1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
253 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
255 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
256 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
260 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
261 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
262 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
263 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
264 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
265 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
272 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
273 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
275 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
276 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
277 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
278 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
279 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
280 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
283 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
284 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
285 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
287 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
288 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
289 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
290 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
296 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
297 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
298 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
301 return Err(LightningError {
302 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
303 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
304 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
306 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
308 log_level: Level::Trace,
316 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
317 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
319 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
320 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
321 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
322 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
323 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
326 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
327 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
328 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
329 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
332 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
338 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
339 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
340 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
341 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
342 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
343 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
344 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
345 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
346 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
347 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
348 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
350 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
351 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
353 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
355 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
356 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
365 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
366 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
367 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
368 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
369 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
373 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
375 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
376 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
377 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
378 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
379 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
400 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
401 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
405 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
406 if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
410 let first_blocknum = 0;
411 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
412 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
413 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
414 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
415 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
416 msg: QueryChannelRange {
417 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
424 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
425 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
426 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
427 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
428 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
429 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
430 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
431 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
433 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
434 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
436 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
438 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
439 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
440 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
441 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
442 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
449 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
450 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
451 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
452 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
453 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
454 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
456 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
457 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
458 // the result and try again with a different peer.
459 if !msg.full_information {
460 return Err(LightningError {
461 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
462 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
469 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
470 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
471 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
472 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
473 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
474 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
475 /// memory constrained systems.
476 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
477 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
479 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
481 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
482 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
483 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
485 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
486 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
487 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
488 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
489 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
490 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
491 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
492 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
493 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
495 short_channel_ids: vec![],
498 return Err(LightningError {
499 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
500 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
504 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
505 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
506 // exists even if its not yet routable.
507 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
508 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
509 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
510 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
511 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
512 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
513 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
516 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
517 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
522 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
523 let batch_count = batches.len();
524 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
525 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
526 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
527 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
529 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
530 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
531 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
532 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
533 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
534 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
535 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
537 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
538 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
539 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
541 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
542 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
543 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
545 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
546 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
547 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
548 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
550 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
551 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
553 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
556 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
558 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
559 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
560 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
561 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
565 short_channel_ids: batch,
573 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
576 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
577 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
582 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
584 C::Target: chain::Access,
587 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
588 let mut ret = Vec::new();
589 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
590 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
595 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
596 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
597 /// within a channel update.
598 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
599 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
600 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
601 pub last_update: u32,
602 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
604 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
605 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
606 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
607 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
608 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
609 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
610 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
611 pub fees: RoutingFees,
612 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
613 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
614 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
615 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
616 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
619 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
621 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
626 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
627 (0, last_update, required),
628 (2, enabled, required),
629 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
630 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
631 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
632 (10, fees, required),
633 (12, last_update_message, required),
636 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
637 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
638 /// Received within a channel announcement.
639 pub struct ChannelInfo {
640 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
641 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
642 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
643 pub node_one: NodeId,
644 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
645 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
646 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
647 pub node_two: NodeId,
648 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
649 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
650 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
651 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
652 /// An initial announcement of the channel
653 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
654 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
655 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
656 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
657 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
658 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
659 /// network graph in memory!).
660 announcement_received_time: u64,
663 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
664 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
665 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
666 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
672 (0, features, required),
673 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
674 (2, node_one, required),
675 (4, one_to_two, required),
676 (6, node_two, required),
677 (8, two_to_one, required),
678 (10, capacity_sats, required),
679 (12, announcement_message, required),
683 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
684 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
685 pub struct RoutingFees {
686 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
688 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
689 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
690 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
693 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
694 (0, base_msat, required),
695 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
698 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
699 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
700 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
701 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
702 pub features: NodeFeatures,
703 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
704 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
705 pub last_update: u32,
706 /// Color assigned to the node
708 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
709 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
710 /// should not be exposed to the user.
712 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
713 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
714 /// An initial announcement of the node
715 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
716 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
717 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
718 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
721 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
722 (0, features, required),
723 (2, last_update, required),
725 (6, alias, required),
726 (8, announcement_message, option),
727 (10, addresses, vec_type),
730 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
731 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
732 pub struct NodeInfo {
733 /// All valid channels a node has announced
734 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
735 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
736 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
737 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
738 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
739 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
740 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
741 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
742 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
745 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
746 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
747 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
748 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
753 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
754 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
755 (2, announcement_info, option),
756 (4, channels, vec_type),
759 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
760 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
762 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
763 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
764 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
766 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
767 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
768 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
769 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
770 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
771 chan_info.write(writer)?;
773 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
774 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
775 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
776 node_id.write(writer)?;
777 node_info.write(writer)?;
780 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
785 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
786 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
787 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
789 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
790 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
791 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
792 for _ in 0..channels_count {
793 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
794 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
795 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
797 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
798 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
799 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
800 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
801 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
802 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
804 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
808 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
809 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
814 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
815 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
816 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
817 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
818 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
820 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
821 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
822 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
828 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
829 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
830 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
831 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
832 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
837 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
838 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
841 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
842 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
846 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
847 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
848 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
849 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
850 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
856 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
857 /// given node announcement.
859 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
860 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
861 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
862 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
863 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
864 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
865 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
868 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
869 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
870 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
872 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
873 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
876 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
877 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
878 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
880 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
881 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
882 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
883 // that it be at least the current time.
884 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
885 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
886 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
887 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
892 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
893 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
894 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
895 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
896 features: msg.features.clone(),
897 last_update: msg.timestamp,
900 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
901 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
909 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
911 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
912 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
913 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
915 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
916 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
917 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
918 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
919 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
921 C::Target: chain::Access,
923 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
924 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
925 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
926 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
927 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
928 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
931 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
932 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
933 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
935 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
936 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
937 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
938 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
939 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
941 C::Target: chain::Access,
943 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
946 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
947 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
948 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
950 C::Target: chain::Access,
952 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
953 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
956 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
958 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
961 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
962 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
963 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
964 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
965 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
966 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
967 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
968 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
969 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
970 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
972 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
973 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
976 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
977 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
979 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
980 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
986 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
987 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
988 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
990 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
993 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
994 features: msg.features.clone(),
995 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
997 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
999 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1000 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1001 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1002 announcement_received_time,
1005 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1006 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1007 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
1008 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1009 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1010 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1012 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1013 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1014 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1015 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1017 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1018 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1020 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1021 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1022 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1024 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1027 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1028 entry.insert(chan_info);
1032 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1033 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1034 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1035 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1036 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1038 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1039 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1040 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1041 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1042 announcement_info: None,
1049 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1050 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1055 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1056 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1057 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1058 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1059 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1060 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1062 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1063 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1064 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1067 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1068 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1069 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1071 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1072 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1078 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1079 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1081 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1083 // TODO: downgrade the node
1087 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1088 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1089 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1092 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1093 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1094 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1096 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1097 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1099 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1100 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1101 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1102 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1103 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1106 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1107 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1110 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1111 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1112 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1114 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1115 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1116 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1117 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1118 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1119 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1120 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1121 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1122 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1124 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1125 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1126 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1127 info.one_to_two = None;
1129 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1130 info.two_to_one = None;
1132 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1133 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1134 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1135 // channel_update for.
1136 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1137 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1141 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1142 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1143 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1144 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1145 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1150 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1153 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1154 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1155 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1157 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1158 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1159 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1160 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1163 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1164 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1165 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1167 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1168 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1169 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1170 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1173 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1175 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1176 let chan_was_enabled;
1178 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1180 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1181 // disable this check during tests!
1182 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1183 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1184 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1186 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1187 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1191 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1192 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1193 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1195 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1196 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1197 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1200 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1201 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1202 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1203 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1204 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1208 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
1209 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
1210 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1211 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1212 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1213 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1214 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1215 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1216 // but only in the non-normative section.
1217 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1218 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1219 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1220 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1222 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1224 chan_was_enabled = false;
1227 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1228 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1230 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
1231 enabled: chan_enabled,
1232 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1233 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1234 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1235 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1237 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1238 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1242 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
1246 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1247 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1248 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1249 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1250 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1251 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1252 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1253 })?, "channel_update");
1255 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1257 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1258 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1259 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1260 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1261 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1262 })?, "channel_update");
1264 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1269 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1271 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1272 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1273 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1274 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1275 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1276 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1278 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1280 proportional_millionths
1282 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1283 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1284 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1286 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1287 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1289 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1290 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1292 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1294 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1295 if chan_info.enabled {
1296 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1297 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1298 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1299 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1304 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1310 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1311 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1312 ($node_id: expr) => {
1313 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1314 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1315 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1317 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1318 entry.remove_entry();
1321 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1326 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1327 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1331 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1332 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1334 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1335 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1339 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1341 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1342 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1346 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1347 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1348 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1349 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1350 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1351 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1352 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1362 use ln::PaymentHash;
1363 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1364 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1365 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1366 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1367 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1368 use util::test_utils;
1369 use util::logger::Logger;
1370 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1371 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1372 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1374 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1376 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1377 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1378 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1379 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1380 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1381 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1382 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1386 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1387 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1393 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1394 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1395 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1398 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1399 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1401 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1403 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1404 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1408 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1409 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1410 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1411 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1413 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1414 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1415 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1416 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1417 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1418 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1421 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1422 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1423 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1424 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1429 addresses: Vec::new(),
1430 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1431 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1433 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1434 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1436 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1437 contents: unsigned_announcement
1441 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1442 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1443 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1444 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1445 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1447 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1448 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1449 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1450 short_channel_id: 0,
1453 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1454 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1455 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1457 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1458 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1459 ChannelAnnouncement {
1460 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1461 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1462 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1463 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1464 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1468 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1469 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1470 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1471 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1472 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1473 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1474 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1475 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1479 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1480 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1481 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1482 short_channel_id: 0,
1485 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1486 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1487 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1488 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1489 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1490 excess_data: Vec::new()
1492 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1493 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1495 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1496 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1501 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1502 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1503 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1505 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1506 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1507 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1509 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1510 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1512 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1516 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1517 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1518 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1519 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1524 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1525 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1529 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1530 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1532 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1533 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1536 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1539 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1540 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1541 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1542 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1543 // Return false because contains excess data.
1544 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1545 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1549 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1550 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1551 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1552 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1553 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1554 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1556 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1561 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1563 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1565 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1566 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1568 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1569 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1571 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1572 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1573 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1574 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1575 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1580 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1586 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1587 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1588 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1590 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1593 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1594 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1595 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1596 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1597 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1599 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1600 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1601 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1602 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1604 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1607 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1608 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1609 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1610 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1611 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1612 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1613 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1618 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1624 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1625 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1626 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1627 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1629 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1632 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1633 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1634 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1635 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1636 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1637 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1638 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1639 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1643 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1644 Some(channel_entry) => {
1645 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1651 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1652 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1653 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1654 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1655 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1656 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1657 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1661 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1662 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1663 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1665 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1668 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1669 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1671 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1676 fn handling_channel_update() {
1677 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1678 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1679 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1680 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1681 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1683 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1684 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1686 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1687 let short_channel_id;
1690 // Announce a channel we will update
1691 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1692 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1694 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1695 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1696 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1703 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1704 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1705 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1710 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1712 Some(channel_info) => {
1713 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1714 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1719 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1720 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1721 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1722 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1723 // Return false because contains excess data
1724 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1725 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1729 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1730 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1731 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1732 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1733 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1735 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1738 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1739 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1740 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1741 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1742 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1744 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1747 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1748 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1749 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1750 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1751 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1753 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1756 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1757 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1758 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1759 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1760 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1761 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1763 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1766 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1767 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1768 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1769 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1770 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1771 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1772 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1774 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
1779 fn handling_network_update() {
1780 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1781 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1782 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1783 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1784 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1787 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1788 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1791 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1792 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1795 let short_channel_id;
1797 // Announce a channel we will update
1798 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1799 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1800 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1801 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1802 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1804 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1805 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1807 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1809 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1810 rejected_by_dest: false,
1811 all_paths_failed: true,
1813 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1814 msg: valid_channel_update,
1816 short_channel_id: None,
1822 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1825 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1827 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1829 Some(channel_info) => {
1830 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1834 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1836 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1837 rejected_by_dest: false,
1838 all_paths_failed: true,
1840 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1842 is_permanent: false,
1844 short_channel_id: None,
1850 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1852 Some(channel_info) => {
1853 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1858 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1859 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1861 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1862 rejected_by_dest: false,
1863 all_paths_failed: true,
1865 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1869 short_channel_id: None,
1875 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
1876 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1877 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1878 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1882 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
1883 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
1884 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1885 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1886 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1887 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1888 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1889 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1891 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1892 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1894 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1895 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1896 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1897 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1898 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1900 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1901 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
1902 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1904 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1905 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
1906 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
1908 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1909 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1911 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
1912 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
1913 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
1914 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
1915 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
1916 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
1917 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1919 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
1920 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1921 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
1924 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
1925 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1929 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1930 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1931 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1932 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1933 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1935 // Channels were not announced yet.
1936 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1937 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1939 let short_channel_id;
1941 // Announce a channel we will update
1942 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1943 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1944 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1950 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1951 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1952 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1953 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1954 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1955 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1956 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1963 // Valid channel update
1964 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1965 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
1966 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1967 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1973 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1974 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1975 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1976 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1977 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1978 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1979 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1985 // Channel update with excess data.
1986 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1987 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
1988 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
1989 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1990 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1996 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1997 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1998 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1999 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2000 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2001 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2002 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2007 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2008 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2009 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2013 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2014 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2015 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2016 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2017 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2018 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2021 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2022 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2025 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2026 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2027 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2034 // Nodes were never announced
2035 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2036 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2039 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2040 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2045 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2046 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2052 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2053 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2055 // Skip the first node.
2056 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2057 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2060 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2061 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2062 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2063 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2064 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2065 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2066 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2071 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2072 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2076 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2077 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2078 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2080 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2081 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2083 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2084 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2085 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2086 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2090 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2091 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2096 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2097 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2098 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2099 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2100 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2104 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2105 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2106 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2107 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2108 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2110 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2111 let first_blocknum = 0;
2112 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2114 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2116 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2117 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2118 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2122 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2124 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2125 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2126 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2129 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2130 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2131 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2132 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2133 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2135 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2139 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2140 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2141 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2143 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2144 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2145 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2147 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2148 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2149 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2150 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2162 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2163 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2164 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2165 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2166 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2168 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2170 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2171 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2173 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2175 sync_complete: true,
2177 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2178 short_channel_ids: vec![
2179 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2180 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2181 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2182 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2183 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2184 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2187 assert!(result.is_ok());
2189 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2190 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2193 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2194 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2195 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2196 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2197 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2198 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2199 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2200 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2201 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2202 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2205 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2211 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2212 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2213 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2214 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2215 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2217 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2219 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2221 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2223 full_information: true,
2225 assert!(result.is_ok());
2228 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2229 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2231 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2233 full_information: false,
2235 assert!(result.is_err());
2236 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2241 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2242 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2243 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2245 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2246 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2247 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2248 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2250 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2251 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2252 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2255 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2256 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2257 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2260 // used for testing resumption on same block
2261 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2264 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2265 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2266 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2267 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2273 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2274 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2275 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2278 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2280 number_of_blocks: 0,
2283 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2284 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2286 number_of_blocks: 0,
2287 sync_complete: true,
2288 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2292 // Error when wrong chain
2293 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2294 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2297 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2299 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2302 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2303 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2305 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2306 sync_complete: true,
2307 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2311 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2312 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2313 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2316 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2317 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2318 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2321 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2322 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2323 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2324 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2325 sync_complete: true,
2326 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2330 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2331 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2332 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2335 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2336 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2337 number_of_blocks: 1,
2342 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2343 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2344 number_of_blocks: 1,
2345 sync_complete: true,
2346 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2351 // No results in valid query range
2352 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2353 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2356 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2357 first_blocknum: 1000,
2358 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2363 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2364 first_blocknum: 1000,
2365 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2366 sync_complete: true,
2367 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2372 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2373 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2374 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2377 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2378 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2379 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2384 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2385 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2386 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2387 sync_complete: true,
2388 short_channel_ids: vec![
2389 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2395 // Single block exactly full
2396 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2397 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2400 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2401 first_blocknum: 100000,
2402 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2407 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2408 first_blocknum: 100000,
2409 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2410 sync_complete: true,
2411 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2412 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2418 // Multiple split on new block
2419 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2420 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2423 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2424 first_blocknum: 100000,
2425 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2430 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2431 first_blocknum: 100000,
2432 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2433 sync_complete: false,
2434 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2435 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2439 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2440 first_blocknum: 107999,
2441 number_of_blocks: 2,
2442 sync_complete: true,
2443 short_channel_ids: vec![
2444 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2450 // Multiple split on same block
2451 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2452 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2455 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2456 first_blocknum: 100002,
2457 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2462 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2463 first_blocknum: 100002,
2464 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2465 sync_complete: false,
2466 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2467 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2471 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2472 first_blocknum: 108001,
2473 number_of_blocks: 1,
2474 sync_complete: true,
2475 short_channel_ids: vec![
2476 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2483 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2484 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2485 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2486 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2488 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2490 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2491 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2492 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2493 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2496 assert!(result.is_ok());
2498 assert!(result.is_err());
2501 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2502 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2504 for i in 0..events.len() {
2505 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2507 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2508 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2509 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2510 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2511 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2512 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2513 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2515 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2516 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2517 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2518 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2519 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2521 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2522 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2523 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2526 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2532 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2533 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2534 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2535 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2536 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2538 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2540 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2542 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2544 assert!(result.is_err());
2548 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
2556 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2557 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2558 let mut v = Vec::new();
2559 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2561 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2566 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2567 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2568 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2570 let _ = net_graph.encode();