 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
891 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
892 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
893 pub node_one: NodeId,
894 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
895 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
896 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
897 pub node_two: NodeId,
898 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
899 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
900 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
901 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
902 /// An initial announcement of the channel
903 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
904 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
905 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
906 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
907 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
908 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
909 /// network graph in memory!).
910 announcement_received_time: u64,
914 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
915 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
916 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
917 if self.one_to_two.is_none() || self.two_to_one.is_none() { return None; }
918 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
919 if target == &self.node_one {
920 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
921 } else if target == &self.node_two {
922 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
927 let dir = direction.expect("We checked that both directions are available at the start");
928 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
931 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
932 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
933 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
934 if self.one_to_two.is_none() || self.two_to_one.is_none() { return None; }
935 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
936 if source == &self.node_one {
937 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
938 } else if source == &self.node_two {
939 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
944 let dir = direction.expect("We checked that both directions are available at the start");
945 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
948 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
949 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
950 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
952 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
954 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
959 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
960 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
961 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
962 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
967 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
968 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
969 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
970 (0, self.features, required),
971 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
972 (2, self.node_one, required),
973 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
974 (6, self.node_two, required),
975 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
976 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
977 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
983 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
984 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
985 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
986 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
987 // channel updates via the gossip network.
988 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
990 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
991 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
992 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
993 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
994 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
995 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
996 Err(err) => Err(err),
1001 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
1002 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1003 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
1004 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
1005 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
1006 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1007 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
1008 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1009 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
1010 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
1011 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1012 (0, features, required),
1013 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1014 (2, node_one, required),
1015 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
1016 (6, node_two, required),
1017 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
1018 (10, capacity_sats, required),
1019 (12, announcement_message, required),
1023 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
1024 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
1025 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1026 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
1027 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1028 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
1029 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
1030 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1035 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
1036 /// source node to a target node.
1038 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1039 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
1040 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
1041 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
1042 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
1043 from_node_one: bool,
1046 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1048 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1049 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one }
1052 /// Returns information for the channel.
1054 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1056 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1058 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1059 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1062 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1063 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1064 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1066 match capacity_msat {
1067 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1068 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1069 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1071 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1075 /// Returns information for the direction.
1077 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1079 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1081 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1083 pub fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1085 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1087 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1089 pub fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1092 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1093 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1094 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1095 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1100 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1102 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1103 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1104 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1105 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1106 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1109 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1111 liquidity_msat: u64,
1113 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1115 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1118 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1120 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1122 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1123 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1125 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1128 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1130 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1133 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1134 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1138 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1139 /// use when making routing decisions.
1140 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1142 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1143 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1144 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1146 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1147 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1148 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1149 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1150 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1151 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1156 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1157 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1158 pub struct RoutingFees {
1159 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1161 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1162 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1163 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1166 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1167 (0, base_msat, required),
1168 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1171 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1172 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1173 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1174 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1175 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1176 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1177 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1178 pub last_update: u32,
1179 /// Color assigned to the node
1181 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1182 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1183 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1184 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1185 /// An initial announcement of the node
1186 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1187 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1188 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1189 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1192 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1193 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1194 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1195 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1196 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1197 .unwrap_or_default()
1201 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1202 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1203 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1204 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1205 (0, self.features, required),
1206 (2, self.last_update, required),
1207 (4, self.rgb, required),
1208 (6, self.alias, required),
1209 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1210 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1216 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1217 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1218 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1219 (0, features, required),
1220 (2, last_update, required),
1222 (6, alias, required),
1223 (8, announcement_message, option),
1224 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1226 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1227 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1228 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1232 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1234 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1235 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1237 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1239 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1240 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1241 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1242 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1243 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1244 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1246 use core::fmt::Write;
1247 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1248 // Display printable ASCII characters
1249 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1250 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1259 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1260 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1265 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1266 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1267 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1272 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1273 pub struct NodeInfo {
1274 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1275 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1276 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1277 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1278 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1279 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1283 /// Returns whether the node has only announced Tor addresses.
1284 pub fn is_tor_only(&self) -> bool {
1285 self.announcement_info
1287 .map(|info| info.addresses())
1288 .and_then(|addresses| (!addresses.is_empty()).then(|| addresses))
1289 .map(|addresses| addresses.iter().all(|address| address.is_tor()))
1294 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1295 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1296 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1297 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1302 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1303 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1304 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1305 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1306 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1307 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1313 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1314 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1315 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1316 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1317 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1319 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1320 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1321 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1322 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1324 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1331 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1332 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1333 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1334 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1335 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1336 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1337 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1338 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1339 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1340 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1341 (4, channels, required_vec),
1343 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1344 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1347 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1353 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1354 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1356 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1357 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1358 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1360 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1361 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1362 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1363 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1364 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1365 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1367 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1368 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1369 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1370 node_id.write(writer)?;
1371 node_info.write(writer)?;
1374 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1375 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1376 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1382 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1383 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1384 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1386 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1387 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1388 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1389 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1390 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1391 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1392 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1393 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1395 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1396 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1397 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1398 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1399 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1400 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1401 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1404 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1405 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1406 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1410 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1413 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1414 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1415 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1416 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1417 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1418 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1423 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1424 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1425 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1426 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1427 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1429 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1430 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1431 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1437 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1438 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1439 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1440 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1441 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1442 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1443 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1444 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1445 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1446 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1447 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1451 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1452 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1453 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1455 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1456 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1458 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1459 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1460 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1461 removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1462 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
1463 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1467 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1468 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1469 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1470 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1471 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1477 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1478 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1479 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1480 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1483 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1484 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1485 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1486 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1489 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1492 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1493 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1494 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1498 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1499 /// given node announcement.
1501 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1502 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1503 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1504 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1505 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1506 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1509 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1510 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1511 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1513 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1514 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1517 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1518 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1519 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1521 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1522 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1523 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1526 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1527 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1528 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1529 // that it be at least the current time.
1530 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1531 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1532 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1533 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1538 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1539 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1540 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1541 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1542 features: msg.features.clone(),
1543 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1546 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1554 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1556 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1557 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1558 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1560 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1561 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1562 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1563 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1564 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1566 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1568 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1569 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1572 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1574 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1575 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1576 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1578 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1579 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1580 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1581 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1582 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1585 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1586 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1587 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1589 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1590 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1591 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1592 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1593 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1595 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1597 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1600 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1602 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1603 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1605 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1606 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1607 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1608 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1611 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1612 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1613 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1615 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1617 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1619 capacity_sats: None,
1620 announcement_message: None,
1621 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1624 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1627 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1628 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1629 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1631 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1632 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1634 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1636 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1637 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1638 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1639 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1641 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1642 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1643 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1644 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1646 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1647 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1649 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1650 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1651 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1653 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1656 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1657 entry.insert(channel_info);
1661 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1662 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1663 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1664 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1666 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1667 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1668 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1669 announcement_info: None,
1678 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1679 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1680 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1682 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1684 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1685 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1688 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1689 return Err(LightningError {
1690 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1691 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1696 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1698 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1699 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1700 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1701 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1703 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1704 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1705 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1706 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1708 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1709 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1710 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1711 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1712 return Err(LightningError {
1713 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1714 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1717 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1718 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1719 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1720 return Err(LightningError {
1721 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1722 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1729 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1730 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1731 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1732 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1733 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1734 return Err(LightningError{
1735 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1736 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1740 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1741 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1743 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1744 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1745 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1747 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1750 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1751 features: msg.features.clone(),
1752 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1754 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1756 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1757 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1758 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1759 announcement_received_time,
1762 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1764 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1768 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1770 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1771 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1772 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1773 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1774 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1775 let current_time_unix = None;
1777 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1780 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1782 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1783 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1784 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1785 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1786 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1787 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1788 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1792 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1793 /// from local storage.
1794 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1795 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1796 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1797 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1798 let current_time_unix = None;
1800 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1801 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1802 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1803 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1804 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1806 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1807 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1808 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1809 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1810 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1811 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1814 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1815 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1818 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1821 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1825 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1826 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1827 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1830 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1831 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1832 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1834 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1835 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1837 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1838 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1840 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1841 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1842 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1843 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1844 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1847 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1848 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1851 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1852 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1853 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1855 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1856 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1858 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1859 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1860 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1861 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1862 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1863 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1864 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1865 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1866 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1868 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1869 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1870 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1871 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1872 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1873 info.one_to_two = None;
1875 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1876 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1877 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1878 info.two_to_one = None;
1880 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1881 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1882 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1883 // channel_update for.
1884 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1885 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1886 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1887 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1888 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1892 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1893 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1894 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1895 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1896 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1897 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1901 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1902 if let Some(time) = time {
1903 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1905 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1906 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1907 // of this function.
1908 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1910 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1911 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1914 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1918 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1919 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1922 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1925 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1926 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1927 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1929 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1930 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1931 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1932 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
1935 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1936 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1937 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1939 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1940 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1941 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1942 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
1945 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
1947 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
1949 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1950 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1951 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1952 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
1955 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1956 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
1957 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1959 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1961 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1962 return Err(LightningError {
1963 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1964 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1968 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1970 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1971 // disable this check during tests!
1972 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1973 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1974 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1976 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1977 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1981 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
1983 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1984 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1986 core::mem::drop(channels);
1987 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
1988 return Err(LightningError {
1989 err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
1990 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
1994 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1995 return Err(LightningError{err:
1996 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1997 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2000 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
2001 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
2002 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
2003 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
2004 return Err(LightningError{err:
2005 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
2006 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2009 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
2010 ($target: expr) => {
2011 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
2012 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
2013 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
2014 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
2015 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
2016 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
2017 // but only in the non-normative section.
2018 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
2019 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2020 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
2021 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2027 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
2029 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
2030 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
2032 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2033 enabled: chan_enabled,
2034 last_update: msg.timestamp,
2035 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
2036 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2037 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2039 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2040 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2044 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2048 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2049 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2050 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2051 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2052 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2053 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2054 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2055 })?, "channel_update");
2058 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2061 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2062 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2063 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2064 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2065 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2066 })?, "channel_update");
2069 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2078 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2079 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2080 ($node_id: expr) => {
2081 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2082 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2083 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2085 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2086 entry.remove_entry();
2089 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2094 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2095 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2099 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2100 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2102 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2103 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2107 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2108 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2109 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2112 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2113 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2114 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2115 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2118 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2120 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2121 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2125 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2126 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2127 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2130 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2131 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2132 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2133 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2136 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2137 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2138 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2139 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2140 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2141 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2146 pub(crate) mod tests {
2147 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2148 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2149 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2150 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2151 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2152 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2153 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2154 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2155 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2156 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2157 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2158 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2159 use crate::util::test_utils;
2160 use crate::util::ser::{Hostname, ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2161 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2163 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2164 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2166 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2167 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2168 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2169 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2170 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2171 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2172 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2173 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2174 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2177 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2178 use crate::prelude::*;
2179 use crate::sync::Arc;
2181 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2182 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2183 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2186 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2187 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2188 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2190 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2191 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2192 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2193 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2197 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2198 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2199 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2200 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2201 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2203 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2204 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2205 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2206 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2207 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2208 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2211 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2212 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2213 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2214 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2218 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2219 addresses: Vec::new(),
2220 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2221 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2223 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2224 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2226 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2227 contents: unsigned_announcement
2231 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2232 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2233 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2234 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2235 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2237 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2238 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2239 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2240 short_channel_id: 0,
2241 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2242 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2243 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2244 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2245 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2247 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2248 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2249 ChannelAnnouncement {
2250 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2251 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2252 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2253 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2254 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2258 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2259 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2260 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2261 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2262 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2265 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2266 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2267 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2268 short_channel_id: 0,
2271 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2272 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2273 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2274 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2275 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2276 excess_data: Vec::new()
2278 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2279 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2281 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2282 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2287 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2288 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2289 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2291 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2292 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2293 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2295 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2296 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2298 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2302 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2303 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2304 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2305 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2310 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2311 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2315 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2316 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2318 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2319 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2322 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2325 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2326 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2327 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2328 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2329 // Return false because contains excess data.
2330 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2331 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2335 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2336 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2337 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2338 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2339 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2340 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2342 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2347 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2348 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2349 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2351 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2352 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2354 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2355 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2357 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2358 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2359 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2360 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2361 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2366 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2372 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2373 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2374 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2376 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2379 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2380 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2381 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2382 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2383 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2385 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2386 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2387 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2388 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2390 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2393 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2394 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2395 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2396 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2397 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2398 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2399 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2400 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2405 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2411 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2412 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2413 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2414 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2415 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2417 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2420 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2422 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2424 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2425 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2426 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2428 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2429 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2430 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2431 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2432 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2434 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2437 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2439 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2440 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2441 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2446 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2447 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2448 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2449 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2450 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2451 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2452 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2456 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2457 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2458 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2460 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2463 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2464 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2466 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2469 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2470 // announcement is mainnet).
2471 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2472 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2473 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2474 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2476 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2481 fn handling_channel_update() {
2482 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2483 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2484 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2485 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2486 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2488 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2489 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2491 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2492 let short_channel_id;
2495 // Announce a channel we will update
2496 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2497 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2498 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2500 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2501 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2502 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2509 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2510 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2511 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2512 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2517 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2519 Some(channel_info) => {
2520 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2521 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2526 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2527 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2528 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2529 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2530 // Return false because contains excess data
2531 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2532 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2536 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2537 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2538 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2539 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2540 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2542 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2545 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2546 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2547 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2548 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2549 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2551 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2554 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2555 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2556 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2557 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2558 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2560 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2563 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2564 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2565 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2566 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2567 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2568 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2570 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2573 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2574 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2575 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2576 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2577 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2578 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2579 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2581 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2584 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2585 // update is mainet).
2586 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2587 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2588 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2590 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2592 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2597 fn handling_network_update() {
2598 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2599 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2600 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2602 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2603 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2604 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2607 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2608 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2611 let short_channel_id;
2613 // Check that we can manually apply a channel update.
2614 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2615 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2616 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2617 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2618 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2620 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2622 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2623 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2624 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2627 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2629 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2631 Some(channel_info) => {
2632 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2636 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2638 is_permanent: false,
2641 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2643 Some(channel_info) => {
2644 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2649 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2650 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2655 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2656 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2657 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2660 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2661 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2663 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2664 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2665 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2666 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2667 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2668 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2670 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2671 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2673 is_permanent: false,
2676 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2677 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2679 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2680 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2685 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2686 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2687 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2692 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2693 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2694 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2695 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2696 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2697 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2700 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2701 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2703 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2704 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2705 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2706 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2707 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2709 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2710 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2711 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2712 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2714 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2715 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2716 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2718 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2719 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2720 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2722 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2723 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2724 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2725 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2727 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2728 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2730 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2732 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2733 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2734 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2735 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2736 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2738 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2739 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2740 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2741 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2742 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2743 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2744 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2745 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2746 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2747 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2748 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2749 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2750 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2751 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2752 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2753 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2754 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2757 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2758 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2759 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2761 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2763 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2765 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2767 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2768 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2769 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2771 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2772 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2773 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2774 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2776 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2777 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2778 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2780 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2781 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2782 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2783 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2785 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2786 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2787 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2788 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2789 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2792 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2794 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2795 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2796 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2798 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2800 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2801 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2802 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2804 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2805 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2806 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2807 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2809 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2810 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2811 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2813 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2814 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2815 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2817 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2818 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2819 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2820 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2821 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2826 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2827 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2828 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2829 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2830 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2832 // Channels were not announced yet.
2833 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2834 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2836 let short_channel_id;
2838 // Announce a channel we will update
2839 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2840 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2841 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2847 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2848 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2849 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2850 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2851 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2852 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2858 // Valid channel update
2859 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2860 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2861 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2862 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2868 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2869 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2870 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2871 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2872 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2873 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2879 // Channel update with excess data.
2880 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2881 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2882 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2883 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2884 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2890 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2891 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2892 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2893 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2894 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2895 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2900 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2901 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2902 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2906 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2907 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2908 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2909 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2910 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2911 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2914 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2915 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2918 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2919 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2920 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2926 // Nodes were never announced
2927 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2928 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2931 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2932 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2937 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2938 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2944 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2945 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2947 // Skip the first node.
2948 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2949 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2952 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2953 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2954 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2955 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2956 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2957 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2958 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2963 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2964 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2968 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2969 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2970 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2972 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2973 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2975 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2976 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2977 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2978 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2982 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2983 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2988 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2989 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2990 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2991 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2993 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2994 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2998 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2999 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3000 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
3002 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3003 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3005 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3006 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
3007 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
3008 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
3012 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
3013 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
3014 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
3015 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
3017 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3018 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3019 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3020 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
3022 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3024 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
3026 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3027 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3028 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3032 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3034 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3035 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3036 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3037 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3038 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3041 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3042 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3043 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3044 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3045 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3046 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3047 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3049 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3055 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3056 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3057 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3059 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3060 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3061 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3062 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3064 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3065 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3066 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3069 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3070 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3071 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3074 // used for testing resumption on same block
3075 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3078 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3079 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3080 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3081 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3087 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3088 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3092 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3094 number_of_blocks: 0,
3097 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3098 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3100 number_of_blocks: 0,
3101 sync_complete: true,
3102 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3106 // Error when wrong chain
3107 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3111 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3113 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3116 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3117 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3119 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3120 sync_complete: true,
3121 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3125 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3126 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3130 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3131 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3132 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3135 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3136 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3137 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3138 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3139 sync_complete: true,
3140 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3144 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3145 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3149 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3150 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3151 number_of_blocks: 1,
3156 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3157 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3158 number_of_blocks: 1,
3159 sync_complete: true,
3160 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3165 // No results in valid query range
3166 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3170 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3171 first_blocknum: 1000,
3172 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3177 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3178 first_blocknum: 1000,
3179 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3180 sync_complete: true,
3181 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3186 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3187 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3191 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3192 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3193 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3198 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3199 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3200 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3201 sync_complete: true,
3202 short_channel_ids: vec![
3203 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3209 // Single block exactly full
3210 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3214 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3215 first_blocknum: 100000,
3216 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3221 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3222 first_blocknum: 100000,
3223 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3224 sync_complete: true,
3225 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3226 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3232 // Multiple split on new block
3233 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3237 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3238 first_blocknum: 100000,
3239 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3244 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3245 first_blocknum: 100000,
3246 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3247 sync_complete: false,
3248 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3249 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3253 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3254 first_blocknum: 107999,
3255 number_of_blocks: 2,
3256 sync_complete: true,
3257 short_channel_ids: vec![
3258 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3264 // Multiple split on same block
3265 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3269 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3270 first_blocknum: 100002,
3271 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3276 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3277 first_blocknum: 100002,
3278 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3279 sync_complete: false,
3280 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3281 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3285 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3286 first_blocknum: 108001,
3287 number_of_blocks: 1,
3288 sync_complete: true,
3289 short_channel_ids: vec![
3290 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3297 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3298 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3299 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3300 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3302 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3304 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3305 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3306 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3307 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3310 assert!(result.is_ok());
3312 assert!(result.is_err());
3315 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3316 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3318 for i in 0..events.len() {
3319 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3321 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3322 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3323 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3324 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3325 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3326 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3327 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3329 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3330 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3331 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3332 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3333 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3335 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3336 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3337 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3340 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3346 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3347 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3348 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3349 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3350 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3352 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3354 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3356 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3358 assert!(result.is_err());
3362 fn displays_node_alias() {
3363 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3364 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3365 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3366 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3369 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3370 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3371 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3373 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3374 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3375 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3376 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3379 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3380 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3381 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3385 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3386 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3387 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3388 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3389 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3390 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3392 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3393 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3396 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3397 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3398 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3399 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3400 last_update_message: None,
3403 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3404 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3406 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3407 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3408 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3410 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3411 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3412 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3414 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3415 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3416 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3417 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3418 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3420 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3421 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3422 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3424 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3425 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3426 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3427 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3428 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3430 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3432 capacity_sats: None,
3433 announcement_message: None,
3434 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3437 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3438 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3440 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3441 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3443 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3444 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3445 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3446 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3447 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3448 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3449 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3450 capacity_sats: None,
3451 announcement_message: None,
3452 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3455 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3456 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3458 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3459 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3461 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3462 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3463 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3465 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3466 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3467 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3468 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3469 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3470 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3471 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3473 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3474 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3475 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3476 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3477 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3481 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3482 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3483 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3484 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3485 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3486 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3489 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3490 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3493 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3494 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3495 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3496 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3497 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3499 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3500 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3501 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3503 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3504 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3505 channels: Vec::new(),
3506 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3509 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3510 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3511 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3512 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3514 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3515 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3516 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3520 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3521 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3522 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3523 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3524 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3525 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3529 fn test_node_id_display() {
3530 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3531 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3535 fn is_tor_only_node() {
3536 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3537 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3539 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3540 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3541 let node_1_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
3543 let announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3544 gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3546 let tcp_ip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3547 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3550 let tcp_ip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3551 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3554 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2([255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]);
3555 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3556 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3561 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
3562 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3566 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3568 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3569 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3570 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3572 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3574 announcement.addresses = vec![
3575 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone(),
3578 announcement.timestamp += 1000;
3580 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3582 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3583 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3585 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3587 announcement.addresses = vec![
3588 tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3590 announcement.timestamp += 2000;
3592 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3594 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3595 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3597 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3599 announcement.addresses = vec![
3600 tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()
3602 announcement.timestamp += 3000;
3604 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3606 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3607 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3609 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3611 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
3612 announcement.timestamp += 4000;
3614 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3616 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3617 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3619 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3621 announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone()];
3622 announcement.timestamp += 5000;
3624 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3626 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3627 assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3629 let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
3631 announcement.addresses = vec![tcp_ip_v4.clone()];
3632 announcement.timestamp += 6000;
3634 node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx
3636 gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement).unwrap();
3637 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
3645 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3647 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3648 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3649 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3650 let mut v = Vec::new();
3651 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3652 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3653 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3657 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3658 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3659 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3660 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3661 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3662 black_box(&net_graph).encode()