1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history and in the source files from which this was generated.
4 // This file is licensed under the license available in the LICENSE or LICENSE.md
5 // file in the root of this repository or, if no such file exists, the same
6 // license as that which applies to the original source files from which this
7 // source was automatically generated.
9 //! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
12 use alloc::str::FromStr;
13 use alloc::string::String;
14 use core::ffi::c_void;
15 use core::convert::Infallible;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use crate::c_types::*;
18 #[cfg(feature="no-std")]
19 use alloc::{vec::Vec, boxed::Box};
22 use lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig as nativeChannelHandshakeConfigImport;
23 pub(crate) type nativeChannelHandshakeConfig = nativeChannelHandshakeConfigImport;
25 /// Configuration we set when applicable.
27 /// Default::default() provides sane defaults.
30 pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
31 /// A pointer to the opaque Rust object.
33 /// Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
34 /// the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
35 pub inner: *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig,
36 /// Indicates that this is the only struct which contains the same pointer.
38 /// Rust functions which take ownership of an object provided via an argument require
39 /// this to be true and invalidate the object pointed to by inner.
43 impl Drop for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
45 if self.is_owned && !<*mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig>::is_null(self.inner) {
46 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner)) };
50 /// Frees any resources used by the ChannelHandshakeConfig, if is_owned is set and inner is non-NULL.
52 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_free(this_obj: ChannelHandshakeConfig) { }
54 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
55 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
56 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig) };
59 impl ChannelHandshakeConfig {
60 pub(crate) fn get_native_ref(&self) -> &'static nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
61 unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
63 pub(crate) fn get_native_mut_ref(&self) -> &'static mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
64 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
66 /// When moving out of the pointer, we have to ensure we aren't a reference, this makes that easy
67 pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
68 assert!(self.is_owned);
69 let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
70 self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
74 /// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
75 /// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
76 /// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
78 /// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
79 /// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
80 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
81 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
85 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
86 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
88 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u32 {
89 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().minimum_depth;
92 /// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
93 /// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
94 /// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
96 /// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
97 /// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
98 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
99 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
101 /// Default value: 6.
103 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
104 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
106 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
107 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.minimum_depth = val;
109 /// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
110 /// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
113 /// This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
114 /// be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
115 /// blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
116 /// possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
118 /// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
119 /// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
122 /// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
123 /// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
125 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u16 {
126 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().our_to_self_delay;
129 /// Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
130 /// the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
133 /// This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
134 /// be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
135 /// blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
136 /// possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
138 /// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
139 /// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
142 /// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
143 /// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
145 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u16) {
146 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.our_to_self_delay = val;
148 /// Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
150 /// This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
151 /// our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
153 /// Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
156 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
157 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().our_htlc_minimum_msat;
160 /// Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
162 /// This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
163 /// our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
165 /// Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
168 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u64) {
169 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.our_htlc_minimum_msat = val;
171 /// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
174 /// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
175 /// channel value in whole percentages.
178 /// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
179 /// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
180 /// `ChannelManager`.
182 /// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
183 /// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
185 /// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
186 /// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
187 /// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
188 /// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
189 /// for more information.
191 /// Default value: 10.
192 /// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
193 /// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
195 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u8 {
196 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel;
199 /// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
202 /// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
203 /// channel value in whole percentages.
206 /// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
207 /// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
208 /// `ChannelManager`.
210 /// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
211 /// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
213 /// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
214 /// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
215 /// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
216 /// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
217 /// for more information.
219 /// Default value: 10.
220 /// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
221 /// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
223 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u8) {
224 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = val;
226 /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
227 /// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
228 /// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
229 /// relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
231 /// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
232 /// prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
233 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
235 /// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
236 /// counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
237 /// private channel without that option.
239 /// Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
243 /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
245 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
246 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
248 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
249 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().negotiate_scid_privacy;
252 /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
253 /// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
254 /// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
255 /// relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
257 /// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
258 /// prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
259 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
261 /// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
262 /// counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
263 /// private channel without that option.
265 /// Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
266 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
267 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
269 /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
271 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
272 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
274 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
275 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.negotiate_scid_privacy = val;
277 /// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
280 /// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
282 /// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
283 /// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
285 /// Default value: false.
287 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
288 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().announced_channel;
291 /// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
294 /// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
296 /// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
297 /// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
299 /// Default value: false.
301 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
302 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.announced_channel = val;
304 /// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
305 /// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
306 /// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
308 /// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
309 /// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
310 /// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
312 /// The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
314 /// Default value: true.
316 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
318 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
319 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey;
322 /// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
323 /// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
324 /// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
326 /// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
327 /// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
328 /// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
330 /// The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
332 /// Default value: true.
334 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
336 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
337 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = val;
339 /// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
340 /// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
342 /// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
343 /// on their side, at all times.
344 /// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
345 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
347 /// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
348 /// amount can never be used for payments.
349 /// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
350 /// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
353 /// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
354 /// other than the default value.
356 /// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
357 /// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
358 /// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
359 /// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
360 /// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
362 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u32 {
363 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths;
366 /// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
367 /// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
369 /// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
370 /// on their side, at all times.
371 /// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
372 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
374 /// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
375 /// amount can never be used for payments.
376 /// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
377 /// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
380 /// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
381 /// other than the default value.
383 /// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
384 /// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
385 /// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
386 /// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
387 /// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
389 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
390 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = val;
392 /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
393 /// channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
394 /// transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
396 /// Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
397 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
398 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
399 /// whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
400 /// channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
402 /// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
403 /// prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
404 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
406 /// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
407 /// counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
408 /// fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
410 /// LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
411 /// vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
412 /// Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
414 /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
416 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
417 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
418 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
419 /// [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
421 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
422 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx;
425 /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
426 /// channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
427 /// transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
429 /// Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
430 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
431 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
432 /// whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
433 /// channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
435 /// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
436 /// prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
437 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
439 /// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
440 /// counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
441 /// fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
443 /// LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
444 /// vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
445 /// Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
447 /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
449 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
450 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
451 /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
452 /// [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
454 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
455 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = val;
457 /// The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
459 /// Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
460 /// routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
462 /// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
463 /// other than the default value.
465 /// Default value: 50
466 /// Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
467 /// This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
469 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u16 {
470 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().our_max_accepted_htlcs;
473 /// The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
475 /// Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
476 /// routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
478 /// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
479 /// other than the default value.
481 /// Default value: 50
482 /// Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
483 /// This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
485 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u16) {
486 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.our_max_accepted_htlcs = val;
488 /// Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
491 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(mut minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut our_to_self_delay_arg: u16, mut our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg: u8, mut negotiate_scid_privacy_arg: bool, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool, mut their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg: bool, mut our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
492 ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
493 minimum_depth: minimum_depth_arg,
494 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay_arg,
495 our_htlc_minimum_msat: our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg,
496 max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg,
497 negotiate_scid_privacy: negotiate_scid_privacy_arg,
498 announced_channel: announced_channel_arg,
499 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg,
500 their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg,
501 negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx: negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg,
502 our_max_accepted_htlcs: our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg,
505 impl Clone for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
506 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
508 inner: if <*mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
509 ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
515 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
516 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
517 Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeChannelHandshakeConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
520 /// Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
521 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(orig: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
524 /// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a ChannelHandshakeConfig object
525 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
526 alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig }).into()}
527 /// Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
530 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_default() -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
531 ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }
534 use lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits as nativeChannelHandshakeLimitsImport;
535 pub(crate) type nativeChannelHandshakeLimits = nativeChannelHandshakeLimitsImport;
537 /// Optional channel limits which are applied during channel creation.
539 /// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
541 /// Use 0/`<type>::max_value()` as appropriate to skip checking.
543 /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
545 /// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
546 /// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
547 /// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
550 pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
551 /// A pointer to the opaque Rust object.
553 /// Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
554 /// the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
555 pub inner: *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits,
556 /// Indicates that this is the only struct which contains the same pointer.
558 /// Rust functions which take ownership of an object provided via an argument require
559 /// this to be true and invalidate the object pointed to by inner.
563 impl Drop for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
565 if self.is_owned && !<*mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits>::is_null(self.inner) {
566 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner)) };
570 /// Frees any resources used by the ChannelHandshakeLimits, if is_owned is set and inner is non-NULL.
572 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_free(this_obj: ChannelHandshakeLimits) { }
574 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
575 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
576 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits) };
579 impl ChannelHandshakeLimits {
580 pub(crate) fn get_native_ref(&self) -> &'static nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
581 unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
583 pub(crate) fn get_native_mut_ref(&self) -> &'static mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
584 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
586 /// When moving out of the pointer, we have to ensure we aren't a reference, this makes that easy
587 pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
588 assert!(self.is_owned);
589 let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
590 self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
594 /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
595 /// only applies to inbound channels.
597 /// Default value: 0.
599 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_min_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
600 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().min_funding_satoshis;
603 /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
604 /// only applies to inbound channels.
606 /// Default value: 0.
608 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
609 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.min_funding_satoshis = val;
611 /// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
612 /// only applies to inbound channels.
614 /// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
616 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
617 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_funding_satoshis;
620 /// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
621 /// only applies to inbound channels.
623 /// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
625 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
626 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_funding_satoshis = val;
628 /// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
629 /// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
631 /// Default value: u64::max_value.
633 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
634 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_htlc_minimum_msat;
637 /// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
638 /// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
640 /// Default value: u64::max_value.
642 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
643 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_htlc_minimum_msat = val;
645 /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
646 /// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
648 /// Default value: 0.
650 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
651 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
654 /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
655 /// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
657 /// Default value: 0.
659 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
660 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = val;
662 /// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
663 /// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
664 /// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
666 /// Default value: u64::max_value.
668 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_channel_reserve_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
669 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_channel_reserve_satoshis;
672 /// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
673 /// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
674 /// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
676 /// Default value: u64::max_value.
678 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_channel_reserve_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
679 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_channel_reserve_satoshis = val;
681 /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
682 /// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
684 /// Default value: 0.
686 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_min_max_accepted_htlcs(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u16 {
687 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().min_max_accepted_htlcs;
690 /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
691 /// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
693 /// Default value: 0.
695 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_max_accepted_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u16) {
696 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.min_max_accepted_htlcs = val;
698 /// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
699 /// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
700 /// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
701 /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait.
703 /// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
705 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u32 {
706 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_minimum_depth;
709 /// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
710 /// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
711 /// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
712 /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait.
714 /// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
716 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u32) {
717 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_minimum_depth = val;
719 /// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
720 /// channels to not be double-spent.
722 /// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
723 /// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
724 /// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
725 /// control of the signing keys).
727 /// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
728 /// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
730 /// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
731 /// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
732 /// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
733 /// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
735 /// Default value: true
737 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_trust_own_funding_0conf(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> bool {
738 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().trust_own_funding_0conf;
741 /// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
742 /// channels to not be double-spent.
744 /// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
745 /// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
746 /// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
747 /// control of the signing keys).
749 /// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
750 /// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
752 /// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
753 /// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
754 /// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
755 /// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
757 /// Default value: true
759 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_trust_own_funding_0conf(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: bool) {
760 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.trust_own_funding_0conf = val;
762 /// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
763 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
765 /// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
766 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
767 /// channels will ever be opened.
769 /// Default value: true.
771 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_force_announced_channel_preference(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> bool {
772 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().force_announced_channel_preference;
775 /// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
776 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
778 /// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
779 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
780 /// channels will ever be opened.
782 /// Default value: true.
784 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_force_announced_channel_preference(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: bool) {
785 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.force_announced_channel_preference = val;
787 /// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
789 /// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
790 /// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would \"lose\" money as it would be locked for a long time.
792 /// Default value: 2016, which we also enforce as a maximum value so you can tweak config to
793 /// reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
795 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_their_to_self_delay(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u16 {
796 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().their_to_self_delay;
799 /// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
801 /// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
802 /// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would \"lose\" money as it would be locked for a long time.
804 /// Default value: 2016, which we also enforce as a maximum value so you can tweak config to
805 /// reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
807 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_their_to_self_delay(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u16) {
808 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.their_to_self_delay = val;
810 /// Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeLimits given each field
813 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_new(mut min_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg: u64, mut max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg: u64, mut min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16, mut max_minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut trust_own_funding_0conf_arg: bool, mut force_announced_channel_preference_arg: bool, mut their_to_self_delay_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
814 ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
815 min_funding_satoshis: min_funding_satoshis_arg,
816 max_funding_satoshis: max_funding_satoshis_arg,
817 max_htlc_minimum_msat: max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg,
818 min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg,
819 max_channel_reserve_satoshis: max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg,
820 min_max_accepted_htlcs: min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg,
821 max_minimum_depth: max_minimum_depth_arg,
822 trust_own_funding_0conf: trust_own_funding_0conf_arg,
823 force_announced_channel_preference: force_announced_channel_preference_arg,
824 their_to_self_delay: their_to_self_delay_arg,
827 impl Clone for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
828 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
830 inner: if <*mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
831 ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
837 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
838 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
839 Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeChannelHandshakeLimits)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
842 /// Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeLimits
843 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_clone(orig: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
846 /// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a ChannelHandshakeLimits object
847 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
848 alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits }).into()}
849 /// Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeLimits. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
852 pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_default() -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
853 ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }
855 /// Options for how to set the max dust exposure allowed on a channel. See
856 /// [`ChannelConfig::max_dust_htlc_exposure`] for details.
860 pub enum MaxDustHTLCExposure {
861 /// This sets a fixed limit on the total dust exposure in millisatoshis. Setting this too low
862 /// may prevent the sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, however this
863 /// limit is very important to prevent stealing of large amounts of dust HTLCs by miners
864 /// through [fee griefing
865 /// attacks](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-May/002714.html).
867 /// Note that if the feerate increases significantly, without a manual increase
868 /// to this maximum the channel may be unable to send/receive HTLCs between the maximum dust
869 /// exposure and the new minimum value for HTLCs to be economically viable to claim.
872 /// This sets a multiplier on the [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] feerate (in sats/KW) to
873 /// determine the maximum allowed dust exposure. If this variant is used then the maximum dust
874 /// exposure in millisatoshis is calculated as:
875 /// `feerate_per_kw * value`. For example, with our default value
876 /// `FeeRateMultiplier(10_000)`:
878 /// - For the minimum fee rate of 1 sat/vByte (250 sat/KW, although the minimum
879 /// defaults to 253 sats/KW for rounding, see [`FeeEstimator`]), the max dust exposure would
880 /// be 253 * 10_000 = 2,530,000 msats.
881 /// - For a fee rate of 30 sat/vByte (7500 sat/KW), the max dust exposure would be
882 /// 7500 * 50_000 = 75,000,000 msats (0.00075 BTC).
884 /// Note, if you're using a third-party fee estimator, this may leave you more exposed to a
885 /// fee griefing attack, where your fee estimator may purposely overestimate the fee rate,
886 /// causing you to accept more dust HTLCs than you would otherwise.
888 /// This variant is primarily meant to serve pre-anchor channels, as HTLC fees being included
889 /// on HTLC outputs means your channel may be subject to more dust exposure in the event of
890 /// increases in fee rate.
892 /// # Backwards Compatibility
893 /// This variant only became available in LDK 0.0.116, so if you downgrade to a prior version
894 /// by default this will be set to a [`Self::FixedLimitMsat`] of 5,000,000 msat.
896 /// [`FeeEstimator`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator
897 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep
901 use lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure as MaxDustHTLCExposureImport;
902 pub(crate) type nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure = MaxDustHTLCExposureImport;
904 impl MaxDustHTLCExposure {
906 pub(crate) fn to_native(&self) -> nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure {
908 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (ref a, ) => {
909 let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
910 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
914 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (ref a, ) => {
915 let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
916 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
923 pub(crate) fn into_native(self) -> nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure {
925 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (mut a, ) => {
926 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
930 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (mut a, ) => {
931 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
938 pub(crate) fn from_native(native: &MaxDustHTLCExposureImport) -> Self {
939 let native = unsafe { &*(native as *const _ as *const c_void as *const nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure) };
941 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (ref a, ) => {
942 let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
943 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
947 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (ref a, ) => {
948 let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
949 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
956 pub(crate) fn native_into(native: nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure) -> Self {
958 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (mut a, ) => {
959 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
963 nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (mut a, ) => {
964 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
971 /// Frees any resources used by the MaxDustHTLCExposure
973 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_free(this_ptr: MaxDustHTLCExposure) { }
974 /// Creates a copy of the MaxDustHTLCExposure
976 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_clone(orig: &MaxDustHTLCExposure) -> MaxDustHTLCExposure {
980 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
981 pub(crate) extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
982 Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const MaxDustHTLCExposure)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
985 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
986 pub(crate) extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
987 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut MaxDustHTLCExposure) };
990 /// Utility method to constructs a new FixedLimitMsat-variant MaxDustHTLCExposure
991 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_fixed_limit_msat(a: u64) -> MaxDustHTLCExposure {
992 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(a, )
995 /// Utility method to constructs a new FeeRateMultiplier-variant MaxDustHTLCExposure
996 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_fee_rate_multiplier(a: u64) -> MaxDustHTLCExposure {
997 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(a, )
999 /// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a MaxDustHTLCExposure object
1000 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
1001 alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure }).into()}
1002 /// Checks if two MaxDustHTLCExposures contain equal inner contents.
1003 /// This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
1005 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_eq(a: &MaxDustHTLCExposure, b: &MaxDustHTLCExposure) -> bool {
1006 if &a.to_native() == &b.to_native() { true } else { false }
1009 /// Serialize the MaxDustHTLCExposure object into a byte array which can be read by MaxDustHTLCExposure_read
1010 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_write(obj: &crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
1011 crate::c_types::serialize_obj(&unsafe { &*obj }.to_native())
1014 pub(crate) extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_write_void(obj: *const c_void) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
1015 MaxDustHTLCExposure_write(unsafe { &*(obj as *const MaxDustHTLCExposure) })
1018 /// Read a MaxDustHTLCExposure from a byte array, created by MaxDustHTLCExposure_write
1019 pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_read(ser: crate::c_types::u8slice) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_MaxDustHTLCExposureDecodeErrorZ {
1020 let res: Result<lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure, lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::c_types::deserialize_obj(ser);
1021 let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure::native_into(o) }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError::native_into(e) }).into() };
1025 use lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig as nativeChannelConfigImport;
1026 pub(crate) type nativeChannelConfig = nativeChannelConfigImport;
1028 /// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
1029 /// with our counterparty.
1032 pub struct ChannelConfig {
1033 /// A pointer to the opaque Rust object.
1035 /// Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
1036 /// the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
1037 pub inner: *mut nativeChannelConfig,
1038 /// Indicates that this is the only struct which contains the same pointer.
1040 /// Rust functions which take ownership of an object provided via an argument require
1041 /// this to be true and invalidate the object pointed to by inner.
1045 impl Drop for ChannelConfig {
1046 fn drop(&mut self) {
1047 if self.is_owned && !<*mut nativeChannelConfig>::is_null(self.inner) {
1048 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner)) };
1052 /// Frees any resources used by the ChannelConfig, if is_owned is set and inner is non-NULL.
1054 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_free(this_obj: ChannelConfig) { }
1056 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
1057 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
1058 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfig) };
1061 impl ChannelConfig {
1062 pub(crate) fn get_native_ref(&self) -> &'static nativeChannelConfig {
1063 unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
1065 pub(crate) fn get_native_mut_ref(&self) -> &'static mut nativeChannelConfig {
1066 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
1068 /// When moving out of the pointer, we have to ensure we aren't a reference, this makes that easy
1069 pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelConfig {
1070 assert!(self.is_owned);
1071 let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
1072 self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
1076 /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
1077 /// over the channel.
1078 /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
1079 /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
1081 /// Default value: 0.
1083 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u32 {
1084 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
1087 /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
1088 /// over the channel.
1089 /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
1090 /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
1092 /// Default value: 0.
1094 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u32) {
1095 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = val;
1097 /// Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
1098 /// excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
1099 /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
1100 /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
1102 /// The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
1103 /// as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
1106 /// Default value: 1000.
1108 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1110 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u32 {
1111 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().forwarding_fee_base_msat;
1114 /// Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
1115 /// excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
1116 /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
1117 /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
1119 /// The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
1120 /// as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
1123 /// Default value: 1000.
1125 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1127 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u32) {
1128 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.forwarding_fee_base_msat = val;
1130 /// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
1131 /// the channel this config applies to.
1133 /// This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
1134 /// HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
1135 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
1136 /// (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
1138 /// Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
1139 /// we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
1140 /// commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
1141 /// enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
1142 /// the spending transaction).
1144 /// Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
1145 /// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
1146 /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
1148 /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1150 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u16 {
1151 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().cltv_expiry_delta;
1154 /// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
1155 /// the channel this config applies to.
1157 /// This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
1158 /// HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
1159 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
1160 /// (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
1162 /// Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
1163 /// we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
1164 /// commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
1165 /// enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
1166 /// the spending transaction).
1168 /// Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
1169 /// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
1170 /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
1172 /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1174 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u16) {
1175 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.cltv_expiry_delta = val;
1177 /// Limit our total exposure to potential loss to on-chain fees on close, including in-flight
1178 /// HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too small to claim on-chain and fees on
1179 /// commitment transaction(s) broadcasted by our counterparty in excess of our own fee estimate.
1181 /// # HTLC-based Dust Exposure
1183 /// When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
1184 /// not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
1185 /// party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
1186 /// to such payments may be substantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
1187 /// channel is force-closed.
1189 /// The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
1190 /// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
1191 /// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
1192 /// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
1193 /// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
1194 /// value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
1195 /// variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
1197 /// The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
1198 /// exposure across all three types per-channel.
1200 /// # Transaction Fee Dust Exposure
1202 /// Further, counterparties broadcasting a commitment transaction in a force-close may result
1203 /// in other balance being burned to fees, and thus all fees on commitment and HTLC
1204 /// transactions in excess of our local fee estimates are included in the dust calculation.
1206 /// Because of this, another way to look at this limit is to divide it by 43,000 (or 218,750
1207 /// for non-anchor channels) and see it as the maximum feerate disagreement (in sats/vB) per
1208 /// non-dust HTLC we're allowed to have with our peers before risking a force-closure for
1209 /// inbound channels.
1211 /// Thus, for the default value of 10_000 * a current feerate estimate of 10 sat/vB (or 2,500
1212 /// sat/KW), we risk force-closure if we disagree with our peer by:
1213 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (483*2)` = 0.6 sat/vB for anchor channels with 483 HTLCs in
1214 /// both directions (the maximum),
1215 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (50*2)` = 5.8 sat/vB for anchor channels with 50 HTLCs in both
1216 /// directions (the LDK default max from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
1217 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (483*2)` = 0.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 483 HTLCs
1218 /// in both directions (the maximum),
1219 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (50*2)` = 1.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 50 HTLCs
1220 /// in both (the LDK default maximum from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
1222 /// Note that when using [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] this maximum disagreement
1223 /// will scale linearly with increases (or decreases) in the our feerate estimates. Further,
1224 /// for anchor channels we expect our counterparty to use a relatively low feerate estimate
1225 /// while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and
1226 /// feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours.
1228 /// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000.
1230 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep
1232 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure {
1233 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_dust_htlc_exposure;
1234 crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure::from_native(inner_val)
1236 /// Limit our total exposure to potential loss to on-chain fees on close, including in-flight
1237 /// HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too small to claim on-chain and fees on
1238 /// commitment transaction(s) broadcasted by our counterparty in excess of our own fee estimate.
1240 /// # HTLC-based Dust Exposure
1242 /// When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
1243 /// not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
1244 /// party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
1245 /// to such payments may be substantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
1246 /// channel is force-closed.
1248 /// The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
1249 /// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
1250 /// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
1251 /// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
1252 /// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
1253 /// value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
1254 /// variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
1256 /// The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
1257 /// exposure across all three types per-channel.
1259 /// # Transaction Fee Dust Exposure
1261 /// Further, counterparties broadcasting a commitment transaction in a force-close may result
1262 /// in other balance being burned to fees, and thus all fees on commitment and HTLC
1263 /// transactions in excess of our local fee estimates are included in the dust calculation.
1265 /// Because of this, another way to look at this limit is to divide it by 43,000 (or 218,750
1266 /// for non-anchor channels) and see it as the maximum feerate disagreement (in sats/vB) per
1267 /// non-dust HTLC we're allowed to have with our peers before risking a force-closure for
1268 /// inbound channels.
1270 /// Thus, for the default value of 10_000 * a current feerate estimate of 10 sat/vB (or 2,500
1271 /// sat/KW), we risk force-closure if we disagree with our peer by:
1272 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (483*2)` = 0.6 sat/vB for anchor channels with 483 HTLCs in
1273 /// both directions (the maximum),
1274 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (50*2)` = 5.8 sat/vB for anchor channels with 50 HTLCs in both
1275 /// directions (the LDK default max from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
1276 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (483*2)` = 0.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 483 HTLCs
1277 /// in both directions (the maximum),
1278 /// * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (50*2)` = 1.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 50 HTLCs
1279 /// in both (the LDK default maximum from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
1281 /// Note that when using [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] this maximum disagreement
1282 /// will scale linearly with increases (or decreases) in the our feerate estimates. Further,
1283 /// for anchor channels we expect our counterparty to use a relatively low feerate estimate
1284 /// while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and
1285 /// feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours.
1287 /// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000.
1289 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep
1291 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure) {
1292 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_dust_htlc_exposure = val.into_native();
1294 /// The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
1295 /// `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
1297 /// When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
1298 /// closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
1299 /// funder/initiator.
1301 /// When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
1302 /// acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
1303 /// this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
1304 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
1305 /// willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
1308 /// When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
1309 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
1310 /// Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
1312 /// Default value: 1000 satoshis.
1314 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
1315 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
1317 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u64 {
1318 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis;
1321 /// The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
1322 /// `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
1324 /// When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
1325 /// closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
1326 /// funder/initiator.
1328 /// When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
1329 /// acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
1330 /// this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
1331 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
1332 /// willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
1335 /// When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
1336 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
1337 /// Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
1339 /// Default value: 1000 satoshis.
1341 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
1342 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
1344 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u64) {
1345 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = val;
1347 /// If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
1348 /// HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
1351 /// - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
1352 /// generated by this channel's counterparty.
1353 /// - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
1354 /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
1355 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
1356 /// actual forward amounts is their fee. See
1357 /// <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
1358 /// for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
1361 /// It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
1362 /// as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
1363 /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
1367 /// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
1368 /// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
1370 /// Default value: false.
1372 /// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
1373 /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
1374 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
1375 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
1376 /// [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
1377 /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
1379 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1380 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
1383 /// If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
1384 /// HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
1387 /// - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
1388 /// generated by this channel's counterparty.
1389 /// - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
1390 /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
1391 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
1392 /// actual forward amounts is their fee. See
1393 /// <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
1394 /// for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
1397 /// It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
1398 /// as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
1399 /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
1403 /// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
1404 /// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
1406 /// Default value: false.
1408 /// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
1409 /// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
1410 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
1411 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
1412 /// [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
1413 /// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
1415 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: bool) {
1416 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_underpaying_htlcs = val;
1418 /// Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
1421 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: u32, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: u16, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: u64, mut accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg: bool) -> ChannelConfig {
1422 ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelConfig {
1423 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg,
1424 forwarding_fee_base_msat: forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg,
1425 cltv_expiry_delta: cltv_expiry_delta_arg,
1426 max_dust_htlc_exposure: max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.into_native(),
1427 force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg,
1428 accept_underpaying_htlcs: accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg,
1429 }), is_owned: true }
1431 impl Clone for ChannelConfig {
1432 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
1434 inner: if <*mut nativeChannelConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
1435 ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
1441 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
1442 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
1443 Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeChannelConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
1446 /// Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
1447 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_clone(orig: &ChannelConfig) -> ChannelConfig {
1450 /// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a ChannelConfig object
1451 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
1452 alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig }).into()}
1453 /// Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
1454 /// This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
1455 /// Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
1457 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_eq(a: &ChannelConfig, b: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1458 if a.inner == b.inner { return true; }
1459 if a.inner.is_null() || b.inner.is_null() { return false; }
1460 if a.get_native_ref() == b.get_native_ref() { true } else { false }
1462 /// Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
1464 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_apply(this_arg: &mut crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, update: &crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfigUpdate) {
1465 unsafe { &mut (*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_arg.inner as *mut crate::lightning::util::config::nativeChannelConfig)) }.apply(update.get_native_ref())
1468 /// Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
1471 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_default() -> ChannelConfig {
1472 ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }
1475 /// Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
1476 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write(obj: &crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
1477 crate::c_types::serialize_obj(unsafe { &*obj }.get_native_ref())
1480 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write_void(obj: *const c_void) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
1481 crate::c_types::serialize_obj(unsafe { &*(obj as *const nativeChannelConfig) })
1484 /// Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
1485 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_read(ser: crate::c_types::u8slice) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ {
1486 let res: Result<lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::c_types::deserialize_obj(ser);
1487 let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(o), is_owned: true } }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError::native_into(e) }).into() };
1491 use lightning::util::config::ChannelConfigUpdate as nativeChannelConfigUpdateImport;
1492 pub(crate) type nativeChannelConfigUpdate = nativeChannelConfigUpdateImport;
1494 /// A parallel struct to [`ChannelConfig`] to define partial updates.
1497 pub struct ChannelConfigUpdate {
1498 /// A pointer to the opaque Rust object.
1500 /// Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
1501 /// the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
1502 pub inner: *mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate,
1503 /// Indicates that this is the only struct which contains the same pointer.
1505 /// Rust functions which take ownership of an object provided via an argument require
1506 /// this to be true and invalidate the object pointed to by inner.
1510 impl Drop for ChannelConfigUpdate {
1511 fn drop(&mut self) {
1512 if self.is_owned && !<*mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate>::is_null(self.inner) {
1513 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner)) };
1517 /// Frees any resources used by the ChannelConfigUpdate, if is_owned is set and inner is non-NULL.
1519 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_free(this_obj: ChannelConfigUpdate) { }
1521 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
1522 pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
1523 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate) };
1526 impl ChannelConfigUpdate {
1527 pub(crate) fn get_native_ref(&self) -> &'static nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
1528 unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
1530 pub(crate) fn get_native_mut_ref(&self) -> &'static mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
1531 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
1533 /// When moving out of the pointer, we have to ensure we aren't a reference, this makes that easy
1534 pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
1535 assert!(self.is_owned);
1536 let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
1537 self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
1542 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z {
1543 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
1544 let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
1548 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z) {
1549 let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
1550 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = local_val;
1553 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z {
1554 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().forwarding_fee_base_msat;
1555 let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
1559 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z) {
1560 let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
1561 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.forwarding_fee_base_msat = local_val;
1564 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z {
1565 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().cltv_expiry_delta;
1566 let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
1570 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z) {
1571 let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
1572 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.cltv_expiry_delta = local_val;
1575 /// Returns a copy of the field.
1577 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ {
1578 let mut inner_val = this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.clone();
1579 let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ::Some( { crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure::native_into(inner_val.unwrap()) }) };
1583 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ) {
1584 let mut local_val = { /*val*/ let val_opt = val; if val_opt.is_none() { None } else { Some({ { { val_opt.take() }.into_native() }})} };
1585 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = local_val;
1588 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z {
1589 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis;
1590 let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
1594 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z) {
1595 let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
1596 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = local_val;
1598 /// Constructs a new ChannelConfigUpdate given each field
1601 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z) -> ChannelConfigUpdate {
1602 let mut local_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg = if forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg.is_some() { Some( { forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg.take() }) } else { None };
1603 let mut local_forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg = if forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg.is_some() { Some( { forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg.take() }) } else { None };
1604 let mut local_cltv_expiry_delta_arg = if cltv_expiry_delta_arg.is_some() { Some( { cltv_expiry_delta_arg.take() }) } else { None };
1605 let mut local_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg = { /*max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg*/ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg_opt = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg; if max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg_opt.is_none() { None } else { Some({ { { max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg_opt.take() }.into_native() }})} };
1606 let mut local_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg = if force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg.is_some() { Some( { force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg.take() }) } else { None };
1607 ChannelConfigUpdate { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
1608 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: local_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg,
1609 forwarding_fee_base_msat: local_forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg,
1610 cltv_expiry_delta: local_cltv_expiry_delta_arg,
1611 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: local_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg,
1612 force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: local_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg,
1613 }), is_owned: true }
1615 /// Creates a "default" ChannelConfigUpdate. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
1618 pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_default() -> ChannelConfigUpdate {
1619 ChannelConfigUpdate { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }
1622 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig as nativeUserConfigImport;
1623 pub(crate) type nativeUserConfig = nativeUserConfigImport;
1625 /// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
1627 /// Default::default() provides sane defaults for most configurations
1628 /// (but currently with 0 relay fees!)
1631 pub struct UserConfig {
1632 /// A pointer to the opaque Rust object.
1634 /// Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
1635 /// the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
1636 pub inner: *mut nativeUserConfig,
1637 /// Indicates that this is the only struct which contains the same pointer.
1639 /// Rust functions which take ownership of an object provided via an argument require
1640 /// this to be true and invalidate the object pointed to by inner.
1644 impl Drop for UserConfig {
1645 fn drop(&mut self) {
1646 if self.is_owned && !<*mut nativeUserConfig>::is_null(self.inner) {
1647 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner)) };
1651 /// Frees any resources used by the UserConfig, if is_owned is set and inner is non-NULL.
1653 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_free(this_obj: UserConfig) { }
1655 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
1656 pub(crate) extern "C" fn UserConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
1657 let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeUserConfig) };
1661 pub(crate) fn get_native_ref(&self) -> &'static nativeUserConfig {
1662 unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
1664 pub(crate) fn get_native_mut_ref(&self) -> &'static mut nativeUserConfig {
1665 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
1667 /// When moving out of the pointer, we have to ensure we aren't a reference, this makes that easy
1668 pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeUserConfig {
1669 assert!(self.is_owned);
1670 let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
1671 self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
1675 /// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
1677 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_handshake_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig {
1678 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_handshake_config;
1679 crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
1681 /// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
1683 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_handshake_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig) {
1684 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_handshake_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
1686 /// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel handshake config settings.
1688 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_handshake_limits(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits {
1689 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_handshake_limits;
1690 crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
1692 /// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel handshake config settings.
1694 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_handshake_limits(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits) {
1695 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_handshake_limits = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
1697 /// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
1699 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig {
1700 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_config;
1701 crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
1703 /// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
1705 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) {
1706 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
1708 /// If this is set to false, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
1709 /// channels. This prevents us from taking on HTLC-forwarding risk when we intend to run as a
1710 /// node which is not online reliably.
1712 /// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
1713 /// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
1714 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
1715 /// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
1717 /// Note that because you cannot change a channel's announced state after creation, there is no
1718 /// way to disable forwarding on public channels retroactively. Thus, in order to change a node
1719 /// from a publicly-announced forwarding node to a private non-forwarding node you must close
1720 /// all your channels and open new ones. For privacy, you should also change your node_id
1721 /// (swapping all private and public key material for new ones) at that time.
1723 /// Default value: false.
1725 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_forwards_to_priv_channels(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
1726 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_forwards_to_priv_channels;
1729 /// If this is set to false, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
1730 /// channels. This prevents us from taking on HTLC-forwarding risk when we intend to run as a
1731 /// node which is not online reliably.
1733 /// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
1734 /// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
1735 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
1736 /// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
1738 /// Note that because you cannot change a channel's announced state after creation, there is no
1739 /// way to disable forwarding on public channels retroactively. Thus, in order to change a node
1740 /// from a publicly-announced forwarding node to a private non-forwarding node you must close
1741 /// all your channels and open new ones. For privacy, you should also change your node_id
1742 /// (swapping all private and public key material for new ones) at that time.
1744 /// Default value: false.
1746 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_forwards_to_priv_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
1747 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = val;
1749 /// If this is set to false, we do not accept inbound requests to open a new channel.
1750 /// Default value: true.
1752 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
1753 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_inbound_channels;
1756 /// If this is set to false, we do not accept inbound requests to open a new channel.
1757 /// Default value: true.
1759 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
1760 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_inbound_channels = val;
1762 /// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
1765 /// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
1766 /// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
1767 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
1768 /// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
1770 /// Default value: false.
1772 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
1773 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
1774 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
1776 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_manually_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
1777 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().manually_accept_inbound_channels;
1780 /// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
1783 /// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
1784 /// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
1785 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
1786 /// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
1788 /// Default value: false.
1790 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
1791 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
1792 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
1794 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_manually_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
1795 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.manually_accept_inbound_channels = val;
1797 /// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
1798 /// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
1799 /// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
1801 /// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
1803 /// Default value: false.
1805 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
1806 /// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
1808 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_intercept_htlcs(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
1809 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_intercept_htlcs;
1812 /// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
1813 /// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
1814 /// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
1816 /// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
1818 /// Default value: false.
1820 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
1821 /// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
1823 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_intercept_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
1824 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_intercept_htlcs = val;
1826 /// If this is set to false, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
1827 /// parts. If this is set to true, we'll accept the payment.
1829 /// Setting this to true will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
1830 /// version < 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
1831 /// keysend, downgrading will cause us to fail to deserialize [`ChannelManager`].
1833 /// Default value: false.
1835 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
1837 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_mpp_keysend(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
1838 let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_mpp_keysend;
1841 /// If this is set to false, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
1842 /// parts. If this is set to true, we'll accept the payment.
1844 /// Setting this to true will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
1845 /// version < 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
1846 /// keysend, downgrading will cause us to fail to deserialize [`ChannelManager`].
1848 /// Default value: false.
1850 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
1852 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_mpp_keysend(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
1853 unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_mpp_keysend = val;
1855 /// Constructs a new UserConfig given each field
1858 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_new(mut channel_handshake_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut channel_handshake_limits_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut channel_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, mut accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool, mut manually_accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_intercept_htlcs_arg: bool, mut accept_mpp_keysend_arg: bool) -> UserConfig {
1859 UserConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeUserConfig {
1860 channel_handshake_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_handshake_config_arg.take_inner()) },
1861 channel_handshake_limits: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_handshake_limits_arg.take_inner()) },
1862 channel_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_config_arg.take_inner()) },
1863 accept_forwards_to_priv_channels: accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg,
1864 accept_inbound_channels: accept_inbound_channels_arg,
1865 manually_accept_inbound_channels: manually_accept_inbound_channels_arg,
1866 accept_intercept_htlcs: accept_intercept_htlcs_arg,
1867 accept_mpp_keysend: accept_mpp_keysend_arg,
1868 }), is_owned: true }
1870 impl Clone for UserConfig {
1871 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
1873 inner: if <*mut nativeUserConfig>::is_null(self.inner) { core::ptr::null_mut() } else {
1874 ObjOps::heap_alloc(unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }.clone()) },
1880 /// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
1881 pub(crate) extern "C" fn UserConfig_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
1882 Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeUserConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
1885 /// Creates a copy of the UserConfig
1886 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_clone(orig: &UserConfig) -> UserConfig {
1889 /// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a UserConfig object
1890 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
1891 alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::UserConfig }).into()}
1892 /// Creates a "default" UserConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
1895 pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_default() -> UserConfig {
1896 UserConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }