1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
31 use util::logger::Logger;
32 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use std::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
37 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
39 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
40 use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
42 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
44 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
45 /// refuse to relay the message.
46 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
48 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
49 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
50 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
52 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
53 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
54 pub struct NetworkGraph {
55 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
56 channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
57 nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
60 /// A simple newtype for RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>.
61 /// This exists only to make accessing a RwLock<NetworkGraph> possible from
62 /// the C bindings, as it can be done directly in Rust code.
63 pub struct LockedNetworkGraph<'a>(pub RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>);
65 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
66 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
67 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
68 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
69 /// serving historical announcements.
70 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
71 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
72 /// Representation of the payment channel network
73 pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
74 chain_access: Option<C>,
75 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
76 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
80 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
81 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
82 /// assuming a fresh network graph.
83 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
84 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
85 /// channel owners' keys.
86 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
88 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
89 network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)),
90 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
92 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
97 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
98 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
99 pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
101 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
102 network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
103 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
105 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
110 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
111 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
112 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
113 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
114 self.chain_access = chain_access;
117 /// Take a read lock on the network_graph and return it in the C-bindings
118 /// newtype helper. This is likely only useful when called via the C
119 /// bindings as you can call `self.network_graph.read().unwrap()` in Rust
121 pub fn read_locked_graph<'a>(&'a self) -> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
122 LockedNetworkGraph(self.network_graph.read().unwrap())
125 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
126 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
127 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
128 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
129 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
130 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
138 impl<'a> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
139 /// Get a reference to the NetworkGraph which this read-lock contains.
140 pub fn graph(&self) -> &NetworkGraph {
146 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
147 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
148 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
150 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
155 impl<C: Deref , L: Deref > RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
156 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
157 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
158 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
159 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
160 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
163 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
164 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
166 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
169 fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
171 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
172 let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
174 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
175 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
177 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
178 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
183 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
184 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
185 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
188 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
189 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
190 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
191 let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
192 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
193 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
194 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
195 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
196 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
197 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
198 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
199 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
201 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
202 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
204 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
206 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
207 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
216 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
217 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
218 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
219 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
220 let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
224 network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
226 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
227 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
228 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
229 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
230 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
240 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
241 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
242 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
244 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
245 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
246 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
247 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
248 /// tracking this directly.
249 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
251 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
252 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
256 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
257 if !self.should_request_full_sync(their_node_id) {
261 let first_blocknum = 0;
262 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
263 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
264 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
265 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
266 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
267 msg: QueryChannelRange {
268 chain_hash: self.network_graph.read().unwrap().genesis_hash,
275 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
276 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
277 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
278 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
279 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
280 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
281 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
282 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
284 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
285 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
289 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
290 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
291 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
292 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
293 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
300 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
301 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
302 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
303 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
304 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
305 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
307 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
308 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
309 // the result and try again with a different peer.
310 if !msg.full_information {
311 return Err(LightningError {
312 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
313 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
320 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
321 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
322 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
323 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
324 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
325 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
326 /// memory constrained systems.
327 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
330 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
332 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
334 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
335 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
336 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
338 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
339 if msg.chain_hash != network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
341 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
342 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
343 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
344 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
345 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
346 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
348 short_channel_ids: vec![],
351 return Err(LightningError {
352 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
353 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
357 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
358 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
359 // exists even if its not yet routable.
360 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
361 for (_, ref chan) in network_graph.get_channels().range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
362 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
363 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
364 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
365 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
368 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
369 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
375 let batch_count = batches.len();
376 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
377 // Per spec, the initial first_blocknum needs to be <= the query's first_blocknum and subsequent
378 // must be >= the prior reply. We'll simplify this by using zero since its still spec compliant and
379 // sequence completion is now explicitly.
380 let first_blocknum = 0;
382 // Per spec, the final end_blocknum needs to be >= the query's end_blocknum, so we'll use the
383 // query's value. Prior batches must use the number of blocks that fit into the message. We'll
384 // base this off the last SCID in the batch since we've somewhat abusing first_blocknum.
385 let number_of_blocks = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
388 block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) + 1
391 // Only true for the last message in a sequence
392 let sync_complete = batch_index == batch_count - 1;
394 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
395 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
396 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
397 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
401 short_channel_ids: batch,
409 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
412 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
413 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
418 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L>
420 C::Target: chain::Access,
423 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
424 let mut ret = Vec::new();
425 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
426 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
432 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
433 /// within a channel update.
434 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
435 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
436 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
437 pub last_update: u32,
438 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
440 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
441 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
442 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
443 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
444 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
445 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
447 pub fees: RoutingFees,
448 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
449 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
450 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
451 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
452 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
455 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
456 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
457 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
462 impl_writeable!(DirectionalChannelInfo, 0, {
472 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
473 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
474 /// Received within a channel announcement.
475 pub struct ChannelInfo {
476 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
477 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
478 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
479 pub node_one: PublicKey,
480 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
481 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
482 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
483 pub node_two: PublicKey,
484 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
485 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
486 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
487 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
488 /// An initial announcement of the channel
489 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
490 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
491 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
492 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
495 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
496 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
497 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
498 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
503 impl_writeable!(ChannelInfo, 0, {
514 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
515 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
516 pub struct RoutingFees {
517 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
519 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
520 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
521 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
524 impl Readable for RoutingFees{
525 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<RoutingFees, DecodeError> {
526 let base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
527 let proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
530 proportional_millionths,
535 impl Writeable for RoutingFees {
536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
537 self.base_msat.write(writer)?;
538 self.proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
543 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
544 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
545 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
546 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
547 pub features: NodeFeatures,
548 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
549 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
550 pub last_update: u32,
551 /// Color assigned to the node
553 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
554 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
555 /// should not be exposed to the user.
557 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
558 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
559 /// An initial announcement of the node
560 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
561 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
562 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
563 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
566 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
568 self.features.write(writer)?;
569 self.last_update.write(writer)?;
570 self.rgb.write(writer)?;
571 self.alias.write(writer)?;
572 (self.addresses.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
573 for ref addr in &self.addresses {
576 self.announcement_message.write(writer)?;
581 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
582 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, DecodeError> {
583 let features = Readable::read(reader)?;
584 let last_update = Readable::read(reader)?;
585 let rgb = Readable::read(reader)?;
586 let alias = Readable::read(reader)?;
587 let addresses_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
588 let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(addresses_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 40) as usize);
589 for _ in 0..addresses_count {
590 match Readable::read(reader) {
591 Ok(Ok(addr)) => { addresses.push(addr); },
592 Ok(Err(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
593 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
597 let announcement_message = Readable::read(reader)?;
598 Ok(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
609 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
610 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
611 pub struct NodeInfo {
612 /// All valid channels a node has announced
613 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
614 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
615 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
616 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
617 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
618 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
619 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
620 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
621 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
624 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
626 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
627 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
632 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
633 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
634 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
635 for ref chan in self.channels.iter() {
638 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees.write(writer)?;
639 self.announcement_info.write(writer)?;
644 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 64*1024;
646 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
647 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeInfo, DecodeError> {
648 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
649 let mut channels = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8) as usize);
650 for _ in 0..channels_count {
651 channels.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
653 let lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Readable::read(reader)?;
654 let announcement_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
657 lowest_inbound_channel_fees,
663 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
664 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
665 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
666 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
667 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
668 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
669 chan_info.write(writer)?;
671 (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
672 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
673 node_id.write(writer)?;
674 node_info.write(writer)?;
680 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
681 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
682 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
683 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
684 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
685 for _ in 0..channels_count {
686 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
687 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
688 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
690 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
691 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
692 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
693 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
694 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
695 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
705 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
706 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
707 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
708 for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
709 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
711 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
712 for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
713 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
720 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
722 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
723 pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
724 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
726 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
727 pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
729 /// Get network addresses by node id.
730 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
731 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
733 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
734 pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
735 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
736 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
737 return Some(&node_info.addresses)
743 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
744 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
747 channels: BTreeMap::new(),
748 nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
752 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
753 /// given node announcement.
755 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
756 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
757 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
758 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
759 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
760 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
761 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
764 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
765 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
766 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
768 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
769 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
772 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
773 match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
774 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
776 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
777 if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
778 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
783 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
784 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
785 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
786 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
787 features: msg.features.clone(),
788 last_update: msg.timestamp,
791 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
792 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
800 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
802 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
803 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
804 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
806 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
807 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
808 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
809 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
810 -> Result<(), LightningError>
811 where C::Target: chain::Access {
812 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
813 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
814 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
815 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
816 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
817 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
820 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
821 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
822 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
824 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
825 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
826 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
827 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
828 -> Result<(), LightningError>
829 where C::Target: chain::Access {
830 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
833 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
834 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
835 -> Result<(), LightningError>
836 where C::Target: chain::Access {
837 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
838 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
841 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
843 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
846 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
847 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
848 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
849 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
850 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
851 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
852 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
853 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
854 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
855 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
857 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
858 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
861 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
862 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
864 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
865 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
871 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
872 features: msg.features.clone(),
873 node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
875 node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
877 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
878 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
879 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
882 match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
883 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
884 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
885 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
887 if utxo_value.is_some() {
888 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
889 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
890 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
892 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
893 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
895 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
896 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
897 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
899 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
902 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
903 entry.insert(chan_info);
907 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
908 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
909 match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
910 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
911 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
913 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
914 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
915 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
916 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
917 announcement_info: None,
924 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
925 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
930 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
931 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
932 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
933 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
934 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
936 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
937 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
940 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
941 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
942 one_to_two.enabled = false;
944 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
945 two_to_one.enabled = false;
951 fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
953 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
955 // TODO: downgrade the node
959 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
962 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
963 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
964 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
965 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
966 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
969 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
970 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
971 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
972 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
973 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
976 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
978 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
979 let chan_was_enabled;
981 match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
982 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
984 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
985 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
986 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
989 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
990 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
991 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
992 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
993 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
997 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
998 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
999 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1000 if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
1001 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1003 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1005 chan_was_enabled = false;
1008 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1009 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1011 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
1012 enabled: chan_enabled,
1013 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1014 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1015 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1016 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1018 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1019 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1023 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
1027 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1028 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1029 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1030 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1031 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
1033 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
1035 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1036 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1037 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
1039 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
1045 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1046 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1047 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1048 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1049 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1050 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1052 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1054 proportional_millionths
1056 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1057 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1058 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1060 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1061 let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1063 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1064 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1066 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1068 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1069 if chan_info.enabled {
1070 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1071 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1072 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1073 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1078 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1084 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1085 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1086 ($node_id: expr) => {
1087 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1088 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1089 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1091 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1092 entry.remove_entry();
1095 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1100 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1101 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1108 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1109 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1110 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1111 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
1112 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1113 use util::test_utils;
1114 use util::logger::Logger;
1115 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1116 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1117 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1119 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1120 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1121 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1122 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1123 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
1124 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1125 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1129 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1130 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1134 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
1135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1136 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1137 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1138 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_hash, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1139 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1143 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1144 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1145 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1147 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1148 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1149 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1150 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1151 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1152 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1156 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1157 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1159 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1160 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1161 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1162 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1163 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1164 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1165 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1166 let first_announcement_time = 500;
1168 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1169 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1170 timestamp: first_announcement_time,
1174 addresses: Vec::new(),
1175 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1176 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1178 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1179 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1180 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1181 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1184 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1186 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1190 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1191 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1192 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1193 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1194 short_channel_id: 0,
1197 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1198 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1199 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1202 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1203 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1204 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1205 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1206 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1207 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1208 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1210 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1211 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1216 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1217 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1221 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1222 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1224 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1225 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1228 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1231 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1232 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1233 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1234 let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
1235 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1236 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1238 // Return false because contains excess data.
1239 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1240 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1243 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1245 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1246 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1247 unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
1248 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1249 let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1250 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1251 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1253 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1255 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1260 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1261 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1262 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1264 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1265 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1266 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1267 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1268 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1269 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1271 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1272 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1273 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1274 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1275 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1278 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1279 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1280 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1281 short_channel_id: 0,
1284 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1285 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1286 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1289 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1290 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1291 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1292 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1293 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1294 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1295 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1298 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1299 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1300 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1301 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1306 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1307 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1313 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1314 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1315 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1317 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1320 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1321 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1322 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1323 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source.clone().genesis_hash, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1324 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1326 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1327 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1328 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1329 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1330 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1331 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1332 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1335 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1337 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1340 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1341 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1342 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1344 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1345 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1346 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1347 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1348 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1349 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1350 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1352 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1353 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1358 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1359 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1365 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1366 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1367 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1368 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1370 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1373 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1374 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1375 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1376 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1377 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1378 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1379 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1380 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1381 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1382 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1384 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1385 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1389 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1390 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1391 Some(channel_entry) => {
1392 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1398 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1399 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1400 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1401 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1402 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1403 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1404 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1405 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1406 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1407 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1409 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1410 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1414 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1415 let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1416 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1417 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1418 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1419 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1420 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1422 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1424 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1427 unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1428 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1429 let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1430 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1431 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1432 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1433 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1434 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1436 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1438 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1443 fn handling_channel_update() {
1444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1445 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1446 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1447 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1449 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1450 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1451 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1452 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1453 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1454 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1456 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1457 let short_channel_id = 0;
1458 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1459 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1462 // Announce a channel we will update
1463 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1464 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1465 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1466 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1467 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1468 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1469 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1470 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1475 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1476 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1477 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1480 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1481 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1482 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1483 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1484 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1485 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1486 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1488 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1495 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1500 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1501 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1502 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1503 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1504 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1505 excess_data: Vec::new()
1507 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1508 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1509 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1510 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1513 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1514 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1519 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1520 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1522 Some(channel_info) => {
1523 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1524 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1529 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1530 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1531 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1532 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1533 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1534 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1536 // Return false because contains excess data
1537 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1538 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1541 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 10;
1543 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1544 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1545 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1546 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1547 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1550 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1552 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1554 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1556 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1557 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1558 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1559 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1560 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1563 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1565 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1567 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1569 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1570 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1571 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1572 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1573 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1576 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1578 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1580 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1582 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1583 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1584 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
1585 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1586 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1587 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1588 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1591 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1593 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1595 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1597 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1598 let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1599 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1600 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1603 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1605 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1611 fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
1612 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1613 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1614 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1615 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1616 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1617 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1618 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1620 let short_channel_id = 0;
1621 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1624 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1625 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1626 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1630 // Announce a channel we will update
1631 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1632 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1637 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1638 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1639 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1642 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1643 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1644 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1645 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1646 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1647 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1648 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1650 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1655 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1660 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1661 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1662 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1663 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1664 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1665 excess_data: Vec::new()
1667 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1668 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1669 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1670 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1673 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1674 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1679 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1681 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1682 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1684 Some(channel_info) => {
1685 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
1690 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1695 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1697 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1699 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1700 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1702 Some(channel_info) => {
1703 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1708 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1713 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1715 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1717 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1718 assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
1719 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1720 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1722 // TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1726 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1727 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1728 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1729 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1730 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1731 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1732 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1733 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1735 let short_channel_id = 1;
1736 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1738 // Channels were not announced yet.
1739 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1740 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1743 // Announce a channel we will update
1744 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1745 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1750 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1751 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1752 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1755 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1756 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1757 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1758 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1759 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1760 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1761 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1763 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1769 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1770 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1771 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1772 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1773 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1774 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1775 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1782 // Valid channel update
1783 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1788 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1789 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1790 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1791 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1792 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1793 excess_data: Vec::new()
1795 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1796 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1797 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1798 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1800 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1806 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1807 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1808 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1809 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1810 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1811 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1812 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1819 // Channel update with excess data.
1820 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1825 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1826 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1827 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1828 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1829 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1830 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec()
1832 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1833 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1834 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1835 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1837 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1843 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1844 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1845 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1846 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1847 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1848 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1849 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1854 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1855 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1856 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1860 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
1861 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1862 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1863 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1864 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1865 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1866 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1867 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1869 let short_channel_id = 1;
1870 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1873 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
1874 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1877 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
1878 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1879 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1884 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1885 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1886 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1889 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1890 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1891 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1892 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1893 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1894 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1895 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1897 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1904 // Nodes were never announced
1905 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1906 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1909 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1910 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1915 addresses: Vec::new(),
1916 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1917 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1919 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1920 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1921 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1922 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1924 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1929 unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
1930 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1931 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1932 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1933 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1936 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1942 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1943 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
1945 // Skip the first node.
1946 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1947 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
1950 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
1951 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1952 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1957 addresses: Vec::new(),
1958 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1959 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec(),
1961 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1962 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1963 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1964 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1966 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1967 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1972 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1973 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1977 fn network_graph_serialization() {
1978 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1980 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1981 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1982 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1983 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1985 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1986 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1987 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1988 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1989 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1990 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1991 short_channel_id: 0,
1994 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1995 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1996 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1999 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2000 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2001 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2002 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2003 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2004 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2005 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2007 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2008 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2013 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2014 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2015 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2020 addresses: Vec::new(),
2021 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2022 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2024 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2025 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
2026 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2027 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
2030 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2035 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
2036 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2037 assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
2038 assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
2039 network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2040 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
2044 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2045 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2046 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2047 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2049 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2050 let first_blocknum = 0;
2051 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
2053 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2055 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
2056 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2057 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2061 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2063 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2064 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2065 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2068 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2069 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2070 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2071 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2072 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2074 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2078 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2079 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2080 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2082 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2083 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2085 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2086 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2087 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2088 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2100 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2101 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2102 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2103 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2105 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2107 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2108 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2110 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2112 sync_complete: true,
2114 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2115 short_channel_ids: vec![
2116 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2117 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2118 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2119 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2120 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2121 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2124 assert!(result.is_ok());
2126 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2127 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2130 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2131 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2132 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2133 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2134 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2135 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2136 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2137 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2138 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2139 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2142 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2148 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2149 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2150 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2151 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2153 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2155 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2157 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2159 full_information: true,
2161 assert!(result.is_ok());
2164 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2165 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2167 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2169 full_information: false,
2171 assert!(result.is_err());
2172 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2177 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2178 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2180 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2181 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2182 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2183 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2184 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2185 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2186 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2187 let bitcoin_key_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey);
2188 let bitcoin_key_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey);
2190 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2191 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2192 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2195 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2196 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2197 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2200 // used for testing resumption on same block
2201 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2204 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2205 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2206 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2207 short_channel_id: scid,
2212 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2215 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2216 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2217 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2218 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2219 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2220 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2221 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2223 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2229 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2230 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2231 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2234 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2236 number_of_blocks: 0,
2239 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2240 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2242 number_of_blocks: 0,
2243 sync_complete: true,
2244 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2248 // Error when wrong chain
2249 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2250 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2253 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2255 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2258 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2259 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2261 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2262 sync_complete: true,
2263 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2267 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2268 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2269 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2272 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2273 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2274 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2277 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2278 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2279 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2280 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2281 sync_complete: true,
2282 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2286 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2287 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2288 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2291 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2292 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2293 number_of_blocks: 1,
2298 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2300 number_of_blocks: 0x01000000,
2301 sync_complete: true,
2302 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2307 // No results in valid query range
2308 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2309 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2312 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2313 first_blocknum: 1000,
2314 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2319 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2321 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2322 sync_complete: true,
2323 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2328 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2329 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2330 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2333 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2334 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2335 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2340 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2342 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2343 sync_complete: true,
2344 short_channel_ids: vec![
2345 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2351 // Single block exactly full
2352 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2353 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2356 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2357 first_blocknum: 100000,
2358 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2363 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2365 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2366 sync_complete: true,
2367 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2368 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2374 // Multiple split on new block
2375 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2376 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2379 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2380 first_blocknum: 100000,
2381 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2386 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2388 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2389 sync_complete: false,
2390 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2391 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2395 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2397 number_of_blocks: 108001,
2398 sync_complete: true,
2399 short_channel_ids: vec![
2400 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2406 // Multiple split on same block
2407 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2408 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2411 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2412 first_blocknum: 100002,
2413 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2418 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2420 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2421 sync_complete: false,
2422 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2423 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2427 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2429 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2430 sync_complete: true,
2431 short_channel_ids: vec![
2432 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2439 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2440 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2441 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2442 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2444 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2446 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2449 assert!(result.is_ok());
2451 assert!(result.is_err());
2454 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2455 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2457 for i in 0..events.len() {
2458 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2460 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2461 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2462 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2463 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2464 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2465 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2466 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2468 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2474 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2475 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2476 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2477 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2479 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2481 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2483 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2485 assert!(result.is_err());