1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
23 use crate::chain::Access;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
37 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
42 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use crate::sync::Mutex;
44 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
47 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
48 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
50 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
52 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
54 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
55 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
57 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
58 /// refuse to relay the message.
59 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
61 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
62 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
63 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
65 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
67 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
70 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
71 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
72 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
75 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
76 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
81 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
82 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
83 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
87 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
88 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
95 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
96 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
97 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
101 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
102 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 Some(self.cmp(other))
107 impl Ord for NodeId {
108 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
109 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
113 impl Writeable for NodeId {
114 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
115 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
120 impl Readable for NodeId {
121 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
122 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
123 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
128 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
129 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
130 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
131 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
132 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
134 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
135 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
136 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
137 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
139 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
140 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
141 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
142 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
143 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
144 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
145 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
148 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
149 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
150 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
151 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
152 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
153 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
154 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
155 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
158 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
159 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
160 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
161 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
164 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
165 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
167 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
168 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
170 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
171 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
172 ChannelUpdateMessage {
173 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
176 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
177 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
179 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
180 short_channel_id: u64,
181 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
182 /// `channel_update` message is received.
185 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
186 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
188 /// The node id of the failed node.
190 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
191 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
196 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
197 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
200 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
201 (0, short_channel_id, required),
202 (2, is_permanent, required),
204 (4, NodeFailure) => {
205 (0, node_id, required),
206 (2, is_permanent, required),
210 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
211 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
212 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
213 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
214 /// serving historical announcements.
216 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
217 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
218 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
219 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
222 chain_access: Option<C>,
223 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
224 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
225 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
229 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
230 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
232 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
233 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
234 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
235 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
236 /// channel owners' keys.
237 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
241 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
243 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
248 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
249 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
250 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
251 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
252 self.chain_access = chain_access;
255 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
256 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
258 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
259 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
263 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
264 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
265 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
266 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
267 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
268 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
269 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
277 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
278 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
279 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
280 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
281 match *network_update {
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
283 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
284 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
285 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
286 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
287 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
289 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
290 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
291 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
292 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
294 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
296 log_debug!(self.logger,
297 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
298 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
307 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
308 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
309 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
312 return Err(LightningError {
313 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
314 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
315 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
317 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
319 log_level: Level::Trace,
327 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
328 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
330 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
331 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
332 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
333 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
334 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
338 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
339 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
340 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
343 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
344 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
345 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
348 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
349 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
350 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
351 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
352 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
353 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
354 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
355 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
356 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
358 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
359 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
361 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
363 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
364 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
370 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
371 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
372 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
373 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
377 for (_, ref node) in iter {
378 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
379 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
387 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
388 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
389 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
391 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
392 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
393 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
394 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
395 /// tracking this directly.
396 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
397 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
398 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
399 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
400 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
404 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
406 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
407 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
408 // updates from all our peers normally.
410 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
411 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
412 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
415 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
416 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
417 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
418 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
419 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
421 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
422 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
423 // relying on it useless.
425 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
426 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
427 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
429 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
430 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
431 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
432 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
433 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
436 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
437 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
438 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
439 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
440 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
441 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
442 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
444 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
445 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
446 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
447 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
449 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
450 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
451 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
453 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
454 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
455 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
456 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
458 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
459 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
460 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
462 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
466 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
467 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
468 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
469 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
470 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
471 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
472 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
478 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
479 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
480 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
481 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
485 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
486 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
487 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
488 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
492 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
493 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
494 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
495 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
496 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
497 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
498 /// memory constrained systems.
499 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
500 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
502 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
504 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
505 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
506 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
508 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
509 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
510 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
511 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
512 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
513 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
514 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
515 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
516 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
518 short_channel_ids: vec![],
521 return Err(LightningError {
522 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
523 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
527 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
528 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
529 // exists even if its not yet routable.
530 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
531 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
532 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
533 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
534 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
535 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
536 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
539 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
540 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
545 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
546 let batch_count = batches.len();
547 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
548 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
549 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
550 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
552 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
553 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
554 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
555 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
556 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
557 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
558 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
560 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
561 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
562 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
564 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
565 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
566 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
568 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
569 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
570 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
571 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
573 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
574 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
576 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
579 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
581 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
582 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
583 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
584 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
588 short_channel_ids: batch,
596 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
599 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
600 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
604 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
605 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
606 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
610 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
611 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
612 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
617 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
619 C::Target: chain::Access,
622 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
623 let mut ret = Vec::new();
624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
625 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
630 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
631 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
632 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
633 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
634 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
635 pub last_update: u32,
636 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
638 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
639 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
640 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
641 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
642 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
643 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
644 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
645 pub fees: RoutingFees,
646 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
647 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
648 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
649 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
650 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
653 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
654 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
655 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
660 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
661 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
662 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
663 (0, self.last_update, required),
664 (2, self.enabled, required),
665 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
666 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
667 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
668 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
669 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
670 (10, self.fees, required),
671 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
677 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
678 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
679 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
680 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
681 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
682 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
683 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
684 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
685 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
687 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
688 (0, last_update, required),
689 (2, enabled, required),
690 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
691 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
692 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
693 (10, fees, required),
694 (12, last_update_message, required)
697 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
698 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
699 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
700 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
701 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
702 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
704 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
705 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
708 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
713 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
714 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
715 /// Received within a channel announcement.
716 pub struct ChannelInfo {
717 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
718 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
719 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
720 pub node_one: NodeId,
721 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
722 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
723 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
724 pub node_two: NodeId,
725 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
726 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
727 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
728 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
729 /// An initial announcement of the channel
730 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
731 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
732 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
733 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
734 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
735 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
736 /// network graph in memory!).
737 announcement_received_time: u64,
741 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
742 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
743 pub(crate) fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
744 let (direction, source) = {
745 if target == &self.node_one {
746 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
747 } else if target == &self.node_two {
748 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
753 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
756 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
757 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
758 pub(crate) fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
759 let (direction, target) = {
760 if source == &self.node_one {
761 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
762 } else if source == &self.node_two {
763 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
768 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
771 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
772 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
773 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
775 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
777 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
782 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
783 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
784 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
785 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
790 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
791 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
792 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
793 (0, self.features, required),
794 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
795 (2, self.node_one, required),
796 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
797 (6, self.node_two, required),
798 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
799 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
800 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
806 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
807 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
808 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
809 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
810 // channel updates via the gossip network.
811 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
813 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
814 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
815 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
816 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
817 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
818 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
819 Err(err) => Err(err),
824 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
825 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
826 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
827 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
828 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
829 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
830 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
831 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
832 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
833 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
834 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
835 (0, features, required),
836 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
837 (2, node_one, required),
838 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
839 (6, node_two, required),
840 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
841 (10, capacity_sats, required),
842 (12, announcement_message, required),
846 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
847 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
848 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
849 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
850 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
851 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
852 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
853 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
858 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
859 /// source node to a target node.
861 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
862 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
863 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
864 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
865 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
868 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
870 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
871 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
872 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
874 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
875 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
876 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
877 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
879 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
880 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
882 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
883 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
885 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
889 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
893 /// Returns information for the channel.
894 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
896 /// Returns information for the direction.
897 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
899 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
900 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
901 self.htlc_maximum_msat
904 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
906 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
907 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
909 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
910 self.effective_capacity
913 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
914 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
915 match self.direction {
916 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
922 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
923 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
924 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
925 .field("channel", &self.channel)
930 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
932 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
933 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
936 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
937 /// Returns information for the channel.
939 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
941 /// Returns information for the direction.
943 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
945 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
947 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
950 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
951 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
956 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
958 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
959 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
960 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
961 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
962 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
965 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
969 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
971 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
974 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
976 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
978 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
979 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
981 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
984 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
985 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
989 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
990 /// use when making routing decisions.
991 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
993 impl EffectiveCapacity {
994 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
995 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
997 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
998 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
999 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1000 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1001 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1006 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1007 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
1008 pub struct RoutingFees {
1009 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
1011 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1012 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1013 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1016 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1017 (0, base_msat, required),
1018 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1021 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1022 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1023 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1024 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1025 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1026 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1027 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1028 pub last_update: u32,
1029 /// Color assigned to the node
1031 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1032 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1033 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1034 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1035 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1036 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1037 /// An initial announcement of the node
1038 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1039 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1040 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1041 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1044 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1045 (0, features, required),
1046 (2, last_update, required),
1048 (6, alias, required),
1049 (8, announcement_message, option),
1050 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1053 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1055 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1056 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1057 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1058 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1060 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1061 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1062 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1063 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1064 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1065 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1067 for c in alias.chars() {
1068 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1069 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1070 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1074 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1075 // Display printable ASCII characters
1076 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1077 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1078 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1086 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1087 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1092 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1093 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1094 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1098 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1099 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1100 pub struct NodeInfo {
1101 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1102 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1103 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1104 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1105 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1106 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1107 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1108 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1109 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1110 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1113 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1114 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1115 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1116 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1121 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1122 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1123 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1124 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1125 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1126 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1132 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1133 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1134 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1135 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1136 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1138 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1139 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1140 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1141 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1143 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1150 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1151 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1152 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1153 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1154 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1156 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1157 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1158 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1159 (4, channels, vec_type),
1163 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1164 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1165 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1170 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1171 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1173 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1174 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1175 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1177 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1178 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1179 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1180 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1181 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1182 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1184 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1185 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1186 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1187 node_id.write(writer)?;
1188 node_info.write(writer)?;
1191 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1192 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1193 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1199 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1200 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1201 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1203 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1204 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1205 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1206 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1207 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1208 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1209 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1211 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1212 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1213 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1214 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1215 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1216 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1219 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1220 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1221 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1225 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1228 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1229 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1230 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1231 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1232 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1237 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1238 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1239 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1240 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1241 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1243 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1244 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1245 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1251 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1252 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1253 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1254 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1255 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1256 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1260 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1261 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1262 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1264 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1267 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1268 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1269 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1270 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1271 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1275 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1276 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1277 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1278 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1279 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1285 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1286 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1287 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1288 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1291 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1292 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1293 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1294 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1297 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1300 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1301 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1302 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1306 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1307 /// given node announcement.
1309 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1310 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1311 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1312 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1313 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1314 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1315 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1318 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1319 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1320 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1322 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1323 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1326 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1327 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1328 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1330 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1331 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1332 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1333 // that it be at least the current time.
1334 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1335 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1336 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1337 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1342 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1343 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1344 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1345 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1346 features: msg.features.clone(),
1347 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1349 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1350 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1351 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1359 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1361 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1362 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1363 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1365 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1366 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1367 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1368 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1369 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1371 C::Target: chain::Access,
1373 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1374 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1375 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1376 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1377 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1378 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1381 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1382 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1383 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1385 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1386 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1387 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1388 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1389 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1391 C::Target: chain::Access,
1393 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1396 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1398 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1399 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1401 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1402 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1403 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1404 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1407 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1408 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1409 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1411 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1413 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1415 capacity_sats: None,
1416 announcement_message: None,
1417 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1420 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1423 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1424 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1425 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1427 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1428 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1430 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1431 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1432 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1433 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1435 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1436 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1437 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1438 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1440 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1441 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1443 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1444 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1445 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1447 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1450 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1451 entry.insert(channel_info);
1455 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1456 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1457 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1458 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1460 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1461 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1462 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1463 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1464 announcement_info: None,
1473 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1474 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1475 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1477 C::Target: chain::Access,
1479 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1480 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1483 let node_one = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1);
1484 let node_two = NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2);
1487 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1489 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1490 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1491 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1492 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1494 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1495 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1496 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1497 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1499 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1500 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1501 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1502 if node_one == chan.node_one && node_two == chan.node_two {
1503 return Err(LightningError {
1504 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1505 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1508 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1509 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1510 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1511 return Err(LightningError {
1512 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1513 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1520 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1521 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1522 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1523 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_one) ||
1524 removed_nodes.contains_key(&node_two) {
1525 return Err(LightningError{
1526 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1527 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1531 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1533 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1536 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1537 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1538 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1539 let expected_script =
1540 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1541 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1542 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1544 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1545 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1548 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1549 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1551 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1552 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1558 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1559 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1560 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1562 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1565 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1566 features: msg.features.clone(),
1571 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1572 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1573 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1574 announcement_received_time,
1577 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1580 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1581 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1582 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1583 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1584 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1585 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1586 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1587 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1588 let current_time_unix = None;
1590 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1592 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1593 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1594 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1595 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1598 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1599 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1600 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1602 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1603 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1609 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1610 /// from local storage.
1611 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1612 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1613 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1614 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1615 let current_time_unix = None;
1617 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1618 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1619 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1620 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1621 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1623 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1624 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1625 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1626 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1627 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1628 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1631 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1632 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1635 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1638 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1642 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1643 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1644 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1647 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1648 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1649 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1651 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1652 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1654 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1655 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1657 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1658 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1659 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1660 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1661 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1664 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1665 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1668 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1669 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1670 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1672 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1673 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1675 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1676 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1677 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1678 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1679 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1680 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1681 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1682 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1683 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1685 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1686 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1687 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1688 info.one_to_two = None;
1690 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1691 info.two_to_one = None;
1693 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1694 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1695 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1696 // channel_update for.
1697 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1698 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1702 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1703 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1704 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1705 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1706 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1710 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1711 if let Some(time) = time {
1712 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1714 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1715 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1716 // of this function.
1717 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1719 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1720 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1723 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1727 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1728 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1731 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1734 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1735 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1736 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1738 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1739 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1740 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1741 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1744 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1745 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1746 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1748 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1749 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1750 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1751 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1754 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1756 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1757 let chan_was_enabled;
1759 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1761 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1762 // disable this check during tests!
1763 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1764 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1765 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1767 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1768 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1772 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1773 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1774 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1776 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1777 return Err(LightningError{err:
1778 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1779 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1782 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1783 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1784 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1785 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1786 return Err(LightningError{err:
1787 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1788 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1791 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1792 ($target: expr) => {
1793 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1794 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1795 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1796 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1797 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1798 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1799 // but only in the non-normative section.
1800 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1801 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1802 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1803 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1805 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1807 chan_was_enabled = false;
1812 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1814 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1815 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1817 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1818 enabled: chan_enabled,
1819 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1820 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1821 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1822 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1824 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1825 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1829 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1833 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1834 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1835 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1836 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1837 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1838 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1839 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1840 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1841 })?, "channel_update");
1843 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1845 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1846 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1847 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1848 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1849 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1850 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1851 })?, "channel_update");
1853 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1858 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1860 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1861 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1862 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1863 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1864 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1865 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1867 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1869 proportional_millionths
1871 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1872 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1873 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1875 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1876 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1878 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1879 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1881 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1883 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1884 if chan_info.enabled {
1885 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1886 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1887 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1888 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1893 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1899 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1900 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1901 ($node_id: expr) => {
1902 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1903 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1904 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1906 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1907 entry.remove_entry();
1910 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1915 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1916 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1920 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1921 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1923 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1924 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1928 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1929 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1930 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1933 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1934 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1935 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1936 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1939 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1941 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1942 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1946 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1947 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1948 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1951 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1952 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1953 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1954 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1957 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1958 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1959 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1960 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1961 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1962 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1963 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1973 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
1974 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1975 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
1976 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
1977 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1978 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1979 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1980 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1981 use crate::util::test_utils;
1982 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1983 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1984 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1986 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1987 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1989 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1990 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1991 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1992 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1993 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1994 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1998 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1999 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2002 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2003 use crate::prelude::*;
2004 use crate::sync::Arc;
2006 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2007 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2008 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2009 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
2012 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2013 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2014 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2017 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2018 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2019 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2023 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2024 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2025 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2026 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2027 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2029 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2030 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2031 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2032 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2033 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2034 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2037 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2038 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
2039 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2040 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
2045 addresses: Vec::new(),
2046 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2047 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2049 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2050 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2052 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2053 contents: unsigned_announcement
2057 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2058 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2059 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2060 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2061 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2063 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2064 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
2065 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2066 short_channel_id: 0,
2069 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
2070 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
2071 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2073 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2074 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2075 ChannelAnnouncement {
2076 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2077 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2078 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2079 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2080 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2084 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
2085 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2086 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2087 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2088 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2091 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2092 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2093 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
2094 short_channel_id: 0,
2097 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2098 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2099 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2100 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2101 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2102 excess_data: Vec::new()
2104 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2105 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2107 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2108 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2113 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2114 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2115 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2117 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2118 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2119 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2121 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2122 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2124 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2128 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2129 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2130 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2131 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2136 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2137 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2141 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2142 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2144 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2145 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2148 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2151 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2152 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2153 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2154 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2155 // Return false because contains excess data.
2156 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2157 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2161 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2162 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2163 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2164 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2165 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2166 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2168 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2173 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2174 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2175 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2177 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2178 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2180 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2181 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2183 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2184 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2185 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2186 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2187 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2188 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2193 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2199 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2200 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2201 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2203 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2206 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2207 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2208 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2209 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2210 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2212 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2213 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2214 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2215 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2217 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2220 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2221 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2222 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2223 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2224 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2225 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2226 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2231 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2237 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2238 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2239 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2240 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2242 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2245 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2247 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2249 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2250 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2251 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2253 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2254 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2255 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2256 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2257 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2259 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2262 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2264 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2265 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2266 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2271 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2272 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2273 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2274 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2275 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2276 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2277 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2281 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2282 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2283 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2285 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2288 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2289 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2291 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2296 fn handling_channel_update() {
2297 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2298 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2299 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2300 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2301 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2302 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2304 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2305 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2307 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2308 let short_channel_id;
2311 // Announce a channel we will update
2312 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2313 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2315 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2316 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2317 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2324 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2325 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2326 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2331 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2333 Some(channel_info) => {
2334 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2335 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2340 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2341 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2342 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2343 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2344 // Return false because contains excess data
2345 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2346 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2350 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2351 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2352 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2353 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2354 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2356 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2359 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2360 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2361 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2362 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2363 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2365 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2368 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2369 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2370 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2371 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2372 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2374 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2377 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2378 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2379 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2380 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2381 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2382 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2384 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2387 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2388 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2389 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2390 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2391 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2392 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2393 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2395 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2400 fn handling_network_update() {
2401 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2402 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2403 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2406 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2407 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2408 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2411 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2412 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2415 let short_channel_id;
2417 // Announce a channel we will update
2418 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2419 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2420 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2421 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2422 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2424 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2425 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2427 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2429 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2430 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2431 all_paths_failed: true,
2433 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2434 msg: valid_channel_update,
2436 short_channel_id: None,
2442 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2445 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2447 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2449 Some(channel_info) => {
2450 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2454 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2456 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2457 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2458 all_paths_failed: true,
2460 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2462 is_permanent: false,
2464 short_channel_id: None,
2470 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2472 Some(channel_info) => {
2473 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2478 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2479 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2481 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2482 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2483 all_paths_failed: true,
2485 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2489 short_channel_id: None,
2495 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2496 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2497 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2500 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2501 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2503 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2504 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2505 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2506 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2507 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2508 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2510 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2511 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2513 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2514 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2515 all_paths_failed: true,
2517 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2519 is_permanent: false,
2521 short_channel_id: None,
2527 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2528 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2530 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2531 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2533 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2534 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2535 all_paths_failed: true,
2537 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2541 short_channel_id: None,
2547 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2548 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2549 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2554 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2555 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2556 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2557 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2558 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2559 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2560 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2563 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2564 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2566 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2567 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2568 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2569 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2570 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2572 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2573 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2574 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2576 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2577 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2578 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2580 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2581 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2583 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2584 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2585 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2586 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2587 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2588 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2589 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2591 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2592 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2593 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2596 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2597 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2599 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2601 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2603 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2605 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2606 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2607 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2609 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2610 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2611 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2612 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2614 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2615 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2616 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2618 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2619 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2620 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2621 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2623 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2624 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2625 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2626 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2627 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2630 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2632 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2633 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2634 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2636 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2638 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2639 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2640 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2642 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2643 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2644 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2645 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2647 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2648 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2649 network_graph.channel_failed(short_channel_id, true);
2651 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2652 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2653 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2655 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2656 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2657 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2658 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2659 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2664 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2665 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2666 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2667 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2668 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2670 // Channels were not announced yet.
2671 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2672 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2674 let short_channel_id;
2676 // Announce a channel we will update
2677 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2678 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2679 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2685 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2686 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2687 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2688 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2689 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2690 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2696 // Valid channel update
2697 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2698 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2699 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2700 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2706 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2707 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2708 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2709 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2710 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2711 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2717 // Channel update with excess data.
2718 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2719 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2720 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2721 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2722 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2728 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2729 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2730 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2731 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2732 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2733 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2738 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2739 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2740 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2744 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2745 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2746 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2747 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2748 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2749 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2752 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2753 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2756 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2757 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2758 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2764 // Nodes were never announced
2765 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2766 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2769 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2770 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2775 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2776 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2782 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2783 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2785 // Skip the first node.
2786 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2787 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2790 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2791 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2792 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2793 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2794 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2795 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2796 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2801 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2802 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2806 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2807 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2808 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2810 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2811 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2813 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2814 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2815 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2816 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2820 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2821 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2826 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2827 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2828 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2829 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2831 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2832 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2836 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2837 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2838 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2840 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2841 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2843 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2844 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2845 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2846 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2850 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2851 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2852 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2853 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
2855 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2856 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2857 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2858 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2860 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2862 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2864 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None };
2865 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2866 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2867 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2870 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2872 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
2873 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
2874 let init_msg = Init { features, remote_network_address: None };
2875 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg).unwrap();
2876 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2879 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2880 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2881 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2882 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2883 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2884 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2885 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2887 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2893 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2894 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2895 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2897 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2898 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2899 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2900 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2902 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2903 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2904 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2907 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2908 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2909 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2912 // used for testing resumption on same block
2913 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2916 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2917 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2918 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2919 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2925 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2926 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2930 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2932 number_of_blocks: 0,
2935 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2936 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2938 number_of_blocks: 0,
2939 sync_complete: true,
2940 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2944 // Error when wrong chain
2945 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2949 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2951 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2954 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2955 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2957 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2958 sync_complete: true,
2959 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2963 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2964 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2968 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2969 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2970 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2973 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2974 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2975 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2976 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2977 sync_complete: true,
2978 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2982 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2983 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2987 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2988 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2989 number_of_blocks: 1,
2994 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2995 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2996 number_of_blocks: 1,
2997 sync_complete: true,
2998 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3003 // No results in valid query range
3004 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3008 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3009 first_blocknum: 1000,
3010 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3015 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3016 first_blocknum: 1000,
3017 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3018 sync_complete: true,
3019 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3024 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3025 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3029 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3030 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3031 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3036 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3037 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3038 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3039 sync_complete: true,
3040 short_channel_ids: vec![
3041 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3047 // Single block exactly full
3048 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3052 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3053 first_blocknum: 100000,
3054 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3059 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3060 first_blocknum: 100000,
3061 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3062 sync_complete: true,
3063 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3064 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3070 // Multiple split on new block
3071 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3075 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3076 first_blocknum: 100000,
3077 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3082 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3083 first_blocknum: 100000,
3084 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3085 sync_complete: false,
3086 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3087 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3091 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3092 first_blocknum: 107999,
3093 number_of_blocks: 2,
3094 sync_complete: true,
3095 short_channel_ids: vec![
3096 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3102 // Multiple split on same block
3103 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3107 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3108 first_blocknum: 100002,
3109 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3114 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3115 first_blocknum: 100002,
3116 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3117 sync_complete: false,
3118 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3119 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3123 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3124 first_blocknum: 108001,
3125 number_of_blocks: 1,
3126 sync_complete: true,
3127 short_channel_ids: vec![
3128 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3135 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3136 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3137 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3138 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3140 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3142 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3143 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3144 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3145 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3148 assert!(result.is_ok());
3150 assert!(result.is_err());
3153 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3154 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3156 for i in 0..events.len() {
3157 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3159 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3160 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3161 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3162 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3163 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3164 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3165 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3167 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3168 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3169 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3170 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3171 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3173 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3174 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3175 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3178 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3184 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3185 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3186 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3187 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3188 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3190 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
3192 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3194 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3196 assert!(result.is_err());
3200 fn displays_node_alias() {
3201 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3202 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3203 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3204 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3207 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3208 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3209 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3211 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3212 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3213 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3214 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3217 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3218 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3219 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3223 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3224 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3225 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3226 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3227 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3229 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3230 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3233 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3234 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3235 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3236 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3237 last_update_message: None,
3240 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3241 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3243 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3244 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3245 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3247 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3248 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3249 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3251 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3252 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3253 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3254 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3255 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3257 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3258 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3259 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3261 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3262 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3263 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3264 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3265 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3267 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3269 capacity_sats: None,
3270 announcement_message: None,
3271 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3274 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3275 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3277 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3278 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3280 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3281 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3282 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
3283 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3284 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3285 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3286 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3287 capacity_sats: None,
3288 announcement_message: None,
3289 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3292 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3293 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3295 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3296 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3298 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3299 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3300 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3302 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3303 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3304 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
3305 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3306 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3307 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3308 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3310 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3311 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3312 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3313 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3314 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3318 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3319 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3321 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3322 let valid_netaddr = crate::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: crate::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3323 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3324 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
3327 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3328 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3329 announcement_message: None,
3332 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3333 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3334 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3335 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3337 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3338 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3339 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3341 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3342 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3343 channels: Vec::new(),
3344 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3345 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3348 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3349 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3350 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3351 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3353 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3354 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3355 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3359 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3367 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3368 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3369 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3370 let mut v = Vec::new();
3371 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3373 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3378 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3379 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3380 let mut d = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3381 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3383 let _ = net_graph.encode();