1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
253 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
255 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
256 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
260 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
261 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
262 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
263 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
264 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
265 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
272 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
273 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
275 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
276 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
277 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
278 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
279 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
280 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
283 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
284 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
285 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
287 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
288 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
289 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
290 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
296 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
297 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
298 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
301 return Err(LightningError {
302 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
303 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
304 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
306 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
308 log_level: Level::Trace,
316 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
317 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
319 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
320 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
321 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
322 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
323 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
326 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
327 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
328 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
329 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
332 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
338 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
339 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
340 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
341 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
342 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
343 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
344 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
345 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
346 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
347 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
348 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
350 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
351 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
353 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
355 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
356 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
365 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
366 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
367 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
368 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
369 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
373 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
375 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
376 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
377 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
378 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
379 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
399 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
400 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
404 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
406 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
407 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
408 // updates from all our peers normally.
410 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
411 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
412 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
415 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
416 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
417 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
418 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
419 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
421 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
422 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
423 // relying on it useless.
425 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
426 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
427 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
429 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
430 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
431 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
432 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
433 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
436 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
437 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
438 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
439 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
440 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
441 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
442 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
444 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
445 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
446 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
447 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
449 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
450 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
451 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
453 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
454 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
455 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
456 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
457 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
459 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
460 if should_request_full_sync {
461 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
463 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
467 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
468 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
469 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
470 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
471 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
472 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
473 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
478 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
479 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
480 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
481 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
485 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
486 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
487 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
488 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
492 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
493 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
494 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
495 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
496 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
497 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
498 /// memory constrained systems.
499 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
500 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
502 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
504 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
505 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
506 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
508 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
509 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
510 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
511 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
512 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
513 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
514 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
515 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
516 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
518 short_channel_ids: vec![],
521 return Err(LightningError {
522 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
523 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
527 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
528 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
529 // exists even if its not yet routable.
530 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
531 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
532 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
533 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
534 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
535 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
536 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
539 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
540 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
545 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
546 let batch_count = batches.len();
547 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
548 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
549 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
550 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
552 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
553 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
554 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
555 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
556 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
557 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
558 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
560 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
561 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
562 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
564 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
565 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
566 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
568 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
569 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
570 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
571 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
573 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
574 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
576 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
579 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
581 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
582 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
583 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
584 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
588 short_channel_ids: batch,
596 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
599 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
600 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
605 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
607 C::Target: chain::Access,
610 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
611 let mut ret = Vec::new();
612 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
613 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
618 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
619 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
620 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
621 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
622 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
623 pub last_update: u32,
624 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
626 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
627 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
628 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
629 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
630 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
631 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
632 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
633 pub fees: RoutingFees,
634 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
635 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
636 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
637 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
638 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
641 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
642 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
643 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
649 (0, last_update, required),
650 (2, enabled, required),
651 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
652 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
653 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
654 (10, fees, required),
655 (12, last_update_message, required),
658 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
659 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
660 /// Received within a channel announcement.
661 pub struct ChannelInfo {
662 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
663 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
664 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
665 pub node_one: NodeId,
666 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
667 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
668 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
669 pub node_two: NodeId,
670 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
671 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
672 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
673 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
674 /// An initial announcement of the channel
675 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
676 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
677 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
678 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
679 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
680 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
681 /// network graph in memory!).
682 announcement_received_time: u64,
686 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
687 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
688 pub(crate) fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
689 let (direction, source) = {
690 if target == &self.node_one {
691 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
692 } else if target == &self.node_two {
693 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
698 Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
701 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
702 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
703 pub(crate) fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
704 let (direction, target) = {
705 if source == &self.node_one {
706 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
707 } else if source == &self.node_two {
708 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
713 Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target))
717 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
718 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
719 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
720 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
725 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
726 (0, features, required),
727 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
728 (2, node_one, required),
729 (4, one_to_two, required),
730 (6, node_two, required),
731 (8, two_to_one, required),
732 (10, capacity_sats, required),
733 (12, announcement_message, required),
736 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
737 /// source node to a target node.
739 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
740 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
741 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
744 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
745 /// Returns information for the channel.
746 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
748 /// Returns information for the direction.
749 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
751 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
753 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
754 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
755 /// whichever is smaller.
756 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
757 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
759 .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
760 .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
761 let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
762 if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
763 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
765 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
768 .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
769 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
770 .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
773 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
774 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
775 match self.direction {
776 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
782 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
783 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
784 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
785 .field("channel", &self.channel)
790 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
792 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
793 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
796 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
797 /// Returns information for the channel.
799 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
801 /// Returns information for the direction.
803 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
805 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
807 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
810 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
811 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
816 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
818 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
819 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
820 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
821 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
824 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
828 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
830 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
833 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
835 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
838 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
841 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
842 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
846 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
847 /// use when making routing decisions.
848 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
850 impl EffectiveCapacity {
851 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
852 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
854 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
855 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
856 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
857 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
858 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
863 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
864 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
865 pub struct RoutingFees {
866 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
868 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
869 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
870 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
873 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
874 (0, base_msat, required),
875 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
878 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
879 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
880 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
881 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
882 pub features: NodeFeatures,
883 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
884 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
885 pub last_update: u32,
886 /// Color assigned to the node
888 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
889 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
890 /// should not be exposed to the user.
892 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
893 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
894 /// An initial announcement of the node
895 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
896 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
897 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
898 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
901 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
902 (0, features, required),
903 (2, last_update, required),
905 (6, alias, required),
906 (8, announcement_message, option),
907 (10, addresses, vec_type),
910 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
911 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
912 pub struct NodeInfo {
913 /// All valid channels a node has announced
914 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
915 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
916 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
917 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
918 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
919 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
920 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
921 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
922 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
925 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
926 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
927 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
928 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
933 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
934 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
935 (2, announcement_info, option),
936 (4, channels, vec_type),
939 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
940 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
942 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
943 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
944 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
946 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
947 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
948 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
949 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
950 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
951 chan_info.write(writer)?;
953 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
954 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
955 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
956 node_id.write(writer)?;
957 node_info.write(writer)?;
960 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
965 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
966 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
967 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
969 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
970 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
971 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
972 for _ in 0..channels_count {
973 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
974 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
975 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
977 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
978 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
979 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
980 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
981 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
982 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
984 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
988 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
989 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
994 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
995 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
996 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
997 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
998 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1000 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1001 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1002 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1008 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
1009 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1010 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1011 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1012 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1017 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1018 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
1021 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1022 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1026 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1027 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1028 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1029 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1030 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1036 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1037 /// given node announcement.
1039 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1040 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1041 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1042 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1043 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1044 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1045 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1048 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1049 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1050 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1052 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1053 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1056 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1057 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1058 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1060 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1061 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1062 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1063 // that it be at least the current time.
1064 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1065 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1066 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1067 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1072 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1073 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1074 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1075 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1076 features: msg.features.clone(),
1077 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1080 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1081 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1089 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1091 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1092 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1093 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1095 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1096 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1097 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
1098 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1099 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1101 C::Target: chain::Access,
1103 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1104 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1105 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1106 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1107 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1108 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1111 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1112 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1113 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1115 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1116 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1117 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1118 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1119 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1121 C::Target: chain::Access,
1123 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1126 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1127 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1128 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1130 C::Target: chain::Access,
1132 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1133 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1136 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1138 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1141 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1142 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1143 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1144 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1145 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1146 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1147 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1148 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1149 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1150 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1152 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1153 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1156 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1157 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1159 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1160 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1166 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1167 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1168 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1170 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1173 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1174 features: msg.features.clone(),
1175 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1177 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1179 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1180 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1181 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1182 announcement_received_time,
1185 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1186 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1187 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
1188 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1189 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1190 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1192 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1193 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1194 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1195 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1197 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1198 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1200 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1201 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1202 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1204 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1207 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1208 entry.insert(chan_info);
1212 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1213 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1214 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1215 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1216 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1218 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1219 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1220 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1221 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1222 announcement_info: None,
1229 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1230 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1235 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1236 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1237 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1238 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1239 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1240 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1242 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1243 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1244 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1247 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1248 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1249 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1251 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1252 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1258 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1259 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1261 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1263 // TODO: downgrade the node
1267 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1268 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1269 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1272 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1273 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1274 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1276 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1277 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1279 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1280 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1281 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1282 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1283 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1286 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1287 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1290 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1291 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1292 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1294 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1295 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1296 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1297 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1298 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1299 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1300 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1301 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1302 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1304 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1305 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1306 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1307 info.one_to_two = None;
1309 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1310 info.two_to_one = None;
1312 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1313 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1314 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1315 // channel_update for.
1316 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1317 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1321 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1322 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1323 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1324 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1325 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1330 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1333 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1334 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1335 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1337 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1338 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1339 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1340 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1343 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1344 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1345 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1347 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1348 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1349 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1350 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1353 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1355 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1356 let chan_was_enabled;
1358 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1360 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1361 // disable this check during tests!
1362 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1363 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1364 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1366 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1367 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1371 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1372 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1373 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1375 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1376 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1377 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1380 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1381 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1382 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1383 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1384 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1388 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1389 ($target: expr) => {
1390 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1391 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1392 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1393 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1394 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1395 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1396 // but only in the non-normative section.
1397 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1398 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1399 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1400 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1402 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1404 chan_was_enabled = false;
1409 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1411 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1412 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1414 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1415 enabled: chan_enabled,
1416 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1417 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1418 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1419 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1421 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1422 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1426 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1430 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1431 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1432 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1433 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1434 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1435 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1436 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1437 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1438 })?, "channel_update");
1440 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1442 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1443 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1444 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1445 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1446 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1447 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1448 })?, "channel_update");
1450 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1455 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1457 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1458 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1459 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1460 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1461 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1462 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1464 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1466 proportional_millionths
1468 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1469 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1470 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1472 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1473 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1475 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1476 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1478 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1480 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1481 if chan_info.enabled {
1482 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1483 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1484 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1485 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1490 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1496 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1497 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1498 ($node_id: expr) => {
1499 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1500 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1501 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1503 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1504 entry.remove_entry();
1507 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1512 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1513 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1517 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1518 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1520 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1521 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1525 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1527 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1528 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1532 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1533 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1534 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1535 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1536 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1537 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1538 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1548 use ln::PaymentHash;
1549 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1550 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1551 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1552 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1553 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1554 use util::test_utils;
1555 use util::logger::Logger;
1556 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1557 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1558 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1560 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1562 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1563 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1564 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1565 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1566 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1567 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1568 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1572 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1573 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1579 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1580 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1581 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1584 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1585 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1588 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1589 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1590 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1594 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1595 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1596 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1597 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1599 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1600 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1601 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1602 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1603 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1604 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1607 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1608 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1609 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1610 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1615 addresses: Vec::new(),
1616 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1617 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1619 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1620 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1622 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1623 contents: unsigned_announcement
1627 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1628 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1629 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1630 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1631 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1633 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1634 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1635 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1636 short_channel_id: 0,
1639 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1640 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1641 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1643 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1644 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1645 ChannelAnnouncement {
1646 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1647 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1648 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1649 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1650 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1654 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1655 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1656 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1657 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1658 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1659 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1660 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1661 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1665 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1666 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1667 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1668 short_channel_id: 0,
1671 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1672 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1673 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1674 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1675 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1676 excess_data: Vec::new()
1678 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1679 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1681 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1682 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1687 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1688 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1689 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1691 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1692 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1693 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1695 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1696 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1698 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1702 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1703 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1704 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1705 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1710 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1711 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1715 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1716 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1718 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1719 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1722 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1725 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1726 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1727 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1728 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1729 // Return false because contains excess data.
1730 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1731 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1735 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1736 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1737 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1738 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1739 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1740 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1742 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1747 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1748 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1749 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1751 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1752 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1754 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1755 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1757 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1758 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1759 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1760 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1761 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1766 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1772 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1773 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1774 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1776 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1779 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1780 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1781 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1782 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1783 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1785 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1786 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1787 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1788 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1790 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1793 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1794 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1795 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1796 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1797 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1798 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1799 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1804 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1810 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1811 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1812 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1813 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1815 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1818 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1819 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1820 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1821 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1822 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1823 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1824 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1825 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1829 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1830 Some(channel_entry) => {
1831 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1837 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1838 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1839 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1840 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1841 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1842 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1843 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1847 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1848 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1849 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1851 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1854 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1855 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1857 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1862 fn handling_channel_update() {
1863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1864 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1865 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1866 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1867 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1869 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1870 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1872 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1873 let short_channel_id;
1876 // Announce a channel we will update
1877 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1878 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1880 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1881 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1882 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1889 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1890 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1891 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1896 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1898 Some(channel_info) => {
1899 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1900 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1905 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1906 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1907 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1908 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1909 // Return false because contains excess data
1910 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1911 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1915 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1916 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1917 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1918 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1919 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1921 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1924 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1925 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1926 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1927 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1928 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1930 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1933 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1934 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1935 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1936 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1937 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1939 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1942 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1943 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1944 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1945 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1946 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1947 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1949 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1952 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1953 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1954 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1955 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1956 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1957 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1958 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1960 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
1965 fn handling_network_update() {
1966 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1967 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1968 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1969 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1970 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1973 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1974 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1977 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1978 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1981 let short_channel_id;
1983 // Announce a channel we will update
1984 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1985 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1986 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1987 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1988 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1990 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1991 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1993 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1995 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1996 rejected_by_dest: false,
1997 all_paths_failed: true,
1999 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2000 msg: valid_channel_update,
2002 short_channel_id: None,
2008 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2011 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2013 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2015 Some(channel_info) => {
2016 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2020 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2022 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2023 rejected_by_dest: false,
2024 all_paths_failed: true,
2026 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2028 is_permanent: false,
2030 short_channel_id: None,
2036 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2038 Some(channel_info) => {
2039 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2044 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2045 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2047 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2048 rejected_by_dest: false,
2049 all_paths_failed: true,
2051 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2055 short_channel_id: None,
2061 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2062 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2063 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2064 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2068 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2069 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2070 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2071 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2072 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2073 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2074 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2075 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2077 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2078 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2080 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2081 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2082 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2083 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2084 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2086 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2087 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2088 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2090 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2091 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2092 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2094 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2095 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2097 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2098 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2099 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2100 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2101 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2102 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2103 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2105 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2106 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2107 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2110 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2111 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2115 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2116 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2117 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2118 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2119 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2121 // Channels were not announced yet.
2122 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2123 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2125 let short_channel_id;
2127 // Announce a channel we will update
2128 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2129 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2130 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2136 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2137 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2138 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2139 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2140 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2141 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2142 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2149 // Valid channel update
2150 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2151 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2152 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2153 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2159 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2160 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2161 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2162 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2163 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2164 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2165 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2171 // Channel update with excess data.
2172 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2173 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2174 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2175 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2176 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2182 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2183 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2184 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2185 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2186 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2187 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2188 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2193 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2194 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2195 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2199 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2200 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2201 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2202 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2203 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2204 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2207 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2208 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2211 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2212 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2213 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2220 // Nodes were never announced
2221 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2222 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2225 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2226 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2231 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2232 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2238 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2239 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2241 // Skip the first node.
2242 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2243 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2246 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2247 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2248 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2249 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2250 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2251 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2252 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2257 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2258 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2262 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2263 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2264 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2266 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2267 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2269 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2270 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2271 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2272 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2276 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2277 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2282 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2283 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2284 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2285 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2286 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2290 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2291 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2292 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2294 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2295 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2296 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2297 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2299 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2301 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2303 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2304 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2305 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2309 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2311 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2312 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2313 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2316 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2317 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2318 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2319 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2320 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2321 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2322 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2324 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2330 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2331 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2332 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2334 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2335 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2336 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2337 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2339 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2340 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2341 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2344 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2345 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2346 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2349 // used for testing resumption on same block
2350 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2353 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2354 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2355 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2356 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2362 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2363 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2364 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2367 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2369 number_of_blocks: 0,
2372 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2373 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2375 number_of_blocks: 0,
2376 sync_complete: true,
2377 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2381 // Error when wrong chain
2382 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2383 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2386 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2388 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2391 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2392 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2394 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2395 sync_complete: true,
2396 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2400 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2401 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2402 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2405 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2406 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2407 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2410 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2411 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2412 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2413 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2414 sync_complete: true,
2415 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2419 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2420 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2421 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2424 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2425 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2426 number_of_blocks: 1,
2431 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2432 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2433 number_of_blocks: 1,
2434 sync_complete: true,
2435 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2440 // No results in valid query range
2441 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2442 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2445 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2446 first_blocknum: 1000,
2447 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2452 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2453 first_blocknum: 1000,
2454 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2455 sync_complete: true,
2456 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2461 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2462 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2463 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2466 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2467 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2468 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2473 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2474 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2475 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2476 sync_complete: true,
2477 short_channel_ids: vec![
2478 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2484 // Single block exactly full
2485 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2486 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2489 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2490 first_blocknum: 100000,
2491 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2496 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2497 first_blocknum: 100000,
2498 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2499 sync_complete: true,
2500 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2501 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2507 // Multiple split on new block
2508 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2509 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2512 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2513 first_blocknum: 100000,
2514 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2519 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2520 first_blocknum: 100000,
2521 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2522 sync_complete: false,
2523 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2524 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2528 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2529 first_blocknum: 107999,
2530 number_of_blocks: 2,
2531 sync_complete: true,
2532 short_channel_ids: vec![
2533 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2539 // Multiple split on same block
2540 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2541 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2544 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2545 first_blocknum: 100002,
2546 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2551 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2552 first_blocknum: 100002,
2553 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2554 sync_complete: false,
2555 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2556 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2560 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2561 first_blocknum: 108001,
2562 number_of_blocks: 1,
2563 sync_complete: true,
2564 short_channel_ids: vec![
2565 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2572 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2573 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2574 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2575 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2577 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2579 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2580 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2581 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2582 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2585 assert!(result.is_ok());
2587 assert!(result.is_err());
2590 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2591 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2593 for i in 0..events.len() {
2594 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2596 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2597 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2598 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2599 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2600 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2601 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2602 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2604 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2605 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2606 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2607 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2608 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2610 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2611 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2612 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2615 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2621 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2622 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2623 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2624 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2625 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2627 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2629 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2631 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2633 assert!(result.is_err());
2637 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2645 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2646 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2647 let mut v = Vec::new();
2648 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2650 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2655 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2656 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2657 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2659 let _ = net_graph.encode();