1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
500 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
501 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
502 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
503 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
504 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
506 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
507 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
508 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
509 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
510 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
511 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
512 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
514 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
518 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
519 struct ClaimingPayment {
521 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
522 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
523 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
524 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
526 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
527 (0, amount_msat, required),
528 (2, payment_purpose, required),
529 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
530 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
531 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
534 struct ClaimablePayment {
535 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
537 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
540 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
541 struct ClaimablePayments {
542 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
543 /// failed/claimed by the user.
545 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
546 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
548 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
549 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
550 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
552 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
553 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
554 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
555 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
558 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
559 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
560 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
561 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
562 enum BackgroundEvent {
563 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
564 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
565 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
566 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
568 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
569 /// are regenerated on startup.
570 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
571 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
572 /// channel to continue normal operation.
574 /// In general this should be used rather than
575 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
576 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
577 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
579 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
580 /// are regenerated on startup.
581 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
582 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
583 funding_txo: OutPoint,
584 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
586 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
587 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
589 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
590 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
591 channel_id: ChannelId,
596 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
597 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
598 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
599 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
600 /// event can be generated.
601 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
602 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
603 /// operation of another channel.
605 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
606 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
607 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
608 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
610 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
611 event: events::Event,
612 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
616 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
617 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
618 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
619 (0, event, upgradable_required),
620 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
621 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
622 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
623 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
624 // downgrades to prior versions.
625 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
629 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
630 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
631 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
632 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
633 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
637 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
638 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
639 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
643 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
644 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
645 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
646 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
647 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
648 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
650 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
651 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
652 channel_id: ChannelId,
653 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
658 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
660 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
661 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
662 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
663 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
668 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
669 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
673 /// State we hold per-peer.
674 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
675 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
677 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
678 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
679 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
681 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
682 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
683 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
684 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
685 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
686 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
687 latest_features: InitFeatures,
688 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
689 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
690 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
691 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
692 /// user but which have not yet completed.
694 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
695 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
696 /// for a missing channel.
697 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
698 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
699 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
701 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
702 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
703 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
704 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
706 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
707 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
708 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
709 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
710 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
711 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
712 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
713 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
714 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
715 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
716 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
717 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
718 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
719 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
720 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
724 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
725 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
726 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
727 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
728 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
729 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
732 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
733 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
734 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
737 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
738 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
739 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
742 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
743 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
744 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
745 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
749 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
750 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
751 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
752 /// The original OpenChannel message.
753 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
754 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
755 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
758 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
759 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
760 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
762 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
763 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
765 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
768 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
769 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
770 struct PendingInboundPayment {
771 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
772 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
773 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
774 /// this payment being removed.
776 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
777 user_payment_id: u64,
778 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
779 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
780 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
783 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
784 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
785 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
786 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
787 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
788 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
789 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
790 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
792 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
793 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
801 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
803 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
804 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
805 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
810 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
811 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
812 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
813 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
814 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
815 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
816 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
817 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
818 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
820 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
821 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
830 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
832 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
833 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
834 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
839 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
840 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
841 $vis trait AChannelManager {
842 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
843 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
844 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
845 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
846 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
847 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
848 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
849 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
850 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
851 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
852 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
853 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
854 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
855 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
856 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
857 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
858 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
859 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
862 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
863 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
864 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
865 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
866 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
867 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
869 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
870 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
871 ES::Target: EntropySource,
872 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
873 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
874 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
878 type Watch = M::Target;
880 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
882 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
884 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
886 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
887 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
889 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
891 type Router = R::Target;
893 type Logger = L::Target;
895 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
898 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
899 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
901 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
902 /// to individual Channels.
904 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
905 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
906 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
907 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
909 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
910 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
911 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
912 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
913 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
914 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
915 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
917 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
918 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
919 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
921 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
922 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
923 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
924 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
925 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
927 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
928 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
929 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
930 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
932 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
933 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
934 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
936 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
937 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
938 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
939 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
940 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
942 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
943 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
944 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
945 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
946 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
947 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
948 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
949 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
952 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
953 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
954 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
955 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
956 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
960 // `total_consistency_lock`
962 // |__`forward_htlcs`
964 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
966 // |__`per_peer_state`
968 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
970 // | |__`claimable_payments`
972 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
978 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
980 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
984 // | |__`pending_events`
986 // | |__`pending_background_events`
988 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
990 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
991 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
992 ES::Target: EntropySource,
993 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
994 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
995 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
999 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1000 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1001 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1009 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1011 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1012 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1014 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1015 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1016 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1017 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1019 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1020 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1022 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1023 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1024 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1025 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1026 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1027 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1028 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1029 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1031 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1034 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1036 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1038 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1039 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1040 /// and via the classic SCID.
1042 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1043 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1045 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1047 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1049 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1050 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1051 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1053 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1054 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1056 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1057 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1059 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1060 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1062 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1063 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1064 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1065 /// active channel list on load.
1067 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1068 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1070 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1072 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1073 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1074 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1076 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1077 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1078 /// the handling of the events.
1080 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1081 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1084 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1085 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1086 /// would break backwards compatability.
1087 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1088 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1089 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1091 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1092 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1094 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1096 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1097 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1098 /// confirmation depth.
1100 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1101 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1102 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1104 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1106 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1108 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1110 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1112 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1114 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1115 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1116 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1118 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1119 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1121 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1122 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1123 /// keeping additional state.
1124 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1126 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1127 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1128 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1129 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1131 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1132 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1134 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1135 /// are currently open with that peer.
1137 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1138 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1141 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1143 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1144 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1145 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1146 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1147 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1149 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1150 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1151 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1152 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1153 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1155 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1156 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1158 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1159 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1160 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1161 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1162 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1164 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1165 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1167 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1168 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1169 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1170 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1171 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1173 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1175 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1177 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1178 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1179 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1180 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1181 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1182 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1183 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1184 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1185 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1187 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1189 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1193 signer_provider: SP,
1198 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1200 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1201 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1202 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1203 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1204 pub struct ChainParameters {
1205 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1206 pub network: Network,
1208 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1210 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1211 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1214 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1221 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1222 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1223 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1224 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1225 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1226 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1228 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1229 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1230 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1231 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1232 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1234 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1235 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1238 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1239 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1240 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1241 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1243 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1244 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1245 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1246 _read_guard: read_guard,
1251 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1252 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1253 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1254 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1256 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1257 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1258 should_persist: persist_check,
1259 _read_guard: read_guard,
1264 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1265 fn drop(&mut self) {
1266 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1267 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1272 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1273 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1275 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1277 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1278 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1279 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1280 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1281 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1283 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1284 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1286 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1288 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1289 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1290 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1291 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1292 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1293 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1294 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1295 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1296 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1297 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1298 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1299 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1300 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1302 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1303 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1305 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1306 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1307 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1308 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1310 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1311 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1312 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1313 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1314 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1315 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1318 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1320 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1321 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1324 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1326 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1327 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1329 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1330 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1331 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1333 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1334 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1335 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1337 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1338 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1339 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1340 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1342 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1343 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1344 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1346 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1347 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1348 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1350 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1351 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1352 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1353 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1354 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1355 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1356 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1357 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1358 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1359 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1360 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1363 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1364 /// to better separate parameters.
1365 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1366 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1367 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1368 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1369 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1370 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1371 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1372 pub features: InitFeatures,
1373 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1374 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1375 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1377 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1379 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1380 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1381 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1382 /// payments to us through this channel.
1383 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1384 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1385 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1386 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1387 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1388 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1389 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1392 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1394 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1395 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1398 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1399 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1400 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1401 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1402 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1403 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1404 /// lifetime of the channel.
1405 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1406 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1407 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1408 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1409 /// our counterparty already.
1411 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1412 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1413 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1414 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1416 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1417 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1418 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1419 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1421 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1422 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1424 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1425 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1427 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1428 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1429 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1430 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1431 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1432 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1433 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1434 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1435 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1438 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1440 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1441 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1442 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1443 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1444 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1445 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1446 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1448 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1449 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1451 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1452 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1453 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1454 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1455 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1456 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1457 /// this value on chain.
1459 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1461 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1463 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1464 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1465 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1466 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1467 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1468 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1469 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1471 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1472 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1473 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1474 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1475 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1476 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1478 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1479 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1480 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1481 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1482 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1483 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1485 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1486 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1487 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1488 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1489 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1490 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1491 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1492 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1494 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1495 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1496 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1497 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1498 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1499 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1500 /// route which is valid.
1501 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1502 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1503 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1504 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1505 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1506 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1508 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1509 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1510 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1511 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1512 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1513 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1514 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1515 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1516 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1518 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1520 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1521 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1522 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1523 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1524 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1526 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1527 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1528 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1529 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1530 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1531 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1532 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1534 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1535 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1536 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1537 pub is_outbound: bool,
1538 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1539 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1540 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1541 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1542 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1544 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1545 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1546 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1547 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1548 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1549 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1550 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1552 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1553 pub is_usable: bool,
1554 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1555 pub is_public: bool,
1556 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1557 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1558 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1559 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1560 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1561 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1563 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1564 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1567 impl ChannelDetails {
1568 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1569 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1570 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1572 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1573 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1574 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1575 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1578 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1579 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1580 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1582 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1583 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1584 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1585 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1588 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1589 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1590 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1593 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1594 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1597 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1598 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1600 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1601 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1602 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1603 features: latest_features,
1604 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1605 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1606 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1607 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1608 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1609 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1610 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1611 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1612 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1613 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1615 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1616 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1617 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1618 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1619 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1620 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1621 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1622 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1623 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1624 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1625 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1626 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1627 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1628 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1629 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1630 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1631 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1632 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1633 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1634 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1635 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1636 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1637 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1638 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1639 config: Some(context.config()),
1640 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1645 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1646 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1647 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1648 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1649 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1650 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1651 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1652 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1653 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1655 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1657 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1658 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1660 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1661 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1662 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1663 /// to drop the channel.
1667 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1668 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1669 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1670 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1671 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1673 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1674 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1675 payment_id: PaymentId,
1677 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1679 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1680 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1681 payment_id: PaymentId,
1682 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1684 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1685 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1686 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1689 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1690 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1691 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1693 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1694 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1695 payment_id: PaymentId,
1696 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1697 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1698 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1700 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1701 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1702 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1704 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1705 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1706 payment_id: PaymentId,
1707 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1708 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1712 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1714 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1716 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1717 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1718 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1719 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1721 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1722 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1723 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1726 macro_rules! handle_error {
1727 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1728 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1729 // entering the macro.
1730 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1731 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1735 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1736 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1738 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1739 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1740 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1741 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1745 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1746 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1747 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1748 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1749 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1750 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1755 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1756 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1758 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1759 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1760 action: err.action.clone()
1764 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1765 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1766 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1767 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1768 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1772 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1777 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1780 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1781 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1782 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1788 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1789 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1790 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1791 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1792 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1793 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1795 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1796 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1797 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1798 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1799 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1801 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1802 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1804 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1808 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1809 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1810 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1812 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1813 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1815 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1816 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1818 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1819 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1820 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1821 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1822 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1823 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1825 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1826 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1830 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1831 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1833 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1834 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1836 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1837 match $channel_phase {
1838 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1839 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1841 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1842 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1844 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1845 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1851 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1852 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1856 let key = *$entry.key();
1857 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1859 $entry.remove_entry();
1867 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1868 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1872 let key = *$entry.key();
1873 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1875 $entry.remove_entry();
1883 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1884 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1886 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1887 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1893 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1894 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1895 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1896 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1897 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1899 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1900 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1901 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1902 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1903 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1904 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1905 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1906 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1907 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1908 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1913 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1914 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1915 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1916 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1917 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1918 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1919 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1920 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1921 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1923 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1928 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1929 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1930 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1931 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1932 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1933 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1934 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1935 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1936 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1938 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1943 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1944 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1945 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1946 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1947 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1948 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1949 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1950 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1951 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1952 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1953 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1955 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1956 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1957 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1963 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1964 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1966 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1967 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1968 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1969 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1970 updates.announcement_sigs);
1971 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1972 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1975 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1976 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1977 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1979 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1981 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1982 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1984 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1985 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1986 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1987 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1992 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1993 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1994 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1995 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1996 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1997 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1999 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2000 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2001 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2004 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2005 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2006 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2007 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2008 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2009 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2010 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2011 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2015 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2021 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2022 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2023 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2024 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2026 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2027 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2028 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2029 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2031 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2033 debug_assert!(false);
2034 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2035 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2036 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2037 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2038 $chan_entry.remove();
2042 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2043 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2044 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2045 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2046 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2047 // filter for uniqueness here.
2048 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2049 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2050 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2051 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2053 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2054 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2055 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2057 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2058 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2059 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2063 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2064 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2065 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2066 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2068 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2070 debug_assert!(false);
2071 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2072 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2073 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2074 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2075 $chan_entry.remove();
2081 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2082 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2083 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2084 while !processed_all_events {
2085 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2089 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2092 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2093 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2094 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2096 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2097 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2098 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2100 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2101 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2102 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2103 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2107 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2108 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2109 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2110 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2113 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2115 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2116 $event_to_handle = event;
2118 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2119 post_event_actions.push(action);
2124 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2125 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2126 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2127 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2128 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2129 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2132 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2133 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2134 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2135 processed_all_events = false;
2138 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2139 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2145 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2147 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2148 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2149 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2150 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2151 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2152 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2156 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2158 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2160 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2161 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2163 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2165 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2166 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2167 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2170 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2171 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2172 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2174 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2175 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2176 current_timestamp: u32,
2178 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2179 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2180 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2181 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2183 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2184 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2185 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2190 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2192 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2193 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2194 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2195 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2196 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2197 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2198 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2199 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2201 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2204 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2205 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2207 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2209 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2211 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2213 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2214 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2215 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2216 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2217 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2218 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2228 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2229 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2230 &self.default_configuration
2233 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2234 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2235 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2238 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2239 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2241 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2243 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2247 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2252 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2254 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2255 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2256 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2257 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2258 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2260 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2261 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2263 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2264 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2265 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2267 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2268 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2269 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2271 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2272 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2273 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2274 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2275 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2276 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2278 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2279 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2280 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2281 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2282 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2283 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2287 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2288 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2292 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2293 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2295 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2297 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2298 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2299 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2300 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2301 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2302 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2306 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2311 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2313 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2314 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2317 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2319 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2325 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2326 node_id: their_network_key,
2329 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2332 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2333 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2334 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2335 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2336 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2337 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2338 // the same channel.
2339 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2343 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2346 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2347 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2348 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2349 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2353 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2354 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2355 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2363 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2364 /// more information.
2365 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2366 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2367 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2368 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2369 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2370 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2371 // the same channel.
2372 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2374 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2376 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2379 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2380 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2381 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2389 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2390 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2392 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2393 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2395 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2396 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2397 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2398 // really wanted anyway.
2399 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2402 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2403 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2404 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2407 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2410 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2411 let context_to_details = |context| {
2412 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2414 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2416 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2417 .map(context_to_details)
2423 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2424 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2426 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2427 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2428 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2430 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2431 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2432 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2433 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2434 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2435 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2437 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2438 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2439 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2441 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2442 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2443 payment_id: *payment_id,
2444 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2445 total_msat: *total_msat,
2448 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2449 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2451 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2452 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2454 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2459 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2460 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2461 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2462 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2463 Some(transaction) => {
2464 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2465 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2470 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2471 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2472 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2473 reason: closure_reason,
2474 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2475 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2479 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2482 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2483 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2487 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2488 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2493 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2494 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2495 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2496 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2497 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2498 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2499 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2500 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2502 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2503 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2504 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2505 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2506 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2510 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2511 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2512 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2513 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2516 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2517 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2518 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2519 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2523 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2532 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2533 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2535 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2536 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2539 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2540 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2541 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2542 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2545 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2549 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2550 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2551 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2553 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2554 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2556 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2557 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2558 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2559 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2561 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2563 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2564 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2565 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2568 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2569 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2570 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2571 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2572 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2573 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2576 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2577 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2578 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2580 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2581 /// the channel being closed or not:
2582 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2583 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2584 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2585 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2586 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2587 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2588 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2590 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2591 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2592 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2593 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2595 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2597 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2598 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2599 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2602 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2603 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2604 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2605 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2606 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2607 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2611 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2612 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2613 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2614 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2615 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2616 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2617 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2620 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2621 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2622 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2623 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2624 // ignore the result here.
2625 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2629 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2630 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2631 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2632 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2634 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2635 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2636 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2639 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2640 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2642 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2644 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2645 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2646 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2647 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2649 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2650 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2651 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2654 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2655 // Unfunded channel has no update
2656 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2659 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2660 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2661 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2662 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2664 (None, *peer_node_id)
2666 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2669 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2670 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2671 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2676 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2679 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2681 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2682 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2683 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2684 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2685 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2686 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2687 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2688 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2689 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2690 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2701 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2702 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2703 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2705 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2706 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2707 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2710 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2711 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2712 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2714 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2715 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2716 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2717 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2718 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2721 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2722 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2723 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2724 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2725 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2729 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2730 /// local transaction(s).
2731 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2732 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2733 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2737 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2738 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2739 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2740 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2741 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2742 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2743 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2745 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2746 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2750 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2751 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2752 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2753 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2754 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2755 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2756 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2757 err_data: Vec::new(),
2761 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2762 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2763 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2766 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2767 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2768 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2769 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2770 outgoing_cltv_value,
2771 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2775 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2776 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2777 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2778 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2779 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2780 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2781 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2782 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2784 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2786 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2787 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2788 err_data: Vec::new(),
2789 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2792 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2793 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2794 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2795 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2797 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2800 // final_expiry_too_soon
2801 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2802 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2804 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2805 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2806 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2807 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2808 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2809 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2810 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2811 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2812 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2813 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2814 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2817 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2818 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2819 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2821 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2823 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2824 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2828 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2829 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2830 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2831 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2832 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2833 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2834 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2835 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2836 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2837 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2838 err_data: Vec::new(),
2839 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2842 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2843 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2844 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2845 err_data: Vec::new(),
2846 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2849 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2853 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2856 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2857 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2860 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2861 phantom_shared_secret,
2865 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2866 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2867 err_data: Vec::new(),
2868 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2871 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2874 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2875 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2876 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2877 outgoing_cltv_value,
2878 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2882 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2883 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2884 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2885 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2886 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2888 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2889 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2890 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2891 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2892 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2893 failure_code: $err_code,
2899 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2900 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2903 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2904 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2905 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2907 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2908 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2909 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2910 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2911 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2912 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2913 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2914 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2916 macro_rules! return_err {
2917 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2919 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2920 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2921 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2922 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2923 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2924 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2930 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2932 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2933 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2935 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2936 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2939 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2940 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2941 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2942 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2945 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2946 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2947 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2949 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2950 // inbound channel's state.
2951 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2952 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2953 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2957 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2958 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2959 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2960 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2961 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2962 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2963 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2964 // phantom or an intercept.
2965 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2966 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2967 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2971 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2974 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2976 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2978 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2979 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2980 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2984 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2985 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2988 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2989 // have no consistency guarantees.
2990 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2994 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2995 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2996 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2997 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2998 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3000 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3001 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3002 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3003 // we don't have the channel here.
3004 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3006 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3008 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3009 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3010 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3011 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3012 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3013 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3014 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3015 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3016 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3017 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3018 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3020 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3023 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3024 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3026 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3027 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3031 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3032 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3033 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3034 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3036 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3043 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3044 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3045 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3046 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3047 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3048 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3050 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3051 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3053 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3054 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3055 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3056 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3057 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3058 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3059 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3060 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3061 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3062 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3068 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3069 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3070 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3071 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3073 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3074 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3076 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3077 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3078 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3080 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3081 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3082 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3083 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3084 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3085 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3086 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3090 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3092 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3095 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3096 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3097 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3098 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3099 macro_rules! return_err {
3100 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3102 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3103 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3104 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3105 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3106 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3107 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3113 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3115 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3116 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3119 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3120 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3121 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3122 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3123 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3125 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3128 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3129 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3130 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3131 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3132 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3138 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3139 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3140 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3142 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3143 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3144 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3146 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3147 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3148 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3149 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3150 return Err(LightningError {
3151 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3152 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3155 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3156 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3159 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3162 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3163 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3164 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3165 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3167 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3168 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3169 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3171 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3172 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3173 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3175 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3176 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3180 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3183 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3184 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3185 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3187 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3188 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3189 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3190 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3191 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3194 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3195 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3197 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3198 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3199 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3200 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3201 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3202 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3203 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3204 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3206 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3207 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3208 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3210 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3212 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3219 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3220 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3221 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3222 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3227 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3228 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3229 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3232 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3233 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3235 log_trace!(self.logger,
3236 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3237 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3238 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3239 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3241 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3242 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3243 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3245 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3246 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3248 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3249 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3250 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3251 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3255 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3256 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3259 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3260 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3261 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3262 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3263 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3265 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3266 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3267 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3269 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3270 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3272 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3273 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3274 Some(monitor_update) => {
3275 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3276 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3278 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3279 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3280 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3281 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3282 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3283 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3284 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3292 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3295 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3296 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3297 // `channel_by_id` map.
3298 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3299 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3304 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3305 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3307 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3312 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3314 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3315 /// fields for more info.
3317 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3318 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3320 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3322 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3323 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3324 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3325 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3326 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3328 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3329 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3330 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3331 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3332 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3334 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3335 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3336 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3337 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3339 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3341 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3342 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3343 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3345 /// In general, a path may raise:
3346 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3347 /// node public key) is specified.
3348 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3349 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3351 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3352 /// relevant updates.
3354 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3355 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3356 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3358 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3359 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3360 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3361 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3362 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3363 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3364 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3365 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3367 self.pending_outbound_payments
3368 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3369 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3370 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3373 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3374 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3375 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3376 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3377 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3378 self.pending_outbound_payments
3379 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3380 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3381 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3382 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3386 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3387 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3389 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3390 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3391 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3395 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3396 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3397 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3401 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3402 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3406 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3407 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3408 /// retries are exhausted.
3410 /// # Event Generation
3412 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3413 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3415 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3416 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3417 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3419 /// # Requested Invoices
3421 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3422 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3423 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3425 /// # Restart Behavior
3427 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3428 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3429 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3431 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3432 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3434 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3437 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3438 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3439 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3440 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3441 /// never reach the recipient.
3443 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3444 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3446 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3447 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3449 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3450 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3451 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3453 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3454 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3455 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3458 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3459 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3461 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3464 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3465 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3468 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3469 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3470 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3471 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3474 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3475 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3476 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3477 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3478 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3480 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3481 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3482 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3485 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3488 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3489 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3492 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3493 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3494 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3495 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3496 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3499 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3501 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3502 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3503 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3504 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3505 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3507 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3508 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3509 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3510 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3511 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3512 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3513 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3514 } else { unreachable!(); });
3516 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3517 Err((chan, err)) => {
3518 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3519 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3521 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3522 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3523 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3529 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3532 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3533 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3536 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3537 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3538 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3542 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3543 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3546 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3548 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3551 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3552 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3553 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3555 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3562 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3563 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3564 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3568 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3570 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3571 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3573 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3574 /// across the p2p network.
3576 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3577 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3579 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3580 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3581 /// keys per-channel).
3583 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3584 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3585 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3587 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3588 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3589 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3591 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3592 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3593 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3594 /// for more details.
3596 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3597 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3598 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3601 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3602 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3603 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3604 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3605 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3611 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3612 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3613 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3614 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3615 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3616 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3617 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3618 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3622 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3623 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3624 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3625 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3629 let mut output_index = None;
3630 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3631 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3632 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3633 if output_index.is_some() {
3634 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3635 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3638 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3641 if output_index.is_none() {
3642 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3643 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3646 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3650 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3652 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3653 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3654 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3655 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3657 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3658 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3660 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3661 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3663 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3665 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3666 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3667 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3668 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3669 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3670 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3671 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3672 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3673 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3674 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3675 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3676 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3677 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3683 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3684 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3685 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3687 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3688 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3689 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3690 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3694 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3695 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3696 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3697 config.apply(config_update);
3698 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3701 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3702 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3703 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3704 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3705 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3706 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3713 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3714 debug_assert!(false);
3715 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3717 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3718 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3725 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3727 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3728 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3729 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3730 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3732 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3733 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3735 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3736 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3738 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3740 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3741 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3742 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3743 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3744 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3745 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3746 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3747 pub fn update_channel_config(
3748 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3749 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3750 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3753 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3754 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3756 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3757 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3759 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3760 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3761 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3762 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3763 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3765 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3766 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3767 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3770 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3773 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3774 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3775 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3776 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3777 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3778 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3781 let next_hop_scid = {
3782 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3783 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3784 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3787 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3788 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3789 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3790 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3791 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3794 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3796 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3797 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3798 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3800 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3801 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3802 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3807 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3808 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3809 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3812 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3813 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3814 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3816 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3818 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3819 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3820 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3821 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3822 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3825 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3826 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3827 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3828 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3829 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3831 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3835 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3836 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3838 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3841 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3842 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3845 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3846 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3847 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3850 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3851 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3852 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3853 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3854 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3855 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3856 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3857 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3860 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3861 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3863 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3868 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3870 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3871 /// Will likely generate further events.
3872 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3875 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3876 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3877 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3879 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3880 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3882 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3883 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3884 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3886 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3887 match forward_info {
3888 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3889 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3890 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3891 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3892 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3895 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3896 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3897 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3899 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3900 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3901 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3902 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3903 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3904 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3905 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3908 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3909 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3911 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3914 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3915 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3921 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3922 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3924 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3928 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3929 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3931 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3935 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3936 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3937 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3938 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3939 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3941 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3942 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3943 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3944 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3945 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3947 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3949 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3950 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3954 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3955 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3956 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3957 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3959 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3960 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3966 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3969 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3972 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3973 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3974 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3975 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3976 // problem, not ours.
3982 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3983 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3985 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3990 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3991 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3992 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3995 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3996 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3997 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
3998 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3999 match forward_info {
4000 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4001 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4002 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4003 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4004 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4008 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4009 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4010 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4011 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4012 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4013 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4014 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4015 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4017 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4018 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4019 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4022 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4025 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4027 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4028 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4029 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4030 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4035 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4036 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4038 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4040 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4041 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4043 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4046 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4048 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4049 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4050 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4057 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4061 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4062 match forward_info {
4063 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4064 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4065 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4066 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4067 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4070 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4071 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4072 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4073 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4074 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4075 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4076 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4078 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4079 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4080 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4084 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4085 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4088 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4091 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4092 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4093 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4094 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4095 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4096 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4097 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4098 phantom_shared_secret,
4100 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4101 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4102 // if routing nodes overpay
4103 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4104 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4106 total_value_received: None,
4107 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4110 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4113 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4115 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4116 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4117 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4118 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4119 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4120 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4122 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4123 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4124 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4125 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4126 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4127 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4128 phantom_shared_secret,
4130 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4131 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4133 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4136 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4137 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4138 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4139 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4140 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4143 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4144 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4145 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4146 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4147 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4148 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4150 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4151 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4152 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4154 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4155 .entry(payment_hash)
4156 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4157 .or_insert_with(|| {
4158 committed_to_claimable = true;
4160 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4163 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4164 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4166 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4168 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4170 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4172 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4173 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4174 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4177 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4179 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4180 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4181 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4182 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4183 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4184 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4185 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4187 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4188 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4190 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4192 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4193 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4194 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4195 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4196 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4199 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4200 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4201 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4202 committed_to_claimable = true;
4204 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4205 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4206 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4207 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4208 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4209 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4210 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4211 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4212 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4213 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4218 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4219 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4220 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4221 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4223 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4225 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4226 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4228 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4229 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4230 committed_to_claimable = true;
4233 payment_claimable_generated
4237 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4238 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4239 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4240 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4241 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4242 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4243 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4244 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4246 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4247 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4248 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4249 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4250 Ok(result) => result,
4252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4253 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4256 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4257 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4258 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4260 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4261 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4264 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4265 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4266 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4268 check_total_value!(purpose);
4270 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4271 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4272 check_total_value!(purpose);
4276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4277 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4279 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4281 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4282 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4284 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4285 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4287 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4288 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4290 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4291 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4292 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4294 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4295 if payment_claimable_generated {
4296 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4302 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4303 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4311 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4312 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4313 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4314 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4316 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4317 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4319 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4321 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4322 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4323 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4325 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4327 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4328 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4329 events.append(&mut new_events);
4332 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4334 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4335 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4336 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4338 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4340 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4341 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4342 if background_events.is_empty() {
4343 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4346 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4348 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4349 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4350 // monitor updating completing.
4351 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4353 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4354 let mut updated_chan = false;
4356 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4357 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4360 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4362 updated_chan = true;
4363 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4364 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4371 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4372 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4374 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4375 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4376 // however, ensure that.
4378 log_error!(self.logger,
4379 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4381 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4383 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4385 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4388 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4389 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4391 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4392 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4393 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4394 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4395 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4401 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4404 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4405 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4406 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4407 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4408 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4411 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4412 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4413 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4414 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4416 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4417 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4419 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4421 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4422 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4425 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4427 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4428 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4432 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4433 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4434 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4435 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4436 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4437 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4438 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4440 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4441 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4444 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4447 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4448 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4450 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4455 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4456 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4464 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4466 /// This currently includes:
4467 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4468 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4469 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4471 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4472 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4473 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4474 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4476 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4477 /// estimate fetches.
4479 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4480 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4481 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4482 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4483 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4485 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4486 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4488 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4489 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4490 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4492 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4493 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4494 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4495 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4496 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4497 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4499 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4500 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4501 log_error!(self.logger,
4502 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4503 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4504 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4505 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4506 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4507 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4508 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4509 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4510 channel_id: *chan_id,
4511 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4522 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4523 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4526 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4527 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4528 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4530 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4531 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4536 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4537 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4539 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4540 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4541 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4542 if needs_close { return false; }
4545 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4546 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4547 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4548 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4549 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4550 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4551 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4552 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4554 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4555 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4556 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4557 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4561 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4563 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4566 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4568 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4569 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4570 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4571 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4575 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4577 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4583 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4585 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4586 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4587 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4588 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4589 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4591 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4592 channel_id: *chan_id,
4593 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4601 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4602 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4603 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4605 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4606 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4607 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4612 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4613 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4614 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4615 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4616 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4617 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4618 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4619 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4625 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4627 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4628 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4633 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4634 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4635 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4636 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4637 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4638 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4639 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4640 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4641 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4642 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4643 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4645 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4646 // have no channels to the peer.
4647 let remove_entry = {
4648 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4649 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4652 entry.remove_entry();
4655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4660 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4661 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4662 // This should be unreachable
4663 debug_assert!(false);
4666 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4667 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4668 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4669 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4670 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4671 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4672 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4675 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4676 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4677 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4679 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4680 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4687 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4688 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4689 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4690 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4691 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4694 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4695 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4698 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4700 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4701 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4702 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4703 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4704 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4711 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4712 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4713 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4715 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4716 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4717 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4718 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4720 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4721 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4722 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4723 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4724 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4725 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4728 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4729 /// reason for the failure.
4731 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4732 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4735 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4736 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4737 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4738 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4739 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4740 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4741 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4746 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4747 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4748 match failure_code {
4749 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4750 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4751 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4752 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4753 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4754 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4756 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4757 let fail_data = match data {
4758 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4761 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4766 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4767 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4769 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4771 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4772 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4773 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4774 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4775 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4776 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4777 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4779 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4781 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4782 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4784 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4789 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4790 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4791 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4792 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4793 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4794 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4795 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4796 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4797 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4798 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4800 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4801 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4802 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4803 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4805 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4806 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4807 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4808 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4809 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4813 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4814 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4815 // be surfaced to the user.
4816 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4817 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4818 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4820 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4822 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4827 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4828 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4830 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4831 debug_assert!(false);
4832 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4837 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4840 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4841 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4842 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4847 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4848 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4849 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4850 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4851 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4852 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4853 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4854 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4855 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4858 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4859 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4860 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4863 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4864 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4865 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4867 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4868 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4869 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4870 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4871 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4873 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4875 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4877 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4878 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4879 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4880 push_forward_ev = true;
4882 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4884 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4887 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4890 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4891 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4892 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4893 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4894 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4895 failed_next_destination: destination,
4901 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4902 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4904 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4905 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4906 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4907 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4909 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4910 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4911 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4912 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4914 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4915 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4916 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4918 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4919 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4920 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4921 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4922 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4923 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4924 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4925 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4926 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4929 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4930 /// even type numbers.
4934 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4935 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4937 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4938 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4939 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4942 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4943 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4948 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4949 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4950 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4951 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4952 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4953 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4954 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4955 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4960 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4961 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4962 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4963 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4964 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4966 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4967 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4968 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4972 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4973 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4974 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4975 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4976 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4977 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4978 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4979 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4980 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4981 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4991 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4993 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4994 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4995 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4996 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4997 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4998 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4999 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5000 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5001 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5003 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5004 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5005 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5006 debug_assert!(false);
5010 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5012 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5013 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5014 debug_assert!(false);
5018 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5019 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5021 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5022 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5023 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5024 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5027 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5028 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5029 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5030 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5034 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5035 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5036 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5037 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5039 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5040 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5041 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5042 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5043 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5048 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5049 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5050 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5051 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5052 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5053 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5054 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5056 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5059 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5060 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5061 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5062 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5066 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5067 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5068 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5069 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5071 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5072 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5073 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5074 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5079 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5080 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5084 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5085 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5086 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5089 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5092 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5093 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5094 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5095 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5097 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5098 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5101 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5104 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5105 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5106 if let Err(e) = res {
5107 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5108 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5109 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5110 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5111 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5114 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5115 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5116 // monitor update as a background event.
5117 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5118 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5119 counterparty_node_id,
5120 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5121 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5130 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5131 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5132 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5138 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5139 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5140 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5141 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5142 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5143 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5144 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5145 // again on restart.
5146 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5147 payment_preimage, update_res);
5150 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5151 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5153 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5154 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5155 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5156 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5157 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5158 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5159 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5160 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5161 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5162 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5165 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5166 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5167 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5168 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5169 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5170 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5174 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5175 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5178 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5181 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5182 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5183 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5184 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5185 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5187 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5188 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5191 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5192 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5193 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5194 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5195 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5196 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5197 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5200 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5201 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5203 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5204 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5205 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5206 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5208 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5212 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5213 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5214 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5220 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5221 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5222 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5225 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5226 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5228 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5229 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5230 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5232 payment_purpose: purpose,
5235 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5237 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5241 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5243 sender_intended_total_msat,
5247 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5248 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5250 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5251 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5252 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5259 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5260 /// update completion.
5261 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5262 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5263 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5264 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5265 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5266 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5268 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5269 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5270 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5271 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5272 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5273 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5275 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5277 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5278 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5279 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5280 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5283 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5284 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5286 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5287 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5288 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5293 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5294 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5295 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5296 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5301 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5302 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5303 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5304 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5305 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5310 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5314 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5320 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5321 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5322 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5326 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5327 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5328 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5334 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5335 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5337 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5338 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5340 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5341 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5342 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5343 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5344 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5350 let mut peer_state_lock;
5351 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5352 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5353 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5356 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5359 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5360 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5361 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5362 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5363 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5366 let remaining_in_flight =
5367 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5368 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5371 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5372 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5373 remaining_in_flight);
5374 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5377 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5380 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5382 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5383 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5386 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5387 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5388 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5390 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5391 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5392 /// used to accept such channels.
5394 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5395 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5396 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5397 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5400 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5401 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5403 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5404 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5405 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5407 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5408 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5410 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5411 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5413 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5414 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5416 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5417 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5418 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5419 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5422 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5423 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5425 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5426 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5428 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5429 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5432 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5434 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5435 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5436 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5438 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5439 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5440 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5441 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5442 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5443 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5444 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5446 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5450 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5451 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5452 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5453 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5454 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5455 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5456 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5459 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5462 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5463 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5464 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5465 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5466 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5467 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5468 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5469 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5472 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5473 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5477 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5478 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5479 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5481 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5482 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5483 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5486 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5491 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5492 /// or 0-conf channels.
5494 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5495 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5496 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5497 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5498 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5499 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5501 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5502 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5503 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5504 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5505 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5506 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5507 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5511 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5514 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5515 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5517 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5518 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5520 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5521 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5522 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5523 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5524 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5526 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5529 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5530 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5531 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5534 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5535 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5540 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5543 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5544 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5545 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5548 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5552 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5553 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5554 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5555 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5556 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5559 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5561 debug_assert!(false);
5562 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5567 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5568 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5569 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5570 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5571 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5572 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5575 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5576 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5580 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5581 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5582 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5583 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5586 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5587 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5589 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5592 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5593 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5594 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5595 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5596 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5597 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5598 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5599 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5600 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5602 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5603 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5604 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5609 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5610 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5611 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5612 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5613 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5614 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5615 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5623 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5624 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5625 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5627 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5631 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5632 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5635 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5636 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5638 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5642 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5643 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5645 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5647 debug_assert!(false);
5648 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5652 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5654 match phase.get_mut() {
5655 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5656 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5657 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5660 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5667 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5668 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5669 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5670 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5671 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5673 user_channel_id: user_id,
5678 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5679 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5682 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5684 debug_assert!(false);
5685 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5690 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5691 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5692 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5693 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5695 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5696 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5697 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5698 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5699 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5700 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5701 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5702 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5703 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5707 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5710 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5715 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5718 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5721 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5722 funding_msg.channel_id))
5724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5725 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5729 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5730 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5731 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5732 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5733 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5734 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5735 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5739 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5741 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5742 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5743 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5744 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5746 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5747 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5748 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5749 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5750 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5751 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5752 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5753 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5758 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5764 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5765 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5767 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5769 debug_assert!(false);
5770 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5777 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5778 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5779 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5780 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5781 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5782 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5783 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5784 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5785 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5786 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5787 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5788 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5802 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5804 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5806 debug_assert!(false);
5807 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5809 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5810 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5811 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5813 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5814 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5815 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5816 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5817 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5818 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5819 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5820 msg: announcement_sigs,
5822 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5823 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5824 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5825 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5826 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5827 // announcement_signatures.
5828 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5829 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5830 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5831 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5838 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5839 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5844 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5845 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5849 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5854 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5855 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5856 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5858 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5860 debug_assert!(false);
5861 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5865 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5866 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
5868 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5869 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
5870 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5872 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5875 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5876 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5877 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5878 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5880 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5881 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5882 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5883 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5884 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5885 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5889 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5890 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5891 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5892 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
5896 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5897 let context = phase.context_mut();
5898 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5899 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5900 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
5901 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
5906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5909 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5910 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5911 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5918 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5920 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5922 debug_assert!(false);
5923 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5925 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5926 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5928 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5930 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5931 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5932 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5933 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5934 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5939 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5940 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5941 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5942 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5943 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5944 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
5945 } else { (tx, None) }
5947 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5948 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
5951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5954 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5955 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5956 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5958 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
5959 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5962 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5966 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5971 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5972 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5973 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5974 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5976 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5977 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5978 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5979 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5981 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5983 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5985 debug_assert!(false);
5986 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5988 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5989 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5990 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5992 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5993 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5994 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5995 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5996 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5997 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5999 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6000 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6001 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6002 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6003 match pending_forward_info {
6004 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6005 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6006 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6007 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6009 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6010 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6011 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6012 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6013 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6016 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6018 _ => pending_forward_info
6021 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6023 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6024 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6032 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6034 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6038 debug_assert!(false);
6039 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6043 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6045 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6046 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6047 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6050 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6051 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6057 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
6061 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6063 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6065 debug_assert!(false);
6066 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6068 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6069 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6070 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6071 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6072 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6073 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6075 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6076 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6084 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6085 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6086 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6088 debug_assert!(false);
6089 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6093 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6095 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6096 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6097 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6099 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6100 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6102 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6103 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6111 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6113 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6115 debug_assert!(false);
6116 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6118 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6119 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6120 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6122 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6123 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6124 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6125 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6126 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6127 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6130 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6131 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6139 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6140 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6141 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6142 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6143 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6144 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6145 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6146 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6147 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6148 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6149 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6151 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6152 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6154 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6155 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6156 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6158 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6159 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6162 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6163 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6165 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6166 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6167 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6169 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6170 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6171 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6172 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6173 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6176 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6177 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6180 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6181 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6182 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6183 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6184 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6185 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6187 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6190 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6191 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6192 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6197 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6198 // payments are being processed.
6199 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6200 push_forward_event = true;
6202 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6203 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6210 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6214 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6215 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6216 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6218 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6222 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6223 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6224 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6225 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6226 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6228 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6229 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6230 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6231 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6232 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6233 // real by taking more time.
6234 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6235 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6236 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6241 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6242 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6243 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6244 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6245 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6246 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6247 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6249 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6250 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6251 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6252 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6253 channel_funding_outpoint,
6254 counterparty_node_id,
6259 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6260 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6262 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6264 debug_assert!(false);
6265 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6266 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6268 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6270 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6271 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6272 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6273 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6274 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6275 *counterparty_node_id)
6277 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6278 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6279 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6280 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6281 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6282 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6283 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6285 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6287 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6288 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6294 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6298 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6300 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6302 debug_assert!(false);
6303 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6307 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6309 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6310 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6312 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6313 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6316 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6321 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6322 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6323 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6325 debug_assert!(false);
6326 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6330 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6332 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6333 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6337 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6338 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6339 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6340 msg, &self.default_configuration
6341 ), chan_phase_entry),
6342 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6343 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6344 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6347 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6348 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6356 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6357 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6358 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6359 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6361 // It's not a local channel
6362 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6366 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6367 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6368 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6372 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6374 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6375 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6376 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6377 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6378 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6379 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6380 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6384 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6385 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6386 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6387 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6389 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6390 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6393 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6394 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6399 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6402 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6404 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6409 debug_assert!(false);
6410 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6414 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6416 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6417 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6418 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6419 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6420 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6421 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6422 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6423 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6424 let mut channel_update = None;
6425 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6426 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6427 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6430 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6431 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6432 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6433 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6434 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6435 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6436 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6441 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6442 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6443 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6444 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6445 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6446 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6450 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6451 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6458 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6459 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6462 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6463 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6468 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6469 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6470 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6472 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6473 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6474 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6475 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6476 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6477 match monitor_event {
6478 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6479 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6481 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6484 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6485 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6489 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6490 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6491 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6492 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6494 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6495 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6496 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6497 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6500 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6502 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6505 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6506 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6507 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6508 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6509 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6510 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6514 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6515 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6517 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6519 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6520 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6521 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6522 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6523 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6531 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6532 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6538 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6539 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6542 has_pending_monitor_events
6545 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6546 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6547 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6549 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6551 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6554 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6555 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6556 /// update was applied.
6557 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6558 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6559 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6560 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6562 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6563 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6564 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6565 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6568 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6571 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6572 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6573 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6575 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6576 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6577 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6578 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6579 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6580 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6582 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6583 has_monitor_update = true;
6585 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6586 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6587 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6588 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6590 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6592 continue 'peer_loop;
6601 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6602 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6603 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6606 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6607 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6613 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6614 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6615 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6616 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6617 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6618 let mut has_update = false;
6620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6622 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6625 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6626 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6628 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6629 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6630 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6631 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6633 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6634 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6637 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6638 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6639 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6640 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6641 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6646 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6648 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6649 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6650 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6656 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6657 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6662 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6668 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6669 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6675 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6676 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6678 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6679 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6680 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6681 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6682 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6683 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6684 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6685 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6686 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6687 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6688 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6689 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6690 assert!(should_broadcast);
6691 } else { unreachable!(); }
6692 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6693 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6694 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6697 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6701 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6704 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6705 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6707 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6708 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6709 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6710 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6712 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6714 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6715 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6719 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6720 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6722 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6724 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6725 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6727 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6728 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6729 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6730 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6731 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6732 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6733 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6734 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6735 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6736 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6737 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6740 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6741 /// stored external to LDK.
6743 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6744 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6745 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6747 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6748 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6751 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6752 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6753 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6754 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6756 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6757 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6758 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6759 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6760 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6762 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6763 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6764 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6765 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6766 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6768 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6769 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6771 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6772 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6776 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6777 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6779 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6781 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6782 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6784 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6785 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6786 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6787 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6788 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6789 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6790 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6793 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6794 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6796 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6797 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6798 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6801 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6802 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6804 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6805 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6806 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6807 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6809 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6810 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6811 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6812 Some(_) => continue,
6813 None => return scid_candidate
6818 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6820 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6821 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6823 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6824 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6825 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6829 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6830 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6831 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6833 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6834 /// times to get a unique scid.
6835 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6836 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6837 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6839 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6840 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6841 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6842 return scid_candidate
6846 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6847 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6848 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6849 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6852 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6855 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
6856 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
6858 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6859 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6860 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6869 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6870 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6871 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6872 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6873 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6877 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6878 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6879 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6880 events.push_back((event, None));
6884 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6885 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6886 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6890 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6891 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6895 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6896 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6899 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6900 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6901 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6902 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6903 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6904 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6907 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6908 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6911 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6912 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6913 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6914 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6916 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6920 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6921 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6922 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6923 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6924 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6926 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6930 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6931 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6932 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6933 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6934 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6935 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6936 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6937 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
6939 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6941 if further_update_exists {
6942 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6947 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6948 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6953 log_debug!(self.logger,
6954 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6955 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6959 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6960 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6961 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6965 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6966 for action in actions {
6968 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6969 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6971 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6977 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6978 /// using the given event handler.
6980 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6981 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6985 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6989 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6991 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6992 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6993 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6994 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6995 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6996 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7000 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7001 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7002 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7003 /// is always placed next to each other.
7005 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7006 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7007 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7008 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7010 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7011 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7012 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7013 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7014 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7015 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7016 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
7018 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7019 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7020 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7021 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7024 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7025 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7027 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7028 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7031 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7037 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7041 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7042 events.replace(pending_events);
7051 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7053 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7054 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7055 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7056 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7057 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7058 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7062 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7064 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7065 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7066 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7068 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7072 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7074 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7075 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7076 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7077 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7078 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7079 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7083 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7085 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7086 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7087 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7088 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7089 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7092 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7093 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7096 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7098 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7099 let new_height = height - 1;
7101 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7102 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7103 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7104 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7105 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7106 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7109 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7113 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7115 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7116 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7117 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7118 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7119 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7120 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7124 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7125 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7126 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7127 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7129 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7130 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7133 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7134 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7135 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7137 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7138 if height < last_best_block_height {
7139 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7140 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7144 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7145 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7146 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7147 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7149 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7150 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7153 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7154 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7156 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7158 macro_rules! max_time {
7159 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7161 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7162 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7163 // having an explicit local time source.
7164 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7165 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7166 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7167 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7168 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7174 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7175 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7176 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7177 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7181 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7182 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7183 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7186 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7187 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7188 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7195 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7197 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7198 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7199 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7200 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7201 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7202 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7203 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7208 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7219 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7220 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7222 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7223 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7224 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7225 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7226 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7228 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7229 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7232 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7235 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7236 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7238 // Retain unfunded channels.
7239 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7240 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7241 let res = f(channel);
7242 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7243 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7244 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7245 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7246 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7248 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7249 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7250 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7252 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7254 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7264 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7265 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7268 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7271 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7272 msg: announcement_sigs,
7274 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7275 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7276 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7278 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7279 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7280 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7285 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7286 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7287 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7288 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7289 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7290 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7291 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7292 // is always consistent.
7293 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7294 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7295 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7296 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7297 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7300 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7301 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7302 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7303 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7304 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7305 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7306 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7310 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7311 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7312 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7313 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7314 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7315 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7316 data: reason_message,
7328 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7329 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7330 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7331 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7332 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7333 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7334 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7335 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7336 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7337 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7339 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7340 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7341 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7345 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7348 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7349 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7350 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7351 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7352 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7353 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7354 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7355 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7356 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7357 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7360 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7361 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7362 _ => unreachable!(),
7364 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7365 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7366 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7373 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7375 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7380 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7382 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7383 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7385 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7386 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7389 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7390 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7391 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7394 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7395 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7396 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7397 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7400 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7401 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7402 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7403 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7406 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7407 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7409 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7410 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7411 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7412 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7413 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7416 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7417 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7418 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7419 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7422 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7423 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7424 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7425 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7428 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7429 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7430 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7431 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7435 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7436 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7438 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7439 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7440 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7441 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7442 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7443 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7447 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7449 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7452 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7453 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7454 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7455 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7458 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7460 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7463 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7464 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7465 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7466 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7469 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7474 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7476 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7479 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7484 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7489 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7494 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7499 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7504 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7509 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7514 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7519 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7524 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7529 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7531 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7534 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7535 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7536 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7537 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7538 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7540 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7545 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7547 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7550 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7552 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7553 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7555 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7556 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7557 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7560 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7561 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7562 let context = match phase {
7563 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7564 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7565 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7566 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7571 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7572 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7575 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7579 // Clean up for removal.
7580 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7581 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7584 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7585 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7586 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7587 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7589 // V1 Channel Establishment
7590 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7591 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7592 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7594 // V2 Channel Establishment
7595 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7597 // Common Channel Establishment
7598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7599 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7600 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7604 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7605 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7606 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7608 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7610 // Channel Operations
7611 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7616 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7619 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7620 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7621 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7629 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7630 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7631 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7632 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7635 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7637 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7639 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7640 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7644 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7645 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7646 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7652 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7653 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7654 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7655 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7656 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7657 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7660 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7661 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7663 if inbound_peer_limited {
7666 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7667 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7668 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7669 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7670 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7671 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7672 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7673 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7678 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7679 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7681 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7682 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7683 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7684 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7689 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7690 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7695 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7698 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7699 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7700 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7701 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7703 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7704 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7705 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7706 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7707 // worry about closing and removing them.
7708 debug_assert!(false);
7712 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7713 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7714 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7718 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7722 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7725 match &msg.data as &str {
7726 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7727 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7729 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7730 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7731 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7732 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7733 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7734 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7735 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7736 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7739 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7740 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7741 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7742 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7743 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7744 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7749 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7750 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7751 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7752 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7753 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7755 log_level: Level::Trace,
7765 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7766 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7768 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7769 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7770 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7772 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7773 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7774 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7775 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
7777 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7778 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7779 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7783 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7785 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7786 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7789 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7790 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7792 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7800 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7801 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7805 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7806 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7809 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7810 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7813 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7814 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7817 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7818 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7819 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7820 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7823 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7824 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7825 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7826 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7829 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7830 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7831 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7832 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7835 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7836 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7837 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7838 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7841 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7842 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7843 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7844 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7847 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7848 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7849 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7850 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7853 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7854 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7855 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7856 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7859 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7860 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7861 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7862 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7865 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7866 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7867 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7868 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7872 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7873 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7874 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7875 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7876 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7880 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7881 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7883 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7884 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7885 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7886 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7887 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7890 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7891 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7892 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7893 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7896 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7897 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7898 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7899 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7902 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7903 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7904 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7905 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7906 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7907 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7908 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7909 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7910 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7911 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7912 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7913 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7914 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7915 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7916 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7917 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7918 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7919 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7920 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7921 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7926 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7927 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7929 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7930 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7931 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7932 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7935 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7936 (2, node_id, required),
7937 (4, features, required),
7938 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7939 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7940 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7941 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7944 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7945 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7946 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7947 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7948 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7949 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7950 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7951 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7952 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7953 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7954 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7955 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7956 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7957 (7, self.config, option),
7958 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7959 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7960 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7961 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7962 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7963 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7964 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7965 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7966 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7967 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7968 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7969 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7970 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7971 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7972 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7973 (32, self.is_public, required),
7974 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7975 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7976 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7977 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7978 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7984 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7985 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7986 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7987 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7988 (2, channel_id, required),
7989 (3, channel_type, option),
7990 (4, counterparty, required),
7991 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7992 (6, funding_txo, option),
7993 (7, config, option),
7994 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7995 (9, confirmations, option),
7996 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7997 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7998 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7999 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8000 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8001 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8002 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8003 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8004 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8005 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8006 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8007 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8008 (26, is_outbound, required),
8009 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8010 (30, is_usable, required),
8011 (32, is_public, required),
8012 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8013 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8014 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8015 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8016 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8019 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8020 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8021 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8022 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8023 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8025 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8029 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8031 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8032 outbound_scid_alias,
8036 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8037 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8039 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8040 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8041 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8042 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8043 confirmations_required,
8045 force_close_spend_delay,
8046 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8047 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8048 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8049 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8050 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8051 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8052 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8053 channel_shutdown_state,
8058 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8059 (2, channels, required_vec),
8060 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8061 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8064 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8066 (0, onion_packet, required),
8067 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8070 (0, payment_data, required),
8071 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8072 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8073 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8074 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8076 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8077 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8078 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8079 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8080 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8081 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8085 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8086 (0, routing, required),
8087 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8088 (4, payment_hash, required),
8089 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8090 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8091 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8092 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8096 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8097 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8099 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8101 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8102 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8103 reason.write(writer)?;
8105 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8106 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8109 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8110 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8111 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8112 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8119 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8120 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8121 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8124 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8125 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8126 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8127 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8131 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8132 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8133 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8134 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8135 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8138 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8139 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8140 // messages contained in the variants.
8141 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8142 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8143 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8145 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8146 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8147 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8148 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8149 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8152 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8153 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8154 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8155 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8156 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8158 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8163 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8168 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8169 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8170 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8171 (2, outpoint, required),
8172 (4, htlc_id, required),
8173 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8174 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8177 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8178 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8179 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8180 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8181 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8183 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8184 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8185 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8186 (2, self.value, required),
8187 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8188 (4, payment_data, option),
8189 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8190 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8191 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8192 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8198 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8199 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8200 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8201 (0, prev_hop, required),
8202 (1, total_msat, option),
8203 (2, value_ser, required),
8204 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8205 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8206 (5, total_value_received, option),
8207 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8208 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8209 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8211 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8212 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8213 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8215 if payment_data.is_some() {
8216 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8218 if total_msat.is_none() {
8219 total_msat = Some(value);
8221 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8224 if total_msat.is_none() {
8225 if payment_data.is_none() {
8226 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8228 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8230 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8234 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8237 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8238 total_value_received,
8239 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8241 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8242 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8247 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8248 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8249 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8252 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8253 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8254 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8255 let mut payment_id = None;
8256 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8257 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8258 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8259 (0, session_priv, required),
8260 (1, payment_id, option),
8261 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8262 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8263 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8264 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8266 if payment_id.is_none() {
8267 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8269 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8271 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8272 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8273 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8275 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8276 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8277 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8278 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8282 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8283 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8284 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8286 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8289 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8290 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8295 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8296 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8298 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8300 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8301 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8302 (0, session_priv, required),
8303 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8304 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8305 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8306 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8307 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8308 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8311 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8313 field.write(writer)?;
8320 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8321 (0, forward_info, required),
8322 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8323 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8324 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8325 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8328 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8330 (0, htlc_id, required),
8331 (2, err_packet, required),
8336 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8337 (0, payment_secret, required),
8338 (2, expiry_time, required),
8339 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8340 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8341 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8344 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8346 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8348 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8349 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8350 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8356 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8358 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8360 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8362 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8363 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8364 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8367 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8370 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8371 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8374 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8375 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8378 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8379 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8383 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8385 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8388 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8389 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8390 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8393 channel.write(writer)?;
8399 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8400 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8401 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8402 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8403 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8404 for forward in pending_forwards {
8405 forward.write(writer)?;
8410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8412 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8413 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8414 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8416 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8417 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8418 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8419 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8420 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8421 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8422 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8423 htlc.write(writer)?;
8425 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8426 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8429 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8430 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8431 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8432 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8433 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8434 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8435 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8438 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8439 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8440 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8441 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8442 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8444 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8445 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8446 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8447 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8448 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8449 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8450 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8455 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8456 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8457 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8458 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8459 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8460 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8461 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8462 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8463 0u64.write(writer)?;
8465 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8466 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8467 event.write(writer)?;
8471 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8472 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8473 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8474 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8475 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8476 0u64.write(writer)?;
8478 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8479 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8480 // likely to be identical.
8481 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8482 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8484 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8485 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8486 hash.write(writer)?;
8487 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8490 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8491 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8492 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8493 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8494 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8497 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8498 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8500 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8501 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8502 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8503 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8506 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8507 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8508 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8509 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8513 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8514 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8515 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8517 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8518 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8519 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8525 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8526 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8527 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8528 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8531 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8532 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8533 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8534 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8535 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8538 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8539 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8540 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8541 if !updates.is_empty() {
8542 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8543 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8548 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8549 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8550 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8551 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8552 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8553 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8554 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8555 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8556 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8557 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8558 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8559 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8560 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8567 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8568 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8569 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8570 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8573 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8574 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8575 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8576 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8577 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8578 // check that the event is sane here.
8579 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8580 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8581 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8582 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8588 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8589 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8590 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8591 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8592 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8593 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8596 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8597 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8598 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8599 events.push_back((ev, action));
8600 } else if action.is_some() {
8601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8609 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8610 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8611 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8612 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8613 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8616 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8618 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8620 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8621 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8622 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8623 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8624 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8625 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8626 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8627 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8628 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8629 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8630 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8631 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8632 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8634 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8635 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8637 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8638 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8640 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8641 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8642 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8643 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8644 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8645 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8647 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8648 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8650 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8651 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8652 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8653 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8654 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8655 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8659 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8660 pub entropy_source: ES,
8662 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8663 pub node_signer: NS,
8665 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8666 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8668 pub signer_provider: SP,
8670 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8672 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8673 pub fee_estimator: F,
8674 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8676 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8677 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8678 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8679 pub chain_monitor: M,
8681 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8682 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8683 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8684 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8685 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8686 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8688 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8690 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8691 /// deserialization.
8693 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8694 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8695 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8697 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8698 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8700 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8701 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8702 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8703 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8705 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8708 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8709 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8712 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8713 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8715 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8717 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8718 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8719 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8720 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8724 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8725 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8726 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8727 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8728 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8730 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8731 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8736 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8737 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8738 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8739 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8741 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8742 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8743 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8744 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8745 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8746 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8750 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8751 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8752 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8756 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8757 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8759 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8760 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8761 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8762 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8763 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8764 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8768 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8769 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8771 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8772 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8773 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8775 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8777 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8778 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8779 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8780 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8781 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8782 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8783 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8784 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8785 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8786 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8788 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8789 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8790 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8791 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8792 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8793 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8794 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8795 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8796 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8797 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8798 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8799 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8800 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8802 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
8803 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
8804 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
8806 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
8807 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
8808 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8810 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
8811 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
8812 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8814 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8815 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8816 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8817 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8820 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8821 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8822 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8823 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8824 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8825 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8826 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8828 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8829 let mut found_htlc = false;
8830 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8831 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8834 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8835 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8836 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8837 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8838 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8839 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8840 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8841 log_info!(args.logger,
8842 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8843 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
8844 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8848 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8849 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8850 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8851 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8852 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8854 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8855 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8857 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8859 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8860 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8863 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8864 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8865 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8869 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8870 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8871 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8872 // safely discard the channel.
8873 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8874 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8875 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8876 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8877 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8878 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8879 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8882 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
8883 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8884 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8885 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8886 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8887 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8891 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8892 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8893 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8894 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
8895 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8896 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8897 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8899 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8903 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8904 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8905 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8906 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8907 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8908 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8909 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8910 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8911 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8913 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8916 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8917 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8918 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8919 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8920 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8921 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8922 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8923 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8925 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8928 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8931 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8932 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8933 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8934 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8935 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8936 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8937 is_connected: false,
8941 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8942 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8943 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8944 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8945 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8946 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8947 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8948 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8951 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8952 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8953 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8954 for _ in 0..event_count {
8955 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8956 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8961 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8962 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8963 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8965 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8966 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8967 // on-startup monitor updates.
8968 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8969 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8971 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8975 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8976 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8978 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8979 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8980 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8981 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8982 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8986 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8987 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8988 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8989 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8990 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8991 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8992 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8994 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8995 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8999 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9000 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9001 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9002 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9003 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9004 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9005 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9006 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9007 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9008 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9009 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9010 let mut events_override = None;
9011 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9012 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9013 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9014 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9015 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9016 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9017 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9018 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9019 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9020 (8, events_override, option),
9021 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9022 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9023 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9024 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9026 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9027 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9030 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9031 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9034 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9035 pending_events_read = events;
9038 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9039 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9042 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9043 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9044 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9045 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9046 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9047 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9049 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9051 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9052 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9053 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9056 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9057 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9058 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9059 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9060 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9062 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9063 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9064 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9066 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9067 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9068 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9069 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9070 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9072 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9073 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9074 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9075 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9076 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9077 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9078 pending_background_events.push(
9079 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9080 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9081 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9082 update: update.clone(),
9085 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9086 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9087 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9088 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9089 pending_background_events.push(
9090 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9091 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9092 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9095 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9096 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9097 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9099 max_in_flight_update_id
9103 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9106 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9107 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9108 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9110 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9111 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9112 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9113 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9114 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9115 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9116 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9117 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9118 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9121 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9122 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9123 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9124 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9125 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9126 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9127 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9128 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9129 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9130 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9131 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9134 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9135 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9136 debug_assert!(false);
9137 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9142 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9143 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9144 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9145 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9146 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9147 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9148 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9149 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9151 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9152 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9153 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9155 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9156 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9157 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9158 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9159 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9160 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9161 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9162 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9167 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9168 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9170 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9171 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9172 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9173 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9176 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9177 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9178 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9179 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9180 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9181 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9182 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9184 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9185 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9186 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9187 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9188 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9189 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9190 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9191 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9194 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9195 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9196 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9197 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9199 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9200 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9201 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9204 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9205 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9206 retry_strategy: None,
9207 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9208 payment_params: None,
9209 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9210 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9211 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9212 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9213 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9214 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9215 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9216 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9217 total_msat: path_amt,
9218 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9220 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9221 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9226 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9229 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9230 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9231 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9233 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9234 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9235 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9236 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9237 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9238 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9239 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9240 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9241 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9242 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9243 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9248 !forwards.is_empty()
9250 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9251 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9252 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9253 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9254 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9255 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9256 intercepted_id != ev_id
9263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9264 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9265 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9266 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9267 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9268 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9269 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9270 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9271 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9272 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9273 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9275 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9276 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9277 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9279 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9280 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9281 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9288 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9289 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9291 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9293 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9294 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9295 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9296 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9297 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9298 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9299 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9300 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9301 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9304 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9305 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9306 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9307 // channel still live case here.
9311 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9312 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9317 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9318 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9319 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9320 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9321 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9322 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9323 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9324 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9328 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9329 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9331 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9332 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9333 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9334 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9336 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9337 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9340 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9341 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9343 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9344 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9346 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9349 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9350 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9351 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9353 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9357 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9358 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9359 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9360 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9363 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9364 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9365 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9366 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9367 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9368 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9369 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9370 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9372 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9373 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9377 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9379 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9381 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9382 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9384 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9385 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9390 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9391 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9393 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9395 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9397 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9398 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9399 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9404 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9405 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9408 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9409 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9410 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9411 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9413 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9414 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9415 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9417 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9418 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9419 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9420 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9421 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9422 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9424 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9425 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9426 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9427 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9428 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9429 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9433 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9434 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9435 debug_assert!(false);
9436 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9441 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9443 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9444 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9445 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9446 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9447 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9448 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9449 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9450 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9451 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9452 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9453 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9455 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9456 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9458 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9459 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9460 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9461 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9463 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9464 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9465 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9466 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9468 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9469 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9470 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9471 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9473 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9474 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9475 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9478 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9479 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9482 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9483 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9486 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9489 purpose: payment.purpose,
9490 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9491 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9492 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9498 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9499 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9500 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9501 for action in actions.iter() {
9502 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9503 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9504 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9506 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9507 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9508 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9509 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9511 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9512 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9513 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9514 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9520 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9522 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9523 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9527 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9529 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9530 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9531 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9532 router: args.router,
9534 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9536 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9537 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9538 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9539 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9541 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9542 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9543 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9544 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9545 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9546 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9548 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9553 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9555 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9557 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9558 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9559 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9560 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9561 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9562 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9564 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9565 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9566 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9568 logger: args.logger,
9569 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9572 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9573 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9574 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9575 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9576 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9579 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9580 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9581 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9582 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9583 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9584 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9587 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9588 //connection or two.
9590 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9596 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9597 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9598 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9599 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9600 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9601 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9602 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9603 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9604 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9605 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9606 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9607 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9608 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9609 use crate::util::test_utils;
9610 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9611 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9614 fn test_notify_limits() {
9615 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9616 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9617 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9618 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9620 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9622 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9623 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9624 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9625 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9626 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9628 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9630 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9631 // to connect messages with new values
9632 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9633 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9634 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9635 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9636 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9637 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9639 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9640 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9641 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9642 // ... but the last node should not.
9643 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9644 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9645 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9646 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9648 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9649 // about the channel.
9650 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9651 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9652 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9654 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9656 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9657 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9658 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9659 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9660 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9661 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9663 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9664 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9665 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9667 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9668 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9669 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9670 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9671 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9672 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9674 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9675 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9676 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9677 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9678 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9679 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9681 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9683 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9684 // the channel info has updated.
9685 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9686 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9687 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9688 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9689 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9690 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9694 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9695 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9700 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9701 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9703 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9704 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9705 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9706 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9708 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9709 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9710 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9711 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9712 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9713 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9714 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9715 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9717 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9718 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9719 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9721 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9722 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9723 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9725 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9727 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9728 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9729 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9731 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9732 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9733 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9735 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9736 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9737 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9738 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9739 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9740 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9741 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9742 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9743 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9745 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9746 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9747 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9751 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9753 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9754 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9755 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9756 // lightning messages manually.
9757 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9758 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9761 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9763 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9764 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9766 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9767 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9769 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9770 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9772 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9773 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9774 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9776 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9777 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9778 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9780 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9782 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9784 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9785 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9788 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9789 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9790 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9793 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9794 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9795 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9796 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9798 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9801 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9802 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9803 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9804 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9811 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9812 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9813 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9816 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9817 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9818 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9819 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9820 // fails as expected.
9821 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9822 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9823 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9824 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9825 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9826 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9829 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9830 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9831 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9832 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9834 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9835 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9837 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9838 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9839 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9841 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9842 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9843 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
9844 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
9845 let route = find_route(
9846 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9847 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9849 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9850 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9852 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9854 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9855 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9858 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9859 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9860 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9861 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9862 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9864 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9865 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9866 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9867 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9868 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9869 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9870 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9871 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9872 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9874 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9875 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9877 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9878 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9879 let route = find_route(
9880 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9881 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9883 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9884 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9888 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9889 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9890 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9892 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9893 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9894 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9895 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9897 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9898 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9899 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9900 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9905 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9907 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9908 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9909 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9910 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9911 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9912 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9913 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9914 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9915 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9917 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9918 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9920 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9921 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9922 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9923 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9925 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9927 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9928 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9929 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9931 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9932 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9933 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9936 let route = find_route(
9937 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9938 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9940 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9941 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9942 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9944 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9945 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9946 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9947 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9948 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9951 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9954 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9955 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9956 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9957 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9958 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9959 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9960 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9961 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9962 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9964 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9965 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9969 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9970 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9971 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9975 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9977 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9978 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9980 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9981 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9982 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
9983 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9984 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9985 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9986 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9987 let route = find_route(
9988 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9989 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9992 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9993 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9994 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9995 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9996 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9997 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10000 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10001 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10002 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10003 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10004 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10005 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10006 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10008 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10012 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10013 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10014 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10015 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10016 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10022 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10023 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10025 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10026 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10027 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10028 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10029 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10030 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10031 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10032 let route = find_route(
10033 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10034 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10037 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10038 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10039 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10040 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10041 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10042 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10043 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10044 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10047 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10048 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10049 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10050 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10051 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10052 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10053 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10055 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10059 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10062 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10063 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10065 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10066 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10067 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10068 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10070 // Marshall an MPP route.
10071 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10072 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10073 route.paths.push(path);
10074 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10075 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10076 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10077 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10078 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10079 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10081 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10082 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10084 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10085 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10087 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10092 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10096 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10098 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10100 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10101 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10103 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10104 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10106 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10109 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10110 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10111 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10112 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10113 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10114 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10117 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10120 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10121 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10126 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10127 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10129 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10130 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10131 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10133 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10134 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10136 total_msat: 100_000,
10139 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10140 // payment verification fails as expected.
10141 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10142 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10143 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10144 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10146 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10150 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10151 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10155 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10156 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10157 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10158 // the channel is successfully closed.
10159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10162 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10164 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10165 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10166 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10167 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10168 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10170 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10171 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10173 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10174 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10175 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10176 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10179 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10181 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10182 // as it has the funding transaction.
10183 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10184 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10185 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10188 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10190 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10192 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10194 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10195 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10196 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10198 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10201 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10202 // as it has the funding transaction.
10203 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10204 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10205 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10208 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10209 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10211 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10212 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10213 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10214 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10216 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10217 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10218 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10219 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10221 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10222 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10224 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10225 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10226 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10227 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10228 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10229 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10230 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10234 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10235 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10236 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10237 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10238 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10239 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10240 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10243 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10245 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10246 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10247 // closing transaction).
10248 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10249 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10250 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10252 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10253 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10254 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10255 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10256 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10259 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10261 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10263 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10264 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10267 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10269 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10270 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10273 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10274 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10275 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10278 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10279 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10280 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10283 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10285 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10286 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10288 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10289 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10291 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10292 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10297 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10298 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10299 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10300 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10301 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10302 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10303 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10304 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10307 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10308 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10309 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10311 // Test the API functions.
10312 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10314 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10316 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10318 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10320 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10322 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10324 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10328 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10329 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10335 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10337 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10338 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10340 let mut funding_tx = None;
10341 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10342 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10343 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10346 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10347 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10348 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10349 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10350 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10352 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10354 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10356 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10358 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10360 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10362 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10365 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10366 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10367 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10368 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10369 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10371 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10372 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10374 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10375 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10376 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10377 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10378 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10379 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10380 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10383 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10384 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10385 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10386 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10387 }, true).unwrap_err();
10389 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10390 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10391 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10392 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10393 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10394 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10395 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10397 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10398 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10400 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10401 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10402 }, true).unwrap_err();
10404 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10405 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10406 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10407 }, false).unwrap();
10408 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10410 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10411 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10413 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10414 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10416 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10417 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10419 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10420 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10421 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10423 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10424 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10425 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10427 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10428 // "protected" and can connect again.
10429 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10430 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10431 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10433 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10435 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10437 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10438 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10442 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10443 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10449 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10451 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10452 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10454 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10455 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10456 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10457 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10460 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10462 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10463 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10464 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10466 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10467 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10468 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10470 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10471 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10472 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10473 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10477 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10478 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10479 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10482 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10483 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10487 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10489 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10490 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10492 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10493 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10494 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10495 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10496 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10497 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10500 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10501 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10503 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10504 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10508 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10509 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10512 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10513 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10514 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10515 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10516 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10518 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10519 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10521 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10522 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10523 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10524 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10530 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10531 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10533 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10534 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10535 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10537 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10538 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10540 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10542 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10546 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10547 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10548 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10549 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10550 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10551 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10552 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10553 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10555 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10556 payment_metadata: None,
10557 keysend_preimage: None,
10558 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10559 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10561 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10563 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10564 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10565 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10566 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10567 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10569 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10570 } else { panic!(); }
10572 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10573 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10575 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10576 payment_metadata: None,
10577 keysend_preimage: None,
10578 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10579 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10581 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10583 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10584 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10588 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10589 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10590 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10591 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10592 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10594 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10595 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10600 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10601 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10603 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10604 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10606 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10607 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10608 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10609 match &msg_events[0] {
10610 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10611 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10613 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10614 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10615 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10621 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10622 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10624 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10625 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10628 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10632 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10633 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10634 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10635 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10636 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10638 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10639 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10640 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10642 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10644 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10645 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10646 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10648 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10649 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10651 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10652 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10657 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10658 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10660 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10661 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10663 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10664 // not have generated any events.
10665 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10669 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10670 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10671 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10672 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10673 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10675 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10676 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10678 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10679 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10680 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10682 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10683 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10684 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10685 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10688 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10689 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10692 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10693 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10696 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10697 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10698 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10699 ..Default::default()
10701 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10702 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10705 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10706 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10709 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10710 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10711 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10712 ..Default::default()
10714 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10715 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10716 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10717 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10719 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10720 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10723 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10724 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10725 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10726 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10727 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10730 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10731 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10732 ..Default::default()
10734 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10737 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10738 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10739 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10740 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10744 fn test_payment_display() {
10745 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10746 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10747 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10748 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10749 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10750 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10756 use crate::chain::Listen;
10757 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10758 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10759 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10760 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10761 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10762 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10763 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10764 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10765 use crate::util::test_utils;
10766 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10768 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10769 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10770 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10772 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10774 use criterion::Criterion;
10776 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10777 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10778 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10779 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10780 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10781 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10782 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10784 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10785 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10787 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10788 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10790 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10792 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10795 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10796 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10799 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10800 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10801 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10803 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10804 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10806 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10807 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10808 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10809 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10810 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10812 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10813 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10814 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10816 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10817 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10818 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10819 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10821 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10822 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10823 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10825 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10826 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10827 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10828 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10829 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10831 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10832 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10833 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10835 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10836 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10838 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10839 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10840 }, false).unwrap();
10841 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10842 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10843 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10846 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10847 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10848 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10850 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10851 } else { panic!(); }
10853 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10854 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10855 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10856 match events_b[0] {
10857 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10858 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10863 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10864 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10865 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10866 match events_a[0] {
10867 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10868 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10873 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10875 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10876 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10877 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10879 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10880 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10881 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10882 match msg_events[0] {
10883 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10884 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10885 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10889 match msg_events[1] {
10890 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10894 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10895 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10896 match events_a[0] {
10897 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10898 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10903 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10904 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10905 match events_b[0] {
10906 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10907 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10912 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10913 macro_rules! send_payment {
10914 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10915 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10916 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10917 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10918 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10919 payment_count += 1;
10920 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10921 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10923 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10924 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
10925 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
10926 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10927 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10928 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10929 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10930 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10931 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10932 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10933 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10936 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10937 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10938 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10940 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10941 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10942 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10943 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10944 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10946 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10949 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10950 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10951 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10952 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10954 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10958 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10959 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10960 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);