1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
37 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
39 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
40 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
45 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
46 /// refuse to relay the message.
47 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
49 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
50 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
51 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
53 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
54 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
55 pub struct NetworkGraph {
56 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
57 channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
58 nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
61 /// A simple newtype for RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>.
62 /// This exists only to make accessing a RwLock<NetworkGraph> possible from
63 /// the C bindings, as it can be done directly in Rust code.
64 pub struct LockedNetworkGraph<'a>(pub RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>);
66 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
67 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
68 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
69 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
70 /// serving historical announcements.
71 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
72 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
73 /// Representation of the payment channel network
74 pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
75 chain_access: Option<C>,
76 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
77 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
81 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
82 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
83 /// assuming a fresh network graph.
84 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
85 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
86 /// channel owners' keys.
87 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
89 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
90 network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)),
91 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
93 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
98 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
99 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
100 pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
102 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
103 network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
104 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
106 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
111 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
112 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
113 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
114 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
115 self.chain_access = chain_access;
118 /// Take a read lock on the network_graph and return it in the C-bindings
119 /// newtype helper. This is likely only useful when called via the C
120 /// bindings as you can call `self.network_graph.read().unwrap()` in Rust
122 pub fn read_locked_graph<'a>(&'a self) -> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
123 LockedNetworkGraph(self.network_graph.read().unwrap())
126 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
127 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
128 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
129 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
130 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
131 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
139 impl<'a> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
140 /// Get a reference to the NetworkGraph which this read-lock contains.
141 pub fn graph(&self) -> &NetworkGraph {
147 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
148 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
149 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
151 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
156 impl<C: Deref , L: Deref > RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
157 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
158 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
159 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
160 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
161 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
164 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
165 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
167 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
170 fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
172 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
173 let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
174 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}abled.", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if chan_enabled { "en" } else { "dis" });
175 let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
177 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
178 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" }, short_channel_id);
179 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
181 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
182 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" }, node_id);
183 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
188 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
189 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
190 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
193 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
194 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
195 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
196 let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
197 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
198 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
199 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
200 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
201 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
202 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
203 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
204 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
206 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
207 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
209 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
211 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
212 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
221 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
222 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
223 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
224 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
225 let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
229 network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
231 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
232 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
233 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
234 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
235 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
245 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
246 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
247 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
249 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
250 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
251 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
252 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
253 /// tracking this directly.
254 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
256 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
257 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
261 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
262 if !self.should_request_full_sync(their_node_id) {
266 let first_blocknum = 0;
267 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
268 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
269 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
270 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
271 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
272 msg: QueryChannelRange {
273 chain_hash: self.network_graph.read().unwrap().genesis_hash,
280 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
281 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
282 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
283 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
284 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
285 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
286 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
287 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
289 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
290 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
292 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
293 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
294 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
295 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
296 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
297 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
298 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
305 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
306 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
307 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
308 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
309 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
312 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
313 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
314 // the result and try again with a different peer.
315 if !msg.full_information {
316 return Err(LightningError {
317 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
318 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
325 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
326 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
327 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
328 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
329 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
330 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
331 /// memory constrained systems.
332 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
333 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
335 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
337 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
339 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
340 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
341 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
343 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
344 if msg.chain_hash != network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
345 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
346 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
347 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
348 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
349 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
350 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
351 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
353 short_channel_ids: vec![],
356 return Err(LightningError {
357 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
358 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
362 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
363 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
364 // exists even if its not yet routable.
365 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
366 for (_, ref chan) in network_graph.get_channels().range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
367 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
368 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
369 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
370 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
373 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
374 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
379 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
380 let batch_count = batches.len();
381 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
382 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
383 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
384 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
386 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
387 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
388 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
389 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
390 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
391 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
392 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
394 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
395 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
396 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
398 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
399 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
400 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
402 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
403 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
404 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
405 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
407 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
408 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
410 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
413 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
415 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
416 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
417 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
418 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
422 short_channel_ids: batch,
430 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
433 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
434 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
439 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L>
441 C::Target: chain::Access,
444 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
445 let mut ret = Vec::new();
446 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
447 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
452 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
453 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
454 /// within a channel update.
455 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
456 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
457 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
458 pub last_update: u32,
459 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
461 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
462 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
463 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
464 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
465 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
466 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
467 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
468 pub fees: RoutingFees,
469 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
470 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
471 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
472 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
473 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
476 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
477 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
478 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
483 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
484 (0, last_update, required),
485 (2, enabled, required),
486 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
487 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
488 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
489 (10, fees, required),
490 (12, last_update_message, required),
493 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
494 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
495 /// Received within a channel announcement.
496 pub struct ChannelInfo {
497 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
498 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
499 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
500 pub node_one: PublicKey,
501 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
502 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
503 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
504 pub node_two: PublicKey,
505 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
506 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
507 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
508 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
509 /// An initial announcement of the channel
510 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
511 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
512 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
513 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
516 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
517 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
518 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
519 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
525 (0, features, required),
526 (2, node_one, required),
527 (4, one_to_two, required),
528 (6, node_two, required),
529 (8, two_to_one, required),
530 (10, capacity_sats, required),
531 (12, announcement_message, required),
535 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
536 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
537 pub struct RoutingFees {
538 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
540 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
541 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
542 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
545 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
546 (0, base_msat, required),
547 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
550 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
551 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
552 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
553 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
554 pub features: NodeFeatures,
555 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
556 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
557 pub last_update: u32,
558 /// Color assigned to the node
560 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
561 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
562 /// should not be exposed to the user.
564 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
565 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
566 /// An initial announcement of the node
567 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
568 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
569 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
570 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
573 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
574 (0, features, required),
575 (2, last_update, required),
577 (6, alias, required),
578 (8, announcement_message, option),
579 (10, addresses, vec_type),
582 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
583 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
584 pub struct NodeInfo {
585 /// All valid channels a node has announced
586 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
587 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
588 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
589 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
590 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
591 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
592 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
593 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
594 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
597 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
598 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
599 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
600 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
605 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
606 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
607 (2, announcement_info, option),
608 (4, channels, vec_type),
611 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
612 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
614 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
615 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
616 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
618 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
619 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
620 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
621 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
622 chan_info.write(writer)?;
624 (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
625 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
626 node_id.write(writer)?;
627 node_info.write(writer)?;
630 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
635 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
636 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
637 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
639 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
640 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
641 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
642 for _ in 0..channels_count {
643 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
644 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
645 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
647 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
648 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
649 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
650 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
651 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
652 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
654 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
664 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
665 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
666 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
667 for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
668 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
670 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
671 for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
672 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
679 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
681 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
682 pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
683 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
685 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
686 pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
688 /// Get network addresses by node id.
689 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
690 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
692 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
693 pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
694 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
695 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
696 return Some(&node_info.addresses)
702 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
703 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
706 channels: BTreeMap::new(),
707 nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
711 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
712 /// given node announcement.
714 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
715 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
716 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
717 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
718 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
719 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
720 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
723 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
724 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
725 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
727 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
728 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
731 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
732 match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
733 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
735 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
736 if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
737 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)});
742 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
743 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
744 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
745 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
746 features: msg.features.clone(),
747 last_update: msg.timestamp,
750 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
751 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
759 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
761 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
762 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
763 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
765 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
766 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
767 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
768 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
769 -> Result<(), LightningError>
770 where C::Target: chain::Access {
771 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
772 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
773 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
774 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
775 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
776 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
779 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
780 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
781 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
783 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
784 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
785 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
786 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
787 -> Result<(), LightningError>
788 where C::Target: chain::Access {
789 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
792 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
793 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
794 -> Result<(), LightningError>
795 where C::Target: chain::Access {
796 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
797 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
800 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
802 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
805 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
806 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
807 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
808 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
809 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
810 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
811 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
812 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
813 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
814 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
816 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
817 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
820 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
821 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
823 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
824 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
830 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
831 features: msg.features.clone(),
832 node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
834 node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
836 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
837 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
838 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
841 match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
842 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
843 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
844 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
846 if utxo_value.is_some() {
847 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
848 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
849 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
851 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
852 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
854 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
855 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
856 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
858 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)})
861 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
862 entry.insert(chan_info);
866 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
867 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
868 match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
869 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
870 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
872 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
873 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
874 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
875 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
876 announcement_info: None,
883 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
884 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
889 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
890 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
891 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
892 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
893 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
895 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
896 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
899 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
900 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
901 one_to_two.enabled = false;
903 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
904 two_to_one.enabled = false;
910 fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
912 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
914 // TODO: downgrade the node
918 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
921 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
922 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
923 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
924 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
925 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
928 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
929 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
930 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
931 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
932 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
935 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
937 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
938 let chan_was_enabled;
940 match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
941 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
943 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
944 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
945 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
948 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
949 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
950 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
951 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
952 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
956 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
957 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
958 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
959 if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
960 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)});
962 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
964 chan_was_enabled = false;
967 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
968 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
970 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
971 enabled: chan_enabled,
972 last_update: msg.timestamp,
973 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
974 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
975 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
977 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
978 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
982 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
986 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
987 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
988 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
989 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
990 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
992 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
994 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
995 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
996 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
998 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1004 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1005 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1006 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1007 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1008 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1009 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1011 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1013 proportional_millionths
1015 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1016 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1017 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1019 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1020 let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1022 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1023 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1025 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1027 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1028 if chan_info.enabled {
1029 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1030 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1031 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1032 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1037 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1043 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1044 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1045 ($node_id: expr) => {
1046 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1047 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1048 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1050 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1051 entry.remove_entry();
1054 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1059 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1060 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1067 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1068 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1069 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1070 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
1071 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1072 use util::test_utils;
1073 use util::logger::Logger;
1074 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1075 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1076 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1078 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1079 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1080 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1081 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1082 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
1083 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1084 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1088 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1089 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1095 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
1096 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1097 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1098 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1099 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_hash, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1100 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1104 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1105 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1106 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1108 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1109 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1110 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1111 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1112 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1113 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1117 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1118 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1120 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1121 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1122 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1123 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1124 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1125 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1126 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1127 let first_announcement_time = 500;
1129 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1130 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1131 timestamp: first_announcement_time,
1135 addresses: Vec::new(),
1136 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1137 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1139 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1140 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1141 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1142 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1145 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1147 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1151 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1152 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1153 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1154 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1155 short_channel_id: 0,
1158 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1159 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1160 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1163 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1164 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1165 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1166 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1167 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1168 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1169 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1171 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1172 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1177 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1178 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1182 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1183 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1185 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1186 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1189 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1192 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1193 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1194 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1195 let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
1196 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1197 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1199 // Return false because contains excess data.
1200 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1201 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1204 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1206 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1207 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1208 unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
1209 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1210 let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1211 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1212 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1214 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1216 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1221 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1222 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1223 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1225 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1226 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1227 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1228 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1229 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1230 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1232 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1233 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1234 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1235 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1236 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1239 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1240 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1241 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1242 short_channel_id: 0,
1245 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1246 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1247 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1250 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1251 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1252 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1253 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1254 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1255 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1256 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1259 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1260 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1261 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1262 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1267 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1268 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1274 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1275 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1276 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1278 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1281 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1282 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1283 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1284 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source.clone().genesis_hash, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1285 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1287 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1288 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1289 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1290 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1291 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1292 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1293 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1296 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1298 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1301 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1302 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1303 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1305 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1306 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1307 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1308 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1309 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1310 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1311 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1313 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1314 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1319 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1320 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1326 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1327 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1328 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1329 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1331 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1334 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1335 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1336 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1337 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1338 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1339 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1340 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1341 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1342 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1343 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1345 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1346 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1350 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1351 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1352 Some(channel_entry) => {
1353 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1359 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1360 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1361 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1362 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1363 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1364 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1365 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1366 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1367 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1368 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1370 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1371 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1375 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1376 let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1377 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1378 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1379 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1380 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1381 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1383 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1385 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1388 unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1389 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1390 let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1391 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1392 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1393 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1394 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1395 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1397 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1399 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1404 fn handling_channel_update() {
1405 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1406 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1407 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1408 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1410 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1411 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1412 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1413 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1414 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1415 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1417 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1418 let short_channel_id = 0;
1419 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1420 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1423 // Announce a channel we will update
1424 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1425 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1426 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1427 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1428 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1429 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1430 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1431 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1436 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1437 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1438 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1441 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1442 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1443 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1444 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1445 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1446 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1447 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1449 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1456 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1461 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1462 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1463 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1464 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1465 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1466 excess_data: Vec::new()
1468 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1469 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1470 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1471 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1474 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1475 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1480 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1481 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1483 Some(channel_info) => {
1484 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1485 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1490 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1491 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1492 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1493 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1494 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1495 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1497 // Return false because contains excess data
1498 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1499 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1502 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 10;
1504 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1505 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1506 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1507 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1508 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1511 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1513 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1515 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1517 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1518 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1519 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1520 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1521 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1524 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1526 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1528 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1530 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1531 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1532 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1533 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1534 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1537 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1539 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1541 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1543 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1544 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1545 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
1546 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1547 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1548 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1549 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1552 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1554 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1556 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1558 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1559 let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1560 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1561 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1564 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1566 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1572 fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
1573 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1574 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1575 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1576 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1577 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1578 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1579 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1581 let short_channel_id = 0;
1582 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1585 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1586 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1587 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1591 // Announce a channel we will update
1592 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1593 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1598 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1599 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1600 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1603 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1604 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1605 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1606 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1607 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1608 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1609 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1611 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1616 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1621 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1622 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1623 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1624 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1625 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1626 excess_data: Vec::new()
1628 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1629 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1630 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1631 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1634 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1635 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1640 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1642 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1643 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1645 Some(channel_info) => {
1646 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
1651 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1656 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1658 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1660 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1661 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1663 Some(channel_info) => {
1664 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1669 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1674 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1676 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1678 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1679 assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
1680 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1681 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1683 // TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1687 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1688 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1689 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1690 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1691 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1692 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1693 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1694 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1696 let short_channel_id = 1;
1697 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1699 // Channels were not announced yet.
1700 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1701 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1704 // Announce a channel we will update
1705 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1706 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1711 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1712 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1713 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1716 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1717 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1718 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1719 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1720 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1721 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1722 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1724 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1730 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1731 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1732 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1733 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1734 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1735 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1736 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1743 // Valid channel update
1744 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1749 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1750 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1751 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1752 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1753 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1754 excess_data: Vec::new()
1756 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1757 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1758 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1759 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1761 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1767 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1768 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1769 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1770 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1771 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1772 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1773 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1780 // Channel update with excess data.
1781 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1786 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1787 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1788 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1789 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1790 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1791 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec()
1793 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1794 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1795 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1796 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1798 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1804 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1805 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1806 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1807 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1808 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1809 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1810 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1815 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1816 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1817 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1821 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
1822 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1823 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1824 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1825 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1826 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1827 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1828 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1830 let short_channel_id = 1;
1831 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1834 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
1835 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1838 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
1839 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1840 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1845 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1846 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1847 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1850 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1851 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1852 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1853 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1854 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1855 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1856 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1858 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1865 // Nodes were never announced
1866 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1867 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1870 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1871 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1876 addresses: Vec::new(),
1877 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1878 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1880 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1881 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1882 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1883 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1885 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1890 unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
1891 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1892 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1893 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1894 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1897 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1903 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1904 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
1906 // Skip the first node.
1907 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1908 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
1911 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
1912 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1913 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1918 addresses: Vec::new(),
1919 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1920 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec(),
1922 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1923 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1924 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1925 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1927 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1928 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1933 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1934 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1938 fn network_graph_serialization() {
1939 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1941 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1942 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1943 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1944 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1946 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1947 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1948 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1949 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1950 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1951 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1952 short_channel_id: 0,
1955 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1956 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1957 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1960 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1961 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1962 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1963 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1964 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1965 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1966 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1968 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1969 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1974 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1975 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1976 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1981 addresses: Vec::new(),
1982 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1983 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1985 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1986 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1987 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1988 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1991 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1996 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
1997 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
1998 assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
1999 assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
2000 network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2001 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
2005 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2006 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2007 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2008 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2010 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2011 let first_blocknum = 0;
2012 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2014 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2016 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2017 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2018 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2019 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2022 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2024 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2025 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2026 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2029 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2030 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2031 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2032 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2033 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2035 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2039 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2040 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2041 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2043 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2044 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2046 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2047 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2048 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2049 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2061 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2062 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2063 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2064 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2066 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2068 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2069 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2071 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2073 sync_complete: true,
2075 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2076 short_channel_ids: vec![
2077 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2078 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2079 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2080 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2081 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2082 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2085 assert!(result.is_ok());
2087 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2088 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2091 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2092 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2093 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2094 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2095 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2096 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2097 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2098 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2099 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2100 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2103 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2109 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2110 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2111 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2112 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2114 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2116 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2118 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2120 full_information: true,
2122 assert!(result.is_ok());
2125 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2126 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2128 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2130 full_information: false,
2132 assert!(result.is_err());
2133 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2138 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2139 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2141 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2142 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2143 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2144 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2145 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2146 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2147 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2148 let bitcoin_key_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey);
2149 let bitcoin_key_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey);
2151 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2152 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2153 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2156 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2157 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2158 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2161 // used for testing resumption on same block
2162 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2165 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2166 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2167 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2168 short_channel_id: scid,
2173 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2176 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2177 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2178 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2179 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2180 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2181 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2182 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2184 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2190 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2191 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2192 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2195 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2197 number_of_blocks: 0,
2200 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2201 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2203 number_of_blocks: 0,
2204 sync_complete: true,
2205 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2209 // Error when wrong chain
2210 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2211 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2214 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2216 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2219 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2220 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2222 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2223 sync_complete: true,
2224 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2228 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2229 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2230 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2233 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2234 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2235 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2238 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2239 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2240 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2241 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2242 sync_complete: true,
2243 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2247 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2248 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2249 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2252 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2253 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2254 number_of_blocks: 1,
2259 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2260 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2261 number_of_blocks: 1,
2262 sync_complete: true,
2263 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2268 // No results in valid query range
2269 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2270 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2273 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2274 first_blocknum: 1000,
2275 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2280 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2281 first_blocknum: 1000,
2282 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2283 sync_complete: true,
2284 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2289 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2290 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2291 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2294 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2295 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2296 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2301 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2302 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2303 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2304 sync_complete: true,
2305 short_channel_ids: vec![
2306 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2312 // Single block exactly full
2313 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2314 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2317 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2318 first_blocknum: 100000,
2319 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2324 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2325 first_blocknum: 100000,
2326 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2327 sync_complete: true,
2328 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2329 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2335 // Multiple split on new block
2336 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2337 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2340 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2341 first_blocknum: 100000,
2342 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2347 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2348 first_blocknum: 100000,
2349 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2350 sync_complete: false,
2351 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2352 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2356 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2357 first_blocknum: 107999,
2358 number_of_blocks: 2,
2359 sync_complete: true,
2360 short_channel_ids: vec![
2361 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2367 // Multiple split on same block
2368 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2369 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2372 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2373 first_blocknum: 100002,
2374 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2379 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2380 first_blocknum: 100002,
2381 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2382 sync_complete: false,
2383 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2384 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2388 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2389 first_blocknum: 108001,
2390 number_of_blocks: 1,
2391 sync_complete: true,
2392 short_channel_ids: vec![
2393 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2400 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2401 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2402 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2403 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2405 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2407 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2408 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2409 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2410 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2413 assert!(result.is_ok());
2415 assert!(result.is_err());
2418 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2419 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2421 for i in 0..events.len() {
2422 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2424 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2425 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2426 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2427 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2428 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2429 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2430 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2432 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2433 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2434 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2435 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2436 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2438 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2439 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2440 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2443 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2449 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2450 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2451 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2452 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2454 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2456 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2458 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2460 assert!(result.is_err());
2464 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
2472 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2473 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2474 let mut v = Vec::new();
2475 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2477 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2482 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2483 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2484 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2486 let _ = net_graph.encode();