1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
253 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
254 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
255 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
256 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
257 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
264 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
265 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
267 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
268 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
269 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
270 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
271 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
272 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
274 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
275 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
276 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
277 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
279 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
280 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
281 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
282 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
288 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
289 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
290 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
292 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
297 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
298 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
300 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
301 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
302 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
303 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
304 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
307 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
308 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
309 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
310 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
313 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
314 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
315 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
318 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
319 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
320 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
321 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
322 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
323 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
324 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
325 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
326 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
327 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
328 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
329 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
331 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
332 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
334 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
336 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
337 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
346 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
347 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
348 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
349 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
350 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
354 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
356 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
357 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
358 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
359 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
360 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
370 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
371 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
372 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
374 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
375 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
376 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
377 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
378 /// tracking this directly.
379 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
381 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
382 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
386 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
387 if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
391 let first_blocknum = 0;
392 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
393 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
394 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
395 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
396 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
397 msg: QueryChannelRange {
398 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
405 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
406 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
407 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
408 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
409 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
410 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
411 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
412 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
414 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
415 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
417 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
418 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
419 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
420 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
421 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
422 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
423 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
430 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
431 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
432 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
433 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
434 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
435 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
437 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
438 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
439 // the result and try again with a different peer.
440 if !msg.full_information {
441 return Err(LightningError {
442 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
443 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
450 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
451 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
452 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
453 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
454 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
455 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
456 /// memory constrained systems.
457 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
458 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
460 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
462 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
463 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
464 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
466 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
467 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
468 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
469 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
470 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
471 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
472 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
473 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
474 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
476 short_channel_ids: vec![],
479 return Err(LightningError {
480 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
481 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
485 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
486 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
487 // exists even if its not yet routable.
488 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
489 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
490 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
491 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
492 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
493 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
494 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
497 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
498 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
503 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
504 let batch_count = batches.len();
505 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
506 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
507 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
508 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
510 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
511 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
512 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
513 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
514 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
515 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
516 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
518 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
519 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
520 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
522 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
523 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
524 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
526 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
527 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
528 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
529 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
531 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
532 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
534 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
537 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
539 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
540 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
541 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
542 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
546 short_channel_ids: batch,
554 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
557 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
558 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
563 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
565 C::Target: chain::Access,
568 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
569 let mut ret = Vec::new();
570 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
571 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
576 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
577 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
578 /// within a channel update.
579 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
580 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
581 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
582 pub last_update: u32,
583 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
585 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
586 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
587 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
588 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
589 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
590 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
591 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
592 pub fees: RoutingFees,
593 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
594 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
595 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
596 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
597 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
600 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
601 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
602 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
607 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
608 (0, last_update, required),
609 (2, enabled, required),
610 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
611 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
612 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
613 (10, fees, required),
614 (12, last_update_message, required),
617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
618 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
619 /// Received within a channel announcement.
620 pub struct ChannelInfo {
621 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
622 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
623 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
624 pub node_one: NodeId,
625 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
626 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
627 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
628 pub node_two: NodeId,
629 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
630 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
631 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
632 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
633 /// An initial announcement of the channel
634 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
635 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
636 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
637 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
638 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
639 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
640 /// network graph in memory!).
641 announcement_received_time: u64,
644 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
645 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
646 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
647 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
652 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
653 (0, features, required),
654 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
655 (2, node_one, required),
656 (4, one_to_two, required),
657 (6, node_two, required),
658 (8, two_to_one, required),
659 (10, capacity_sats, required),
660 (12, announcement_message, required),
664 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
665 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
666 pub struct RoutingFees {
667 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
669 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
670 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
671 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
674 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
675 (0, base_msat, required),
676 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
679 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
680 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
681 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
682 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
683 pub features: NodeFeatures,
684 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
685 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
686 pub last_update: u32,
687 /// Color assigned to the node
689 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
690 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
691 /// should not be exposed to the user.
693 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
694 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
695 /// An initial announcement of the node
696 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
697 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
698 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
699 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
702 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
703 (0, features, required),
704 (2, last_update, required),
706 (6, alias, required),
707 (8, announcement_message, option),
708 (10, addresses, vec_type),
711 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
712 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
713 pub struct NodeInfo {
714 /// All valid channels a node has announced
715 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
716 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
717 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
718 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
719 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
720 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
721 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
722 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
723 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
726 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
728 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
729 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
734 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
735 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
736 (2, announcement_info, option),
737 (4, channels, vec_type),
740 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
741 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
743 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
744 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
745 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
747 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
748 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
749 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
750 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
751 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
752 chan_info.write(writer)?;
754 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
755 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
756 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
757 node_id.write(writer)?;
758 node_info.write(writer)?;
761 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
766 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
767 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
768 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
770 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
771 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
772 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
773 for _ in 0..channels_count {
774 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
775 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
776 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
778 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
779 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
780 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
781 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
782 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
783 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
785 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
789 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
790 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
795 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
796 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
797 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
798 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
799 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
801 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
802 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
803 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
809 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
810 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
811 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
812 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
813 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
818 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
819 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
822 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
823 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
827 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
828 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
829 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
830 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
831 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
837 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
838 /// given node announcement.
840 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
841 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
842 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
843 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
844 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
845 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
846 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
849 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
850 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
851 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
853 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
854 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
857 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
858 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
859 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
861 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
862 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
863 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
864 // that it be at least the current time.
865 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
866 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
867 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
868 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
873 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
874 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
875 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
876 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
877 features: msg.features.clone(),
878 last_update: msg.timestamp,
881 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
882 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
890 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
892 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
893 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
894 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
896 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
897 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
898 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
899 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
900 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
902 C::Target: chain::Access,
904 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
905 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
906 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
907 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
908 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
909 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
912 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
913 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
914 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
916 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
917 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
918 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
919 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
920 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
922 C::Target: chain::Access,
924 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
927 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
928 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
929 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
931 C::Target: chain::Access,
933 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
934 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
937 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
939 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
942 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
943 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
944 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
945 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
946 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
947 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
948 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
949 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
950 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
951 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
953 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
954 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
957 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
958 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
960 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
961 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
967 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
968 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
969 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
971 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
974 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
975 features: msg.features.clone(),
976 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
978 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
980 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
981 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
982 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
983 announcement_received_time,
986 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
987 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
988 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
989 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
990 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
991 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
993 if utxo_value.is_some() {
994 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
995 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
996 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
998 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
999 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1001 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1002 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1003 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1005 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1008 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1009 entry.insert(chan_info);
1013 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1014 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1015 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1016 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1017 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1019 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1020 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1021 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1022 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1023 announcement_info: None,
1030 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1031 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1036 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1037 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1038 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1039 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1040 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1041 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1043 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1044 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1045 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1048 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1049 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1050 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1052 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1053 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1059 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1060 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1062 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1064 // TODO: downgrade the node
1068 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1069 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1070 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1073 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1074 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1075 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1078 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1079 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1080 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1081 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1082 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1085 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1086 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1089 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1090 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1091 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1093 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1094 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1095 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1096 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1097 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1098 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1099 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1100 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1101 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1103 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1104 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1105 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1106 info.one_to_two = None;
1108 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1109 info.two_to_one = None;
1111 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1112 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1113 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1114 // channel_update for.
1115 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1116 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1120 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1121 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1122 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1123 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1124 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1129 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1132 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1133 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1134 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1135 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1136 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1139 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1140 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1141 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1142 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1143 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1146 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1148 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1149 let chan_was_enabled;
1151 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1152 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1153 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1155 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1156 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1157 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1160 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1161 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1162 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1163 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1164 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1168 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
1169 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
1170 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1171 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1172 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1173 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1174 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1175 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1176 // but only in the non-normative section.
1177 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1178 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1179 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1180 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1182 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1184 chan_was_enabled = false;
1187 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1188 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1190 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
1191 enabled: chan_enabled,
1192 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1193 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1194 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1195 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1197 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1198 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1202 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
1206 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1207 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1208 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1209 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1210 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1211 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1212 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1215 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1217 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1218 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1219 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1220 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1221 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1224 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1229 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1231 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1232 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1233 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1234 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1235 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1236 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1238 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1240 proportional_millionths
1242 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1243 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1244 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1246 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1247 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1249 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1250 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1252 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1254 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1255 if chan_info.enabled {
1256 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1257 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1258 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1259 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1264 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1270 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1271 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1272 ($node_id: expr) => {
1273 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1274 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1275 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1277 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1278 entry.remove_entry();
1281 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1286 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1287 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1291 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1292 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1294 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1295 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1299 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1301 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1302 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1306 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1307 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1308 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1309 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1310 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1311 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1312 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1322 use ln::PaymentHash;
1323 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1324 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1325 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1326 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1327 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1328 use util::test_utils;
1329 use util::logger::Logger;
1330 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1331 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1332 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1334 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1336 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1337 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1338 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1339 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1340 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1341 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1342 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1346 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1347 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1353 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1354 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1355 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1358 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1359 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1361 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1363 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1364 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1368 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1369 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1370 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1371 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1373 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1374 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1375 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1376 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1377 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1378 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1381 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1382 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1383 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1384 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1389 addresses: Vec::new(),
1390 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1391 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1393 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1394 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1396 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1397 contents: unsigned_announcement
1401 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1402 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1403 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1404 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1405 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1407 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1408 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1409 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1410 short_channel_id: 0,
1413 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1414 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1415 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1417 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1418 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1419 ChannelAnnouncement {
1420 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1421 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1422 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1423 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1424 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1428 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1429 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1430 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1431 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1432 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1433 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1434 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1435 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1439 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1440 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1441 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1442 short_channel_id: 0,
1445 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1446 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1447 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1448 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1449 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1450 excess_data: Vec::new()
1452 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1453 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1455 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1456 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1461 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1462 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1463 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1465 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1466 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1467 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1469 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1470 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1472 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1476 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1477 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1478 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1479 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1484 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1485 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1489 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1490 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1492 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1493 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1496 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1499 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1500 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1501 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1502 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1503 // Return false because contains excess data.
1504 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1505 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1509 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1510 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1511 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1512 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1513 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1514 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1516 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1521 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1523 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1525 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1526 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1528 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1529 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1531 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1532 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1533 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1534 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1535 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1540 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1546 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1547 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1548 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1550 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1553 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1554 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1555 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1556 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1557 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1559 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1560 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1561 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1562 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1564 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1567 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1568 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1569 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1570 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1571 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1572 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1573 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1578 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1584 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1585 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1586 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1587 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1589 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1592 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1593 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1594 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1595 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1596 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1597 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1598 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1599 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1603 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1604 Some(channel_entry) => {
1605 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1611 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1612 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1613 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1614 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1615 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1616 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1617 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1621 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1622 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1623 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1625 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1628 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1629 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1631 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1636 fn handling_channel_update() {
1637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1638 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1639 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1640 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1641 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1643 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1644 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1646 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1647 let short_channel_id;
1650 // Announce a channel we will update
1651 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1652 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1654 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1655 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1656 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1663 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1664 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1665 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1670 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1672 Some(channel_info) => {
1673 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1674 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1679 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1680 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1681 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1682 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1683 // Return false because contains excess data
1684 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1685 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1689 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1690 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1691 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1692 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1693 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1695 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1698 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1699 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1700 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1701 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1702 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1704 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1707 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1708 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1709 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1710 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1711 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1713 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1716 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1717 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1718 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1719 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1720 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1721 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1723 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1726 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1727 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1728 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1729 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1730 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1731 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1732 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1734 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1739 fn handling_network_update() {
1740 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1741 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1742 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1743 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1744 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1747 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1748 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1751 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1752 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1755 let short_channel_id;
1757 // Announce a channel we will update
1758 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1759 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1760 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1761 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1762 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1764 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1765 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1767 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1769 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1770 rejected_by_dest: false,
1771 all_paths_failed: true,
1773 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1774 msg: valid_channel_update,
1776 short_channel_id: None,
1782 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1785 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1787 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1789 Some(channel_info) => {
1790 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1794 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1796 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1797 rejected_by_dest: false,
1798 all_paths_failed: true,
1800 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1802 is_permanent: false,
1804 short_channel_id: None,
1810 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1812 Some(channel_info) => {
1813 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1818 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1819 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1821 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1822 rejected_by_dest: false,
1823 all_paths_failed: true,
1825 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1829 short_channel_id: None,
1835 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
1836 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1837 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1838 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1842 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
1843 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
1844 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1845 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1846 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1847 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1848 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1849 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1851 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1852 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1854 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1855 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1856 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1857 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1858 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1860 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1861 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
1862 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1864 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1865 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
1866 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
1868 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1869 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1871 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
1872 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
1873 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
1874 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
1875 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
1876 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
1877 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1879 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
1880 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1881 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1884 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
1885 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1889 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1890 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1891 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1892 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1893 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1895 // Channels were not announced yet.
1896 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1897 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1899 let short_channel_id;
1901 // Announce a channel we will update
1902 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1903 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1904 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1910 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1911 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1912 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1913 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1914 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1915 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1916 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1923 // Valid channel update
1924 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1925 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
1926 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1927 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1933 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1934 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1935 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1936 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1937 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1938 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1939 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1945 // Channel update with excess data.
1946 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1947 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
1948 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
1949 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1950 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1956 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1957 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1958 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1959 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1960 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1961 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1962 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1967 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1968 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1969 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1973 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
1974 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1975 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1976 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1977 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1978 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1981 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
1982 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1985 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
1986 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1987 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1994 // Nodes were never announced
1995 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1996 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1999 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2000 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2005 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2006 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2012 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2013 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2015 // Skip the first node.
2016 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2017 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2020 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2021 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2022 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2023 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2024 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2025 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2026 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2031 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2032 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2036 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2037 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2038 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2040 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2041 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2043 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2044 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2045 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2046 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2050 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2051 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2056 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2057 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2058 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2059 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2060 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2064 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2065 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2066 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2067 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2068 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2070 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2071 let first_blocknum = 0;
2072 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2074 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2076 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2077 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2078 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2082 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2084 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2085 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2086 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2087 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2089 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2090 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2091 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2092 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2093 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2095 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2099 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2100 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2101 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2103 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2104 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2105 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2107 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2108 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2109 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2110 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2122 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2123 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2124 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2125 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2126 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2128 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2130 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2131 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2133 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2135 sync_complete: true,
2137 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2138 short_channel_ids: vec![
2139 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2140 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2141 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2142 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2143 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2144 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2147 assert!(result.is_ok());
2149 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2150 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2153 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2154 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2155 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2156 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2157 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2158 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2159 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2160 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2161 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2162 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2165 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2171 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2172 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2173 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2174 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2175 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2177 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2179 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2181 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2183 full_information: true,
2185 assert!(result.is_ok());
2188 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2189 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2191 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2193 full_information: false,
2195 assert!(result.is_err());
2196 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2201 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2202 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2203 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2205 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2206 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2207 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2208 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2210 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2211 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2212 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2215 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2216 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2217 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2220 // used for testing resumption on same block
2221 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2224 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2225 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2226 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2227 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2233 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2234 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2235 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2238 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2240 number_of_blocks: 0,
2243 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2244 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2246 number_of_blocks: 0,
2247 sync_complete: true,
2248 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2252 // Error when wrong chain
2253 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2254 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2257 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2259 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2262 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2263 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2265 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2266 sync_complete: true,
2267 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2271 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2272 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2273 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2276 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2277 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2278 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2281 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2282 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2283 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2284 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2285 sync_complete: true,
2286 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2290 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2291 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2292 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2295 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2296 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2297 number_of_blocks: 1,
2302 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2303 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2304 number_of_blocks: 1,
2305 sync_complete: true,
2306 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2311 // No results in valid query range
2312 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2313 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2316 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2317 first_blocknum: 1000,
2318 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2323 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2324 first_blocknum: 1000,
2325 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2326 sync_complete: true,
2327 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2332 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2333 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2334 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2337 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2338 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2339 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2344 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2345 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2346 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2347 sync_complete: true,
2348 short_channel_ids: vec![
2349 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2355 // Single block exactly full
2356 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2357 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2360 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2361 first_blocknum: 100000,
2362 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2367 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2368 first_blocknum: 100000,
2369 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2370 sync_complete: true,
2371 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2372 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2378 // Multiple split on new block
2379 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2380 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2383 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2384 first_blocknum: 100000,
2385 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2390 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2391 first_blocknum: 100000,
2392 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2393 sync_complete: false,
2394 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2395 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2399 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2400 first_blocknum: 107999,
2401 number_of_blocks: 2,
2402 sync_complete: true,
2403 short_channel_ids: vec![
2404 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2410 // Multiple split on same block
2411 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2412 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2415 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2416 first_blocknum: 100002,
2417 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2422 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2423 first_blocknum: 100002,
2424 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2425 sync_complete: false,
2426 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2427 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2431 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2432 first_blocknum: 108001,
2433 number_of_blocks: 1,
2434 sync_complete: true,
2435 short_channel_ids: vec![
2436 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2443 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2444 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2445 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2446 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2448 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2450 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2451 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2452 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2453 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2456 assert!(result.is_ok());
2458 assert!(result.is_err());
2461 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2462 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2464 for i in 0..events.len() {
2465 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2467 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2468 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2469 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2470 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2471 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2472 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2473 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2475 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2476 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2477 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2478 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2479 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2481 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2482 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2483 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2486 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2492 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2493 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2494 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2495 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2496 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2498 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2500 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2502 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2504 assert!(result.is_err());
2508 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
2516 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2517 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2518 let mut v = Vec::new();
2519 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2521 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2526 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2527 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2528 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2530 let _ = net_graph.encode();