1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
253 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
254 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
258 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
259 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
260 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
261 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
262 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
263 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
270 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
271 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
273 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
274 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
275 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
276 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
277 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
278 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
280 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
281 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
282 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
283 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
285 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
286 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
287 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
288 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
294 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
295 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
296 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
298 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
303 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
304 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
306 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
307 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
308 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
309 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
310 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
313 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
314 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
315 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
316 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
319 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
320 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
321 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
324 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
325 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
326 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
327 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
328 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
329 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
330 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
331 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
332 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
333 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
334 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
335 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
337 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
338 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
340 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
342 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
343 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
352 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
353 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
354 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
355 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
356 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
360 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
362 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
363 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
364 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
365 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
366 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
376 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
377 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
378 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
380 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
381 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
382 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
383 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
384 /// tracking this directly.
385 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
387 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
388 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
392 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
393 if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
397 let first_blocknum = 0;
398 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
399 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
400 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
401 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
402 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
403 msg: QueryChannelRange {
404 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
411 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
412 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
413 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
414 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
415 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
416 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
417 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
418 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
420 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
421 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
423 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
424 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
425 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
426 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
427 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
428 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
429 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
436 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
437 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
438 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
439 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
440 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
441 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
443 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
444 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
445 // the result and try again with a different peer.
446 if !msg.full_information {
447 return Err(LightningError {
448 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
449 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
456 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
457 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
458 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
459 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
460 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
461 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
462 /// memory constrained systems.
463 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
464 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
466 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
468 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
469 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
470 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
472 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
473 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
474 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
475 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
476 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
477 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
478 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
479 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
480 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
482 short_channel_ids: vec![],
485 return Err(LightningError {
486 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
487 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
491 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
492 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
493 // exists even if its not yet routable.
494 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
495 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
496 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
497 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
498 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
499 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
500 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
503 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
504 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
509 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
510 let batch_count = batches.len();
511 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
512 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
513 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
514 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
516 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
517 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
518 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
519 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
520 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
521 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
522 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
524 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
525 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
526 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
528 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
529 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
530 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
532 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
533 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
534 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
535 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
537 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
538 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
540 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
543 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
545 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
546 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
547 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
548 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
552 short_channel_ids: batch,
560 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
563 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
564 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
569 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
571 C::Target: chain::Access,
574 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
575 let mut ret = Vec::new();
576 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
577 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
582 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
583 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
584 /// within a channel update.
585 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
586 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
587 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
588 pub last_update: u32,
589 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
591 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
592 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
593 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
594 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
595 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
596 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
597 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
598 pub fees: RoutingFees,
599 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
600 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
601 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
602 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
603 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
606 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
607 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
608 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
613 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
614 (0, last_update, required),
615 (2, enabled, required),
616 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
617 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
618 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
619 (10, fees, required),
620 (12, last_update_message, required),
623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
624 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
625 /// Received within a channel announcement.
626 pub struct ChannelInfo {
627 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
628 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
629 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
630 pub node_one: NodeId,
631 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
632 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
633 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
634 pub node_two: NodeId,
635 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
636 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
637 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
638 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
639 /// An initial announcement of the channel
640 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
641 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
642 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
643 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
644 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
645 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
646 /// network graph in memory!).
647 announcement_received_time: u64,
650 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
651 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
652 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
653 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
658 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
659 (0, features, required),
660 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
661 (2, node_one, required),
662 (4, one_to_two, required),
663 (6, node_two, required),
664 (8, two_to_one, required),
665 (10, capacity_sats, required),
666 (12, announcement_message, required),
670 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
671 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
672 pub struct RoutingFees {
673 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
675 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
676 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
677 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
680 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
681 (0, base_msat, required),
682 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
685 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
686 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
687 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
688 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
689 pub features: NodeFeatures,
690 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
691 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
692 pub last_update: u32,
693 /// Color assigned to the node
695 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
696 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
697 /// should not be exposed to the user.
699 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
700 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
701 /// An initial announcement of the node
702 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
703 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
704 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
705 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
708 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
709 (0, features, required),
710 (2, last_update, required),
712 (6, alias, required),
713 (8, announcement_message, option),
714 (10, addresses, vec_type),
717 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
718 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
719 pub struct NodeInfo {
720 /// All valid channels a node has announced
721 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
722 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
723 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
724 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
725 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
726 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
727 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
728 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
729 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
732 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
733 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
734 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
735 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
740 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
741 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
742 (2, announcement_info, option),
743 (4, channels, vec_type),
746 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
747 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
749 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
750 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
751 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
753 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
754 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
755 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
756 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
757 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
758 chan_info.write(writer)?;
760 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
761 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
762 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
763 node_id.write(writer)?;
764 node_info.write(writer)?;
767 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
772 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
773 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
774 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
776 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
777 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
778 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
779 for _ in 0..channels_count {
780 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
781 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
782 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
784 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
785 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
786 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
787 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
788 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
789 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
791 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
795 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
796 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
801 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
802 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
803 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
804 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
805 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
807 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
808 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
809 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
815 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
816 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
817 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
818 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
819 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
824 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
825 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
828 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
829 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
833 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
834 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
835 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
836 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
837 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
843 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
844 /// given node announcement.
846 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
847 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
848 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
849 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
850 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
851 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
852 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
855 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
856 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
857 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
859 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
860 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
863 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
864 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
865 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
867 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
868 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
869 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
870 // that it be at least the current time.
871 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
872 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
873 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
874 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
879 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
880 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
881 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
882 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
883 features: msg.features.clone(),
884 last_update: msg.timestamp,
887 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
888 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
896 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
898 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
899 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
900 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
902 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
903 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
904 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
905 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
906 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
908 C::Target: chain::Access,
910 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
911 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
912 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
913 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
914 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
915 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
918 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
919 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
920 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
922 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
923 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
924 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
925 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
926 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
928 C::Target: chain::Access,
930 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
933 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
934 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
935 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
937 C::Target: chain::Access,
939 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
940 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
943 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
945 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
948 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
949 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
950 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
951 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
952 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
953 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
954 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
955 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
956 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
957 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
959 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
960 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
963 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
964 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
966 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
967 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
973 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
974 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
975 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
977 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
980 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
981 features: msg.features.clone(),
982 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
984 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
986 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
987 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
988 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
989 announcement_received_time,
992 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
993 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
994 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
995 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
996 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
997 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
999 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1000 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1001 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1002 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1004 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1005 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1007 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1008 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1009 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1011 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1014 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1015 entry.insert(chan_info);
1019 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1020 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1021 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1022 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1023 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1025 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1026 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1027 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1028 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1029 announcement_info: None,
1036 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1037 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1042 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1043 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1044 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1045 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1046 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1047 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1049 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1050 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1051 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1054 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1055 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1056 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1058 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1059 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1065 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1066 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1068 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1070 // TODO: downgrade the node
1074 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1075 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1076 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1079 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1080 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1081 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1083 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1084 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1086 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1087 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1088 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1089 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1090 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1093 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1094 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1097 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1098 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1099 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1101 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1102 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1103 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1104 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1105 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1106 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1107 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1108 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1109 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1111 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1112 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1113 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1114 info.one_to_two = None;
1116 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1117 info.two_to_one = None;
1119 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1120 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1121 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1122 // channel_update for.
1123 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1124 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1128 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1129 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1130 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1131 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1132 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1137 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1140 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1141 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1142 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1144 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1145 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1146 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1147 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1150 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1151 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1152 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1154 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1155 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1156 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1157 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1160 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1162 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1163 let chan_was_enabled;
1165 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1167 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1168 // disable this check during tests!
1169 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1170 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1171 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1173 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1174 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1178 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1179 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1180 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1182 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1183 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1184 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1187 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1188 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1189 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1190 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1191 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1195 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
1196 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
1197 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1198 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1199 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1200 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1201 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1202 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1203 // but only in the non-normative section.
1204 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1205 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1206 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1207 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1209 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1211 chan_was_enabled = false;
1214 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1215 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1217 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
1218 enabled: chan_enabled,
1219 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1220 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1221 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1222 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1224 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1225 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1229 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
1233 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1234 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1235 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1236 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1237 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1238 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1239 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1242 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1244 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1245 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1246 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1247 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1248 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1251 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1256 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1258 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1259 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1260 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1261 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1262 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1263 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1265 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1267 proportional_millionths
1269 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1270 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1271 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1273 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1274 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1276 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1277 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1279 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1281 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1282 if chan_info.enabled {
1283 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1284 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1285 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1286 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1291 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1297 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1298 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1299 ($node_id: expr) => {
1300 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1301 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1302 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1304 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1305 entry.remove_entry();
1308 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1313 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1314 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1318 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1319 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1321 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1322 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1326 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1328 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1329 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1333 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1334 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1335 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1336 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1337 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1338 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1339 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1349 use ln::PaymentHash;
1350 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1351 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1352 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1353 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1354 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1355 use util::test_utils;
1356 use util::logger::Logger;
1357 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1358 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1359 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1361 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1363 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1364 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1365 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1366 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1367 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1368 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1369 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1373 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1374 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1380 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1381 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1382 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1385 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1386 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1388 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1389 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1390 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1391 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1395 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1396 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1397 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1398 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1400 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1401 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1402 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1403 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1404 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1405 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1408 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1409 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1410 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1411 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1416 addresses: Vec::new(),
1417 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1418 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1420 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1421 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1423 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1424 contents: unsigned_announcement
1428 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1429 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1430 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1431 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1432 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1434 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1435 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1436 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1437 short_channel_id: 0,
1440 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1441 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1442 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1444 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1445 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1446 ChannelAnnouncement {
1447 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1448 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1449 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1450 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1451 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1455 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1456 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1457 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1458 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1459 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1460 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1462 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1466 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1467 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1468 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1469 short_channel_id: 0,
1472 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1473 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1474 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1475 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1476 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1477 excess_data: Vec::new()
1479 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1480 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1482 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1483 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1488 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1489 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1490 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1492 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1493 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1494 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1496 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1497 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1499 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1503 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1504 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1505 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1506 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1511 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1512 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1516 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1517 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1519 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1520 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1523 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1526 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1527 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1528 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1529 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1530 // Return false because contains excess data.
1531 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1532 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1536 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1537 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1538 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1539 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1540 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1541 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1543 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1548 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1549 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1550 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1552 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1553 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1555 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1556 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1558 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1559 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1560 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1561 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1562 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1567 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1573 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1574 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1575 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1577 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1580 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1581 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1582 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1583 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1584 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1586 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1587 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1588 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1589 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1591 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1594 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1595 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1596 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1597 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1598 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1599 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1600 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1605 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1611 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1612 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1613 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1614 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1616 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1619 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1620 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1621 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1622 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1623 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1624 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1625 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1626 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1630 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1631 Some(channel_entry) => {
1632 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1638 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1639 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1640 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1641 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1642 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1643 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1644 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1648 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1649 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1650 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1652 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1655 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1656 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1658 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1663 fn handling_channel_update() {
1664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1665 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1666 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1667 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1668 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1670 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1671 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1673 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1674 let short_channel_id;
1677 // Announce a channel we will update
1678 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1679 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1681 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1682 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1683 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1690 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1691 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1692 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1697 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1699 Some(channel_info) => {
1700 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1701 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1706 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1707 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1708 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1709 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1710 // Return false because contains excess data
1711 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1712 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1716 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1717 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1718 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1719 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1720 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1722 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1725 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1726 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1727 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1728 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1729 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1731 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1734 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1735 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1736 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1737 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1738 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1740 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1743 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1744 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1745 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1746 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1747 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1748 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1750 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1753 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1754 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1755 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1756 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1757 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1758 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1759 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1761 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1766 fn handling_network_update() {
1767 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1768 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1769 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1770 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1771 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1772 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1774 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1775 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1778 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1779 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1782 let short_channel_id;
1784 // Announce a channel we will update
1785 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1786 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1787 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1788 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1789 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1791 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1792 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1794 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1796 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1797 rejected_by_dest: false,
1798 all_paths_failed: true,
1800 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1801 msg: valid_channel_update,
1803 short_channel_id: None,
1809 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1812 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1814 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1816 Some(channel_info) => {
1817 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1821 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1823 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1824 rejected_by_dest: false,
1825 all_paths_failed: true,
1827 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1829 is_permanent: false,
1831 short_channel_id: None,
1837 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1839 Some(channel_info) => {
1840 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1845 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1846 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1848 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1849 rejected_by_dest: false,
1850 all_paths_failed: true,
1852 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1856 short_channel_id: None,
1862 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
1863 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1864 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1865 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1869 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
1870 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
1871 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1872 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1873 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1874 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1875 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1876 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1878 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1879 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1881 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1882 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1883 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1884 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1885 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1887 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1888 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
1889 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1891 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1892 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
1893 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
1895 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1896 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1898 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
1899 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
1900 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
1901 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
1902 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
1903 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
1904 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1906 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
1907 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1908 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1911 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
1912 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1916 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1917 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1918 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1919 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1920 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1922 // Channels were not announced yet.
1923 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1924 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1926 let short_channel_id;
1928 // Announce a channel we will update
1929 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1930 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1931 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1937 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1938 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1939 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1940 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1941 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1942 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1943 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1950 // Valid channel update
1951 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1952 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
1953 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1954 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1960 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1961 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1962 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1963 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1964 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1965 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1966 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1972 // Channel update with excess data.
1973 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1974 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
1975 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
1976 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1977 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1983 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1984 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1985 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1986 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1987 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1988 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1989 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1994 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1995 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1996 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2000 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2001 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2002 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2003 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2004 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2005 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2008 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2009 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2012 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2013 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2014 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2021 // Nodes were never announced
2022 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2023 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2026 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2027 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2032 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2033 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2039 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2040 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2042 // Skip the first node.
2043 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2044 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2047 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2048 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2049 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2050 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2051 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2052 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2053 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2058 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2059 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2063 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2064 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2065 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2067 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2068 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2070 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2071 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2072 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2073 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2077 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2078 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2083 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2084 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2085 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2086 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2087 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2091 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2092 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2093 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2094 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2095 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2097 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2098 let first_blocknum = 0;
2099 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2101 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2103 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2104 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2105 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2109 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2111 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2112 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2113 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2116 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2117 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2118 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2119 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2120 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2122 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2126 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2127 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2128 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2130 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2131 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2132 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2134 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2135 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2136 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2137 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2149 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2150 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2151 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2152 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2153 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2155 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2157 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2158 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2160 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2162 sync_complete: true,
2164 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2165 short_channel_ids: vec![
2166 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2167 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2168 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2169 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2170 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2171 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2174 assert!(result.is_ok());
2176 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2177 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2180 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2181 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2182 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2183 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2184 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2185 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2186 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2187 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2188 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2189 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2192 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2198 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2199 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2200 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2201 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2202 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2204 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2206 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2208 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2210 full_information: true,
2212 assert!(result.is_ok());
2215 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2216 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2218 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2220 full_information: false,
2222 assert!(result.is_err());
2223 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2228 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2229 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2230 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2232 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2233 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2234 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2235 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2237 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2238 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2239 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2242 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2243 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2244 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2247 // used for testing resumption on same block
2248 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2251 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2252 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2253 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2254 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2260 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2261 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2262 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2265 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2267 number_of_blocks: 0,
2270 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2271 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2273 number_of_blocks: 0,
2274 sync_complete: true,
2275 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2279 // Error when wrong chain
2280 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2281 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2284 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2286 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2289 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2290 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2292 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2293 sync_complete: true,
2294 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2298 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2299 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2300 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2303 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2304 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2305 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2308 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2309 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2310 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2311 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2312 sync_complete: true,
2313 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2317 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2318 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2319 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2322 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2323 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2324 number_of_blocks: 1,
2329 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2330 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2331 number_of_blocks: 1,
2332 sync_complete: true,
2333 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2338 // No results in valid query range
2339 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2340 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2343 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2344 first_blocknum: 1000,
2345 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2350 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2351 first_blocknum: 1000,
2352 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2353 sync_complete: true,
2354 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2359 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2360 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2361 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2364 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2365 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2366 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2371 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2372 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2373 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2374 sync_complete: true,
2375 short_channel_ids: vec![
2376 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2382 // Single block exactly full
2383 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2384 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2387 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2388 first_blocknum: 100000,
2389 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2394 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2395 first_blocknum: 100000,
2396 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2397 sync_complete: true,
2398 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2399 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2405 // Multiple split on new block
2406 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2407 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2410 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2411 first_blocknum: 100000,
2412 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2417 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2418 first_blocknum: 100000,
2419 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2420 sync_complete: false,
2421 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2422 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2426 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2427 first_blocknum: 107999,
2428 number_of_blocks: 2,
2429 sync_complete: true,
2430 short_channel_ids: vec![
2431 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2437 // Multiple split on same block
2438 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2439 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2442 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2443 first_blocknum: 100002,
2444 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2449 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2450 first_blocknum: 100002,
2451 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2452 sync_complete: false,
2453 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2454 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2458 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2459 first_blocknum: 108001,
2460 number_of_blocks: 1,
2461 sync_complete: true,
2462 short_channel_ids: vec![
2463 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2470 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2471 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2472 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2473 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2475 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2477 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2478 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2479 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2480 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2483 assert!(result.is_ok());
2485 assert!(result.is_err());
2488 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2489 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2491 for i in 0..events.len() {
2492 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2494 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2495 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2496 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2497 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2498 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2499 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2500 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2502 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2503 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2504 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2505 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2506 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2508 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2509 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2510 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2513 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2519 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2520 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2521 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2522 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2523 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2525 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2527 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2529 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2531 assert!(result.is_err());
2535 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
2543 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2544 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2545 let mut v = Vec::new();
2546 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2548 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2553 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2554 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2555 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2557 let _ = net_graph.encode();