1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
38 use std::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
39 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
42 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
44 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
45 /// refuse to relay the message.
46 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
48 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
49 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
50 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
52 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
53 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
54 pub struct NetworkGraph {
55 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
56 channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
57 nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
60 /// A simple newtype for RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>.
61 /// This exists only to make accessing a RwLock<NetworkGraph> possible from
62 /// the C bindings, as it can be done directly in Rust code.
63 pub struct LockedNetworkGraph<'a>(pub RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>);
65 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
66 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
67 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
68 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
69 /// serving historical announcements.
70 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
71 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
72 /// Representation of the payment channel network
73 pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
74 chain_access: Option<C>,
75 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
76 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
80 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
81 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
82 /// assuming a fresh network graph.
83 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
84 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
85 /// channel owners' keys.
86 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
88 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
89 network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)),
90 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
92 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
97 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
98 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
99 pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
101 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
102 network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
103 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
105 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
110 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
111 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
112 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
113 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
114 self.chain_access = chain_access;
117 /// Take a read lock on the network_graph and return it in the C-bindings
118 /// newtype helper. This is likely only useful when called via the C
119 /// bindings as you can call `self.network_graph.read().unwrap()` in Rust
121 pub fn read_locked_graph<'a>(&'a self) -> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
122 LockedNetworkGraph(self.network_graph.read().unwrap())
125 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
126 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
127 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
128 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
129 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
130 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
138 impl<'a> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
139 /// Get a reference to the NetworkGraph which this read-lock contains.
140 pub fn graph(&self) -> &NetworkGraph {
146 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
147 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
148 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
150 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
155 impl<C: Deref , L: Deref > RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
156 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
157 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
158 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
159 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
160 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
163 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
164 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
166 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
169 fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
171 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
172 let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
173 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}abled.", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if chan_enabled { "en" } else { "dis" });
174 let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
176 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
177 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" }, short_channel_id);
178 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
180 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
181 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" }, node_id);
182 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
187 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
188 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
189 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
192 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
193 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
194 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
195 let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
196 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
197 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
198 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
199 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
200 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
201 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
202 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
203 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
205 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
206 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
208 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
210 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
211 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
220 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
221 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
222 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
223 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
224 let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
228 network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
230 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
231 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
232 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
233 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
234 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
244 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
245 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
246 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
248 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
249 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
250 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
251 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
252 /// tracking this directly.
253 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
255 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
256 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
260 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
261 if !self.should_request_full_sync(their_node_id) {
265 let first_blocknum = 0;
266 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
267 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
268 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
269 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
271 msg: QueryChannelRange {
272 chain_hash: self.network_graph.read().unwrap().genesis_hash,
279 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
280 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
281 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
282 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
283 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
284 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
285 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
286 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
288 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
289 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
291 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
292 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
293 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
294 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
295 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
296 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
297 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
304 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
305 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
306 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
307 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
308 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
309 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
311 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
312 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
313 // the result and try again with a different peer.
314 if !msg.full_information {
315 return Err(LightningError {
316 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
317 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
324 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
325 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
326 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
327 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
328 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
329 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
330 /// memory constrained systems.
331 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
332 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
334 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
336 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
338 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
339 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
340 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
342 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
343 if msg.chain_hash != network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
344 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
345 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
346 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
347 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
348 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
349 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
350 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
352 short_channel_ids: vec![],
355 return Err(LightningError {
356 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
357 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
362 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
363 // exists even if its not yet routable.
364 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
365 for (_, ref chan) in network_graph.get_channels().range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
366 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
367 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
368 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
369 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
372 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
373 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
378 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
379 let batch_count = batches.len();
380 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
381 // Per spec, the initial first_blocknum needs to be <= the query's first_blocknum and subsequent
382 // must be >= the prior reply. We'll simplify this by using zero since its still spec compliant and
383 // sequence completion is now explicitly.
384 let first_blocknum = 0;
386 // Per spec, the final end_blocknum needs to be >= the query's end_blocknum, so we'll use the
387 // query's value. Prior batches must use the number of blocks that fit into the message. We'll
388 // base this off the last SCID in the batch since we've somewhat abusing first_blocknum.
389 let number_of_blocks = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
392 block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) + 1
395 // Only true for the last message in a sequence
396 let sync_complete = batch_index == batch_count - 1;
398 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
399 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
400 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
401 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
405 short_channel_ids: batch,
413 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
416 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
417 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
422 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L>
424 C::Target: chain::Access,
427 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
428 let mut ret = Vec::new();
429 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
430 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
435 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
436 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
437 /// within a channel update.
438 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
439 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
440 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
441 pub last_update: u32,
442 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
444 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
445 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
446 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
447 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
448 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
449 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
450 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
451 pub fees: RoutingFees,
452 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
453 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
454 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
455 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
456 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
459 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
460 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
461 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
466 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
467 (0, last_update, required),
468 (2, enabled, required),
469 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
470 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
471 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
472 (10, fees, required),
473 (12, last_update_message, required),
476 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
477 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
478 /// Received within a channel announcement.
479 pub struct ChannelInfo {
480 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
481 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
482 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
483 pub node_one: PublicKey,
484 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
485 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
486 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
487 pub node_two: PublicKey,
488 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
489 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
490 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
491 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
492 /// An initial announcement of the channel
493 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
494 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
495 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
496 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
499 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
500 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
501 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
502 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
508 (0, features, required),
509 (2, node_one, required),
510 (4, one_to_two, required),
511 (6, node_two, required),
512 (8, two_to_one, required),
513 (10, capacity_sats, required),
514 (12, announcement_message, required),
518 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
519 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
520 pub struct RoutingFees {
521 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
523 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
524 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
525 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
528 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
529 (0, base_msat, required),
530 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
533 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
534 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
535 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
536 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
537 pub features: NodeFeatures,
538 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
539 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
540 pub last_update: u32,
541 /// Color assigned to the node
543 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
544 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
545 /// should not be exposed to the user.
547 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
548 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
549 /// An initial announcement of the node
550 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
551 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
552 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
553 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
557 (0, features, required),
558 (2, last_update, required),
560 (6, alias, required),
561 (8, announcement_message, option),
562 (10, addresses, vec_type),
565 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
566 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
567 pub struct NodeInfo {
568 /// All valid channels a node has announced
569 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
570 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
571 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
572 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
573 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
574 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
575 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
576 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
577 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
580 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
581 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
582 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
583 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
588 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
589 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
590 (2, announcement_info, option),
591 (4, channels, vec_type),
594 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
595 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
597 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
598 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
599 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
601 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
602 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
603 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
604 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
605 chan_info.write(writer)?;
607 (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
608 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
609 node_id.write(writer)?;
610 node_info.write(writer)?;
613 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
618 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
619 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
620 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
622 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
623 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
624 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
625 for _ in 0..channels_count {
626 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
627 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
628 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
630 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
631 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
632 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
633 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
634 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
635 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
637 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
647 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
648 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
649 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
650 for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
651 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
653 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
654 for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
655 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
662 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
664 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
665 pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
666 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
668 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
669 pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
671 /// Get network addresses by node id.
672 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
673 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
675 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
676 pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
677 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
678 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
679 return Some(&node_info.addresses)
685 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
686 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
689 channels: BTreeMap::new(),
690 nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
694 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
695 /// given node announcement.
697 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
698 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
699 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
700 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
701 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
702 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
703 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
706 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
707 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
708 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
710 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
711 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
714 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
715 match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
716 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
718 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
719 if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
720 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)});
725 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
726 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
727 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
728 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
729 features: msg.features.clone(),
730 last_update: msg.timestamp,
733 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
734 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
742 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
744 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
745 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
746 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
748 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
749 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
750 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
751 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
752 -> Result<(), LightningError>
753 where C::Target: chain::Access {
754 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
755 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
756 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
757 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
758 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
759 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
762 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
763 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
764 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
766 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
767 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
768 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
769 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
770 -> Result<(), LightningError>
771 where C::Target: chain::Access {
772 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
775 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
776 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
777 -> Result<(), LightningError>
778 where C::Target: chain::Access {
779 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
780 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
783 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
785 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
788 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
789 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
790 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
791 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
792 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
793 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
794 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
795 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
796 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
797 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
799 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
800 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
803 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
804 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
806 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
807 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
813 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
814 features: msg.features.clone(),
815 node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
817 node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
819 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
820 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
821 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
824 match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
825 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
826 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
827 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
829 if utxo_value.is_some() {
830 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
831 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
832 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
834 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
835 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
837 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
838 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
839 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
841 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)})
844 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
845 entry.insert(chan_info);
849 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
850 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
851 match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
852 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
853 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
855 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
856 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
857 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
858 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
859 announcement_info: None,
866 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
867 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
872 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
873 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
874 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
875 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
876 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
878 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
879 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
882 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
883 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
884 one_to_two.enabled = false;
886 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
887 two_to_one.enabled = false;
893 fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
895 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
897 // TODO: downgrade the node
901 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
904 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
905 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
906 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
907 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
908 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
911 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
912 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
913 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
914 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
915 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
918 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
920 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
921 let chan_was_enabled;
923 match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
924 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
926 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
927 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
928 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
931 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
932 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
933 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
934 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
935 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
939 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
940 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
941 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
942 if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
943 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Trace)});
945 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
947 chan_was_enabled = false;
950 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
951 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
953 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
954 enabled: chan_enabled,
955 last_update: msg.timestamp,
956 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
957 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
958 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
960 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
961 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
965 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
969 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
970 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
971 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
972 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
973 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
975 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
977 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
978 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
979 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
981 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
987 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
988 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
989 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
990 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
991 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
992 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
994 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
996 proportional_millionths
998 } else if chan_was_enabled {
999 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1000 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1002 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1003 let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1005 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1006 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1008 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1010 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1011 if chan_info.enabled {
1012 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1013 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1014 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1015 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1020 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1026 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1027 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1028 ($node_id: expr) => {
1029 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1030 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1031 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1033 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1034 entry.remove_entry();
1037 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1042 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1043 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1050 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1051 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1052 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1053 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
1054 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1055 use util::test_utils;
1056 use util::logger::Logger;
1057 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1058 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1059 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1061 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1062 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1063 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1064 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1065 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
1066 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1067 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1071 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1072 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1077 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
1078 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1079 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1080 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1081 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_hash, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1082 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1086 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1087 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1088 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1090 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1091 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1092 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1093 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1094 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1095 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1099 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1100 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1102 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1103 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1104 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1105 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1106 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1107 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1108 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1109 let first_announcement_time = 500;
1111 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1112 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1113 timestamp: first_announcement_time,
1117 addresses: Vec::new(),
1118 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1119 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1121 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1122 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1123 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1124 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1127 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1129 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1133 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1134 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1135 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1136 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1137 short_channel_id: 0,
1140 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1141 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1142 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1145 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1146 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1147 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1148 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1149 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1150 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1151 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1153 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1154 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1159 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1160 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1164 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1165 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1167 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1168 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1171 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1174 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1175 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1176 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1177 let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
1178 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1179 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1181 // Return false because contains excess data.
1182 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1183 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1186 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1188 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1189 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1190 unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
1191 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1192 let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1193 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1194 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1196 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1198 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1203 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1205 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1207 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1208 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1209 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1210 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1211 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1212 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1214 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1215 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1216 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1217 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1218 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1221 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1222 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1223 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1224 short_channel_id: 0,
1227 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1228 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1229 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1232 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1233 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1234 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1235 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1236 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1237 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1238 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1241 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1242 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1243 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1244 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1249 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1250 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1256 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1257 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1258 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1260 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1263 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1264 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1265 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1266 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source.clone().genesis_hash, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1267 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1269 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1270 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1271 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1272 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1273 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1274 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1275 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1278 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1280 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1283 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1284 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1285 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1287 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1288 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1289 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1290 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1291 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1292 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1293 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1295 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1296 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1301 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1302 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1308 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1309 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1310 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1311 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1313 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1316 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1317 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1318 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1319 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1320 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1321 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1322 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1323 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1324 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1325 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1327 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1328 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1332 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1333 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1334 Some(channel_entry) => {
1335 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1341 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1342 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1343 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1344 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1345 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1346 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1347 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1348 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1349 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1350 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1352 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1353 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1357 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1358 let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1359 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1360 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1361 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1362 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1363 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1365 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1367 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1370 unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1371 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1372 let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1373 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1374 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1375 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1376 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1377 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1379 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1381 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1386 fn handling_channel_update() {
1387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1388 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1389 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1390 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1392 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1393 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1394 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1395 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1396 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1397 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1399 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1400 let short_channel_id = 0;
1401 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1402 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1405 // Announce a channel we will update
1406 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1407 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1408 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1409 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1411 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1412 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1413 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1418 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1419 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1420 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1423 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1424 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1425 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1426 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1427 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1428 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1429 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1431 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1438 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1443 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1444 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1445 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1446 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1447 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1448 excess_data: Vec::new()
1450 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1451 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1452 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1453 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1456 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1457 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1462 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1463 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1465 Some(channel_info) => {
1466 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1467 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1472 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1473 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1474 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1475 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1476 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1477 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1479 // Return false because contains excess data
1480 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1481 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1484 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 10;
1486 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1487 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1488 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1489 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1490 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1493 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1495 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1497 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1499 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1500 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1501 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1502 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1503 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1506 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1508 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1510 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1512 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1513 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1514 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1515 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1516 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1519 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1521 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1523 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1525 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1526 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1527 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
1528 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1529 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1530 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1531 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1534 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1536 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1538 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1540 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1541 let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1542 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1543 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1546 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1548 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1554 fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
1555 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1556 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1557 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1558 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1559 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1560 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1561 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1563 let short_channel_id = 0;
1564 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1567 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1568 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1569 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1573 // Announce a channel we will update
1574 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1575 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1580 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1581 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1582 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1585 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1586 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1587 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1588 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1589 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1590 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1591 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1593 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1598 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1603 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1604 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1605 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1606 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1607 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1608 excess_data: Vec::new()
1610 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1611 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1612 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1613 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1616 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1617 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1622 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1624 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1625 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1627 Some(channel_info) => {
1628 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
1633 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1638 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1640 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1642 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1643 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1645 Some(channel_info) => {
1646 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1651 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1656 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1658 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1660 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1661 assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
1662 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1663 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1665 // TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1669 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1670 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1671 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1672 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1673 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1674 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1675 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1676 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1678 let short_channel_id = 1;
1679 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1681 // Channels were not announced yet.
1682 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1683 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1686 // Announce a channel we will update
1687 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1688 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1693 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1694 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1695 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1698 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1699 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1700 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1701 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1702 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1703 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1704 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1706 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1712 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1713 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1714 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1715 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1716 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1717 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1718 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1725 // Valid channel update
1726 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1731 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1732 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1733 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1734 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1735 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1736 excess_data: Vec::new()
1738 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1739 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1740 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1741 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1743 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1749 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1750 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1751 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1752 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1753 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1754 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1755 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1762 // Channel update with excess data.
1763 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1768 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1769 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1770 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1771 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1772 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1773 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec()
1775 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1776 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1777 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1778 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1780 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1786 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1787 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1788 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1789 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1790 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1791 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1792 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1797 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1798 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1799 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1803 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
1804 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1805 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1806 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1807 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1808 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1809 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1810 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1812 let short_channel_id = 1;
1813 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1816 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
1817 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1820 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
1821 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1822 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1827 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1828 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1829 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1832 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1833 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1834 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1835 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1836 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1837 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1838 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1840 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1847 // Nodes were never announced
1848 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1849 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1852 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1853 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1858 addresses: Vec::new(),
1859 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1860 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1862 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1863 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1864 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1865 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1867 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1872 unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
1873 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1874 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1875 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1876 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1879 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1885 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1886 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
1888 // Skip the first node.
1889 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1890 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
1893 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
1894 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1895 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1900 addresses: Vec::new(),
1901 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1902 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec(),
1904 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1905 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1906 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1907 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1909 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1910 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1915 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1916 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1920 fn network_graph_serialization() {
1921 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1923 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1924 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1925 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1926 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1928 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1929 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1930 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1931 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1932 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1933 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1934 short_channel_id: 0,
1937 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1938 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1939 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1942 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1943 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1944 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1945 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1946 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1947 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1948 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1950 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1951 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1956 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1957 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1958 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1963 addresses: Vec::new(),
1964 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1965 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1967 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1968 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1969 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1970 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1973 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1978 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
1979 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
1980 assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
1981 assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
1982 network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
1983 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
1987 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
1988 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1989 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1990 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
1992 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1993 let first_blocknum = 0;
1994 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
1996 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
1998 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
1999 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2000 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2004 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2006 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2007 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2008 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2009 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2011 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2012 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2013 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2014 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2015 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2017 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2021 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2022 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2023 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2025 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2026 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2028 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2029 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2030 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2031 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2043 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2044 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2045 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2046 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2048 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2050 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2051 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2053 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2055 sync_complete: true,
2057 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2058 short_channel_ids: vec![
2059 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2060 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2061 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2062 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2063 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2064 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2067 assert!(result.is_ok());
2069 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2070 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2071 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2073 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2074 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2075 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2076 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2077 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2078 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2079 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2080 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2081 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2082 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2085 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2091 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2092 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2093 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2094 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2096 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2098 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2100 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2102 full_information: true,
2104 assert!(result.is_ok());
2107 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2108 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2110 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2112 full_information: false,
2114 assert!(result.is_err());
2115 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2120 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2121 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2123 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2124 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2125 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2126 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2127 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2128 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2129 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2130 let bitcoin_key_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey);
2131 let bitcoin_key_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey);
2133 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2134 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2135 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2138 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2139 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2140 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2143 // used for testing resumption on same block
2144 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2147 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2148 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2149 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2150 short_channel_id: scid,
2155 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2158 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2159 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2160 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2161 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2162 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2163 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2164 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2166 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2172 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2173 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2174 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2177 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2179 number_of_blocks: 0,
2182 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2183 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2185 number_of_blocks: 0,
2186 sync_complete: true,
2187 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2191 // Error when wrong chain
2192 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2193 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2196 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2198 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2201 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2202 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2204 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2205 sync_complete: true,
2206 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2210 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2211 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2212 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2215 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2216 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2217 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2220 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2221 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2222 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2223 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2224 sync_complete: true,
2225 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2229 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2230 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2231 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2234 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2235 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2236 number_of_blocks: 1,
2241 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2243 number_of_blocks: 0x01000000,
2244 sync_complete: true,
2245 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2250 // No results in valid query range
2251 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2252 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2255 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2256 first_blocknum: 1000,
2257 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2262 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2264 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2265 sync_complete: true,
2266 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2271 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2272 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2273 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2276 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2277 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2278 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2283 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2285 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2286 sync_complete: true,
2287 short_channel_ids: vec![
2288 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2294 // Single block exactly full
2295 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2296 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2299 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2300 first_blocknum: 100000,
2301 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2306 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2308 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2309 sync_complete: true,
2310 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2311 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2317 // Multiple split on new block
2318 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2319 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2322 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2323 first_blocknum: 100000,
2324 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2329 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2331 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2332 sync_complete: false,
2333 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2334 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2338 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2340 number_of_blocks: 108001,
2341 sync_complete: true,
2342 short_channel_ids: vec![
2343 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2349 // Multiple split on same block
2350 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2351 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2354 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2355 first_blocknum: 100002,
2356 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2361 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2363 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2364 sync_complete: false,
2365 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2366 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2370 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2372 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2373 sync_complete: true,
2374 short_channel_ids: vec![
2375 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2382 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2383 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2384 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2385 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2387 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2389 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2392 assert!(result.is_ok());
2394 assert!(result.is_err());
2397 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2398 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2400 for i in 0..events.len() {
2401 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2403 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2404 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2405 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2406 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2407 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2408 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2409 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2411 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2417 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2418 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2419 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2420 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2422 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2424 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2426 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2428 assert!(result.is_err());
2432 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
2440 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2441 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2442 let mut v = Vec::new();
2443 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
2445 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
2450 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
2451 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
2452 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
2454 let _ = net_graph.encode();