1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
740 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
741 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
745 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
747 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
748 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
749 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
753 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
755 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
756 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
757 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
758 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
768 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
769 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
770 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
771 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
772 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
774 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
775 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
777 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
779 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
780 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
782 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
783 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
784 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
785 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
786 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
787 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
789 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
790 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
792 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
793 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
794 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
795 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
796 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
798 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
799 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
801 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
802 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
804 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
805 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
806 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
807 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
813 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
814 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
816 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
817 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
818 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
823 macro_rules! secp_check {
824 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
827 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
832 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
833 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
834 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
835 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
837 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
840 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
841 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
843 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
846 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
848 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
851 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
852 /// required by us according to the configured or default
853 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
855 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
857 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
858 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
859 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
860 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
861 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
864 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
865 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
866 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
867 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
868 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
869 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
870 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
873 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
874 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
877 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
878 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
879 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
880 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
881 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
882 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
883 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
884 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
889 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
890 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
891 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
892 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
893 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
894 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
895 // We've exhausted our options
898 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
899 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
903 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
904 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
905 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
906 outbound_scid_alias: u64
907 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
908 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
909 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
911 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
913 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
914 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
915 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
917 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
920 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
923 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
924 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
927 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
930 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
931 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
932 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
933 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
937 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
939 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
940 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
941 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
945 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
946 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
948 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
949 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
952 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
953 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
954 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
961 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
962 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
963 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
964 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
969 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
971 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
972 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
973 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
975 channel_value_satoshis,
977 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
980 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
981 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
983 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
984 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
987 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
988 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
989 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
990 pending_update_fee: None,
991 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
992 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
993 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
994 update_time_counter: 1,
996 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
998 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
999 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1000 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1001 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1002 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1003 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1007 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1008 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1010 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1011 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1012 closing_fee_limits: None,
1013 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1015 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1017 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1018 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1019 short_channel_id: None,
1020 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1022 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1023 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1024 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1025 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1026 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1027 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1028 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1029 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1030 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1031 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1032 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1034 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1036 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1037 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1038 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1039 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1040 counterparty_parameters: None,
1041 funding_outpoint: None,
1042 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1044 funding_transaction: None,
1046 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1048 counterparty_node_id,
1050 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1052 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1054 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1055 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1057 announcement_sigs: None,
1059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1060 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1062 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1064 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1066 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1067 outbound_scid_alias,
1069 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1072 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1074 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1078 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1079 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1081 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1082 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1083 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1084 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1085 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1086 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1087 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1090 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1091 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1092 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1093 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1094 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1095 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1101 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1102 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1103 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1104 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1105 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1106 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1107 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1108 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1109 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1112 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1113 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1115 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1116 // support this channel type.
1117 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1118 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1122 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1126 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1127 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1128 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1129 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1130 // publicly announced.
1131 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1132 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1136 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1140 channel_type.clone()
1142 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1144 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1148 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1149 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1150 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1151 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1152 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1153 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1154 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1155 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1158 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1162 // Check sanity of message fields:
1163 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1166 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1169 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1172 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1173 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1176 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1179 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1182 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1184 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1185 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1188 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1191 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1195 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1196 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1199 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1202 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1205 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1211 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1214 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1218 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1220 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1221 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1226 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1227 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1228 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1229 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1232 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1235 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1236 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1237 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1239 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1243 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1244 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1245 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1246 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1247 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1251 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1252 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1253 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1254 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1258 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1259 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1260 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1261 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1262 if script.len() == 0 {
1265 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1268 Some(script.clone())
1271 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1272 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1278 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1279 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1282 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1283 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1288 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1289 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1291 let chan = Channel {
1294 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1295 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1297 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1302 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1304 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1305 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1306 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1309 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1312 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1313 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1315 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1316 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1317 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1319 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1320 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1321 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1322 pending_update_fee: None,
1323 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1324 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1325 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1326 update_time_counter: 1,
1328 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1330 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1331 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1332 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1333 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1334 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1335 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1337 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1338 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1340 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1342 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1343 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1344 closing_fee_limits: None,
1345 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1347 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1349 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1350 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1351 short_channel_id: None,
1352 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1354 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1355 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1356 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1357 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1358 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1359 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1360 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1361 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1362 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1363 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1364 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1365 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1367 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1369 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1370 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1371 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1372 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1373 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1374 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1375 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1377 funding_outpoint: None,
1378 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1380 funding_transaction: None,
1382 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1383 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1384 counterparty_node_id,
1386 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1388 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1390 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1391 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1393 announcement_sigs: None,
1395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1396 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1397 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1398 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1400 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1402 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1403 outbound_scid_alias,
1405 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1407 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1408 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1416 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1417 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1418 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1419 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1420 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1422 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1423 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1424 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1425 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1426 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1427 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1428 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1430 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1431 where L::Target: Logger
1433 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1434 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1435 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1437 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1438 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1439 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1440 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1442 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1443 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1444 if match update_state {
1445 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1446 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1447 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1448 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1449 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1451 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1455 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1456 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1457 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1458 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1460 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1461 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1462 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1464 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1465 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1466 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1467 transaction_output_index: None
1472 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1473 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1474 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1475 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1476 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1479 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1481 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1482 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1483 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1485 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1486 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1489 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1490 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1493 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1495 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1496 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1497 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1499 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1500 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1506 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1507 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1508 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1509 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1510 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1511 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1512 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1516 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1517 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1519 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1521 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1522 if generated_by_local {
1523 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1524 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1533 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1535 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1536 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1537 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1538 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1539 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1540 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1541 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1544 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1545 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1546 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1547 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1551 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1552 preimages.push(preimage);
1556 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1557 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1559 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1561 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1562 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1564 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1565 if !generated_by_local {
1566 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1574 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1575 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1576 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1577 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1578 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1579 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1580 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1581 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1585 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1586 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1587 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1588 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1590 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1592 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1593 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1594 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1595 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1598 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1599 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1600 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1601 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1603 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1606 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1607 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1608 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1609 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1611 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1614 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1615 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1620 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1621 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1626 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1628 let channel_parameters =
1629 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1630 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1631 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1634 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1639 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1642 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1643 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1644 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1645 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1647 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1648 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1649 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1657 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1658 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1664 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1665 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1666 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1667 // outside of those situations will fail.
1668 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1672 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1677 1 + // script length (0)
1681 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1682 2 + // witness marker and flag
1683 1 + // witness element count
1684 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1685 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1686 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1687 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1688 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1689 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1691 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1692 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1693 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1699 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1700 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1701 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1702 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1704 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1705 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1706 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1708 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1709 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1710 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1711 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1712 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1713 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1716 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1717 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1720 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1721 value_to_holder = 0;
1724 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1725 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1726 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1727 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1729 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1730 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1733 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1734 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1738 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1739 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1740 /// our counterparty!)
1741 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1742 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1743 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1744 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1745 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1746 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1747 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1749 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1753 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1754 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1755 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1756 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1757 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1758 //may see payments to it!
1759 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1760 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1761 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1763 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1766 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1767 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1768 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1769 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1770 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1773 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1776 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1777 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1779 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1781 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1782 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1783 where L::Target: Logger {
1784 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1785 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1786 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1787 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1788 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1789 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1790 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1791 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1795 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1796 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1797 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1798 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1800 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1801 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1803 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1805 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1807 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1808 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1809 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1811 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1812 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1813 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1814 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1815 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1817 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1818 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1819 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1821 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1822 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1827 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1828 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1832 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1836 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1837 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1838 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1839 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1840 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1841 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1844 // Now update local state:
1846 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1847 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1848 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1849 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1850 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1851 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1852 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1856 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1857 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1858 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1859 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1860 // do not not get into this branch.
1861 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1862 match pending_update {
1863 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1864 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1865 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1866 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1867 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1868 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1869 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1873 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1874 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1875 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1876 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1877 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1878 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1884 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1885 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1886 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1889 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1890 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1893 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1896 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1897 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1899 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1900 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1902 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1903 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1906 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1909 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1910 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1911 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1912 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1917 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1918 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1919 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1920 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1921 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1924 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1925 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1926 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1927 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1928 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1930 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1931 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1932 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1936 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1937 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1938 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1939 /// before we fail backwards.
1940 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1941 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1942 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1943 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1944 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1946 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1948 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1949 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1950 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1952 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1953 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1954 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1956 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1957 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1958 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1960 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1965 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1966 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1972 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1974 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1975 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1976 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1980 // Now update local state:
1981 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1982 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1983 match pending_update {
1984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1985 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1986 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1987 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1991 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1992 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1993 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1994 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2000 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2001 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2002 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2008 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2010 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2011 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2014 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2015 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2016 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2021 // Message handlers:
2023 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2024 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2026 // Check sanity of message fields:
2027 if !self.is_outbound() {
2028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2030 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2033 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2036 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2039 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2042 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2044 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2046 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2047 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2050 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2051 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2054 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2057 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2061 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2062 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2065 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2068 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2071 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2074 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2077 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2080 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2084 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2085 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2088 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2089 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2091 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2094 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2095 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2096 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2097 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2098 if script.len() == 0 {
2101 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2104 Some(script.clone())
2107 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2108 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2114 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2115 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2116 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2117 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2118 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2120 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2121 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2123 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2126 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2127 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2128 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2129 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2130 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2131 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2134 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2135 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2136 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2139 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2140 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2142 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2143 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2148 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2149 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2151 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2152 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2154 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2155 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2156 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2157 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2158 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2159 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2160 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2161 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2162 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2165 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2166 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2168 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2169 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2170 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2171 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2173 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2174 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2176 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2177 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2180 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2181 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2184 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2185 if self.is_outbound() {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2188 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2189 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2190 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2194 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2197 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2198 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2199 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2200 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2203 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2204 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2205 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2206 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2207 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2209 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2211 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2212 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2216 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2217 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2218 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2222 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2223 initial_commitment_tx,
2226 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2227 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2230 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2231 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2233 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2235 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2236 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2237 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2238 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2239 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2240 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2241 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2242 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2243 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2245 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2247 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2249 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2250 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2251 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2252 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2254 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2256 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2257 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2259 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2262 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2263 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2264 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2265 if !self.is_outbound() {
2266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2268 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2271 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2272 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2273 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2274 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2277 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2279 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2280 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2281 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2282 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2284 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2285 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2287 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2288 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2290 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2291 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2292 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2293 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2294 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2299 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2300 initial_commitment_tx,
2303 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2304 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2307 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2308 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2311 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2312 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2313 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2314 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2315 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2316 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2317 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2318 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2319 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2320 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2322 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2324 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2326 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2327 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2328 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2329 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2331 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2333 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2336 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2337 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2339 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2340 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2341 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2342 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2345 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2346 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2347 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2348 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2349 // when routing outbound payments.
2350 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2354 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2356 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2357 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2358 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2359 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2360 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2361 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2362 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2363 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2364 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2366 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2367 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2368 let expected_point =
2369 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2370 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2372 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2374 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2375 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2376 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2377 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2378 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2380 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2388 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2389 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2391 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2393 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2396 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2397 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2398 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2399 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2405 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2406 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2407 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2408 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2409 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2410 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2411 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2412 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2413 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2416 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2419 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2420 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2421 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2423 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2424 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2425 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2426 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2427 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2428 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2430 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2431 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2437 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2438 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2439 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2440 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2441 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2442 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2443 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2444 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2445 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2448 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2451 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2452 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2453 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2455 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2456 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2457 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2458 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2459 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2460 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2462 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2463 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2467 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2468 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2469 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2470 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2471 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2472 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2473 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2475 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2476 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2478 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2485 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2486 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2487 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2488 /// corner case properly.
2489 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2490 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2491 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2493 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2494 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2495 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2496 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2499 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2501 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2502 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2503 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2506 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2507 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2508 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2509 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2511 outbound_capacity_msat,
2512 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2513 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2514 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2520 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2521 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2524 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2525 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2526 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2527 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2528 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2529 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2532 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2533 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2535 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2536 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2539 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2540 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2541 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2543 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2544 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2546 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2549 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2550 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2552 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2553 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2555 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2556 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2558 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2559 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2563 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2564 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2570 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2571 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2572 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2575 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2576 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2577 included_htlcs += 1;
2580 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2585 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2586 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2587 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2588 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2589 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2590 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2595 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2597 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2598 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2603 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2604 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2608 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2609 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2610 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2613 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2614 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2616 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2617 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2618 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2620 total_pending_htlcs,
2621 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2622 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2623 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2625 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2626 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2627 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2629 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2631 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2636 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2637 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2638 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2640 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2641 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2643 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2646 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2647 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2649 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2650 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2652 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2653 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2655 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2656 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2660 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2661 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2667 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2668 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2669 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2670 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2671 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2675 included_htlcs += 1;
2678 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2679 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2682 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2683 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2685 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2686 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2687 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2692 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2693 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2697 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2698 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2700 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2701 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2703 total_pending_htlcs,
2704 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2705 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2706 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2708 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2709 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2710 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2712 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2714 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2719 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2720 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2721 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2722 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2723 if local_sent_shutdown {
2724 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2726 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2727 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2728 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2731 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2734 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2737 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2740 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2744 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2745 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2746 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2749 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2752 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2753 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2754 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2755 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2756 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2757 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2758 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2759 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2760 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2761 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2762 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2764 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2765 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2766 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2767 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2768 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2769 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2773 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2776 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2777 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2778 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2780 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2781 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2782 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2783 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2784 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2785 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2786 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2790 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2791 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2792 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2793 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2794 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2795 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2796 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2800 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2801 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2802 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2803 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2804 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2808 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2809 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2810 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2811 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2812 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2814 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2818 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2822 if !self.is_outbound() {
2823 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2824 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2825 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2826 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2827 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2828 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2829 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2830 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2831 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2832 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2833 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2834 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2835 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2836 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2837 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2840 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2841 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2842 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2843 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2847 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2850 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2854 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2855 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2856 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2860 // Now update local state:
2861 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2862 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2863 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2864 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2865 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2866 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2867 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2872 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2874 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2875 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2876 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2877 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2878 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2879 None => fail_reason.into(),
2880 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2881 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2882 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2885 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2889 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2891 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2892 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2894 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2900 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2903 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2904 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2907 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2911 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2914 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2915 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2918 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2922 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2926 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2927 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2930 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2934 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2938 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2939 where L::Target: Logger
2941 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2942 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2944 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2945 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2947 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2948 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2951 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2953 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2955 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2956 let commitment_txid = {
2957 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2958 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2959 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2961 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2962 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2963 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2964 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2965 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2966 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2970 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2972 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2973 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2974 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2975 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2978 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2979 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2980 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2981 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2984 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2986 if self.is_outbound() {
2987 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2988 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2989 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2990 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2991 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2992 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2993 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2994 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2995 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2996 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3002 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3003 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3006 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3007 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3008 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3009 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3010 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3011 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3012 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3014 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3015 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3016 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3017 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3018 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3019 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3020 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3021 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3023 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3025 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3029 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3030 commitment_stats.tx,
3032 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3033 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3034 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3037 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3038 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3039 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3040 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3042 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3043 let mut need_commitment = false;
3044 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3045 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3046 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3047 need_commitment = true;
3051 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3052 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3053 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3054 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3055 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3056 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3060 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3061 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3062 Some(forward_info.clone())
3064 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3065 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3066 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3067 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3068 need_commitment = true;
3071 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3072 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3073 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3074 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3075 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3076 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3077 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3078 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3079 need_commitment = true;
3083 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3084 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3085 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3086 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3088 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3089 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3090 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3091 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3092 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3093 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3094 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3095 // includes the right HTLCs.
3096 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3097 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3098 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3099 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3100 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3101 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3103 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3104 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3105 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3108 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3109 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3110 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3111 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3112 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3113 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3114 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3115 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3116 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3120 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3121 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3123 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3124 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3125 per_commitment_secret,
3126 next_per_commitment_point,
3127 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3130 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3131 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3132 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3133 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3134 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3135 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3136 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3137 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3140 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3141 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3142 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3143 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3144 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3145 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3146 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3148 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3149 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3150 updates: Vec::new(),
3153 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3154 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3155 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3156 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3157 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3158 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3159 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3160 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3161 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3162 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3163 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3164 // to rebalance channels.
3165 match &htlc_update {
3166 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3167 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3168 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3171 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3172 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3173 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3174 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3175 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3176 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3177 // into the holding cell without ever being
3178 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3179 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3180 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3183 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3189 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3190 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3191 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3192 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3193 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3194 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3195 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3196 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3197 (msg, monitor_update)
3198 } else { unreachable!() };
3199 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3200 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3202 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3203 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3204 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3205 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3206 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3207 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3208 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3209 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3210 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3213 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3215 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3222 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3223 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3225 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3226 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3231 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3232 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3233 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3234 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3235 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3237 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3238 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3239 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3241 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3243 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3245 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3248 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3250 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3254 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3255 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3256 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3257 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3258 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3259 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3260 where L::Target: Logger,
3262 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3265 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3268 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3272 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3274 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3275 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3280 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3281 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3282 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3283 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3284 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3285 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3286 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3287 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3291 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3293 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3294 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3297 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3298 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3300 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3302 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3303 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3304 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3305 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3306 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3307 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3308 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3309 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3313 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3314 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3315 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3316 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3317 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3318 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3319 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3320 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3322 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3323 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3326 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3327 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3328 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3329 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3330 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3331 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3332 let mut require_commitment = false;
3333 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3336 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3337 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3338 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3340 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3341 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3342 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3343 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3344 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3345 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3350 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3351 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3352 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3353 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3354 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3356 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3357 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3358 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3363 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3364 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3366 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3370 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3371 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3373 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3374 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3375 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3376 require_commitment = true;
3377 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3378 match forward_info {
3379 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3380 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3381 require_commitment = true;
3383 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3384 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3385 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3387 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3388 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3389 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3393 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3394 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3395 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3396 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3402 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3403 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3404 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3405 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3407 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3409 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3410 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3411 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3412 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3413 require_commitment = true;
3417 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3419 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3420 match update_state {
3421 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3422 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3423 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3424 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3425 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3427 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3428 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3429 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3430 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3431 require_commitment = true;
3432 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3433 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3438 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3439 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3440 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3441 if require_commitment {
3442 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3443 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3444 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3445 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3446 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3447 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3448 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3449 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3450 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3452 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3453 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3454 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3455 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3456 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3457 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3458 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3460 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3464 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3465 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3466 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3467 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3468 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3470 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3471 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3472 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3475 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3476 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3477 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3478 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3481 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3482 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3483 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3484 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3486 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3489 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3490 if require_commitment {
3491 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3493 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3494 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3495 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3496 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3498 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3499 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3501 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3502 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3503 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3505 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3509 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3510 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3511 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3514 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3516 commitment_update: None,
3517 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3518 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3519 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3526 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3527 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3528 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3529 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3530 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3531 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3532 if !self.is_outbound() {
3533 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3535 if !self.is_usable() {
3536 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3538 if !self.is_live() {
3539 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3542 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3543 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3544 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3545 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3546 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3547 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3548 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3549 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3550 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3551 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3555 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3556 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3557 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3558 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3562 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3563 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3567 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3568 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3572 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3573 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3575 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3576 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3581 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3582 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3583 Some(update_fee) => {
3584 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3585 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3591 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3592 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3594 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3596 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3597 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3598 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3599 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3603 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3604 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3605 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3609 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3610 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3613 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3614 // will be retransmitted.
3615 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3616 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3617 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3619 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3620 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3622 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3623 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3624 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3625 // this HTLC accordingly
3626 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3629 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3630 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3631 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3632 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3635 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3636 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3637 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3638 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3639 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3640 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3645 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3647 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3648 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3649 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3650 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3654 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3655 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3656 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3657 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3658 // the update upon reconnection.
3659 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3663 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3664 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3667 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3668 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3669 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3670 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3671 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3672 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3674 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3675 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3676 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3677 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3678 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3679 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3681 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3682 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3683 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3684 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3685 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3686 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3687 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3690 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3691 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3692 /// to the remote side.
3693 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3694 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3695 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3697 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3698 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3699 // first received the funding_signed.
3700 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3701 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3702 self.funding_transaction.take()
3704 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3705 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3706 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3707 funding_broadcastable = None;
3710 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3711 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3712 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3713 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3714 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3715 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3716 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3717 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3718 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3719 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3720 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3721 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3722 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3723 next_per_commitment_point,
3724 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3728 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3730 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3731 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3732 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3733 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3734 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3735 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3737 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3738 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3739 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3740 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3741 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3742 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3746 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3747 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3749 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3750 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3753 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3754 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3755 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3757 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3758 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3759 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3760 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3761 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3765 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3766 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3768 if self.is_outbound() {
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3771 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3774 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3775 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3777 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3778 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3779 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3780 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3781 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3782 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3783 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3784 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3785 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3786 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3787 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3789 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3791 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3792 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3793 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3799 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3800 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3801 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3802 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3803 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3804 per_commitment_secret,
3805 next_per_commitment_point,
3809 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3810 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3811 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3812 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3813 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3815 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3816 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3817 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3818 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3819 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3820 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3821 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3822 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3823 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3828 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3829 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3831 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3832 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3833 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3834 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3835 reason: err_packet.clone()
3838 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3839 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3840 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3841 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3842 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3843 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3846 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3847 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3848 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3849 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3850 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3857 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3858 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3859 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3860 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3864 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3865 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3866 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3867 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3868 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3869 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3873 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3874 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3876 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3877 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3878 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3879 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3880 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3881 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3882 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3883 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3884 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3885 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3886 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3890 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3891 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3895 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3896 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3897 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3898 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3899 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3900 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3901 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3904 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3905 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3906 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3907 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3908 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3911 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3912 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3913 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3914 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3915 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3916 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3917 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3918 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3921 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3925 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3926 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3927 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3928 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3930 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3934 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3935 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3936 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3938 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3939 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3940 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3941 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3942 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3946 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3948 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3949 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3950 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3951 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3952 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3955 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3956 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3957 channel_ready: None,
3958 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3959 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3960 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3961 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3965 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3966 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3967 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3968 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3969 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3970 next_per_commitment_point,
3971 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3973 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3974 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3975 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3976 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3980 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3981 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3982 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3984 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3985 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3986 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3989 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3995 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3996 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3997 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3998 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3999 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4001 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4002 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4003 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4004 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4006 next_per_commitment_point,
4007 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4011 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4012 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4013 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4015 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4018 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
4019 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
4020 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
4021 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
4023 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4024 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
4025 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
4026 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
4027 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4028 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4029 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4030 raa: required_revoke,
4031 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
4032 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4033 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
4034 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4037 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4038 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4039 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4040 raa: required_revoke,
4041 commitment_update: None,
4042 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4044 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4049 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4050 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4051 raa: required_revoke,
4052 commitment_update: None,
4053 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4055 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4058 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4059 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4060 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4062 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4066 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4067 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4068 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4069 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
4070 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4071 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4074 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4075 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4076 raa: required_revoke,
4077 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4078 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4080 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4084 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4088 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4089 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4090 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4091 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4093 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4095 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4097 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4098 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4099 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4100 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4101 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4102 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4104 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4105 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4106 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4107 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4108 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4110 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4111 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4112 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4113 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4116 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4117 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4118 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4119 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4120 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4121 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4122 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4123 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4124 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4125 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4126 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4127 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4128 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4129 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4130 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4132 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4135 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4136 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4139 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4140 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4141 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4142 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4143 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4144 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4145 self.channel_state &
4146 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4147 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4148 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4149 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4152 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4153 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4154 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4155 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4156 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4157 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4160 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4166 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4167 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4168 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4169 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4171 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4172 return Ok((None, None));
4175 if !self.is_outbound() {
4176 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4177 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4179 return Ok((None, None));
4182 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4184 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4185 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4186 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4187 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4189 let sig = self.holder_signer
4190 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4191 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4193 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4194 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4195 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4196 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4198 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4199 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4200 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4205 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4206 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4207 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4208 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4210 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4213 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4214 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4215 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4216 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4219 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4220 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4224 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4226 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4230 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4231 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4235 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4238 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4239 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4240 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4241 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4243 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4246 assert!(send_shutdown);
4247 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4248 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4251 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4256 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4258 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4259 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4261 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4262 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4263 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4264 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4265 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4266 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4270 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4271 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4272 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4273 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4277 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4278 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4279 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4280 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4281 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4282 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4284 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4285 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4292 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4293 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4295 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4298 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4299 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4301 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4303 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4304 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4305 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4306 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4307 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4308 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4309 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4310 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4311 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4313 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4314 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4317 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4321 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4322 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4323 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4324 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4326 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4329 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4332 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4335 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4339 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4343 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4344 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4345 return Ok((None, None));
4348 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4349 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4350 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4353 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4355 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4358 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4359 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4360 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4361 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4362 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4366 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4367 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4372 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4373 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4374 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4375 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4376 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4377 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4378 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4382 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4384 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4385 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4386 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4387 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4389 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4392 let sig = self.holder_signer
4393 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4394 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4396 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4397 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4398 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4399 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4403 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4404 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4406 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4408 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4409 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4410 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4416 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4417 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4420 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4423 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4427 if !self.is_outbound() {
4428 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4429 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4430 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4431 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4433 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4435 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4437 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4438 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4441 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4442 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4443 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4444 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4445 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4446 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4447 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4448 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4453 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4454 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4455 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4456 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4462 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4463 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4464 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4465 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4467 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4473 // Public utilities:
4475 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4479 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4483 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4484 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4485 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4489 /// Gets the channel's type
4490 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4494 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4495 /// is_usable() returns true).
4496 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4497 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4498 self.short_channel_id
4501 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4502 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4503 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4506 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4507 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4508 self.outbound_scid_alias
4510 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4511 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4512 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4513 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4514 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4517 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4518 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4519 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4520 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4523 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4524 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4525 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4528 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4529 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4532 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4533 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4536 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4537 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4538 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4541 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4542 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4545 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4546 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4547 self.counterparty_node_id
4550 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4551 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4552 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4555 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4556 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4557 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4560 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4561 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4563 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4564 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4565 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4566 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4568 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4572 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4573 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4574 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4577 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4578 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4579 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4582 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4583 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4584 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4586 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4587 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4592 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4593 self.channel_value_satoshis
4596 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4597 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4600 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4601 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4604 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4605 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4608 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4609 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4610 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4613 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4614 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4615 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4618 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4619 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4620 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4623 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4624 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4625 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4626 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4627 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4630 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4632 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4633 self.prev_config = None;
4637 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4638 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4642 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4643 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4644 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4645 let did_channel_update =
4646 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4647 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4648 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4649 if did_channel_update {
4650 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4651 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4652 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4653 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4655 self.config.options = *config;
4659 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4660 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4661 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4662 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4663 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4664 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4665 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4667 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4668 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4671 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4673 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4674 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4680 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4681 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4682 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4683 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4684 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4685 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4686 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4688 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4689 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4696 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4700 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4701 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4702 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4703 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4704 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4705 // which are near the dust limit.
4706 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4707 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4708 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4709 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4710 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4712 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4713 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4715 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4718 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4719 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4722 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4723 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4726 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4727 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4731 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4736 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4738 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4739 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4740 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4741 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4742 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4743 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4745 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4747 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4755 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4756 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4760 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4761 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4762 self.update_time_counter
4765 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4766 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4769 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4770 self.config.announced_channel
4773 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4774 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4777 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4778 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4779 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4780 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4783 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4784 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4785 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4788 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4789 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4790 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4791 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4792 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4795 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4796 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4797 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4798 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4799 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4802 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4803 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4804 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4805 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4808 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4809 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4810 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4813 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4814 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4815 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4817 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4818 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4819 if self.channel_state &
4820 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4821 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4822 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4823 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4824 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4827 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4828 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4829 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4830 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4831 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4832 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4834 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4835 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4836 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4838 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4839 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4840 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4841 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4842 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4843 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4849 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4850 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4851 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4854 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4855 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4856 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4859 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4860 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4861 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4864 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4865 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4866 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4867 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4868 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4869 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4874 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4875 self.channel_update_status
4878 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4879 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4880 self.channel_update_status = status;
4883 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4885 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4886 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4887 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4891 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4892 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4893 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4896 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4900 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4901 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4902 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4904 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4905 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4906 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4908 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4909 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4912 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4913 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4914 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4915 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4916 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4917 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4918 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4919 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4920 self.channel_state);
4922 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4926 if need_commitment_update {
4927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4929 let next_per_commitment_point =
4930 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4931 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4932 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4933 next_per_commitment_point,
4934 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4938 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4944 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4945 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4946 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4947 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4948 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4949 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4950 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4951 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4952 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4953 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4954 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4955 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4956 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4957 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4958 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4959 if self.is_outbound() {
4960 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4961 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4962 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4963 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4964 // channel and move on.
4965 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4966 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4968 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4969 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4970 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4972 if self.is_outbound() {
4973 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4974 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4975 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4976 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4977 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4978 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4982 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4983 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4984 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4985 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4986 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4990 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4991 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4992 // may have already happened for this block).
4993 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4994 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4995 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4996 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4999 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5000 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5001 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5002 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5010 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5011 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5012 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5013 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5015 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5016 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5019 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5021 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5022 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5023 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5026 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5027 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5028 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5029 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5030 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5032 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5033 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5035 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5036 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5037 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5045 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5047 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5048 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5049 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5051 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5052 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5055 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5056 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5057 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5058 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5059 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5060 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5061 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5062 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5063 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5066 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5067 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5068 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5069 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5071 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5072 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5073 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5075 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5076 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5077 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5078 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5080 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5081 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5082 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5083 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5084 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5085 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5086 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5089 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5090 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5092 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5095 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5096 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5097 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5098 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5099 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5100 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5101 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5102 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5103 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5104 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5105 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5106 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5107 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5108 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5109 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5110 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5111 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5117 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5122 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5123 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5125 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5126 if !self.is_outbound() {
5127 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5129 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5130 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5133 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5134 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5137 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5138 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5142 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5143 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5144 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5145 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5146 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5147 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5148 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5149 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5150 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5151 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5152 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5153 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5154 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5155 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5156 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5157 first_per_commitment_point,
5158 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5159 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5160 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5161 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5163 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5167 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5168 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5171 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5172 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5173 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5174 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5177 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5178 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5180 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5181 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5182 if self.is_outbound() {
5183 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5185 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5186 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5188 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5189 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5191 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5192 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5195 self.user_id = user_id;
5196 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5198 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5201 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5202 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5203 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5205 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5206 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5207 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5208 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5210 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5211 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5212 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5213 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5214 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5215 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5216 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5217 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5218 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5219 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5220 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5221 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5222 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5223 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5224 first_per_commitment_point,
5225 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5226 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5227 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5229 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5233 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5234 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5236 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5238 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5239 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5242 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5243 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5244 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5245 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5246 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5247 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5250 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5251 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5252 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5253 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5254 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5255 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5256 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5257 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5258 if !self.is_outbound() {
5259 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5261 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5262 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5264 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5265 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5266 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5267 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5270 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5271 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5273 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5276 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5277 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5282 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5284 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5286 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5287 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5288 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5290 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5291 temporary_channel_id,
5292 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5293 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5298 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5299 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5300 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5301 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5303 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5306 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5307 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5308 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5311 if !self.is_usable() {
5312 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5315 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5317 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5318 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5320 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5321 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5322 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5323 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5324 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5325 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5331 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5332 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5333 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5337 if !self.is_usable() {
5341 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5342 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5346 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5350 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5351 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5354 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5358 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5360 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5365 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5367 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5368 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5369 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5370 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5371 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5375 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5377 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5378 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5379 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5381 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5382 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5383 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5384 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5385 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5386 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5387 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5388 contents: announcement,
5391 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5395 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5396 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5397 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5398 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5399 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5401 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5403 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5404 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5405 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5406 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5408 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5409 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5410 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5411 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5414 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5415 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5416 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5417 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5420 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5423 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5424 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5425 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5426 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5429 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5431 Err(_) => return None,
5433 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5434 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5439 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5440 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5441 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5442 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5443 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5444 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5445 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5446 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5447 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5448 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5449 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5450 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5451 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5452 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5453 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5454 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5455 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5456 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5457 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5460 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5461 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5462 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5463 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5466 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5467 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5468 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5469 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5470 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5471 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5472 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5473 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5475 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5476 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5477 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5478 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5479 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5480 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5481 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5482 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5483 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5485 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5491 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5493 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5494 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5496 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5498 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5499 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5501 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5502 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5503 /// regenerate them.
5505 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5507 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5508 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5509 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5512 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5513 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5514 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5517 if amount_msat == 0 {
5518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5521 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5522 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5525 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5526 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5527 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5528 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5529 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5530 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5531 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5532 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5535 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5536 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5537 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5538 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5540 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5541 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5542 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5545 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5546 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5547 if !self.is_outbound() {
5548 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5549 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5550 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5551 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5552 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5553 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5557 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5560 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5561 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5562 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5564 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5565 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5566 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5567 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5569 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5573 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5574 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5575 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5576 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5577 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5578 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5582 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5583 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5584 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5587 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5588 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5589 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5590 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5592 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5593 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5596 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5597 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5598 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5599 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5600 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5603 // Now update local state:
5604 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5605 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5610 onion_routing_packet,
5615 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5616 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5618 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5620 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5624 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5625 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5626 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5630 onion_routing_packet,
5632 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5637 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5638 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5639 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5640 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5641 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5642 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5643 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5645 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5646 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5648 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5649 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5651 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5652 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5654 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5655 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5656 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5657 have_updates = true;
5659 if have_updates { break; }
5661 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5662 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5663 have_updates = true;
5665 if have_updates { break; }
5668 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5670 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5672 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5673 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5674 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5675 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5676 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5678 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5679 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5680 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5682 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5683 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5687 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5688 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5689 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5690 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5691 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5692 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5693 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5696 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5697 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5698 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5699 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5700 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5701 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5704 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5706 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5707 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5708 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5709 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5710 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5711 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5713 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5716 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5717 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5720 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5721 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5722 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5723 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5724 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5725 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5726 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5727 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5730 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5731 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5734 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5735 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5736 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5737 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5738 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5739 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5740 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5744 if !self.is_outbound() {
5745 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5746 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5747 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5748 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5749 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5750 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5751 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5752 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5753 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5754 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5761 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5762 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5766 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5767 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5769 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5771 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5772 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5773 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5774 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5776 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5777 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5778 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5779 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5780 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5781 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5785 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5786 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5789 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5792 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5793 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5794 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5796 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5797 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5798 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5799 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5800 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5806 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5807 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5808 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5811 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5812 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5815 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5816 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5817 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5818 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5824 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5825 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5826 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5827 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5828 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5829 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5830 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5831 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5834 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5835 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5838 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5839 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5842 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5843 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5844 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5847 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5850 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5851 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5852 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5854 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5859 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5860 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5861 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5862 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5864 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5866 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5868 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5869 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5870 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5871 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5872 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5873 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5877 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5878 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5879 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5882 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5883 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5884 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5885 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5886 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5888 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5889 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5896 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5899 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5900 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5901 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5902 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5903 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5904 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5905 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5906 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5907 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5908 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5909 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5911 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5912 // return them to fail the payment.
5913 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5914 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5915 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5917 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5918 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5923 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5924 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5925 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5926 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5927 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5928 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5929 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5930 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5931 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5932 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5933 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5934 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5935 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5940 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5941 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5942 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5946 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5947 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5949 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5955 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5956 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5957 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5958 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5959 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5961 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5962 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5963 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5964 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5970 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5971 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5972 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5973 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5974 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5975 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5980 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5981 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5982 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5983 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5985 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5986 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5987 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5988 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5993 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5994 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5995 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5996 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5997 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5998 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6003 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6004 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6005 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6008 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6010 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6011 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6012 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6013 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6014 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6016 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6017 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6018 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6019 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6021 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6022 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6023 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6025 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6027 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6028 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6029 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6030 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6031 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6032 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6034 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6035 // deserialized from that format.
6036 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6037 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6038 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6040 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6042 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6043 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6044 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6046 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6047 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6048 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6049 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6052 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6053 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6054 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6057 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6058 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6059 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6060 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6062 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6063 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6065 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6067 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6069 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6071 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6074 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6076 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6081 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6083 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6084 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6085 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6086 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6087 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6088 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6089 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6091 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6093 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6095 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6098 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6099 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6100 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6103 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6105 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6106 preimages.push(preimage);
6108 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6109 reason.write(writer)?;
6111 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6113 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6114 preimages.push(preimage);
6116 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6117 reason.write(writer)?;
6122 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6123 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6125 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6127 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6128 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6129 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6130 source.write(writer)?;
6131 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6135 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6136 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6140 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6141 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6146 match self.resend_order {
6147 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6148 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6151 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6152 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6153 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6155 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6156 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6157 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6158 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6161 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6162 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6163 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6164 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6165 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6168 if self.is_outbound() {
6169 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6170 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6171 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6173 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6174 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6175 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6177 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6179 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6180 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6181 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6182 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6184 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6185 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6186 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6187 // consider the stale state on reload.
6190 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6191 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6192 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6194 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6195 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6196 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6198 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6199 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6201 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6202 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6203 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6205 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6206 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6208 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6211 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6212 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6213 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6215 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6218 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6219 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6221 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6222 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6223 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6225 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6227 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6229 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6231 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6232 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6233 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6234 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6235 htlc.write(writer)?;
6238 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6239 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6240 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6242 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6243 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6245 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6246 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6247 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6248 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6249 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6250 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6251 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6253 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6254 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6255 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6256 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6257 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6259 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6261 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6262 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6263 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6264 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6266 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6267 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6268 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6269 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6270 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6271 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6272 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6274 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6275 (2, chan_type, option),
6276 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6277 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6278 (5, self.config, required),
6279 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6280 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6281 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6282 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6283 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6284 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6285 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6286 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6287 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6288 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6289 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6296 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6297 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6298 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6299 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6300 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6301 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6303 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6304 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6305 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6306 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6310 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6311 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6313 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6314 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6316 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6317 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6321 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6322 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6324 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6326 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6327 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6328 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6329 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6330 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6331 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6332 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6333 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6335 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6337 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6338 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6339 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6342 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6344 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6345 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6346 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6350 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6351 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6352 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6353 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6354 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6355 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6356 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6357 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6358 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6359 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6360 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6361 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6366 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6367 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6368 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6369 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6370 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6371 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6372 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6373 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6374 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6375 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6376 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6377 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6379 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6380 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6383 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6387 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6390 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6395 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6396 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6397 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6398 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6399 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6400 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6401 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6402 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6403 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6404 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6406 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6407 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6408 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6410 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6411 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6412 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6414 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6418 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6419 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6420 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6421 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6424 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6430 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6431 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6434 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6436 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6437 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6440 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6445 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6450 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6451 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6452 // consider the stale state on reload.
6453 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6456 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6463 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6472 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6473 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6475 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6476 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6478 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6484 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6485 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6487 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6488 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6493 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6494 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6498 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6501 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6510 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6515 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6516 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6518 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6520 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6524 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6525 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6526 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6528 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6534 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6535 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6536 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6537 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6538 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6539 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6540 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6541 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6542 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6543 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6545 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6546 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6547 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6548 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6549 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6550 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6552 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6554 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6555 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6556 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6557 (2, channel_type, option),
6558 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6559 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6560 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6561 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6562 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6563 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6564 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6565 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6566 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6567 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6568 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6569 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6570 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6571 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6574 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6575 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6576 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6578 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6579 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6581 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6582 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6587 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6588 if iter.next().is_some() {
6589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6593 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6594 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6595 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6596 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6597 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6600 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6601 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6602 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6605 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6606 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6608 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6609 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6610 // separate u64 values.
6611 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6616 config: config.unwrap(),
6620 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6621 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6622 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6626 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6628 channel_value_satoshis,
6630 latest_monitor_update_id,
6633 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6636 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6637 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6640 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6641 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6642 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6646 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6647 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6648 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6649 monitor_pending_forwards,
6650 monitor_pending_failures,
6651 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6654 holding_cell_update_fee,
6655 next_holder_htlc_id,
6656 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6657 update_time_counter,
6660 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6661 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6662 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6663 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6665 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6666 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6667 closing_fee_limits: None,
6668 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6670 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6672 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6673 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6675 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6677 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6678 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6679 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6680 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6681 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6682 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6683 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6684 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6685 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6688 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6690 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6691 funding_transaction,
6693 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6694 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6695 counterparty_node_id,
6697 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6701 channel_update_status,
6702 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6707 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6709 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6711 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6713 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6714 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6715 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6717 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6719 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6720 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6722 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6730 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6731 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6732 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6733 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6734 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6736 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6737 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6738 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6739 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6740 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6741 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6742 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6743 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6744 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6745 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6746 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6747 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6748 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6749 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6750 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6751 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6752 use crate::util::test_utils;
6753 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6754 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6755 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6756 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6757 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6758 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6759 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6760 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6761 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6762 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6763 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6764 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6765 use crate::prelude::*;
6767 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6770 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6771 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6777 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6778 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6779 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6780 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6784 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6785 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6786 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6787 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6788 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6789 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6793 signer: InMemorySigner,
6795 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6796 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6798 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6799 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6800 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6801 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6803 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6804 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6805 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6808 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6810 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6811 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6814 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6817 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6818 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6819 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6822 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6823 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6824 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6828 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6829 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6830 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6831 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6833 let seed = [42; 32];
6834 let network = Network::Testnet;
6835 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6836 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6837 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6840 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6841 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6842 let config = UserConfig::default();
6843 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6844 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6845 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6847 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6848 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6852 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6853 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6855 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6856 let original_fee = 253;
6857 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6858 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6859 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6860 let seed = [42; 32];
6861 let network = Network::Testnet;
6862 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6864 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6865 let config = UserConfig::default();
6866 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6868 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6869 // same as the old fee.
6870 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6871 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6872 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6876 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6877 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6878 // dust limits are used.
6879 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6880 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6881 let seed = [42; 32];
6882 let network = Network::Testnet;
6883 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6884 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6886 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6887 // they have different dust limits.
6889 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6890 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6891 let config = UserConfig::default();
6892 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6894 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6895 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6896 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6897 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6898 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6900 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6901 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6902 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6903 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6904 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6906 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6907 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6908 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6910 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6911 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6912 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6913 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6916 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6918 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6919 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6920 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6921 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6922 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6924 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6925 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6926 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6927 payment_secret: None,
6928 payment_params: None,
6932 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6933 // the dust limit check.
6934 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6935 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6936 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6937 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6939 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6940 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6941 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6942 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6943 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6944 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6945 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6949 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6950 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6951 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6952 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6953 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6954 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6955 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6956 let seed = [42; 32];
6957 let network = Network::Testnet;
6958 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6960 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6961 let config = UserConfig::default();
6962 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6964 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6965 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6967 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6968 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6969 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6970 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6971 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6972 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6974 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6975 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6976 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6977 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6978 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6980 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6982 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6983 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6984 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6985 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6986 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6988 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6989 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6990 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6991 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6992 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6996 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6997 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6998 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7000 let seed = [42; 32];
7001 let network = Network::Testnet;
7002 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7003 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7004 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7006 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7008 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7009 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7010 let config = UserConfig::default();
7011 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7013 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7014 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7015 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7016 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7018 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7019 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7020 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7022 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7023 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7024 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7025 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7027 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7028 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7029 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7031 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7032 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7034 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7035 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7036 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7037 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7038 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7039 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7040 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7041 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7042 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7047 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7049 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7050 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7051 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7052 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7053 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7054 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7055 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7062 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7063 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7064 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7065 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7066 let seed = [42; 32];
7067 let network = Network::Testnet;
7068 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7069 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7070 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7072 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7073 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7074 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7075 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7076 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7077 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7078 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7079 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7081 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7082 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7083 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7084 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7085 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7086 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7088 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7089 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7090 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7091 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7093 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7095 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7096 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7097 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7098 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7099 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7100 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7102 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7103 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7104 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7105 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7107 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7108 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7109 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7110 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7111 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7113 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7114 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7116 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7117 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7118 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7120 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7121 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7122 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7123 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7124 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7126 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7127 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7129 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7130 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7131 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7135 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7137 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7138 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7139 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7141 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7142 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7143 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7144 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7146 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7147 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7148 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7150 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7152 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7153 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7156 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7157 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7158 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7160 let seed = [42; 32];
7161 let network = Network::Testnet;
7162 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7163 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7164 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7167 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7168 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7169 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7171 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7172 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7174 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7175 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7176 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7178 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7179 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7181 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7183 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7184 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7186 // Channel Negotiations failed
7187 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7188 assert!(result.is_err());
7193 fn channel_update() {
7194 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7195 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7196 let seed = [42; 32];
7197 let network = Network::Testnet;
7198 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7199 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7201 // Create a channel.
7202 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7203 let config = UserConfig::default();
7204 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7205 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7206 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7207 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7209 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7210 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7211 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7213 short_channel_id: 0,
7216 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7217 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7218 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7220 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7221 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7223 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7225 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7227 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7228 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7229 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7230 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7232 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7233 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7234 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7236 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7240 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7242 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7243 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7244 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7245 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7246 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7247 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7248 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7249 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7250 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7251 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7252 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7253 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7254 use crate::sync::Arc;
7256 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7257 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7258 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7261 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7263 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7264 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7265 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7266 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7267 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7268 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7270 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7271 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7276 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7277 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7278 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7280 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7281 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7282 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7283 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7284 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7285 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7287 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7289 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7290 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7291 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7292 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7293 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7294 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7296 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7297 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7298 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7299 selected_contest_delay: 144
7301 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7302 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7304 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7305 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7307 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7308 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7310 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7311 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7313 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7314 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7315 // build_commitment_transaction.
7316 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7317 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7318 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7319 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7320 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7322 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7323 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7324 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7325 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7329 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7330 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7331 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7332 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7336 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7337 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7338 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7340 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7341 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7343 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7344 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7346 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7348 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7349 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7350 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7351 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7352 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7353 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7354 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7356 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7357 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7358 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7359 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7361 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7362 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7363 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7365 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7367 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7368 commitment_tx.clone(),
7369 counterparty_signature,
7370 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7371 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7372 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7374 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7375 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7377 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7378 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7379 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7381 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7382 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7385 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7386 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7388 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7389 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7390 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7391 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7392 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7393 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7394 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7395 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7397 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7400 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7401 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7402 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7406 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7409 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7410 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7411 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7413 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7414 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7415 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7416 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7417 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7418 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7419 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7420 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7422 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7426 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7427 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7429 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7430 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7431 "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", {});
7433 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7434 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7435 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7436 "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", {});
7438 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7439 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7441 amount_msat: 1000000,
7443 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7444 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7446 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7449 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7450 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7452 amount_msat: 2000000,
7454 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7455 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7457 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7460 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7461 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7463 amount_msat: 2000000,
7465 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7466 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7467 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7469 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7472 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7473 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7475 amount_msat: 3000000,
7477 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7478 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7479 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7481 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7484 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7485 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7487 amount_msat: 4000000,
7489 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7490 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7492 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7496 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7497 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7498 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7500 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7501 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7502 "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", {
7505 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7506 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7507 "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" },
7510 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7511 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7512 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7515 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7516 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7517 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7520 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7521 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7522 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7525 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7526 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7527 "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" }
7530 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7531 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7532 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7534 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7535 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7536 "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", {
7539 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7540 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7541 "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" },
7544 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7545 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7546 "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" },
7549 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7550 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7551 "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" },
7554 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7555 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7556 "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" },
7559 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7560 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7561 "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" }
7564 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7565 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7566 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7568 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7569 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7570 "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", {
7573 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7574 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7575 "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" },
7578 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7579 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7580 "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" },
7583 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7584 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7585 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7588 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7589 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7590 "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" }
7593 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7594 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7595 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7596 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7598 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7599 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7600 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7603 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7604 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7605 "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" },
7608 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7609 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7610 "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" },
7613 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7614 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7615 "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" },
7618 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7619 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7620 "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" }
7623 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7624 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7625 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7626 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7628 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7629 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7630 "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", {
7633 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7634 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7635 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7638 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7639 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7640 "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" },
7643 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7644 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7645 "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" },
7648 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7649 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7650 "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" }
7653 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7654 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7655 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7657 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7658 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7659 "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", {
7662 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7663 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7664 "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" },
7667 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7668 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7669 "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" },
7672 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7673 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7674 "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" }
7677 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7678 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7679 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7681 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7682 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7683 "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", {
7686 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7687 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7688 "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" },
7691 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7692 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7693 "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" },
7696 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7697 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7698 "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" }
7701 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7702 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7703 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7705 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7706 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7707 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7710 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7711 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7712 "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" },
7715 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7716 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7717 "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" }
7720 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7721 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7722 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7723 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7725 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7726 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7727 "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", {
7730 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7731 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7732 "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" },
7735 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7736 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7737 "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" }
7740 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7741 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7742 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7743 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7745 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7746 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7747 "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", {
7750 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7751 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7752 "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" },
7755 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7756 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7757 "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" }
7760 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7761 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7762 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7764 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7765 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7766 "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", {
7769 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7770 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7771 "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" }
7774 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7775 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7776 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7777 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7779 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7780 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7781 "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", {
7784 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7785 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7786 "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" }
7789 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7790 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7791 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7792 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7794 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7795 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7796 "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", {
7799 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7800 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7801 "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" }
7804 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7805 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7806 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7807 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7809 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7810 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7811 "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", {});
7813 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7814 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7815 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7816 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7818 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7819 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7820 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7822 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7823 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7824 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7825 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7827 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7828 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7829 "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", {});
7831 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7832 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7833 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7835 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7836 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7837 "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", {});
7839 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7840 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7841 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7842 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7844 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7845 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7846 "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", {});
7848 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7849 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7850 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7851 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7853 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7854 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7855 "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", {});
7857 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7858 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7859 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7860 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7861 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7862 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7864 amount_msat: 2000000,
7866 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7867 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7869 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7872 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7873 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7874 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7876 amount_msat: 5000000,
7878 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7879 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7880 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7882 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7885 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7886 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7888 amount_msat: 5000000,
7890 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7891 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7892 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7894 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7898 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7899 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7900 "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", {
7903 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7904 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7905 "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" },
7907 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7908 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7909 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
7911 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7912 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7913 "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" }
7916 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7917 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7918 "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", {
7921 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7922 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7923 "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" },
7925 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7926 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7927 "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" },
7929 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7930 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7931 "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" }
7936 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7937 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7939 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7940 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7941 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7942 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7944 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7945 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7946 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7948 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7949 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7951 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7952 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7954 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7955 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7956 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7960 fn test_key_derivation() {
7961 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7962 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7964 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7965 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7967 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7968 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7970 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7971 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7973 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7974 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7976 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7977 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7979 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7980 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7982 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7983 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7987 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7988 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7989 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7990 let seed = [42; 32];
7991 let network = Network::Testnet;
7992 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7993 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7995 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7996 let config = UserConfig::default();
7997 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7998 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8000 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8001 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8003 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8004 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8005 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8006 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8007 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8008 assert!(res.is_ok());