1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
253 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
255 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
256 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
260 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
261 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
262 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
263 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
264 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
265 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
272 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
273 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
275 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
276 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
277 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
278 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
279 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
280 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
283 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
284 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
285 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
287 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
288 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
289 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
290 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
296 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
297 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
298 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
301 return Err(LightningError {
302 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
303 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
304 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
306 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
308 log_level: Level::Trace,
316 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
317 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
319 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
320 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
321 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
322 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
323 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
326 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
327 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
328 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
329 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
332 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
338 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
339 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
340 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
341 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
342 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
343 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
344 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
345 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
346 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
347 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
348 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
350 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
351 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
353 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
355 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
356 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
365 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
366 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
367 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
368 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
369 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
373 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
375 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
376 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
377 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
378 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
379 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
399 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
400 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
404 // Send a gossip_timestamp_filter to enable gossip message receipt. Note that we have to
405 // use a "all timestamps" filter as sending the current timestamp would result in missing
406 // gossip messages that are simply sent late. We could calculate the intended filter time
407 // by looking at the current time and subtracting two weeks (before which we'll reject
408 // messages), but there's not a lot of reason to bother - our peers should be discarding
409 // the same messages.
410 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
411 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
412 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
413 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
414 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
416 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
420 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
421 if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
425 let first_blocknum = 0;
426 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
427 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
428 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
429 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
430 msg: QueryChannelRange {
431 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
438 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
439 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
440 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
441 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
442 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
443 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
444 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
445 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
447 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
448 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
450 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
451 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
452 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
453 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
454 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
455 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
456 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
463 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
464 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
465 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
466 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
467 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
468 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
470 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
471 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
472 // the result and try again with a different peer.
473 if !msg.full_information {
474 return Err(LightningError {
475 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
476 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
483 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
484 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
485 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
486 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
487 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
488 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
489 /// memory constrained systems.
490 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
491 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
493 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
495 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
496 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
497 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
499 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
500 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
502 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
503 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
504 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
505 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
506 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
507 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
509 short_channel_ids: vec![],
512 return Err(LightningError {
513 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
514 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
518 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
519 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
520 // exists even if its not yet routable.
521 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
522 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
523 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
524 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
525 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
526 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
527 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
530 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
531 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
537 let batch_count = batches.len();
538 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
539 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
540 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
541 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
543 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
544 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
545 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
546 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
547 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
548 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
549 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
551 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
552 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
553 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
555 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
556 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
557 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
559 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
560 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
561 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
562 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
564 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
565 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
567 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
570 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
572 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
573 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
574 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
575 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
579 short_channel_ids: batch,
587 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
590 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
591 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
596 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
598 C::Target: chain::Access,
601 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
602 let mut ret = Vec::new();
603 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
604 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
609 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
610 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
611 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
612 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
613 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
614 pub last_update: u32,
615 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
617 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
618 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
619 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
620 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
621 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
622 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
623 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
624 pub fees: RoutingFees,
625 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
626 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
627 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
628 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
629 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
632 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
633 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
634 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
639 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
640 (0, last_update, required),
641 (2, enabled, required),
642 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
643 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
644 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
645 (10, fees, required),
646 (12, last_update_message, required),
649 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
650 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
651 /// Received within a channel announcement.
652 pub struct ChannelInfo {
653 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
654 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
655 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
656 pub node_one: NodeId,
657 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
658 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
659 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
660 pub node_two: NodeId,
661 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
662 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
663 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
664 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
665 /// An initial announcement of the channel
666 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
667 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
668 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
669 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
670 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
671 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
672 /// network graph in memory!).
673 announcement_received_time: u64,
677 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
678 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
679 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
680 let (direction, source) = {
681 if target == &self.node_one {
682 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
683 } else if target == &self.node_two {
684 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
689 Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
692 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
693 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
694 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
695 let (direction, target) = {
696 if source == &self.node_one {
697 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
698 } else if source == &self.node_two {
699 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
704 Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target))
708 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
709 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
710 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
711 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
716 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
717 (0, features, required),
718 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
719 (2, node_one, required),
720 (4, one_to_two, required),
721 (6, node_two, required),
722 (8, two_to_one, required),
723 (10, capacity_sats, required),
724 (12, announcement_message, required),
727 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
728 /// source node to a target node.
730 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
731 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
732 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
735 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
736 /// Returns information for the channel.
737 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
739 /// Returns information for the direction.
740 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
742 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
744 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
745 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
746 /// whichever is smaller.
747 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
748 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
750 .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
751 .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
752 let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
753 if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
754 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
756 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
759 .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
760 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
761 .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
764 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
765 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
766 match self.direction {
767 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
773 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
774 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
775 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
776 .field("channel", &self.channel)
781 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
783 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
784 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
787 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
788 /// Returns information for the channel.
790 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
792 /// Returns information for the direction.
794 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
796 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
798 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
801 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
802 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
807 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
809 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
810 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
811 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
812 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
815 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
819 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
821 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
824 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
826 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
829 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
832 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
833 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
837 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
838 /// use when making routing decisions.
839 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
841 impl EffectiveCapacity {
842 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
843 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
845 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
846 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
847 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
848 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
849 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
854 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
855 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
856 pub struct RoutingFees {
857 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
859 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
860 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
861 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
864 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
865 (0, base_msat, required),
866 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
869 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
870 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
871 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
872 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
873 pub features: NodeFeatures,
874 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
875 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
876 pub last_update: u32,
877 /// Color assigned to the node
879 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
880 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
881 /// should not be exposed to the user.
883 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
884 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
885 /// An initial announcement of the node
886 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
887 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
888 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
889 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
892 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
893 (0, features, required),
894 (2, last_update, required),
896 (6, alias, required),
897 (8, announcement_message, option),
898 (10, addresses, vec_type),
901 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
902 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
903 pub struct NodeInfo {
904 /// All valid channels a node has announced
905 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
906 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
907 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
908 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
909 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
910 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
911 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
912 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
913 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
916 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
917 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
918 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
919 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
925 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
926 (2, announcement_info, option),
927 (4, channels, vec_type),
930 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
931 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
933 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
934 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
935 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
937 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
938 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
939 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
940 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
941 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
942 chan_info.write(writer)?;
944 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
945 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
946 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
947 node_id.write(writer)?;
948 node_info.write(writer)?;
951 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
956 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
957 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
958 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
960 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
961 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
962 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
963 for _ in 0..channels_count {
964 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
965 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
966 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
968 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
969 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
970 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
971 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
972 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
973 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
975 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
979 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
980 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
985 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
986 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
987 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
988 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
989 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
991 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
992 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
993 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
999 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
1000 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1001 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1002 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1003 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1008 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1009 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
1012 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1013 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1017 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1018 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1019 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1020 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1021 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1027 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1028 /// given node announcement.
1030 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1031 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1032 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1033 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1034 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1035 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1036 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1039 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1040 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1041 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1043 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1044 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1047 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1048 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1049 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1051 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1052 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1053 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1054 // that it be at least the current time.
1055 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1056 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1057 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1058 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1063 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1064 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1065 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1066 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1067 features: msg.features.clone(),
1068 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1071 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1072 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1080 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1082 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1083 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1084 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1086 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1087 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1088 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
1089 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1090 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1092 C::Target: chain::Access,
1094 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1095 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1096 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1097 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1098 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1099 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1102 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1103 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1104 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1106 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1107 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1108 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1109 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1110 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1112 C::Target: chain::Access,
1114 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1117 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1118 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1119 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1121 C::Target: chain::Access,
1123 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1124 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1127 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1129 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1132 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1133 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1134 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1135 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1136 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1137 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1138 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1139 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1140 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1141 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1143 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1144 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1147 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1148 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1150 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1151 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1157 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1158 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1159 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1161 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1164 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1165 features: msg.features.clone(),
1166 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1168 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1170 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1171 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1172 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1173 announcement_received_time,
1176 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1177 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1178 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
1179 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1180 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1181 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1183 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1184 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1185 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1186 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1188 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1189 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1191 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1192 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1193 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1195 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1198 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1199 entry.insert(chan_info);
1203 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1204 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1205 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1206 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1207 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1209 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1210 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1211 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1212 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1213 announcement_info: None,
1220 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1221 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1226 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1227 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1228 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1229 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1230 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1231 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1233 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1234 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1235 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1238 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1239 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1240 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1242 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1243 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1249 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1250 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1252 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1254 // TODO: downgrade the node
1258 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1259 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1260 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1263 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1264 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1265 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1267 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1268 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1270 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1271 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1272 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1273 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1274 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1277 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1278 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1281 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1282 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1283 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1285 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1286 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1287 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1288 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1289 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1290 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1291 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1292 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1293 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1295 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1296 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1297 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1298 info.one_to_two = None;
1300 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1301 info.two_to_one = None;
1303 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1304 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1305 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1306 // channel_update for.
1307 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1308 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1312 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1313 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1314 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1315 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1316 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1321 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1324 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1325 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1326 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1328 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1329 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1330 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1331 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1334 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1335 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1336 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1338 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1339 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1340 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1341 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1344 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1346 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1347 let chan_was_enabled;
1349 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1351 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1352 // disable this check during tests!
1353 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1354 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1355 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1357 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1358 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1362 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1363 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1364 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1366 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1367 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1368 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1371 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1372 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1373 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1374 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1375 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1379 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1380 ($target: expr) => {
1381 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1382 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1383 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1384 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1385 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1386 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1387 // but only in the non-normative section.
1388 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1389 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1390 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1391 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1393 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1395 chan_was_enabled = false;
1400 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1402 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1403 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1405 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1406 enabled: chan_enabled,
1407 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1408 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1409 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1410 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1412 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1413 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1417 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1421 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1422 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1423 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1424 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1425 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1426 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1427 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1428 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1429 })?, "channel_update");
1431 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1433 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1434 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1435 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1436 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1437 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1438 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1439 })?, "channel_update");
1441 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1446 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1448 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1449 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1450 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1451 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1452 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1453 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1455 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1457 proportional_millionths
1459 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1460 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1461 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1463 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1464 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1466 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1467 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1469 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1471 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1472 if chan_info.enabled {
1473 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1474 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1475 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1476 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1481 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1487 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1488 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1489 ($node_id: expr) => {
1490 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1491 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1492 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1494 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1495 entry.remove_entry();
1498 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1503 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1504 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1508 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1509 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1511 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1512 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1516 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1518 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1519 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1523 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1524 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1525 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1526 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1527 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1528 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1529 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1539 use ln::PaymentHash;
1540 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1541 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1542 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1543 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1544 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1545 use util::test_utils;
1546 use util::logger::Logger;
1547 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1548 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1549 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1551 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1553 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1554 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1555 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1556 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1557 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1558 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1559 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1563 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1564 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1570 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1571 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1572 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1575 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1576 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1578 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1579 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1580 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1581 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1585 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1586 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1587 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1588 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1590 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1591 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1592 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1593 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1594 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1595 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1598 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1599 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1600 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1601 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1606 addresses: Vec::new(),
1607 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1608 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1610 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1611 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1613 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1614 contents: unsigned_announcement
1618 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1619 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1620 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1621 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1622 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1624 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1625 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1626 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1627 short_channel_id: 0,
1630 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1631 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1632 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1634 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1635 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1636 ChannelAnnouncement {
1637 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1638 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1639 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1640 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1641 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1645 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1646 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1647 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1648 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1649 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1650 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1651 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1652 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1656 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1657 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1658 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1659 short_channel_id: 0,
1662 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1663 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1664 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1665 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1666 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1667 excess_data: Vec::new()
1669 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1670 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1672 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1673 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1678 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1679 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1680 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1682 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1683 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1684 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1686 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1687 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1689 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1693 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1694 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1695 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1696 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1701 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1702 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1706 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1707 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1709 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1710 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1713 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1716 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1717 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1718 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1719 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1720 // Return false because contains excess data.
1721 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1722 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1726 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1727 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1728 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1729 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1730 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1731 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1733 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1738 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1739 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1740 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1742 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1743 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1745 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1746 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1748 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1749 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1750 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1751 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1752 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1757 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1763 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1764 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1765 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1767 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1770 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1771 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1772 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1773 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1774 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1776 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1777 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1778 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1779 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1781 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1784 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1785 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1786 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1787 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1788 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1789 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1790 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1795 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1801 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1802 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1803 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1804 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1806 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1809 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1810 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1811 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1812 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1813 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1814 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1815 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1816 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1820 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1821 Some(channel_entry) => {
1822 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1828 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1829 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1830 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1831 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1832 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1833 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1834 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1838 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1839 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1840 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1842 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1845 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1846 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1848 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1853 fn handling_channel_update() {
1854 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1855 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1856 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1857 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1858 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1860 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1861 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1863 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1864 let short_channel_id;
1867 // Announce a channel we will update
1868 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1869 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1871 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1872 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1873 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1880 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1881 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1882 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1887 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1889 Some(channel_info) => {
1890 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1891 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1896 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1897 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1898 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1899 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1900 // Return false because contains excess data
1901 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1902 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1906 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1907 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1908 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1909 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1910 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1912 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1915 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1916 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1917 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1918 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1919 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1921 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1924 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1925 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1926 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1927 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1928 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1930 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1933 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1934 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1935 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1936 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1937 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1938 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1940 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1943 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1944 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1945 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1946 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1947 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1948 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1949 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1951 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
1956 fn handling_network_update() {
1957 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1958 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1959 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1960 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1961 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1962 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1964 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1965 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1968 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1969 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1972 let short_channel_id;
1974 // Announce a channel we will update
1975 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1976 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1977 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1978 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1979 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1981 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1982 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1984 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1986 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1987 rejected_by_dest: false,
1988 all_paths_failed: true,
1990 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1991 msg: valid_channel_update,
1993 short_channel_id: None,
1999 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2002 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2004 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2006 Some(channel_info) => {
2007 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2011 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2013 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2014 rejected_by_dest: false,
2015 all_paths_failed: true,
2017 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2019 is_permanent: false,
2021 short_channel_id: None,
2027 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2029 Some(channel_info) => {
2030 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2035 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2036 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2038 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2039 rejected_by_dest: false,
2040 all_paths_failed: true,
2042 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2046 short_channel_id: None,
2052 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2053 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2054 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2055 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2059 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2060 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2061 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2062 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2063 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2064 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2065 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2066 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2068 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2069 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2071 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2072 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2073 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2074 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2075 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2077 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2078 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2079 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2081 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2082 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2083 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2085 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2086 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2088 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2089 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2090 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2091 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2092 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2093 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2094 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2096 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2097 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2098 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2101 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2102 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2106 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2107 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2108 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2109 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2110 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2112 // Channels were not announced yet.
2113 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2114 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2116 let short_channel_id;
2118 // Announce a channel we will update
2119 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2120 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2121 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2127 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2128 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2129 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2130 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2131 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2132 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2133 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2140 // Valid channel update
2141 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2142 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2143 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2144 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2150 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2151 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2152 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2153 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2154 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2155 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2156 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2162 // Channel update with excess data.
2163 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2164 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2165 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2166 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2167 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2173 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2174 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2175 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2176 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2177 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2178 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2179 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2184 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2185 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2186 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2190 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2191 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2192 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2193 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2194 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2195 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2198 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2199 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2202 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2203 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2204 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2211 // Nodes were never announced
2212 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2213 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2216 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2217 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2222 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2223 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2229 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2230 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2232 // Skip the first node.
2233 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2234 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2237 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2238 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2239 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2240 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2241 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2242 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2243 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2248 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2249 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2253 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2254 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2255 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2257 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2258 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2260 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2261 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2262 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2263 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2267 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2268 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2273 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2274 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2275 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2276 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2277 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2281 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2282 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2283 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2284 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2285 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2287 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2288 let first_blocknum = 0;
2289 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2291 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2293 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2294 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2295 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2299 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2301 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2302 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2303 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2304 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2306 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2307 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2308 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2309 assert_eq!(msg.first_timestamp, 0);
2310 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2312 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2315 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2316 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2317 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2318 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2319 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2321 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2325 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2326 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2327 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2329 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2330 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2331 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2333 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2334 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2335 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id, &init_msg);
2336 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2338 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2340 // Even after the we stop sending the explicit query, we should still send a
2341 // gossip_timestamp_filter on each new connection.
2342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2350 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2351 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2352 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2353 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2354 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2356 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2358 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2359 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2361 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2363 sync_complete: true,
2365 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2366 short_channel_ids: vec![
2367 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2368 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2369 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2370 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2371 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2372 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2375 assert!(result.is_ok());
2377 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2378 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2379 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2381 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2382 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2383 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2384 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2385 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2386 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2387 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2388 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2389 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2390 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2393 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2399 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2400 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2401 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2402 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2403 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2405 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2407 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2409 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2411 full_information: true,
2413 assert!(result.is_ok());
2416 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2417 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2419 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2421 full_information: false,
2423 assert!(result.is_err());
2424 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2429 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2430 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2431 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2433 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2434 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2435 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2436 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2438 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2439 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2440 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2443 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2444 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2445 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2448 // used for testing resumption on same block
2449 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2452 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2453 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2454 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2455 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2461 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2462 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2463 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2466 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2468 number_of_blocks: 0,
2471 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2472 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2474 number_of_blocks: 0,
2475 sync_complete: true,
2476 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2480 // Error when wrong chain
2481 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2482 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2485 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2487 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2490 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2491 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2493 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2494 sync_complete: true,
2495 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2499 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2500 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2501 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2504 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2505 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2506 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2509 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2510 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2511 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2512 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2513 sync_complete: true,
2514 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2518 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2519 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2520 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2523 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2524 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2525 number_of_blocks: 1,
2530 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2531 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2532 number_of_blocks: 1,
2533 sync_complete: true,
2534 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2539 // No results in valid query range
2540 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2541 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2544 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2545 first_blocknum: 1000,
2546 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2551 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2552 first_blocknum: 1000,
2553 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2554 sync_complete: true,
2555 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2560 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2561 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2562 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2565 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2566 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2567 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2572 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2573 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2574 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2575 sync_complete: true,
2576 short_channel_ids: vec![
2577 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2583 // Single block exactly full
2584 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2585 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2588 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2589 first_blocknum: 100000,
2590 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2595 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2596 first_blocknum: 100000,
2597 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2598 sync_complete: true,
2599 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2600 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2606 // Multiple split on new block
2607 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2608 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2611 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2612 first_blocknum: 100000,
2613 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2618 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2619 first_blocknum: 100000,
2620 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2621 sync_complete: false,
2622 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2623 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2627 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2628 first_blocknum: 107999,
2629 number_of_blocks: 2,
2630 sync_complete: true,
2631 short_channel_ids: vec![
2632 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2638 // Multiple split on same block
2639 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2640 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2643 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2644 first_blocknum: 100002,
2645 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2650 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2651 first_blocknum: 100002,
2652 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2653 sync_complete: false,
2654 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2655 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2659 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2660 first_blocknum: 108001,
2661 number_of_blocks: 1,
2662 sync_complete: true,
2663 short_channel_ids: vec![
2664 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2671 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2672 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2673 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2674 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2676 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2678 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2679 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2680 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2681 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2684 assert!(result.is_ok());
2686 assert!(result.is_err());
2689 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2690 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2692 for i in 0..events.len() {
2693 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2695 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2696 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2697 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2698 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2699 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2700 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2701 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2703 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2704 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2705 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2706 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2707 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2709 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2710 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2711 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2714 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2720 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2721 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2722 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2723 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2724 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2726 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2728 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2730 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2732 assert!(result.is_err());
2736 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2744 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2745 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2746 let mut v = Vec::new();
2747 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2749 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2754 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2755 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2756 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2758 let _ = net_graph.encode();