1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
29 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
31 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
32 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
34 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph {
126 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
127 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
128 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
129 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
130 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
133 impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
134 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
135 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
136 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
137 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
139 genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
140 channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
141 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
142 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp)
147 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
148 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
149 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
150 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
153 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
154 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
156 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
158 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
159 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
160 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
161 ChannelUpdateMessage {
162 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
165 /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
166 /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
168 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
170 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
171 /// `channel_update` message is received.
174 /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
175 /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
177 /// The node id of the failed node.
179 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
180 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
185 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
186 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
189 (2, ChannelClosed) => {
190 (0, short_channel_id, required),
191 (2, is_permanent, required),
193 (4, NodeFailure) => {
194 (0, node_id, required),
195 (2, is_permanent, required),
199 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
200 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
201 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
202 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
203 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
204 self.handle_network_update(network_update);
210 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
211 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
212 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
213 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
214 /// serving historical announcements.
216 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
217 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
218 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
219 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
221 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
223 chain_access: Option<C>,
224 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
225 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
229 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
230 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
232 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
233 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
234 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
235 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
236 /// channel owners' keys.
237 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
239 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
241 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
243 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
248 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
249 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
250 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
251 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
252 self.chain_access = chain_access;
255 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
256 /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
258 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
259 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
263 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
264 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
265 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
266 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
267 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
268 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
275 /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
276 fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
278 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
279 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
280 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
281 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
282 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
283 let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
285 NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
286 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
287 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
288 self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
290 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
291 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
292 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
293 self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
299 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
300 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
301 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
304 return Err(LightningError {
305 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
306 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
307 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
309 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
311 log_level: Level::Trace,
319 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
320 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
322 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
323 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
324 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
325 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
326 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
329 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
330 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
331 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
332 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
335 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
336 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
337 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
340 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
341 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
342 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
343 let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
344 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
345 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
346 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
347 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
348 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
349 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
350 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
351 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
353 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
354 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
356 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
358 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
359 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
368 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
369 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
370 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
371 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
372 let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
376 nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
378 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
379 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
380 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
381 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
382 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
392 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
393 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
394 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
396 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
397 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
398 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
399 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
400 /// tracking this directly.
401 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
402 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
403 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
407 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
409 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
410 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
411 // updates from all our peers normally.
413 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
414 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
415 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
418 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
419 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
420 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
421 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
422 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
424 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
425 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
426 // relying on it useless.
428 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
429 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
430 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
432 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
433 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
434 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
435 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
436 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
439 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
440 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
441 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
442 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
443 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
444 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
445 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
447 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
448 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
449 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
450 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
452 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
453 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
454 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
456 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
457 let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
458 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
459 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
460 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
462 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
463 if should_request_full_sync {
464 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
466 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
470 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
471 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
472 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
473 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
474 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
475 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
476 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
481 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
482 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
483 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
484 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
488 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
489 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
490 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
491 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
495 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
496 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
497 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
498 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
499 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
500 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
501 /// memory constrained systems.
502 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
503 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
505 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
507 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
508 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
509 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
511 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
512 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
513 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
514 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
515 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
516 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
517 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
518 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
519 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
521 short_channel_ids: vec![],
524 return Err(LightningError {
525 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
526 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
530 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
531 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
532 // exists even if its not yet routable.
533 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
534 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
535 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
536 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
537 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
538 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
539 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
542 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
543 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
548 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
549 let batch_count = batches.len();
550 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
551 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
552 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
553 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
555 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
556 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
557 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
558 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
559 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
560 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
561 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
563 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
564 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
565 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
567 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
568 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
569 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
571 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
572 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
573 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
574 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
576 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
577 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
579 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
582 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
584 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
585 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
586 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
587 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
591 short_channel_ids: batch,
599 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
602 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
603 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
608 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
610 C::Target: chain::Access,
613 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
614 let mut ret = Vec::new();
615 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
616 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
621 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
622 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
623 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
624 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
625 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
626 pub last_update: u32,
627 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
629 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
630 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
631 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
632 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
633 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
634 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
635 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
636 pub fees: RoutingFees,
637 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
638 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
639 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
640 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
641 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
644 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
645 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
646 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
651 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
652 (0, last_update, required),
653 (2, enabled, required),
654 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
655 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
656 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
657 (10, fees, required),
658 (12, last_update_message, required),
661 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
662 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
663 /// Received within a channel announcement.
664 pub struct ChannelInfo {
665 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
666 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
667 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
668 pub node_one: NodeId,
669 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
670 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
671 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
672 pub node_two: NodeId,
673 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
674 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
675 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
676 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
677 /// An initial announcement of the channel
678 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
679 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
680 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
681 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
682 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
683 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
684 /// network graph in memory!).
685 announcement_received_time: u64,
689 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
690 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
691 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
692 let (direction, source) = {
693 if target == &self.node_one {
694 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
695 } else if target == &self.node_two {
696 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
701 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
704 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
705 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
706 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
707 let (direction, target) = {
708 if source == &self.node_one {
709 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
710 } else if source == &self.node_two {
711 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
716 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
719 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
720 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
721 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
723 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
725 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
730 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
731 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
732 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
733 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
738 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
739 (0, features, required),
740 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
741 (2, node_one, required),
742 (4, one_to_two, required),
743 (6, node_two, required),
744 (8, two_to_one, required),
745 (10, capacity_sats, required),
746 (12, announcement_message, required),
749 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
750 /// source node to a target node.
752 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
753 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
754 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
755 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
756 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
759 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
761 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
762 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
763 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
765 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
766 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
767 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
768 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
770 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
771 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
773 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
774 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
776 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
780 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
784 /// Returns information for the channel.
785 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
787 /// Returns information for the direction.
788 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
790 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
791 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
792 self.htlc_maximum_msat
795 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
797 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
798 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
800 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
801 self.effective_capacity
804 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
805 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
806 match self.direction {
807 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
813 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
814 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
815 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
816 .field("channel", &self.channel)
821 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
823 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
824 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
827 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
828 /// Returns information for the channel.
830 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
832 /// Returns information for the direction.
834 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
836 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
838 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
840 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
842 pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() }
845 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
846 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
851 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
853 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
854 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
855 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
856 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
857 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
860 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
864 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
866 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
869 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
871 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
874 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
877 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
878 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
882 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
883 /// use when making routing decisions.
884 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
886 impl EffectiveCapacity {
887 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
888 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
890 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
891 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
892 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
893 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
894 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
899 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
900 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
901 pub struct RoutingFees {
902 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
904 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
905 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
906 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
909 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
910 (0, base_msat, required),
911 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
914 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
915 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
916 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
917 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
918 pub features: NodeFeatures,
919 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
920 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
921 pub last_update: u32,
922 /// Color assigned to the node
924 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
925 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
926 /// should not be exposed to the user.
928 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
929 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
930 /// An initial announcement of the node
931 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
932 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
933 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
934 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
937 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
938 (0, features, required),
939 (2, last_update, required),
941 (6, alias, required),
942 (8, announcement_message, option),
943 (10, addresses, vec_type),
946 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
947 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
948 pub struct NodeInfo {
949 /// All valid channels a node has announced
950 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
951 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
952 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
953 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
954 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
955 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
956 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
957 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
958 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
961 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
962 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
963 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
964 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
969 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
970 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
971 (2, announcement_info, option),
972 (4, channels, vec_type),
975 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
976 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
978 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
979 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
980 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
982 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
983 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
984 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
985 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
986 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
987 chan_info.write(writer)?;
989 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
990 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
991 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
992 node_id.write(writer)?;
993 node_info.write(writer)?;
996 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
997 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
998 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1004 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
1005 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
1006 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1008 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1009 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1010 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1011 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1012 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1013 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1014 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1016 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1017 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1018 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1019 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1020 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1021 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1024 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1025 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1026 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1031 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1032 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1033 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1038 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
1039 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1040 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1041 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1042 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1044 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1045 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1046 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1052 impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
1053 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1054 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1055 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1056 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1061 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1062 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
1065 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1066 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1067 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1071 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1072 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1073 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1074 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1075 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1081 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1082 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1083 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1084 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1087 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1088 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1089 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1090 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1093 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1096 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1097 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1098 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1102 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1103 /// given node announcement.
1105 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1106 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1107 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1108 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1109 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1110 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1111 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1114 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1115 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1116 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1118 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1119 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1122 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1123 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1124 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1126 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1127 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1128 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1129 // that it be at least the current time.
1130 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1131 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1132 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1133 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1138 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1139 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1140 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1141 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1142 features: msg.features.clone(),
1143 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1146 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1147 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1155 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1157 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1158 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1159 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1161 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1162 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1163 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
1164 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1165 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1167 C::Target: chain::Access,
1169 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1170 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1171 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1172 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1173 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1174 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1177 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1178 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1179 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1181 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1182 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1183 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1184 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1185 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1187 C::Target: chain::Access,
1189 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1192 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1194 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1195 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1197 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1198 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1199 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1200 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1203 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1204 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1205 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1207 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1209 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1211 capacity_sats: None,
1212 announcement_message: None,
1213 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1216 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1219 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1220 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1221 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1223 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1224 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1226 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1227 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1228 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1229 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1231 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1232 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1233 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1234 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1236 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1237 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1239 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1240 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1241 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1243 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1246 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1247 entry.insert(channel_info);
1251 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1252 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1253 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1254 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1256 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1257 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1258 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1259 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1260 announcement_info: None,
1269 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1270 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1271 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1273 C::Target: chain::Access,
1275 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1276 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1279 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1281 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1284 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1285 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1286 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1287 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1288 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
1289 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
1290 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1291 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1292 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1293 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1295 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1296 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1299 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1300 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1302 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1303 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1309 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1310 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1311 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1313 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1316 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1317 features: msg.features.clone(),
1318 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1320 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1322 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1323 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1324 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1325 announcement_received_time,
1328 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1331 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1332 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1333 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1334 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1335 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1336 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1338 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1339 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1340 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1343 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1344 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1345 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1347 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1348 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1354 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1355 pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1357 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1359 // TODO: downgrade the node
1363 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1364 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1365 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1368 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1369 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1370 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1372 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1373 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1375 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1376 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1377 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1378 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1379 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1382 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1383 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1386 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1387 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1388 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1390 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1391 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1392 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1393 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1394 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1395 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1396 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1397 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1398 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1400 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1401 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1402 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1403 info.one_to_two = None;
1405 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1406 info.two_to_one = None;
1408 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1409 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1410 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1411 // channel_update for.
1412 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1413 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1417 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1418 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1419 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1420 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1421 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1426 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1429 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
1430 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1431 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1433 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1434 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1435 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1436 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
1439 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1440 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1441 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1443 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1444 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1445 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1446 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
1449 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1451 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1452 let chan_was_enabled;
1454 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1456 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1457 // disable this check during tests!
1458 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1459 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1460 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1462 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1463 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1467 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1468 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1469 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1471 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
1472 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1473 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1476 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1477 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1478 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1479 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1480 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1484 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1485 ($target: expr) => {
1486 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1487 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1488 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1489 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1490 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1491 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1492 // but only in the non-normative section.
1493 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1494 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1495 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1496 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1498 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1500 chan_was_enabled = false;
1505 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1507 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1508 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1510 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1511 enabled: chan_enabled,
1512 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1513 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1514 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1515 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
1517 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1518 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1522 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1526 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1527 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1528 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1529 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1530 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1531 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1532 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1533 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1534 })?, "channel_update");
1536 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1538 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1539 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1540 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
1541 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1542 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1543 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1544 })?, "channel_update");
1546 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1551 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1553 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1554 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1555 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1556 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1557 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1558 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1560 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1562 proportional_millionths
1564 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1565 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1566 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1568 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1569 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1571 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1572 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1574 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1576 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1577 if chan_info.enabled {
1578 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1579 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1580 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1581 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1586 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1592 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1593 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1594 ($node_id: expr) => {
1595 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1596 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1597 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1599 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1600 entry.remove_entry();
1603 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1608 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1609 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1613 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1614 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1616 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1617 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1621 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1623 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1624 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1628 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1629 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1630 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1631 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1632 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1633 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1634 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1644 use ln::PaymentHash;
1645 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1646 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1647 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1648 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1649 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1650 use util::test_utils;
1651 use util::logger::Logger;
1652 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1653 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1654 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1656 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1658 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1659 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1660 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1661 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1662 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
1663 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1664 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1668 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1669 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1672 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1676 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
1677 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1678 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
1681 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
1682 Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1684 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1685 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1686 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1687 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1691 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1692 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1693 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1694 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1696 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1697 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1698 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1699 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1700 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1701 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1704 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1705 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1706 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1707 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1712 addresses: Vec::new(),
1713 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1714 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1716 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1717 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1719 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1720 contents: unsigned_announcement
1724 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1725 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1726 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1727 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1728 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1730 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1731 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1732 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1733 short_channel_id: 0,
1736 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1737 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1738 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1740 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1741 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1742 ChannelAnnouncement {
1743 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1744 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1745 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1746 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1747 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1751 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1752 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1753 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1754 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1755 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1756 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1757 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1758 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
1762 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1763 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1764 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1765 short_channel_id: 0,
1768 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1769 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1770 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1771 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1772 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1773 excess_data: Vec::new()
1775 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1776 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1778 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1779 contents: unsigned_channel_update
1784 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1785 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1786 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
1788 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1789 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1790 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1792 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1793 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1795 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1799 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1800 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1801 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1802 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1807 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1808 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1812 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1813 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1815 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1816 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
1819 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
1822 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1823 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1824 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1825 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1826 // Return false because contains excess data.
1827 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1828 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1832 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1833 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1834 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1835 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
1836 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1837 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1839 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1844 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1845 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1846 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1848 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1849 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1851 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1852 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1854 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1855 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1856 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1857 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1858 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1863 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1869 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1870 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1871 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1873 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1876 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1877 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1878 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1879 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1880 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1882 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1883 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1884 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1885 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1887 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1890 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1891 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1892 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1893 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1894 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1895 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1896 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1901 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1907 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1908 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1909 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1910 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1912 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1915 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1916 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1917 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1918 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1919 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
1920 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1921 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1922 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1926 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
1927 Some(channel_entry) => {
1928 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1934 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1935 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
1936 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
1937 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1938 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1939 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1940 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1944 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
1945 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
1946 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1948 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
1951 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1952 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1954 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1959 fn handling_channel_update() {
1960 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1961 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1962 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1963 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
1964 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1966 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1967 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1969 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1970 let short_channel_id;
1973 // Announce a channel we will update
1974 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
1975 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1977 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1978 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
1979 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1986 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
1987 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1988 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1993 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1995 Some(channel_info) => {
1996 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1997 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2002 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2003 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2004 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2005 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2006 // Return false because contains excess data
2007 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2008 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2012 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2013 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2014 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2015 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2016 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2018 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2021 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2022 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
2023 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2024 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2025 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2027 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2030 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2031 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
2032 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2033 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2034 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2036 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2039 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2040 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2041 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2042 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2043 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2044 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2046 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2049 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2050 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2051 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2052 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2053 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2054 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2055 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2057 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2062 fn handling_network_update() {
2063 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2064 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2065 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2066 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2067 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2068 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2070 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2071 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2074 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2075 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2078 let short_channel_id;
2080 // Announce a channel we will update
2081 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2082 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2083 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2084 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2085 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2087 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2088 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2090 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2092 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2093 rejected_by_dest: false,
2094 all_paths_failed: true,
2096 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2097 msg: valid_channel_update,
2099 short_channel_id: None,
2105 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2108 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2110 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2112 Some(channel_info) => {
2113 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2117 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2119 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2120 rejected_by_dest: false,
2121 all_paths_failed: true,
2123 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2125 is_permanent: false,
2127 short_channel_id: None,
2133 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2135 Some(channel_info) => {
2136 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2141 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2142 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2144 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2145 rejected_by_dest: false,
2146 all_paths_failed: true,
2148 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2152 short_channel_id: None,
2158 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2159 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2160 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2161 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2165 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2166 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2167 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2168 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
2169 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2170 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
2171 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
2172 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2174 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2175 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2177 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2178 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2179 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2180 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
2181 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2183 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2184 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2185 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2187 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2188 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2189 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2191 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2192 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2194 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2195 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2196 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2197 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2198 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2199 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2200 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2202 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2203 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2204 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2207 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2208 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2212 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2213 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2214 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2215 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2216 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2218 // Channels were not announced yet.
2219 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
2220 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2222 let short_channel_id;
2224 // Announce a channel we will update
2225 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2226 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2227 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2233 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2234 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2235 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2236 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2237 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2238 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2239 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2246 // Valid channel update
2247 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2248 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2249 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2250 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2256 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2257 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2258 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2259 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2260 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2261 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2262 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2268 // Channel update with excess data.
2269 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2270 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2271 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2272 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2273 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2279 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2280 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
2281 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
2282 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
2283 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2284 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2285 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2290 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2291 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
2292 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
2296 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2297 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2298 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2299 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2300 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2301 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2304 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
2305 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2308 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2309 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2310 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2317 // Nodes were never announced
2318 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2319 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2322 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2323 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2328 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2329 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2335 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
2336 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
2338 // Skip the first node.
2339 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2340 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
2343 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2344 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2345 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2346 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2347 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2348 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2349 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2354 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
2355 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
2359 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2360 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2361 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2363 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2364 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2366 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2367 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2368 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2369 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2373 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2374 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2379 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2380 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2381 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2382 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2383 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
2387 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2388 let mut network_graph = create_network_graph();
2389 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2391 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2392 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2393 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph = Readable::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap();
2394 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2395 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2399 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2400 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2401 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2403 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2404 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2405 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2406 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2408 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2410 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2412 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2413 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2414 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2418 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2420 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2421 net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2422 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2425 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2426 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2427 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2428 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2429 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2430 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2431 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2433 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2439 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2440 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2441 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2443 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2444 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2445 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2446 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2448 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2449 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2450 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2453 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2454 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2455 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2458 // used for testing resumption on same block
2459 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2462 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2463 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2464 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2465 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2471 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2472 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2473 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2476 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2478 number_of_blocks: 0,
2481 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2482 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2484 number_of_blocks: 0,
2485 sync_complete: true,
2486 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2490 // Error when wrong chain
2491 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2492 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2495 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2497 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2500 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2501 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2503 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2504 sync_complete: true,
2505 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2509 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2510 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2511 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2514 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2515 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2516 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2519 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2520 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2521 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2522 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2523 sync_complete: true,
2524 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2528 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2529 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2530 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2533 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2534 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2535 number_of_blocks: 1,
2540 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2541 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2542 number_of_blocks: 1,
2543 sync_complete: true,
2544 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2549 // No results in valid query range
2550 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2551 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2554 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2555 first_blocknum: 1000,
2556 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2561 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2562 first_blocknum: 1000,
2563 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2564 sync_complete: true,
2565 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2570 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2571 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2572 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2575 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2576 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2577 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2582 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2583 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2584 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2585 sync_complete: true,
2586 short_channel_ids: vec![
2587 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2593 // Single block exactly full
2594 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2595 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2598 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2599 first_blocknum: 100000,
2600 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2605 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2606 first_blocknum: 100000,
2607 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2608 sync_complete: true,
2609 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2610 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2616 // Multiple split on new block
2617 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2618 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2621 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2622 first_blocknum: 100000,
2623 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2628 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2629 first_blocknum: 100000,
2630 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2631 sync_complete: false,
2632 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2633 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2637 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2638 first_blocknum: 107999,
2639 number_of_blocks: 2,
2640 sync_complete: true,
2641 short_channel_ids: vec![
2642 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2648 // Multiple split on same block
2649 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2650 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2653 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2654 first_blocknum: 100002,
2655 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2660 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2661 first_blocknum: 100002,
2662 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2663 sync_complete: false,
2664 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2665 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2669 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2670 first_blocknum: 108001,
2671 number_of_blocks: 1,
2672 sync_complete: true,
2673 short_channel_ids: vec![
2674 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2681 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2682 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2683 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2684 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2686 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2688 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2689 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2690 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2691 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2694 assert!(result.is_ok());
2696 assert!(result.is_err());
2699 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2700 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2702 for i in 0..events.len() {
2703 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2705 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2706 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2707 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2708 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2709 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2710 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2711 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2713 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2714 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2715 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2716 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2717 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2719 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2720 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2721 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2724 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2730 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2731 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2732 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
2733 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2734 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2736 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2738 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2740 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2742 assert!(result.is_err());
2746 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
2754 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2755 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2756 let mut v = Vec::new();
2757 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2759 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2764 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2765 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2766 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2768 let _ = net_graph.encode();