1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
37 use io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
41 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
42 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
47 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
48 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
50 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
52 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
54 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
55 /// refuse to relay the message.
56 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
58 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
59 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
60 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
62 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
63 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
64 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
67 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
68 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
69 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
72 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
73 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
78 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
79 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
80 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
84 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
85 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
92 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
93 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
94 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
98 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
99 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
100 Some(self.cmp(other))
104 impl Ord for NodeId {
105 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
106 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
110 impl Writeable for NodeId {
111 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
112 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
117 impl Readable for NodeId {
118 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
119 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
120 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
125 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
126 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
127 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
128 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
129 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
131 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
132 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
133 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
136 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
137 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
138 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
139 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
142 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
143 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
145 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
146 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
147 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
148 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
149 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
150 ChannelUpdateMessage {
151 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
154 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
155 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
157 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
159 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
160 /// `channel_update` message is received.
163 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
164 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
166 /// The node id of the failed node.
168 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
169 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
174 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
175 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
178 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
179 (0, short_channel_id, required),
180 (2, is_permanent, required),
182 (4, NodeFailure) => {
183 (0, node_id, required),
184 (2, is_permanent, required),
188 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
189 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
190 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
191 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
192 /// serving historical announcements.
194 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
195 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
196 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
200 chain_access: Option<C>,
201 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
202 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
206 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
207 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
209 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
210 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
211 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
212 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
213 /// channel owners' keys.
214 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
217 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
219 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
224 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
225 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
226 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
227 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
228 self.chain_access = chain_access;
231 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
232 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
234 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
235 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
239 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
240 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
241 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
242 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
243 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
244 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
252 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
253 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
254 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
255 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
256 match *network_update {
257 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
258 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
259 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
260 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
261 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
262 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
264 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
265 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
266 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
267 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
269 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
270 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
271 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
272 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
280 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
281 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
282 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
285 return Err(LightningError {
286 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
287 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
288 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
290 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
292 log_level: Level::Trace,
300 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
301 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
303 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
304 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
305 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
306 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
307 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
310 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
311 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
312 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
313 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
316 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
317 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
318 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
321 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
322 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
323 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
324 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
325 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
326 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
327 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
328 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
329 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
330 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
331 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
332 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
334 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
335 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
337 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
339 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
340 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
349 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
350 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
351 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
352 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
353 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
357 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
359 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
360 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
361 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
362 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
363 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
373 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
374 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
375 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
377 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
378 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
379 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
380 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
381 /// tracking this directly.
382 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
383 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
384 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
388 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
390 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
391 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
392 // updates from all our peers normally.
394 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
395 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
396 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
399 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
400 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
401 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
402 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
403 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
405 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
406 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
407 // relying on it useless.
409 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
410 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
411 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
413 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
414 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
415 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
416 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
417 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
420 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
421 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
422 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
423 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
424 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
425 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
426 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
428 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
429 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
430 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
431 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
433 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
434 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
435 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
437 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
438 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
439 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
440 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
441 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
443 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
444 if should_request_full_sync {
445 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
447 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
451 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
452 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
453 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
454 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
455 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
456 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
457 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
462 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
463 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
464 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
465 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
469 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
470 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
471 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
472 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
476 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
477 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
478 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
479 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
480 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
481 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
482 /// memory constrained systems.
483 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
484 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
486 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
488 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
489 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
490 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
492 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
493 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
494 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
495 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
496 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
497 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
498 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
499 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
500 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
502 short_channel_ids: vec![],
505 return Err(LightningError {
506 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
507 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
511 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
512 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
513 // exists even if its not yet routable.
514 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
515 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
516 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
517 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
518 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
519 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
520 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
523 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
524 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
529 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
530 let batch_count = batches.len();
531 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
532 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
533 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
534 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
536 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
537 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
538 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
539 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
540 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
541 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
542 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
544 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
545 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
546 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
548 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
549 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
550 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
552 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
553 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
554 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
555 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
557 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
558 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
560 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
563 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
565 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
566 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
567 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
568 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
572 short_channel_ids: batch,
580 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
583 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
584 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
589 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
591 C::Target: chain::Access,
594 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
595 let mut ret = Vec::new();
596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
597 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
602 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
603 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
604 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
605 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
606 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
607 pub last_update: u32,
608 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
610 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
611 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
612 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
613 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
614 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
615 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
616 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
617 pub fees: RoutingFees,
618 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
619 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
620 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
621 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
622 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
625 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
626 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
627 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
632 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
633 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
634 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
635 (0, self.last_update, required),
636 (2, self.enabled, required),
637 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
638 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
639 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
640 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
641 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
642 (10, self.fees, required),
643 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
649 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
650 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
651 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
652 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
653 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
654 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
655 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
656 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
657 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
659 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
660 (0, last_update, required),
661 (2, enabled, required),
662 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
663 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
664 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
665 (10, fees, required),
666 (12, last_update_message, required)
669 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
670 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
671 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
672 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
673 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
674 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
676 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
677 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
680 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
685 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
686 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
687 /// Received within a channel announcement.
688 pub struct ChannelInfo {
689 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
690 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
691 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
692 pub node_one: NodeId,
693 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
694 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
695 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
696 pub node_two: NodeId,
697 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
698 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
699 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
700 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
701 /// An initial announcement of the channel
702 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
703 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
704 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
705 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
706 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
707 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
708 /// network graph in memory!).
709 announcement_received_time: u64,
713 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
714 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
715 pub(crate) fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
716 let (direction, source) = {
717 if target == &self.node_one {
718 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
719 } else if target == &self.node_two {
720 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
725 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
728 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
729 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
730 pub(crate) fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
731 let (direction, target) = {
732 if source == &self.node_one {
733 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
734 } else if source == &self.node_two {
735 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
740 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
743 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
744 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
745 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
747 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
749 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
754 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
755 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
756 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
757 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
762 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
763 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
764 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
765 (0, self.features, required),
766 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
767 (2, self.node_one, required),
768 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
769 (6, self.node_two, required),
770 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
771 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
772 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
778 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
779 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
780 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
781 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
782 // channel updates via the gossip network.
783 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
785 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
786 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
787 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
788 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
789 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
790 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
791 Err(err) => Err(err),
796 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
797 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
798 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
799 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
800 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
801 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
802 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
803 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
804 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
805 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
806 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
807 (0, features, required),
808 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
809 (2, node_one, required),
810 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
811 (6, node_two, required),
812 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
813 (10, capacity_sats, required),
814 (12, announcement_message, required),
818 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
819 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
820 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
821 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
822 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
823 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
824 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
825 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
830 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
831 /// source node to a target node.
833 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
834 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
835 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
836 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
837 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
840 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
842 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
843 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
844 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
846 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
847 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
848 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
849 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
851 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
852 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
854 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
855 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
857 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
861 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
865 /// Returns information for the channel.
866 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
868 /// Returns information for the direction.
869 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
871 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
872 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
873 self.htlc_maximum_msat
876 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
878 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
879 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
881 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
882 self.effective_capacity
885 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
886 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
887 match self.direction {
888 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
894 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
895 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
896 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
897 .field("channel", &self.channel)
902 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
904 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
905 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
908 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
909 /// Returns information for the channel.
911 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
913 /// Returns information for the direction.
915 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
917 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
919 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
922 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
923 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
928 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
930 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
931 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
932 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
933 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
934 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
937 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
941 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
943 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
946 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
948 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
950 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
951 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
953 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
956 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
957 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
961 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
962 /// use when making routing decisions.
963 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
965 impl EffectiveCapacity {
966 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
967 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
969 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
970 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
971 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
972 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
973 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
978 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
979 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
980 pub struct RoutingFees {
981 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
983 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
984 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
985 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
988 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
989 (0, base_msat, required),
990 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
993 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
994 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
995 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
996 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
997 pub features: NodeFeatures,
998 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
999 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1000 pub last_update: u32,
1001 /// Color assigned to the node
1003 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1004 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1005 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1006 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1007 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1008 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1009 /// An initial announcement of the node
1010 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1011 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1012 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1013 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1016 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1017 (0, features, required),
1018 (2, last_update, required),
1020 (6, alias, required),
1021 (8, announcement_message, option),
1022 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1025 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1027 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1028 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1029 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1030 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1032 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1033 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1034 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1035 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1036 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1037 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1039 for c in alias.chars() {
1040 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1041 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1042 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1046 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1047 // Display printable ASCII characters
1048 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1049 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1050 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1058 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1064 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1065 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1066 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1070 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1071 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1072 pub struct NodeInfo {
1073 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1074 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1075 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1076 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1077 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1078 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1079 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1080 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1081 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1082 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1085 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1086 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1087 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1088 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1093 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1094 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1095 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1096 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1097 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1098 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1104 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1105 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1106 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1107 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1108 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1110 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1111 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1112 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1113 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1115 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1122 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1123 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1124 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1125 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1126 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1128 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1129 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1130 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1131 (4, channels, vec_type),
1135 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1136 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1137 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1142 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1143 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1145 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1146 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1147 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1149 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1150 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1151 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1152 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1153 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1154 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1156 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1157 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1158 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1159 node_id.write(writer)?;
1160 node_info.write(writer)?;
1163 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1164 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1165 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1171 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1172 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1173 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1175 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1176 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1177 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1178 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1179 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1181 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1183 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1184 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1185 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1186 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1187 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1188 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1191 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1192 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1193 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1197 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1200 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1201 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1202 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1207 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1208 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1209 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1210 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1211 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1213 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1214 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1215 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1221 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1222 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1223 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1224 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1225 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1229 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1230 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1231 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1233 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1236 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1237 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1238 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1242 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1243 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1244 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1245 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1246 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1252 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1253 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1254 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1255 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1258 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1259 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1260 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1261 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1264 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1267 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1268 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1269 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1273 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1274 /// given node announcement.
1276 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1277 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1278 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1279 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1280 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1281 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1282 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1285 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1286 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1287 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1289 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1290 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1293 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1294 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1295 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1297 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1298 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1299 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1300 // that it be at least the current time.
1301 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1302 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1303 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1304 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1309 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1310 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1311 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1312 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1313 features: msg.features.clone(),
1314 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1316 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1317 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1318 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1326 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1328 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1329 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1330 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1332 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1333 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1334 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1335 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1336 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1338 C::Target: chain::Access,
1340 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1341 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1342 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1343 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1344 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1345 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1348 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1349 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1350 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1352 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1353 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1354 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1355 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1356 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1358 C::Target: chain::Access,
1360 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1363 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1365 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1366 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1368 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1369 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1370 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1371 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1374 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1375 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1376 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1378 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1380 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1382 capacity_sats: None,
1383 announcement_message: None,
1384 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1387 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1390 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1391 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1392 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1394 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1395 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1397 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1398 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1399 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1400 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1402 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1403 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1404 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1405 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1407 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1408 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1410 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1411 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1412 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1414 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1417 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1418 entry.insert(channel_info);
1422 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1423 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1424 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1425 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1427 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1428 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1429 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1430 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1431 announcement_info: None,
1440 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1441 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1442 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1444 C::Target: chain::Access,
1446 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1447 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1450 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1452 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1455 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1456 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1457 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1458 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1459 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1460 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1462 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1463 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1464 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1466 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1467 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1470 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1471 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1473 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1474 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1480 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1481 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1482 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1484 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1487 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1488 features: msg.features.clone(),
1489 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1491 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1493 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1494 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1495 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1496 announcement_received_time,
1499 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1502 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1503 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1504 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1505 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1506 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1507 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1509 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1510 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1511 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1514 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1515 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1516 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1518 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1519 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1525 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1526 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1528 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1530 // TODO: downgrade the node
1534 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1535 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1536 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1539 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1540 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1541 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1543 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1544 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1546 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1547 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1548 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1549 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1550 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1553 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1554 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1557 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1558 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1559 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1561 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1562 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1563 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1564 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1565 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1566 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1567 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1568 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1569 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1571 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1572 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1573 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1574 info.one_to_two = None;
1576 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1577 info.two_to_one = None;
1579 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1580 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1581 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1582 // channel_update for.
1583 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1584 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1588 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1589 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1590 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1591 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1592 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1597 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1600 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1601 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1602 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1604 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1605 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1606 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1607 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1610 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1611 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1612 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1614 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1615 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1616 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1617 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1620 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1622 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1623 let chan_was_enabled;
1625 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1627 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1628 // disable this check during tests!
1629 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1630 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1631 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1633 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1634 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1638 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1639 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1640 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1642 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1643 return Err(LightningError{err:
1644 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1645 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1648 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1649 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1650 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1651 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1652 return Err(LightningError{err:
1653 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1654 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1657 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1658 ($target: expr) => {
1659 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1660 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1661 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1662 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1663 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1664 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1665 // but only in the non-normative section.
1666 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1667 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1668 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1669 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1671 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1673 chan_was_enabled = false;
1678 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1680 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1681 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1683 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1684 enabled: chan_enabled,
1685 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1686 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1687 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1688 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1690 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1691 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1695 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1699 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1700 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1701 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1702 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1703 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1704 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1705 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1706 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1707 })?, "channel_update");
1709 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1711 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1712 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1713 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1714 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1715 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1716 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1717 })?, "channel_update");
1719 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1724 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1726 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1727 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1728 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1729 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1730 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1731 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1733 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1735 proportional_millionths
1737 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1738 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1739 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1741 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1742 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1744 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1745 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1747 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1749 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1750 if chan_info.enabled {
1751 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1752 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1753 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1754 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1759 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1765 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1766 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1767 ($node_id: expr) => {
1768 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1769 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1770 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1772 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1773 entry.remove_entry();
1776 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1781 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1782 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1786 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1787 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1789 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1790 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1794 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1795 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1796 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1799 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1801 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1802 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1806 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1807 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1808 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1811 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1812 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1813 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1814 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1815 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1816 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1817 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1827 use ln::PaymentHash;
1828 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1829 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1830 use ln::msgs::{Init, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1831 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1832 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1833 use util::test_utils;
1834 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1835 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1836 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1838 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1840 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1841 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1842 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1843 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1844 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1845 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1846 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1850 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1851 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1854 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1858 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1859 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1860 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1861 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1864 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1865 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1866 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1869 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1870 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1871 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1875 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1876 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1877 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1878 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1880 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1881 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1882 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1883 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1884 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1885 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1888 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1889 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1890 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1891 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1896 addresses: Vec::new(),
1897 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1898 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1900 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1901 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1903 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1904 contents: unsigned_announcement
1908 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1909 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1910 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1911 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1912 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1914 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1915 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1916 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1917 short_channel_id: 0,
1920 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1921 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1922 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1924 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1925 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1926 ChannelAnnouncement {
1927 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1928 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1929 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1930 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1931 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1935 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1936 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1937 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1938 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1939 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1940 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1941 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1942 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1946 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1947 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1948 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1949 short_channel_id: 0,
1952 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1953 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1954 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
1955 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1956 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1957 excess_data: Vec::new()
1959 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1960 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1962 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1963 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1968 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1969 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1970 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1972 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1973 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1974 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1976 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1977 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1979 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1983 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1984 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1985 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1986 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1991 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1992 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1996 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1997 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
1999 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2000 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2003 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2006 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2007 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2008 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2009 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2010 // Return false because contains excess data.
2011 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2012 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2016 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2017 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2018 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2019 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2020 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2021 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2023 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2028 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2029 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2030 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2032 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2033 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2035 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2036 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2038 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2039 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2040 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2041 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2042 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2043 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2048 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2054 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2055 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2056 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2058 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
2061 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2062 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2063 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2064 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2065 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2067 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2068 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2069 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2070 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2072 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2075 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2076 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2077 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2078 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2079 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2080 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2081 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2086 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2092 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
2093 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2094 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2095 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2097 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2100 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
2101 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2102 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2103 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2104 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2105 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2106 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2107 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2111 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2112 Some(channel_entry) => {
2113 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
2119 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2120 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2121 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2122 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2123 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2124 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2125 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2129 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2130 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2131 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2133 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2136 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2137 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2139 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2144 fn handling_channel_update() {
2145 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2146 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2147 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2148 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2149 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2150 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2152 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2153 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2155 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2156 let short_channel_id;
2159 // Announce a channel we will update
2160 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2161 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2163 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2164 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2165 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2172 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2173 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2174 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2179 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2181 Some(channel_info) => {
2182 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2183 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2188 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2189 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2190 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2191 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2192 // Return false because contains excess data
2193 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2194 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2198 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2199 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2200 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2201 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2202 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2204 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2207 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2208 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2209 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2210 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2211 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2213 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2216 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2217 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2218 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2219 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2220 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2222 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2225 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2226 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2227 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2228 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2229 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2230 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2232 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2235 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2236 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2237 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2238 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2239 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2240 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2241 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2243 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2248 fn handling_network_update() {
2249 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2250 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2251 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2252 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2254 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2255 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2258 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2259 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2262 let short_channel_id;
2264 // Announce a channel we will update
2265 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2266 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2267 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2268 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2269 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2271 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2272 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2274 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2276 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2277 rejected_by_dest: false,
2278 all_paths_failed: true,
2280 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2281 msg: valid_channel_update,
2283 short_channel_id: None,
2289 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2292 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2294 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2296 Some(channel_info) => {
2297 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2301 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2303 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2304 rejected_by_dest: false,
2305 all_paths_failed: true,
2307 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2309 is_permanent: false,
2311 short_channel_id: None,
2317 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2319 Some(channel_info) => {
2320 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2325 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2326 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2328 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2329 rejected_by_dest: false,
2330 all_paths_failed: true,
2332 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2336 short_channel_id: None,
2342 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2343 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2344 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2345 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2349 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2350 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2351 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2352 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2353 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2354 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2355 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2358 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2359 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2361 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2362 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2363 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2364 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2365 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2367 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2368 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2369 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2371 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2372 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2373 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2375 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2376 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2378 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2379 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2380 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2381 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2382 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2384 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2386 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2387 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2388 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2391 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2392 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2396 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2397 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2398 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2399 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2400 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2402 // Channels were not announced yet.
2403 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2404 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2406 let short_channel_id;
2408 // Announce a channel we will update
2409 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2410 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2411 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2417 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2418 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2419 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2420 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2421 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2422 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2423 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2430 // Valid channel update
2431 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2432 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2433 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2434 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2440 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2441 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2442 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2443 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2444 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2445 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2446 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2452 // Channel update with excess data.
2453 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2454 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2455 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2456 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2457 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2463 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2464 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2465 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2466 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2467 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2468 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2469 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2474 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2475 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2476 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2480 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2481 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2482 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2483 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2484 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2485 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2488 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2489 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2492 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2493 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2494 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2501 // Nodes were never announced
2502 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2503 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2506 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2507 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2512 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2513 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2519 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2520 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2522 // Skip the first node.
2523 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2524 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2527 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2528 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2529 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2530 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2531 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2532 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2533 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2538 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2539 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2543 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2544 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2545 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2547 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2548 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2550 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2551 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2552 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2553 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2557 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2558 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2563 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2564 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2565 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2566 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2568 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2569 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2573 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2574 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2575 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2577 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2578 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2580 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2581 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2582 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2583 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2587 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2588 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2589 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2591 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2592 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2593 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2594 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2596 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2598 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2600 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2601 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2602 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2603 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2606 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2608 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2609 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2610 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2613 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2614 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2615 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2616 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2617 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2618 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2619 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2621 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2627 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2628 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2629 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2631 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2632 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2633 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2634 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2636 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2637 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2638 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2641 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2642 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2643 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2646 // used for testing resumption on same block
2647 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2650 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2651 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2652 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2653 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2659 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2660 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2664 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2666 number_of_blocks: 0,
2669 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2670 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2672 number_of_blocks: 0,
2673 sync_complete: true,
2674 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2678 // Error when wrong chain
2679 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2683 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2685 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2688 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2689 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2691 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2692 sync_complete: true,
2693 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2697 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2698 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2702 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2703 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2704 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2707 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2708 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2709 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2710 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2711 sync_complete: true,
2712 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2716 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2717 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2721 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2722 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2723 number_of_blocks: 1,
2728 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2729 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2730 number_of_blocks: 1,
2731 sync_complete: true,
2732 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2737 // No results in valid query range
2738 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2742 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2743 first_blocknum: 1000,
2744 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2749 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2750 first_blocknum: 1000,
2751 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2752 sync_complete: true,
2753 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2758 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2759 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2763 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2764 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2765 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2770 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2771 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2772 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2773 sync_complete: true,
2774 short_channel_ids: vec![
2775 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2781 // Single block exactly full
2782 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2786 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2787 first_blocknum: 100000,
2788 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2793 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2794 first_blocknum: 100000,
2795 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2796 sync_complete: true,
2797 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2798 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2804 // Multiple split on new block
2805 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2809 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2810 first_blocknum: 100000,
2811 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2816 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2817 first_blocknum: 100000,
2818 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2819 sync_complete: false,
2820 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2821 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2825 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2826 first_blocknum: 107999,
2827 number_of_blocks: 2,
2828 sync_complete: true,
2829 short_channel_ids: vec![
2830 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2836 // Multiple split on same block
2837 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2841 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2842 first_blocknum: 100002,
2843 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2848 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2849 first_blocknum: 100002,
2850 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2851 sync_complete: false,
2852 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2853 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2857 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2858 first_blocknum: 108001,
2859 number_of_blocks: 1,
2860 sync_complete: true,
2861 short_channel_ids: vec![
2862 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2869 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2870 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2871 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2872 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2874 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2876 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2877 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2878 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2879 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2882 assert!(result.is_ok());
2884 assert!(result.is_err());
2887 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2888 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2890 for i in 0..events.len() {
2891 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2893 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2894 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2895 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2896 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2897 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2898 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2899 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2901 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2902 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2903 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2904 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2905 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2907 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2908 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2909 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2912 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2918 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2919 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2920 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2921 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2922 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2924 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2926 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2928 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2930 assert!(result.is_err());
2934 fn displays_node_alias() {
2935 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
2936 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2937 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
2938 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2941 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
2942 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
2943 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
2945 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
2946 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2947 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
2948 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2951 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
2952 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
2953 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
2957 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
2958 let chanmon_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2959 let node_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2960 let node_chanmgrs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
2961 let nodes = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2963 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
2964 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2967 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
2968 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
2969 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
2970 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
2971 last_update_message: None,
2974 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
2975 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
2977 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
2978 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
2979 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
2981 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
2982 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2983 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
2985 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
2986 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
2987 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
2988 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
2989 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
2991 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2992 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
2993 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
2995 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
2996 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
2997 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
2998 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2999 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3001 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3003 capacity_sats: None,
3004 announcement_message: None,
3005 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3008 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3009 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3011 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3012 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3014 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3015 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3016 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3017 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3018 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3019 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3020 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3021 capacity_sats: None,
3022 announcement_message: None,
3023 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3026 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3027 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3029 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3030 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3032 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3033 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3034 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3036 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3037 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3038 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3039 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3040 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3041 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3042 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3044 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3045 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3046 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3047 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3048 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3052 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3053 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3055 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3056 let valid_netaddr = ::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: ::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3057 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3058 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3061 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3062 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3063 announcement_message: None,
3066 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3067 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3068 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3069 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3071 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3072 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3073 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3075 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3076 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3077 channels: Vec::new(),
3078 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3079 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3082 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3083 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3084 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3085 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3087 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3088 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3089 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3093 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3101 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3102 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3103 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3104 let mut v = Vec::new();
3105 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3107 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3112 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3113 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3114 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3115 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3117 let _ = net_graph.encode();