1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
253 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
255 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
256 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
260 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
261 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
262 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
263 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
264 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
265 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
272 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
273 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
275 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
276 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
277 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
278 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
279 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
280 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
283 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
284 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
285 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
287 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
288 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
289 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
290 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
296 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
297 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
298 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
301 return Err(LightningError {
302 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
303 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
304 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
306 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
308 log_level: Level::Trace,
316 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
317 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
319 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
320 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
321 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
322 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
323 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
326 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
327 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
328 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
329 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
332 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
338 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
339 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
340 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
341 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
342 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
343 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
344 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
345 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
346 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
347 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
348 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
350 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
351 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
353 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
355 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
356 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
365 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
366 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
367 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
368 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
369 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
373 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
375 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
376 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
377 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
378 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
379 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
399 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
400 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
404 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
405 if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
409 let first_blocknum = 0;
410 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
411 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
412 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
413 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
414 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
415 msg: QueryChannelRange {
416 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
423 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
424 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
425 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
426 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
427 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
428 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
429 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
430 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
432 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
433 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
435 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
436 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
437 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
438 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
439 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
440 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
441 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
448 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
449 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
450 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
451 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
452 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
453 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
455 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
456 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
457 // the result and try again with a different peer.
458 if !msg.full_information {
459 return Err(LightningError {
460 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
461 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
468 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
469 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
470 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
471 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
472 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
473 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
474 /// memory constrained systems.
475 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
476 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
478 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
480 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
481 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
482 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
484 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
485 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
486 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
487 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
488 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
489 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
490 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
491 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
492 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
494 short_channel_ids: vec![],
497 return Err(LightningError {
498 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
499 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
503 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
504 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
505 // exists even if its not yet routable.
506 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
507 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
508 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
509 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
510 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
511 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
512 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
515 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
516 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
522 let batch_count = batches.len();
523 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
524 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
525 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
526 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
528 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
529 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
530 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
531 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
532 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
533 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
534 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
536 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
537 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
538 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
540 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
541 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
542 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
544 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
545 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
546 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
547 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
549 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
550 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
552 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
555 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
557 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
558 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
559 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
560 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
564 short_channel_ids: batch,
572 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
575 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
576 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
581 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
583 C::Target: chain::Access,
586 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
587 let mut ret = Vec::new();
588 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
589 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
594 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
595 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
596 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
597 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
598 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
599 pub last_update: u32,
600 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
602 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
603 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
604 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
605 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
606 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
607 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
608 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
609 pub fees: RoutingFees,
610 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
611 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
612 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
613 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
614 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
617 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
618 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
619 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
625 (0, last_update, required),
626 (2, enabled, required),
627 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
628 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
629 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
630 (10, fees, required),
631 (12, last_update_message, required),
634 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
635 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
636 /// Received within a channel announcement.
637 pub struct ChannelInfo {
638 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
639 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
640 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
641 pub node_one: NodeId,
642 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
643 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
644 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
645 pub node_two: NodeId,
646 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
647 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
648 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
649 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
650 /// An initial announcement of the channel
651 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
652 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
653 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
654 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
655 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
656 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
657 /// network graph in memory!).
658 announcement_received_time: u64,
662 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
663 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
664 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
665 let (direction, source) = {
666 if target == &self.node_one {
667 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
668 } else if target == &self.node_two {
669 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
674 Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
677 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
678 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
679 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
680 let (direction, target) = {
681 if source == &self.node_one {
682 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
683 } else if source == &self.node_two {
684 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
689 Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target))
693 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
694 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
695 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
696 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
701 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
702 (0, features, required),
703 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
704 (2, node_one, required),
705 (4, one_to_two, required),
706 (6, node_two, required),
707 (8, two_to_one, required),
708 (10, capacity_sats, required),
709 (12, announcement_message, required),
712 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
713 /// source node to a target node.
715 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
716 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
717 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
720 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
721 /// Returns information for the channel.
722 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
724 /// Returns information for the direction.
725 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
727 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
729 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
730 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
731 /// whichever is smaller.
732 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
733 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
735 .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
736 .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
737 let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
738 if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
739 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
741 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
744 .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
745 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
746 .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
749 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
750 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
751 match self.direction {
752 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
758 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
759 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
760 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
761 .field("channel", &self.channel)
766 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
768 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
769 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
772 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
773 /// Returns information for the channel.
775 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
777 /// Returns information for the direction.
779 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
781 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
783 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
786 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
787 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
792 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
794 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
795 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
796 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
797 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
800 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
804 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
806 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
809 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
811 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
814 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
817 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
818 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
822 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
823 /// use when making routing decisions.
824 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
826 impl EffectiveCapacity {
827 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
828 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
830 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
831 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
832 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
833 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
834 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
839 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
840 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
841 pub struct RoutingFees {
842 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
844 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
845 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
846 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
849 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
850 (0, base_msat, required),
851 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
854 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
855 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
856 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
857 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
858 pub features: NodeFeatures,
859 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
860 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
861 pub last_update: u32,
862 /// Color assigned to the node
864 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
865 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
866 /// should not be exposed to the user.
868 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
869 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
870 /// An initial announcement of the node
871 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
872 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
873 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
874 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
877 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
878 (0, features, required),
879 (2, last_update, required),
881 (6, alias, required),
882 (8, announcement_message, option),
883 (10, addresses, vec_type),
886 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
887 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
888 pub struct NodeInfo {
889 /// All valid channels a node has announced
890 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
891 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
892 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
893 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
894 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
895 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
896 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
897 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
898 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
901 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
902 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
903 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
904 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
910 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
911 (2, announcement_info, option),
912 (4, channels, vec_type),
915 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
916 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
918 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
919 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
920 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
922 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
923 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
924 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
925 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
926 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
927 chan_info.write(writer)?;
929 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
930 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
931 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
932 node_id.write(writer)?;
933 node_info.write(writer)?;
936 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
941 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
942 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
943 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
945 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
946 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
947 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
948 for _ in 0..channels_count {
949 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
950 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
951 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
953 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
954 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
955 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
956 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
957 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
958 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
960 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
964 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
965 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
970 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
971 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
972 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
973 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
974 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
976 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
977 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
978 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
984 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
985 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
986 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
987 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
988 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
993 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
994 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
997 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
998 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1002 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1003 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1004 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1005 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1006 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1012 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1013 /// given node announcement.
1015 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1016 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1017 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1018 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1019 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1020 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1021 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1024 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1025 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1026 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1028 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1029 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1032 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1033 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1034 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1036 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1037 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1038 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1039 // that it be at least the current time.
1040 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1041 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1042 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1043 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1048 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1049 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1050 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1051 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1052 features: msg.features.clone(),
1053 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1056 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1057 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1065 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1067 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1068 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1069 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1071 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1072 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1073 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
1074 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1075 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1077 C::Target: chain::Access,
1079 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1080 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1081 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1082 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1083 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1084 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1087 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1088 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1089 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1091 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1092 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1093 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1094 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1095 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1097 C::Target: chain::Access,
1099 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1102 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1103 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1104 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1106 C::Target: chain::Access,
1108 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1109 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1112 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1114 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1117 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1118 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1119 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1120 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1121 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1122 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1123 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1124 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1125 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1126 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1128 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1129 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1132 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1133 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1135 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1136 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1142 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1143 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1144 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1146 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1149 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1150 features: msg.features.clone(),
1151 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1153 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1155 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1156 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1157 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1158 announcement_received_time,
1161 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1162 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1163 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
1164 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1165 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1166 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1168 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1169 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1170 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1171 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1173 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1174 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1176 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1177 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1178 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1180 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1183 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1184 entry.insert(chan_info);
1188 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1189 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1190 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1191 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1192 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1194 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1195 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1196 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1197 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1198 announcement_info: None,
1205 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1206 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1211 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1212 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1213 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1214 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1215 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1216 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1218 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1219 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1220 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1223 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1224 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1225 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1227 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1228 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1234 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1235 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1237 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1239 // TODO: downgrade the node
1243 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1244 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1245 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1248 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1249 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1250 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1252 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1253 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1255 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1256 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1257 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1258 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1259 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1262 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1263 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1266 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1267 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1268 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1270 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1271 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1272 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1273 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1274 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1275 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1276 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1277 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1278 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1280 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1281 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1282 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1283 info.one_to_two = None;
1285 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1286 info.two_to_one = None;
1288 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1289 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1290 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1291 // channel_update for.
1292 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1293 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1297 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1298 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1299 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1300 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1301 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1306 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1309 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1310 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1311 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1313 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1314 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1315 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1316 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1319 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1320 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1321 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1323 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1324 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1325 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1326 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1329 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1331 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1332 let chan_was_enabled;
1334 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1336 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1337 // disable this check during tests!
1338 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1339 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1340 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1342 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1343 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1347 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1348 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1349 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1351 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1352 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1353 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1356 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1357 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1358 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1359 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1360 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1364 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
1365 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
1366 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1367 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1368 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1369 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1370 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1371 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1372 // but only in the non-normative section.
1373 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1374 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1375 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1376 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1378 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1380 chan_was_enabled = false;
1383 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1384 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1386 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1387 enabled: chan_enabled,
1388 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1389 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1390 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1391 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1393 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1394 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1398 $target = Some(updated_channel_update_info);
1402 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1403 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1404 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1405 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1406 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1407 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1408 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1409 })?, "channel_update");
1411 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1413 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1414 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1415 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1416 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1417 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1418 })?, "channel_update");
1420 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1425 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1427 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1428 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1429 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1430 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1431 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1432 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1434 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1436 proportional_millionths
1438 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1439 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1440 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1442 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1443 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1445 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1446 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1448 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1450 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1451 if chan_info.enabled {
1452 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1453 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1454 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1455 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1460 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1466 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1467 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1468 ($node_id: expr) => {
1469 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1470 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1471 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1473 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1474 entry.remove_entry();
1477 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1482 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1483 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1487 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1488 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1490 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1491 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1495 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1497 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1498 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1502 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1503 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1504 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1505 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1506 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1507 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1508 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1518 use ln::PaymentHash;
1519 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1520 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1521 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1522 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1523 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1524 use util::test_utils;
1525 use util::logger::Logger;
1526 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1527 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1528 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1530 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1532 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1533 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1534 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1535 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1536 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1537 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1538 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1542 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1543 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1549 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1550 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1551 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1554 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1555 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1559 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1560 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1564 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1565 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1566 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1567 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1569 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1570 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1571 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1572 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1573 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1574 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1577 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1578 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1579 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1580 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1585 addresses: Vec::new(),
1586 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1587 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1589 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1590 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1592 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1593 contents: unsigned_announcement
1597 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1598 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1599 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1600 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1601 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1603 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1604 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1605 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1606 short_channel_id: 0,
1609 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1610 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1611 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1613 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1614 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1615 ChannelAnnouncement {
1616 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1617 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1618 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1619 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1620 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1624 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1625 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1626 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1627 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1628 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1629 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1630 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1631 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1635 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1636 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1637 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1638 short_channel_id: 0,
1641 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1642 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1643 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1644 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1645 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1646 excess_data: Vec::new()
1648 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1649 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1651 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1652 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1657 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1658 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1659 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1661 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1662 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1663 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1665 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1666 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1668 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1672 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1673 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1674 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1675 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1680 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1681 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1685 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1686 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1688 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1689 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1692 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1695 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1696 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1697 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1698 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1699 // Return false because contains excess data.
1700 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1701 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1705 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1706 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1707 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1708 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1709 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1710 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1712 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1717 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1718 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1719 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1721 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1722 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1724 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1725 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1727 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1728 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1729 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1730 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1731 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1736 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1742 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1743 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1744 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1746 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1749 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1750 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1751 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1752 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1753 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1755 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1756 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1757 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1758 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1760 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1763 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1764 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1765 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1766 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1767 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1768 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1769 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1774 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1780 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1781 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1782 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1783 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1785 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1788 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1789 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1790 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1791 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1792 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1793 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1794 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1795 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1799 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1800 Some(channel_entry) => {
1801 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1807 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1808 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1809 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1810 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1811 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1812 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1813 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1817 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1818 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1819 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1821 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1824 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1825 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1827 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1832 fn handling_channel_update() {
1833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1834 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1835 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1836 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1837 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1839 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1840 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1842 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1843 let short_channel_id;
1846 // Announce a channel we will update
1847 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1848 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1850 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1851 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1852 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1859 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1860 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1861 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1866 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1868 Some(channel_info) => {
1869 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1870 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1875 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1876 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1877 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1878 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1879 // Return false because contains excess data
1880 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1881 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1885 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1886 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1887 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1888 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1889 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1891 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1894 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1895 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1896 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1897 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1898 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1900 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1903 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1904 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1905 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1906 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1907 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1909 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1912 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1913 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1914 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1915 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1916 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1917 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1919 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1922 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1923 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1924 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1925 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1926 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1927 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1928 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1930 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
1935 fn handling_network_update() {
1936 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1937 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1938 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1939 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1940 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1941 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1943 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1944 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1947 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1948 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1951 let short_channel_id;
1953 // Announce a channel we will update
1954 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1955 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1956 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1957 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1958 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1960 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1961 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1963 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1965 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1966 rejected_by_dest: false,
1967 all_paths_failed: true,
1969 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1970 msg: valid_channel_update,
1972 short_channel_id: None,
1978 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1981 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1983 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1985 Some(channel_info) => {
1986 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1990 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1992 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1993 rejected_by_dest: false,
1994 all_paths_failed: true,
1996 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1998 is_permanent: false,
2000 short_channel_id: None,
2006 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2008 Some(channel_info) => {
2009 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2014 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2015 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2017 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2018 rejected_by_dest: false,
2019 all_paths_failed: true,
2021 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2025 short_channel_id: None,
2031 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2032 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2033 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2034 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2038 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2039 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2040 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2041 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2042 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2043 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2044 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2047 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2048 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2050 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2051 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2052 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2053 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2054 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2056 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2057 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2058 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2060 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2061 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2062 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2064 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2065 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2067 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2068 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2069 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2070 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2071 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2072 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2073 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2075 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2076 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2077 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2080 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2081 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2085 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2086 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2087 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2088 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2089 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2091 // Channels were not announced yet.
2092 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2093 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2095 let short_channel_id;
2097 // Announce a channel we will update
2098 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2099 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2100 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2106 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2107 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2108 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2109 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2110 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2111 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2112 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2119 // Valid channel update
2120 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2121 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2122 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2123 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2129 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2130 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2131 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2132 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2133 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2134 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2135 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2141 // Channel update with excess data.
2142 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2143 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2144 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2145 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2146 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2152 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2153 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2154 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2155 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2156 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2157 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2158 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2163 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2164 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2165 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2169 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2170 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2171 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2172 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2173 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2174 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2177 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2178 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2181 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2182 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2183 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2190 // Nodes were never announced
2191 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2192 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2195 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2196 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2201 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2202 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2208 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2209 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2211 // Skip the first node.
2212 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2213 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2216 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2217 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2218 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2219 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2220 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2221 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2222 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2227 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2228 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2232 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2233 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2234 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2236 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2237 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2239 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2240 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2241 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2242 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2246 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2247 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2252 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2253 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2254 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2255 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2256 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2260 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2261 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2262 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2263 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2264 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2266 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2267 let first_blocknum = 0;
2268 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2270 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2272 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2273 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2274 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2278 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2280 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2281 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2282 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2285 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2286 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2287 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2288 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2289 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2291 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2295 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2296 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2297 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2299 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2300 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2301 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2303 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2304 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2305 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id, &init_msg);
2306 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2310 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2318 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2319 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2320 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2321 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2322 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2324 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2326 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2327 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2329 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2331 sync_complete: true,
2333 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2334 short_channel_ids: vec![
2335 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2336 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2337 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2338 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2339 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2340 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2343 assert!(result.is_ok());
2345 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2346 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2349 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2350 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2351 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2352 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2353 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2354 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2355 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2356 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2357 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2358 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2361 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2367 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2368 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2369 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2370 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2371 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2373 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2375 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2377 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2379 full_information: true,
2381 assert!(result.is_ok());
2384 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2385 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2387 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2389 full_information: false,
2391 assert!(result.is_err());
2392 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2397 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2398 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2399 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2401 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2402 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2403 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2404 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2406 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2407 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2408 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2411 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2412 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2413 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2416 // used for testing resumption on same block
2417 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2420 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2421 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2422 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2423 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2429 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2430 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2431 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2434 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2436 number_of_blocks: 0,
2439 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2440 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2442 number_of_blocks: 0,
2443 sync_complete: true,
2444 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2448 // Error when wrong chain
2449 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2450 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2453 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2455 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2458 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2459 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2461 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2462 sync_complete: true,
2463 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2467 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2468 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2469 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2472 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2473 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2474 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2477 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2478 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2479 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2480 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2481 sync_complete: true,
2482 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2486 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2487 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2488 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2491 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2492 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2493 number_of_blocks: 1,
2498 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2499 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2500 number_of_blocks: 1,
2501 sync_complete: true,
2502 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2507 // No results in valid query range
2508 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2509 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2512 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2513 first_blocknum: 1000,
2514 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2519 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2520 first_blocknum: 1000,
2521 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2522 sync_complete: true,
2523 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2528 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2529 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2530 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2533 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2534 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2535 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2540 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2541 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2542 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2543 sync_complete: true,
2544 short_channel_ids: vec![
2545 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2551 // Single block exactly full
2552 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2553 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2556 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2557 first_blocknum: 100000,
2558 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2563 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2564 first_blocknum: 100000,
2565 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2566 sync_complete: true,
2567 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2568 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2574 // Multiple split on new block
2575 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2576 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2579 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2580 first_blocknum: 100000,
2581 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2586 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2587 first_blocknum: 100000,
2588 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2589 sync_complete: false,
2590 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2591 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2595 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2596 first_blocknum: 107999,
2597 number_of_blocks: 2,
2598 sync_complete: true,
2599 short_channel_ids: vec![
2600 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2606 // Multiple split on same block
2607 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2608 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2611 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2612 first_blocknum: 100002,
2613 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2618 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2619 first_blocknum: 100002,
2620 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2621 sync_complete: false,
2622 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2623 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2627 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2628 first_blocknum: 108001,
2629 number_of_blocks: 1,
2630 sync_complete: true,
2631 short_channel_ids: vec![
2632 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2639 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2640 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2641 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2642 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2644 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2646 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2647 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2648 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2649 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2652 assert!(result.is_ok());
2654 assert!(result.is_err());
2657 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2658 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2660 for i in 0..events.len() {
2661 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2663 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2664 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2665 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2666 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2667 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2668 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2669 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2671 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2672 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2673 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2674 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2675 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2677 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2678 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2679 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2682 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2688 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2689 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2690 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2691 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2692 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2694 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2696 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2698 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2700 assert!(result.is_err());
2704 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2712 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2713 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2714 let mut v = Vec::new();
2715 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2717 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2722 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2723 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2724 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2726 let _ = net_graph.encode();