1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
127 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
128 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
129 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
132 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
133 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
134 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
135 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
138 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
139 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
144 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
145 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
146 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
147 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
150 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
151 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
153 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
155 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
156 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
157 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
158 ChannelUpdateMessage {
159 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
162 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
165 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
166 short_channel_id: u64,
167 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
168 /// `channel_update` message is received.
171 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
172 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
174 /// The node id of the failed node.
176 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
177 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
183 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
186 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
187 (0, short_channel_id, required),
188 (2, is_permanent, required),
190 (4, NodeFailure) => {
191 (0, node_id, required),
192 (2, is_permanent, required),
196 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
197 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
198 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
199 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
200 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
201 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
207 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
208 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
209 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
210 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
211 /// serving historical announcements.
213 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
214 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
215 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
216 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
218 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
220 chain_access: Option<C>,
221 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
226 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
229 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
230 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
231 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
232 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
233 /// channel owners' keys.
234 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
236 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
238 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
240 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
245 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
246 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
247 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
248 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
249 self.chain_access = chain_access;
252 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
253 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
255 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
256 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
260 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
261 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
262 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
263 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
264 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
265 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
272 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
273 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
275 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
276 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
277 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
278 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
279 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
280 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
282 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
283 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
284 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
285 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
287 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
288 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
289 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
290 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
296 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
297 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
298 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
301 return Err(LightningError {
302 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
303 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
304 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
306 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
308 log_level: Level::Trace,
316 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
317 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
319 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
320 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
321 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
322 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
323 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
326 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
327 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
328 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
329 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
332 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
333 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
334 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
337 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
338 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
339 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
340 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
341 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
342 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
343 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
344 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
345 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
346 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
347 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
348 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
350 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
351 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
353 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
355 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
356 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
365 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
366 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
367 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
368 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
369 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
373 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
375 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
376 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
377 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
378 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
379 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
389 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
390 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
391 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
393 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
394 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
395 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
396 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
397 /// tracking this directly.
398 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
400 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
401 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
405 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
406 if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
410 let first_blocknum = 0;
411 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
412 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
413 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
414 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
415 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
416 msg: QueryChannelRange {
417 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
424 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
425 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
426 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
427 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
428 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
429 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
430 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
431 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
433 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
434 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
436 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
438 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
439 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
440 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
441 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
442 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
449 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
450 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
451 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
452 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
453 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
454 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
456 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
457 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
458 // the result and try again with a different peer.
459 if !msg.full_information {
460 return Err(LightningError {
461 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
462 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
469 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
470 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
471 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
472 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
473 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
474 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
475 /// memory constrained systems.
476 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
477 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
479 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
481 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
482 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
483 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
485 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
486 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
487 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
488 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
489 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
490 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
491 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
492 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
493 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
495 short_channel_ids: vec![],
498 return Err(LightningError {
499 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
500 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
504 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
505 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
506 // exists even if its not yet routable.
507 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
508 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
509 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
510 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
511 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
512 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
513 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
516 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
517 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
522 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
523 let batch_count = batches.len();
524 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
525 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
526 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
527 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
529 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
530 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
531 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
532 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
533 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
534 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
535 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
537 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
538 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
539 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
541 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
542 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
543 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
545 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
546 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
547 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
548 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
550 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
551 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
553 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
556 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
558 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
559 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
560 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
561 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
565 short_channel_ids: batch,
573 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
576 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
577 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
582 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
584 C::Target: chain::Access,
587 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
588 let mut ret = Vec::new();
589 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
590 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
595 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
596 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
597 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
598 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
599 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
600 pub last_update: u32,
601 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
603 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
604 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
605 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
606 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
607 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
608 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
609 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
610 pub fees: RoutingFees,
611 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
612 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
613 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
614 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
615 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
618 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
619 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
620 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
626 (0, last_update, required),
627 (2, enabled, required),
628 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
629 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
630 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
631 (10, fees, required),
632 (12, last_update_message, required),
635 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
636 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
637 /// Received within a channel announcement.
638 pub struct ChannelInfo {
639 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
640 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
641 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
642 pub node_one: NodeId,
643 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
644 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
645 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
646 pub node_two: NodeId,
647 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
648 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
649 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
650 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
651 /// An initial announcement of the channel
652 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
653 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
654 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
655 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
656 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
657 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
658 /// network graph in memory!).
659 announcement_received_time: u64,
663 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target`, or `None`
664 /// if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
665 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfo> {
666 let (direction, source, target) = {
667 if target == &self.node_one {
668 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, &self.node_one)
669 } else if target == &self.node_two {
670 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, &self.node_two)
675 Some(DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction, source, target })
679 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
680 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
681 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
682 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
688 (0, features, required),
689 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
690 (2, node_one, required),
691 (4, one_to_two, required),
692 (6, node_two, required),
693 (8, two_to_one, required),
694 (10, capacity_sats, required),
695 (12, announcement_message, required),
698 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
699 /// source node to a target node.
700 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
701 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
702 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
703 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
708 impl<'a: 'b, 'b> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
709 /// Returns information for the channel.
710 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
712 /// Returns information for the direction.
713 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
715 /// Returns the node id for the source.
716 pub fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { self.source }
718 /// Returns the node id for the target.
719 pub fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { self.target }
721 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
723 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
724 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
725 /// whichever is smaller.
726 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
727 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
729 .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
730 .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
731 let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
732 if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
733 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
735 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
738 .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
739 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
740 .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
743 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
744 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
745 match self.direction {
746 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
752 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its the direction.
753 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
754 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
755 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
758 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
759 /// Returns information for the channel.
761 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
763 /// Returns information for the direction.
765 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
767 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
769 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
772 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
774 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
775 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
776 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
777 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
780 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
784 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
786 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
789 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
791 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
794 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
795 /// an invoice, though may not be the case for zero-amount invoices.
797 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
798 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
802 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
803 /// use when making routing decisions.
804 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
806 impl EffectiveCapacity {
807 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
808 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
810 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
811 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
812 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
813 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
814 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
819 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
820 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
821 pub struct RoutingFees {
822 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
824 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
825 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
826 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
829 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
830 (0, base_msat, required),
831 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
834 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
835 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
836 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
837 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
838 pub features: NodeFeatures,
839 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
840 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
841 pub last_update: u32,
842 /// Color assigned to the node
844 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
845 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
846 /// should not be exposed to the user.
848 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
849 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
850 /// An initial announcement of the node
851 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
852 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
853 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
854 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
857 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
858 (0, features, required),
859 (2, last_update, required),
861 (6, alias, required),
862 (8, announcement_message, option),
863 (10, addresses, vec_type),
866 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
867 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
868 pub struct NodeInfo {
869 /// All valid channels a node has announced
870 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
871 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
872 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
873 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
874 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
875 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
876 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
877 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
878 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
881 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
882 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
883 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
884 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
889 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
890 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
891 (2, announcement_info, option),
892 (4, channels, vec_type),
895 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
896 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
898 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
900 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
902 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
903 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
904 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
905 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
906 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
907 chan_info.write(writer)?;
909 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
910 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
911 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
912 node_id.write(writer)?;
913 node_info.write(writer)?;
916 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
921 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
922 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
923 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
925 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
926 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
927 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
928 for _ in 0..channels_count {
929 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
930 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
931 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
933 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
934 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
935 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
936 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
937 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
938 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
940 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
944 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
945 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
950 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
951 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
952 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
953 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
954 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
956 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
957 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
958 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
964 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
965 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
966 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
967 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
968 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
973 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
974 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
977 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
978 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
982 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
983 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
984 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
985 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
986 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
992 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
993 /// given node announcement.
995 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
996 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
997 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
998 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
999 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1000 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1001 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1004 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1005 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1006 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1008 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1009 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1012 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1013 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1014 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1016 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1017 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1018 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1019 // that it be at least the current time.
1020 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1021 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1022 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1023 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1028 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1029 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1030 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1031 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1032 features: msg.features.clone(),
1033 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1036 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1037 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1045 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1047 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1048 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1049 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1051 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1052 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1053 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
1054 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1055 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1057 C::Target: chain::Access,
1059 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1060 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1061 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1062 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1063 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1064 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1067 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1068 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1069 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1071 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1072 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1073 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1074 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1075 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1077 C::Target: chain::Access,
1079 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1082 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1083 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1084 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1086 C::Target: chain::Access,
1088 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1089 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1092 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1094 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1097 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1098 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1099 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1100 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1101 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1102 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1103 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1104 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1105 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1106 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1108 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1109 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1112 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1113 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1115 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1116 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1122 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1123 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1124 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1126 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1129 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1130 features: msg.features.clone(),
1131 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1133 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1135 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1136 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1137 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1138 announcement_received_time,
1141 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1142 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1143 match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
1144 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1145 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1146 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1148 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1149 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1150 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1151 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1153 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1154 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1156 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1157 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
1158 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
1160 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1163 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1164 entry.insert(chan_info);
1168 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
1169 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
1170 match nodes.entry($node_id) {
1171 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1172 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
1174 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1175 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1176 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
1177 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1178 announcement_info: None,
1185 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
1186 add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
1191 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1192 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1193 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1194 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1195 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1196 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1198 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1199 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1200 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1203 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1204 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1205 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1207 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1208 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1214 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1215 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1217 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1219 // TODO: downgrade the node
1223 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1224 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1225 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1228 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1229 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1230 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1232 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1233 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1235 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1236 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1237 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1238 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1239 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1242 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1243 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1246 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1247 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1248 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1250 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1251 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1252 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1253 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1254 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1255 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1256 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1257 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1258 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1260 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1261 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1262 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1263 info.one_to_two = None;
1265 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1266 info.two_to_one = None;
1268 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1269 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1270 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1271 // channel_update for.
1272 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1273 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1277 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1278 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1279 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1280 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1281 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1286 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1289 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1290 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1291 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1293 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1294 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1295 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1296 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1299 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1300 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1301 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1303 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1304 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1305 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1306 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1309 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1311 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1312 let chan_was_enabled;
1314 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1316 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1317 // disable this check during tests!
1318 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1319 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1320 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1322 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1323 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1327 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1328 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1329 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1331 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1332 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1333 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1336 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1337 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1338 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1339 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1340 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1344 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
1345 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
1346 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1347 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1348 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1349 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1350 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1351 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1352 // but only in the non-normative section.
1353 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1354 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1355 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1356 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1358 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1360 chan_was_enabled = false;
1363 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1364 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1366 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1367 enabled: chan_enabled,
1368 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1369 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1370 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1371 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1373 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1374 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1378 $target = Some(updated_channel_update_info);
1382 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1383 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1384 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1385 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1386 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1387 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1388 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1389 })?, "channel_update");
1391 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1393 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1394 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1395 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1396 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1397 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1398 })?, "channel_update");
1400 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1405 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1407 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1408 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1409 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1410 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1411 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1412 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1414 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1416 proportional_millionths
1418 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1419 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1420 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1422 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1423 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1425 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1426 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1428 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1430 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1431 if chan_info.enabled {
1432 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1433 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1434 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1435 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1440 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1446 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1447 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1448 ($node_id: expr) => {
1449 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1450 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1451 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1453 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1454 entry.remove_entry();
1457 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1462 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1463 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1467 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1468 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1470 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1471 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1475 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1477 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1478 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1482 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1483 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1484 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1485 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1486 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1487 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1488 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1498 use ln::PaymentHash;
1499 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1500 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1501 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1502 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1503 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1504 use util::test_utils;
1505 use util::logger::Logger;
1506 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1507 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1508 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1510 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1512 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1513 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1514 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1515 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1516 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1517 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1518 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1522 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1523 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1529 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1530 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1531 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1534 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1535 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1537 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1538 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1539 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1540 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1544 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1545 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1546 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1547 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1549 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1550 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1551 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1552 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1553 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1554 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1557 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1558 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1559 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1560 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1565 addresses: Vec::new(),
1566 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1567 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1569 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1570 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1572 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1573 contents: unsigned_announcement
1577 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1578 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1579 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1580 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1581 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1583 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1584 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1585 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1586 short_channel_id: 0,
1589 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1590 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1591 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1593 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1594 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1595 ChannelAnnouncement {
1596 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
1597 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
1598 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1599 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1600 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1604 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1605 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1606 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1607 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1608 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1609 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1610 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1611 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1615 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1616 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1617 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1618 short_channel_id: 0,
1621 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1622 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1623 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1624 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1625 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1626 excess_data: Vec::new()
1628 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1629 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1631 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
1632 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1637 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1638 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1639 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1641 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1642 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1643 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1645 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1646 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1648 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1652 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1653 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1654 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1655 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1660 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1661 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1665 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1666 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1668 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1669 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1672 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1675 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1676 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1677 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1678 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1679 // Return false because contains excess data.
1680 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1681 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1685 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1686 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1687 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1688 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1689 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1690 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1692 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1697 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1699 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1701 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1702 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1704 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1705 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1707 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1708 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1709 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1710 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1711 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1716 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1722 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1723 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1724 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1726 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1729 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1730 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1731 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1732 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1733 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1735 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1736 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1737 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1738 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1740 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1743 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1744 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1745 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1746 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1747 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1748 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1749 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1754 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1760 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1761 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1762 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1763 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1765 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1768 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1769 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1770 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1771 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1772 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1773 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1774 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1775 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1779 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1780 Some(channel_entry) => {
1781 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1787 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1788 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1789 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1790 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1791 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1792 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1793 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1797 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1798 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1799 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1801 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1804 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1805 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1807 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1812 fn handling_channel_update() {
1813 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1814 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1815 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1816 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1817 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1819 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1820 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1822 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1823 let short_channel_id;
1826 // Announce a channel we will update
1827 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1828 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1830 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1831 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1832 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1839 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1840 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1841 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1846 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1848 Some(channel_info) => {
1849 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1850 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1855 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1856 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1857 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1858 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1859 // Return false because contains excess data
1860 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1861 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1865 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1866 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1867 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1868 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1869 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1871 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1874 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1875 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1876 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1877 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1878 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1880 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1883 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1884 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1885 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
1886 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1887 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1889 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1892 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1893 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1894 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1895 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1896 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1897 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1899 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
1902 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
1903 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1904 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1905 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1906 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1907 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
1908 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1910 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
1915 fn handling_network_update() {
1916 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
1917 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1918 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1919 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
1920 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
1921 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1923 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1924 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1927 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1928 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
1931 let short_channel_id;
1933 // Announce a channel we will update
1934 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1935 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1936 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
1937 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
1938 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
1940 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1941 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
1943 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1945 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1946 rejected_by_dest: false,
1947 all_paths_failed: true,
1949 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1950 msg: valid_channel_update,
1952 short_channel_id: None,
1958 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
1961 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1963 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1965 Some(channel_info) => {
1966 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1970 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1972 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1973 rejected_by_dest: false,
1974 all_paths_failed: true,
1976 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1978 is_permanent: false,
1980 short_channel_id: None,
1986 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1988 Some(channel_info) => {
1989 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1994 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1995 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
1997 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
1998 rejected_by_dest: false,
1999 all_paths_failed: true,
2001 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2005 short_channel_id: None,
2011 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2012 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2013 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2014 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2018 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2019 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2020 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2021 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2022 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2023 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2024 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2025 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2027 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2028 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2030 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2031 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2032 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2033 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2034 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2036 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2037 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2038 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2040 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2041 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2042 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2044 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2045 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2047 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2048 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2049 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2050 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2051 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2052 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2053 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2055 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2056 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2057 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2060 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2061 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2065 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2066 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2067 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2068 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2069 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2071 // Channels were not announced yet.
2072 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2073 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2075 let short_channel_id;
2077 // Announce a channel we will update
2078 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2079 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2080 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2086 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2087 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2088 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2089 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2090 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2091 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2092 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2099 // Valid channel update
2100 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2101 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2102 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2103 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2109 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2110 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2111 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2112 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2113 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2114 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2115 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2121 // Channel update with excess data.
2122 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2123 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2124 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2125 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2126 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2132 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2133 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2134 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2135 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2136 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2137 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2138 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2143 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2144 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2145 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2149 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2150 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2151 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2152 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2153 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2154 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2157 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2158 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2161 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2162 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2163 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2170 // Nodes were never announced
2171 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2172 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2175 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2176 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2181 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2182 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2188 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2189 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2191 // Skip the first node.
2192 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2193 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2196 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2197 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2198 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2199 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2200 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2201 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2202 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2207 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2208 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2212 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2213 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2214 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2216 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2217 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2219 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2220 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2221 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2222 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2226 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2227 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2232 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2233 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2234 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2235 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2236 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2240 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2241 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2242 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2243 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2244 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2246 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2247 let first_blocknum = 0;
2248 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2250 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2252 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2253 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2254 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2258 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2260 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2261 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2262 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2265 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2266 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2267 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2268 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2269 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2271 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2275 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2276 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2277 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2279 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2280 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2281 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2283 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2284 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2285 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2286 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2288 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2298 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2299 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2300 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2301 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2302 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2304 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2306 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2307 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2309 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2311 sync_complete: true,
2313 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2314 short_channel_ids: vec![
2315 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2316 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2317 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2318 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2319 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2320 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2323 assert!(result.is_ok());
2325 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2326 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2329 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2330 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2331 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2332 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2333 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2334 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2335 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2336 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2337 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2338 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2341 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2347 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2348 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2349 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2350 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2351 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2353 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2355 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2357 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2359 full_information: true,
2361 assert!(result.is_ok());
2364 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2365 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2367 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2369 full_information: false,
2371 assert!(result.is_err());
2372 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2377 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2378 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2379 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2381 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2382 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2383 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2384 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2386 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2387 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2388 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2391 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2392 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2393 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2396 // used for testing resumption on same block
2397 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2400 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2401 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2402 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2403 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2409 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2410 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2411 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2414 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2416 number_of_blocks: 0,
2419 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2420 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2422 number_of_blocks: 0,
2423 sync_complete: true,
2424 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2428 // Error when wrong chain
2429 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2430 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2433 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2435 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2438 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2439 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2441 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2442 sync_complete: true,
2443 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2447 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2448 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2449 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2452 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2453 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2454 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2457 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2458 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2459 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2460 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2461 sync_complete: true,
2462 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2466 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2467 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2468 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2471 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2472 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2473 number_of_blocks: 1,
2478 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2479 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2480 number_of_blocks: 1,
2481 sync_complete: true,
2482 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2487 // No results in valid query range
2488 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2489 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2492 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2493 first_blocknum: 1000,
2494 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2499 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2500 first_blocknum: 1000,
2501 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2502 sync_complete: true,
2503 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2508 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2509 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2510 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2513 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2514 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2515 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2520 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2521 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2522 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2523 sync_complete: true,
2524 short_channel_ids: vec![
2525 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2531 // Single block exactly full
2532 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2533 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2536 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2537 first_blocknum: 100000,
2538 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2543 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2544 first_blocknum: 100000,
2545 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2546 sync_complete: true,
2547 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2548 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2554 // Multiple split on new block
2555 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2556 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2559 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2560 first_blocknum: 100000,
2561 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2566 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2567 first_blocknum: 100000,
2568 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2569 sync_complete: false,
2570 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2571 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2575 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2576 first_blocknum: 107999,
2577 number_of_blocks: 2,
2578 sync_complete: true,
2579 short_channel_ids: vec![
2580 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2586 // Multiple split on same block
2587 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2588 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2591 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2592 first_blocknum: 100002,
2593 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2598 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2599 first_blocknum: 100002,
2600 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2601 sync_complete: false,
2602 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2603 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2607 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2608 first_blocknum: 108001,
2609 number_of_blocks: 1,
2610 sync_complete: true,
2611 short_channel_ids: vec![
2612 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2619 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2620 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2621 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2622 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2624 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2626 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2627 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2628 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2629 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2632 assert!(result.is_ok());
2634 assert!(result.is_err());
2637 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2638 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2640 for i in 0..events.len() {
2641 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2643 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2644 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2645 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2646 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2647 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2648 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2649 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2651 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2652 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2653 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2654 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2655 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2657 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2658 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2659 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2662 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2668 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2669 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2670 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2671 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2672 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2674 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2676 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2678 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2680 assert!(result.is_err());
2684 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
2692 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2693 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2694 let mut v = Vec::new();
2695 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2697 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2702 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2703 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2704 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2706 let _ = net_graph.encode();