1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
595 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
598 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
601 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
602 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
603 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
604 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
605 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
611 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
612 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
615 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
619 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
620 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
621 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
624 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
625 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
635 let channel_value = 5000;
637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
638 let channel_id = chan.2;
639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
640 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
641 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
643 let opt_anchors = false;
645 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
646 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
647 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
649 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
650 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
653 *feerate_lock = feerate;
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
657 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
663 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
665 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
667 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
668 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
669 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
670 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
671 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
672 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
676 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
677 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
680 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
681 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
684 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
686 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
687 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
688 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
689 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
690 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
691 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
692 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
693 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
696 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
703 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
706 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
707 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
708 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
711 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
712 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
713 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
714 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
715 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
716 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
718 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
719 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
720 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
721 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
723 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
725 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
728 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
731 htlc_signatures: res.1
734 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
736 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
741 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
742 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
743 //Should produce and error.
744 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
745 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
747 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
748 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
756 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
757 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
763 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
769 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
770 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
771 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
773 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
778 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
779 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
782 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
784 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
785 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
787 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
788 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
789 added_monitors.clear();
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
793 // node[1] has nothing to do
795 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
800 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
803 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
805 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
807 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
812 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
815 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
817 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
825 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
826 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
830 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
834 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
837 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
841 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
843 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
845 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 fn test_update_fee() {
852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
856 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
857 let channel_id = chan.2;
860 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
861 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
862 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
863 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
864 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
865 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
866 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
867 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
868 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
869 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
870 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
873 // Create and deliver (1)...
876 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
877 feerate = *feerate_lock;
878 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
880 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
883 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
884 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
885 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
886 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
887 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
893 // Generate (2) and (3):
894 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
895 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
899 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
900 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
903 // Create and deliver (4)...
905 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
906 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
908 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
910 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
911 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
912 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
913 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
914 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
919 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
923 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
926 // Handle (3), creating (6):
927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
929 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
939 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
944 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
948 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
950 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
951 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
955 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
959 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
961 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
965 fn fake_network_test() {
966 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
967 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
971 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
973 // Create some initial channels
974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
976 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
978 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
984 // Send some more payments
985 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
989 // Test failure packets
990 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
991 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
993 // Add a new channel that skips 3
994 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
996 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006 hops.push(RouteHop {
1007 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1012 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1030 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1034 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035 hops.push(RouteHop {
1036 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1041 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1063 // Claim the rebalances...
1064 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1067 // Close down the channels...
1068 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086 // commitment dance rounds.
1087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1094 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1102 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1107 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1110 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1112 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1118 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1121 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1130 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1142 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1144 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1149 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1161 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1178 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1182 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1189 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1205 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1212 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1214 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1217 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1220 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1235 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1242 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1246 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1251 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1254 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1263 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1265 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1270 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1283 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1302 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1307 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1327 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1330 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1336 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1338 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1348 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1359 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1364 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1366 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1372 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1378 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1380 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1384 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1386 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1388 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1397 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1403 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1413 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1417 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1421 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1423 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1426 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1429 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1432 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1439 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1442 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1445 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1448 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1451 htlc_signatures: res.1
1454 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1458 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1461 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1466 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1470 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1476 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1489 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494 let opt_anchors = false;
1496 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1499 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1501 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1503 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1508 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524 let opt_anchors = false;
1526 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1534 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1539 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1549 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577 let opt_anchors = false;
1579 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1587 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591 // commitment transaction fee.
1592 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1594 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1599 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615 let opt_anchors = false;
1617 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1619 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1624 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1632 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634 match msg_events[0] {
1635 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1652 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1659 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1682 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1687 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692 // Add a pending HTLC.
1693 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694 let payment_event_1 = {
1695 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1704 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1710 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1720 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1749 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1774 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1777 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1780 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1782 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1790 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1795 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1797 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1799 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1805 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1811 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1814 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1824 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1830 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1837 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1844 // adding pending output.
1845 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860 let payment_event_1 = {
1861 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1879 // split the rest to test holding cell
1880 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1889 // now see if they go through on both sides
1890 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1906 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913 // flush the pending htlc
1914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1960 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1963 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1964 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1965 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1967 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1973 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1974 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1975 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1977 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1992 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1993 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1996 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1997 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1998 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1999 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2002 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2006 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2007 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2008 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2009 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2010 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2011 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2012 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2013 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2016 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2017 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2018 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2019 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2020 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2021 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2022 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2025 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2026 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2027 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2028 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2033 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2035 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2036 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2037 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2038 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2039 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2041 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2044 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2051 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052 // initial fulfill/CS.
2053 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2054 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2056 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2058 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2059 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2060 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2061 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2063 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2065 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2066 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2068 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2072 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2075 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2079 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2081 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2087 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2089 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2090 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2091 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2092 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2093 // on-chain as necessary).
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2095 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2097 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2098 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2100 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2104 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2105 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2107 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2108 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2109 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2111 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2112 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2114 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2115 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2116 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2118 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2125 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2126 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2132 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2139 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2141 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2142 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2144 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2146 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2148 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2152 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2154 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2155 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2159 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2160 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2161 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2165 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2167 // Create some initial channels
2168 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2178 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2180 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2187 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2191 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2193 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2195 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2197 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2198 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2199 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2200 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2203 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2204 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2206 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2207 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2208 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2212 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2214 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2215 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2217 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2220 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2221 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2222 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2223 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2225 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2226 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2228 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2229 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2230 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2232 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2235 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2246 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2251 let node2_commitment_txid;
2253 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2258 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2260 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2268 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2270 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271 // confusing us in the following tests.
2272 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2274 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2276 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2279 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2290 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2297 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2299 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2307 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2309 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2312 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2322 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2330 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2334 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2339 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2340 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2341 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2346 fn test_justice_tx() {
2347 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2348 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2349 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2350 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2352 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2353 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2356 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2357 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2362 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2364 // Create some new channels:
2365 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2367 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2368 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2369 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2370 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2377 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2378 // Revoke the old state
2379 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2382 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2386 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2388 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2389 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2390 node_txn.truncate(1);
2392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2393 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2394 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2396 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2398 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2399 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2401 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2403 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2404 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2406 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2408 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2411 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2412 // Create some new channels:
2413 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2415 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2419 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2422 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2427 // Revoke the old state
2428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2433 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2434 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2436 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2440 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2442 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2444 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2447 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2450 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2451 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2452 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2456 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2457 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2458 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2462 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2463 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2464 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2465 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2467 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2468 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2469 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2470 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2472 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2473 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2475 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2476 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2477 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2479 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2480 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2482 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2483 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2490 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2491 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2492 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2493 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2498 // Create some new channel:
2499 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2501 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2503 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2504 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2505 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2507 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2508 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2514 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2515 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517 //Revoke the old state
2518 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2521 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2524 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2526 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2527 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2530 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2531 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2534 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2537 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2541 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2542 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2543 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2545 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2546 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2547 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2549 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2550 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2551 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2552 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2553 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2555 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2562 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2563 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2564 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2567 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2569 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2571 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2572 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2573 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2574 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2575 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2576 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2578 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2579 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2581 //Revoke the old state
2582 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2585 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2587 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2589 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2591 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2592 match events.last().unwrap() {
2593 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2597 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2598 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2600 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2601 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2603 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2604 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2607 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2608 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2611 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2614 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2616 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2620 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2621 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2625 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2626 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2627 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2629 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2630 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2633 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2634 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2635 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2637 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2639 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2644 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2645 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2646 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2647 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2648 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2649 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2650 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2651 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2653 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2654 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2655 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2656 // PaymentSent event).
2658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2661 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663 // Create some initial channels
2664 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2667 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2668 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2670 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2671 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2673 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2677 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2680 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2681 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2682 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2683 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2684 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2685 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2686 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2687 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2688 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2690 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2691 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2692 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2693 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2694 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2696 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2697 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2699 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2700 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2705 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2714 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2715 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2716 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2717 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2719 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2722 added_monitors.clear();
2724 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2725 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2726 match forwarded_events[0] {
2727 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2730 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2731 match forwarded_events[1] {
2732 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2733 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2734 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2735 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2736 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2740 match forwarded_events[2] {
2741 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2742 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2743 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2744 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2745 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2749 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2751 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 added_monitors.clear();
2757 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2759 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2763 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2764 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2769 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2770 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2772 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2773 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2777 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2778 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2779 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2780 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2781 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2782 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2784 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2785 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2786 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2790 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2795 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2799 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2803 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2804 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2805 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2806 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2808 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2809 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2810 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2811 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2815 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2816 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2817 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2818 let commitment_spend =
2819 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2821 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2822 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2825 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2826 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2827 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2831 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2832 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2833 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2836 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2838 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2839 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2840 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2841 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2842 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2844 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2845 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2846 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2847 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2850 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2851 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2852 let mut first_claimed = false;
2853 for event in events {
2855 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2856 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2857 assert!(!first_claimed);
2858 first_claimed = true;
2860 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2861 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2864 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2865 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2869 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2872 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2873 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2874 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2875 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2876 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2877 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2879 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2881 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2885 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2889 // Create some intial channels
2890 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2893 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2897 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2899 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2900 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2901 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2902 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2907 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2910 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2911 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2912 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2915 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2919 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2920 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2922 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2923 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2924 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2925 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2926 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2928 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2929 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2930 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2931 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2932 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2935 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2938 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2940 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2941 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2943 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2944 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2948 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2952 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2954 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2956 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2958 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2960 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2963 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2964 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2966 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2973 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2974 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2975 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2977 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2978 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2982 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2983 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2984 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2985 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001 // and fail backward accordingly.
3003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3008 // Create some initial channels
3009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3010 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3012 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015 // Revoke the old state
3016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3018 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049 // commitment transaction anymore.
3050 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3057 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3067 // Create some initial channels
3068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3071 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075 // Revoke the old state
3076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3078 let value = if use_dust {
3079 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3084 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3088 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3091 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3092 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3093 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3096 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3097 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3098 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3099 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3101 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3110 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3111 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3113 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3114 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3115 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3118 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3129 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3130 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3132 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3133 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3134 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3137 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3138 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3139 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3140 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3141 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3147 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3148 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3150 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3153 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3157 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3160 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3161 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3164 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3167 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3169 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3171 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3172 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3174 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3175 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3178 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3179 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3185 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3188 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3189 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3190 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3191 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3192 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3193 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3202 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3203 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3204 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3207 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3209 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3210 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3216 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3217 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3218 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3219 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3220 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3221 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3226 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3227 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3228 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3229 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3230 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3231 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3232 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3234 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3235 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3236 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3238 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3240 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3241 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3243 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3244 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3245 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3246 // that we should update our routing table for.
3247 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3248 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3254 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3255 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3256 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3262 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3263 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3272 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3273 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3277 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3278 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3279 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3280 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3281 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3285 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3286 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3287 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3288 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3289 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3293 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3297 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3298 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3300 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3302 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3303 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3306 let payment_event = {
3307 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3309 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3311 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3312 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3315 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3316 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3318 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3324 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3326 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3328 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3329 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3330 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3331 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3332 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3333 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3335 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3336 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3342 onion_routing_packet,
3344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3346 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3348 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3350 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3351 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3356 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3357 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3361 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3366 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3367 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3368 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3369 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3372 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3373 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3375 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3376 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3377 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3378 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3380 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3382 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3386 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3387 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3388 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3392 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3393 // registering new transactions
3394 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3395 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3399 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3400 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3404 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3406 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3408 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3410 let mut payment_event = {
3411 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3414 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3416 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3422 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3424 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3425 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3426 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3427 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3430 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3431 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3433 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3435 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3436 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3437 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3439 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3440 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3442 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3444 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3445 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3446 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3447 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3448 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3452 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3454 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3459 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3461 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3462 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3464 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3465 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3466 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3468 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3469 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3470 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3472 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3476 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3477 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3478 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3479 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3480 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3488 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3490 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3491 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3493 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3494 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3495 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3497 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3498 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3500 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3501 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3505 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3506 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3507 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3513 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3514 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3515 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3517 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3518 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3519 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3521 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3522 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3524 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3526 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3527 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3529 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3530 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3533 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3536 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3537 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3538 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3539 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3541 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3542 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3546 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3547 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3551 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3553 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3555 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3557 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3559 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3560 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3562 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3564 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3565 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3566 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3568 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3569 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3570 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3571 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3573 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3574 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3576 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3577 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3581 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3582 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3584 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3585 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3586 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3591 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3592 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3593 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3604 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3607 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3608 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3614 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3615 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3616 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3617 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3618 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3619 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3620 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3622 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3625 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3627 let payment_event = {
3628 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3631 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3633 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3635 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3637 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3638 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3640 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3641 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3642 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3644 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3647 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3648 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3651 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3652 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3653 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3654 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3657 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3658 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3659 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3667 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3668 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3669 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3670 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3671 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3672 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3674 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3675 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3676 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3678 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3679 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3681 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3682 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3683 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3684 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3685 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3686 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3687 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3688 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3689 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3691 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3692 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3693 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3694 // Everything was delivered...
3695 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3698 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3699 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3700 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3702 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3706 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3712 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3717 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3718 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3719 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3721 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3723 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3724 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3726 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3727 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3728 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3730 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3731 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3732 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3734 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3742 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3744 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3745 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3746 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3747 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3748 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3749 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3750 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3751 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3752 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3753 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3754 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3762 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3763 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3765 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3766 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3767 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3773 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3775 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3777 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3778 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3779 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3782 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3784 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3785 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3788 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3798 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3799 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3800 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3801 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3802 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3803 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3805 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3807 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3808 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3809 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3810 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3811 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3812 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3813 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3814 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3815 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3816 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3817 // Everything was delivered...
3818 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3821 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3822 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3825 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3826 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3827 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3829 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3830 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3833 // Channel should still work fine...
3834 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3835 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3836 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3840 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3841 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3842 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3843 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3848 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3849 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3850 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3851 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3856 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3857 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3858 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3859 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3860 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3864 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3865 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3867 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3869 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3870 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3871 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3872 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3873 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3874 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3876 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3877 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3878 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3882 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3883 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3884 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3888 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3889 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3891 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3893 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3894 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3895 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3898 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3899 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3901 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3905 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3906 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3909 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3910 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3912 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3913 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3914 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3915 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3916 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3917 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3918 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3920 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3921 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3922 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3924 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3925 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3926 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3931 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3932 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3933 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3939 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3940 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3942 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3943 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3944 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3945 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3946 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3947 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3949 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3950 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3951 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3952 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3954 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3955 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3957 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3958 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3960 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3962 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3963 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3964 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3965 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3966 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3967 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3968 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3969 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3970 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3974 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3975 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3976 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3977 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3978 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3979 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3982 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3983 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3984 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3985 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3986 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3987 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3988 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3991 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3992 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3993 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3996 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3997 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3998 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4001 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4002 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4007 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4008 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4010 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4011 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4013 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4014 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4015 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4017 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4023 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4024 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4027 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4028 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4031 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4032 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4033 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4034 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4035 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4036 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4037 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4039 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4041 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4042 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4043 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4044 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4045 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4046 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4047 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4048 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4050 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4052 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4053 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4054 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4057 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4060 let mut block = Block {
4061 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4064 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4065 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4066 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4067 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4068 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4069 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4070 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4076 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4079 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4082 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4084 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4085 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4086 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4087 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4091 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4092 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4093 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4096 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4097 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4098 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4101 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4102 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4103 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4105 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4106 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4107 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4108 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4110 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4111 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4113 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4115 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4118 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4119 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4120 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4121 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4124 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4125 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4126 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4131 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4132 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4133 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4134 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4137 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4139 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4140 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4141 match fail_commit[0] {
4142 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4143 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4146 _ => unreachable!(),
4148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4150 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4155 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4156 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4157 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4160 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4161 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4163 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4164 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4165 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4166 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4167 for event in events.drain(..) {
4169 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4170 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4171 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4172 all_outputs.push(outp);
4175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4178 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4179 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4189 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4190 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4191 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4192 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4193 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4194 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4196 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4201 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4203 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4204 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4206 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4207 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4209 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4210 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4211 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4212 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4213 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4217 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4218 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4219 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4223 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4225 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4226 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4227 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4229 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4231 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4232 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4233 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4234 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4236 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4237 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4239 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4240 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4242 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4243 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4244 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4248 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4249 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4250 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4255 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4257 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4258 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4259 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4260 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4261 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4263 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4264 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4267 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4269 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4270 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4271 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4273 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4274 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4275 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4276 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4277 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4281 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4287 // Create some initial channels
4288 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4290 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4292 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4293 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4294 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4296 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4297 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4298 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4300 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4302 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4304 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4308 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4309 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4312 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4313 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4314 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4315 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4316 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4317 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4318 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4320 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4321 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4322 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4324 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4325 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4326 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4330 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4334 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4336 // Create some initial channels
4337 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4339 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4340 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4342 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4344 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4345 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4346 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4348 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4349 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4351 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4353 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4354 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4356 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4358 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4359 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4360 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4361 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4362 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4363 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4366 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4367 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4368 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4370 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4371 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4372 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4373 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4374 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4378 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4384 // Create some initial channels
4385 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4387 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4388 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4389 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4390 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4392 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4394 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4395 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4397 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4399 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4400 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4401 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4402 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4404 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4405 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4407 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4408 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4409 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4413 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4414 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4415 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4420 // Create some initial channels
4421 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4423 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4424 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4428 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4430 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4431 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4432 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4434 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4435 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4437 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4438 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4439 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4440 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4441 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4442 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4443 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4445 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4446 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4447 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4448 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4450 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4452 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4453 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4454 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4455 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4456 // transactions next...
4457 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4458 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4460 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4461 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4462 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4463 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4465 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4466 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4469 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4470 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4472 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4473 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4475 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4476 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4477 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4478 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4479 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4483 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4484 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4485 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4490 // Create some initial channels
4491 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4493 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4494 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4495 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4496 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4498 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4499 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4501 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4503 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4504 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4505 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4507 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4508 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4510 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4511 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4512 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4513 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4515 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4516 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4519 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4520 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4521 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4522 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4524 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4526 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4527 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4529 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4530 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4531 // transactions next...
4532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4533 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4534 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4535 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4537 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4538 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4541 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4542 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4544 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4546 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4547 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4549 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4550 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4552 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4553 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4554 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4555 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4556 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4557 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4558 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4559 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4563 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4564 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4565 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4566 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4567 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4569 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4575 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4577 // Create some initial channels
4578 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4579 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4581 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4582 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4583 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4585 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4587 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4588 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4589 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4591 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4592 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4593 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4594 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4595 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4597 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4598 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4599 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4600 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4601 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4603 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4604 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4606 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4608 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4609 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4610 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4611 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4612 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4613 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4614 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4615 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4616 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4617 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4619 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4620 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4621 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4626 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4630 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4631 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4632 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4633 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4634 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4639 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4640 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4641 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4642 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4646 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4647 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4648 match msg_events[0] {
4649 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4652 match msg_events[1] {
4653 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4656 match msg_events[2] {
4657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4658 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4659 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4660 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4661 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4662 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4667 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4668 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4669 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4670 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4671 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4672 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4673 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4674 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4675 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4676 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4677 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4678 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4680 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4685 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4686 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4687 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4688 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4689 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4692 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4693 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4694 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4695 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4697 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4698 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4700 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4701 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4704 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4705 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4706 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4707 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4708 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4710 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4712 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4713 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4714 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4715 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4716 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4717 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4718 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4719 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4721 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4722 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4723 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4725 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4726 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4728 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4729 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4731 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4732 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4733 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4734 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4735 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4736 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4738 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4739 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4741 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4742 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4743 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4746 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4747 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4749 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4750 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4753 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4754 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4755 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4756 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4758 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4761 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4762 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4764 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4766 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4767 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4773 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4774 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4776 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4777 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4778 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4779 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4780 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4781 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4782 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4783 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4784 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4785 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4786 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
4787 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
4788 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4790 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4791 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4792 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4793 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4794 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4795 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4796 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4797 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4798 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4801 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4804 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4806 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4808 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4809 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4810 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4811 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
4812 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4813 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4814 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4815 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4816 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4817 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4818 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4821 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4822 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4824 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4826 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4827 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4828 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4835 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4836 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4837 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4839 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4841 // Create some initial channels
4842 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4844 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4845 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4846 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4847 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4848 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4850 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4851 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4852 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4855 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4857 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4858 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4860 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4864 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4865 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4868 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4869 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4871 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
4872 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4874 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4878 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4879 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4881 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4882 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4883 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4884 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4885 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4886 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4889 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4890 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4891 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4892 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4893 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4894 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4895 // use the same payment hashes.
4896 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4901 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4904 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4905 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4906 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4907 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4909 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4910 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4912 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4913 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4914 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4915 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4916 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4918 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4919 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4920 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4921 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4923 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4925 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4927 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4928 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4930 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4932 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4934 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4936 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4937 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4939 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4941 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4944 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4946 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4947 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4950 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4952 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4953 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4955 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4956 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4957 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4958 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4959 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4961 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4962 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4963 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4964 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4965 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4966 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4969 let failed_destinations = vec![
4970 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4971 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4972 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4973 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4975 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4978 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4979 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4980 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4981 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4982 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4983 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4985 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
4986 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
4987 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
4988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
4990 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
4991 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
4992 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
4994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
4995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
4997 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4998 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4999 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5002 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5004 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5005 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5006 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5007 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5008 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5009 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5010 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5011 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5015 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5016 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5017 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5018 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5019 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5020 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5021 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5022 if deliver_last_raa {
5023 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5025 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5028 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5029 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5030 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5031 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5033 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5034 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5035 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5037 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5038 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5039 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5041 if announce_latest {
5042 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5044 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5046 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5047 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5048 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5049 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5052 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5055 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5059 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5060 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5061 if deliver_last_raa {
5062 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5064 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5065 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5067 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5068 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5070 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5077 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5078 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5079 let mut a_done = false;
5080 for msg in cs_msgs {
5082 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5083 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5084 // should be failed-backwards here.
5085 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5086 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5087 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5088 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5090 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5095 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5096 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5097 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5099 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5100 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5103 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5104 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5105 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5106 if announce_latest {
5107 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5108 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5109 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5112 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5118 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5119 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5120 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5121 let mut as_updates = 0;
5122 for event in as_events.iter() {
5123 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5124 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5125 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5126 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5128 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5130 if network_update.is_some() {
5133 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5135 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5136 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5137 if announce_latest {
5138 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5139 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5141 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5143 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5144 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5145 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5146 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5147 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5148 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5149 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5150 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5151 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5153 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5155 if network_update.is_some() {
5158 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5160 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5161 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5162 if announce_latest {
5163 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5165 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5167 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5168 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5169 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5170 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5171 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5172 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5176 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5177 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5181 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5182 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5186 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5187 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5188 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5189 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5193 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5194 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5197 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5199 // Create some initial channels
5200 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5202 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5203 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5204 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5205 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5207 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5208 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5211 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5212 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5214 let htlc_timeout = {
5215 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5216 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5218 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5219 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5220 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5224 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5225 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5226 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5228 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5229 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5230 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5231 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5232 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5233 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5234 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5235 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5236 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5237 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5238 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5242 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5243 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5244 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5245 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5249 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5250 let seed = [42; 32];
5251 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5252 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5253 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5254 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5255 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5256 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5257 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5260 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5262 // Create some initial channels
5263 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5265 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5266 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5267 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5269 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5270 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5271 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5272 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5273 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5275 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5276 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5277 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5278 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5279 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5281 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5282 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5283 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5284 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5285 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5286 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5287 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5288 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5291 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5292 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5293 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5294 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5296 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5298 let htlc_timeout = {
5299 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5301 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5302 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5306 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5308 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5310 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5311 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5312 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5313 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5314 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5315 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5316 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5317 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5318 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5319 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5320 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5321 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5325 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5331 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5333 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5334 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5336 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5337 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5338 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5340 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5341 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5342 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5344 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5345 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5346 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5348 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5349 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5350 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5353 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5357 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5358 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5360 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5362 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5363 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5364 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5366 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5368 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5369 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5370 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5372 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5374 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5375 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5378 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5379 let mut block = Block {
5380 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5383 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5384 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5385 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5387 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5388 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5390 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5393 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5398 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5400 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5401 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5404 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5406 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5407 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5408 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5410 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5411 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5413 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5414 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5415 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5417 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5418 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5420 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5423 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5427 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5428 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5430 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5431 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5432 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5433 // actually revoked.
5434 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5435 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5436 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5440 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5441 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5442 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5444 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5445 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5449 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5451 if check_revoke_no_close {
5452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5456 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5457 let mut block = Block {
5458 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5461 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5462 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5463 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5465 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5466 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5469 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5471 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5475 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5476 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5477 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5478 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5479 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5480 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5481 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5483 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5484 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5485 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5487 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5488 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5489 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5491 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5492 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5496 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5497 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5498 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5499 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5500 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5505 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5506 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5510 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5511 for node in nodes.iter() {
5512 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5515 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5516 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5517 let push_msat=10001;
5518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5519 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5520 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5521 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5523 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5524 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5525 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5529 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5533 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5535 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5536 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5537 let push_msat=10001;
5538 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5540 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5541 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5542 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5543 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5544 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5546 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5547 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5548 let push_msat=10001;
5549 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5550 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5551 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5553 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5554 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5555 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5557 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5558 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5559 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5561 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5562 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5563 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5565 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5566 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5567 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5568 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5569 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5570 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5574 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5578 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5580 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5581 let push_msat=10001;
5582 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5583 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5585 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5587 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5588 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5589 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5590 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5595 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5598 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5599 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5600 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5601 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5603 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5608 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5610 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5611 // pending_update_fee.
5613 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5614 *feerate_lock += 20;
5616 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5619 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5621 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5622 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5623 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5630 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5631 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5632 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5633 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5635 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5636 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5637 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5639 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5640 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5641 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5642 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5644 // Flush the pending fee update.
5645 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5646 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5648 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5651 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5652 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5653 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5654 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5655 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5656 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5657 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5658 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5659 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5661 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5662 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5665 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5666 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5667 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5668 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5669 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5670 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5671 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5677 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5678 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5679 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5681 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5682 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5685 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5686 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5688 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5689 // pending_update_fee.
5691 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5692 *feerate_lock += 200;
5694 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5697 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5699 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5700 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5701 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5708 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5709 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5710 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5711 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5713 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5715 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5716 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5717 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5719 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5720 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5721 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5722 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5723 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5725 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5726 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5728 // Flush the pending fee update.
5729 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5730 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5732 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5733 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5736 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5737 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5738 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5739 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5740 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5741 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5742 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5743 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5744 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5746 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5747 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5750 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5751 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5752 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5753 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5754 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5755 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5756 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5761 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5762 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5763 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5764 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5765 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5767 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5768 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5771 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5773 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5774 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5775 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5778 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5781 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5782 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5785 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5788 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5790 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5792 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5793 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5795 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5798 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5799 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5800 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5803 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5806 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5807 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5808 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5809 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5811 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5812 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5813 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5815 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5816 // pending_update_fee.
5818 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5819 *feerate_lock += 20;
5821 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5826 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5827 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5828 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5833 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5835 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5836 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5837 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5838 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5840 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5842 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5843 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5844 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5845 let payment_event = {
5846 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5849 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5852 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5856 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5857 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5859 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5860 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5862 // Flush the pending fee update.
5863 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5864 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5866 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5867 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5870 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5871 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5874 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5875 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5881 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5883 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5885 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5886 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5887 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5888 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5889 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5893 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5894 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5897 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5898 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5899 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5900 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5901 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5902 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5903 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5904 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5905 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5906 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5911 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5912 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5913 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5915 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5916 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5918 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5921 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5922 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5923 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5924 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5927 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5928 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5932 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5933 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5934 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5937 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5938 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5942 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5943 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5945 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5946 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5948 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5949 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5950 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5951 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5955 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5956 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5960 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5961 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5963 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5964 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5965 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5966 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5973 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5974 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5978 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5981 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5982 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5984 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5985 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
5987 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5988 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5989 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
5990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
5995 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
5996 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
5997 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
5998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6004 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6005 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6006 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6007 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6008 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6009 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6013 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6014 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6015 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6016 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6020 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6021 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6022 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6024 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6025 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6026 let payment_event = {
6027 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6030 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6032 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6033 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6037 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6039 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6044 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6046 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6047 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6048 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6050 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6051 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6055 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6056 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6060 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6061 let channel_value = 100000;
6062 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6063 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6065 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6067 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6068 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6070 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6071 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6072 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6074 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6075 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6077 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6080 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6082 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6083 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6084 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6085 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6086 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6087 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6088 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6089 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6091 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6092 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6093 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6096 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6097 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6099 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6100 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6102 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6103 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6104 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6110 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6111 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6115 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6116 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6118 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6119 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6120 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6121 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6122 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6123 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6125 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6126 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6129 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6131 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6132 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6133 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6134 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6135 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6137 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6138 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6139 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6141 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6145 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6146 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6147 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6151 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6152 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6154 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6155 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6156 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6157 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6158 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6159 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6161 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6165 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6166 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6167 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6170 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6171 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6172 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6174 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6177 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6178 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6179 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6181 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6185 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6186 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6187 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6188 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6189 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6190 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6191 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6193 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6194 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6196 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6197 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6198 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6200 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6201 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6202 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6204 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6208 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6209 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6213 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6216 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6217 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6219 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6220 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6221 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6223 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6224 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6225 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6227 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6231 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6232 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6233 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6234 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6238 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6241 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6242 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6244 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6247 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6248 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6249 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6250 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6251 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6252 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6253 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6254 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6255 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6256 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6257 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6258 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6259 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6263 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6264 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6266 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6270 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6271 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6272 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6274 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6278 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6279 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6284 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6286 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6287 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6290 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6291 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6293 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6296 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6299 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6301 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6302 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6303 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6305 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6309 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6310 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6315 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6316 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6318 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6319 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6321 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6324 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6327 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6330 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6332 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6333 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6334 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6336 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6340 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6341 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6349 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6350 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6354 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6357 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6358 failure_code: 0x8000,
6361 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6363 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6364 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6365 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6367 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6371 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6372 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6378 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6380 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6382 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6384 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6386 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6388 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6390 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6391 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6392 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6393 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6394 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6395 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6396 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6398 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6402 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6404 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6406 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6407 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6408 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6414 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6415 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6420 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6423 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6425 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6427 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6429 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6431 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6433 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6434 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6435 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6436 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6437 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6438 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6439 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6445 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6447 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6449 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6450 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6451 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6453 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6457 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6458 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6463 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6464 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6466 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6467 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6470 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6471 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6473 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6475 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6477 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6479 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6481 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6482 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6483 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6484 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6485 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6486 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6487 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6492 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6495 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6496 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6497 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6503 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6504 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6505 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6510 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6511 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6512 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6514 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6517 let mut payment_event = {
6518 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6522 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6524 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6527 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6528 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6529 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6531 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6532 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6535 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6536 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6538 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6540 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6541 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6542 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6544 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6545 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6546 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6547 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6549 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6550 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6559 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6561 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6562 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6564 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6566 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6567 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6568 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6569 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6570 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6571 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6580 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6584 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6585 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6586 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6588 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6591 let mut payment_event = {
6592 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6594 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6598 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6599 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6601 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6602 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6605 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6606 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6608 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6610 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6611 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6613 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6614 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6615 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6616 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6618 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6619 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6624 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6625 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6626 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6627 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6628 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6632 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6633 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6634 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6639 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6640 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6642 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6643 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6645 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6646 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6648 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6649 assert!(is_permanent);
6650 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6655 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6658 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6659 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6660 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6661 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6663 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6667 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6668 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6670 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6672 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6673 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6674 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6675 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6677 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6678 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6680 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6681 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6686 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6687 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6688 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6691 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6692 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6694 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6696 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6697 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6702 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6703 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6708 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6709 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6710 if announce_latest {
6711 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6713 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6718 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6720 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6721 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6722 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6723 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6725 let mut first_failed = false;
6726 for event in events {
6728 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6729 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6730 assert!(!first_failed);
6731 first_failed = true;
6733 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6742 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6743 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6744 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6747 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6748 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6749 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6750 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6751 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6752 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6753 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6755 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6756 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6758 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6759 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6761 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6763 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6764 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6766 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6767 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6769 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6771 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6772 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6775 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6777 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6778 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6779 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6780 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6781 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6783 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6784 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6787 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6788 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6789 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6790 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6791 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6792 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6793 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6795 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6796 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6797 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6799 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6800 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6803 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6804 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6805 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6806 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6807 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6808 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6811 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6813 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6815 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6816 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6818 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6819 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6824 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6825 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6826 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6827 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6831 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6832 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6834 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6835 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6836 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6837 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6838 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6839 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6840 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6841 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6842 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6844 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6845 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6846 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6847 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6850 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6853 } else { assert!(false) }
6855 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6856 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6857 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6858 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6859 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6860 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6861 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6864 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6867 } else { assert!(false); }
6869 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6870 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6871 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6872 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6873 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6874 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6876 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6878 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6879 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6880 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6884 } else { panic!(); }
6885 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6887 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6888 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6889 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6890 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6891 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6892 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6893 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6896 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6899 } else { assert!(false); }
6903 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6904 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6905 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6906 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6911 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6913 // Create some initial channels
6914 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6916 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6917 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6918 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6919 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6920 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6921 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6922 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6925 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6927 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6929 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6931 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6932 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6934 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6936 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6937 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6938 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6940 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6942 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6943 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6944 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6945 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6946 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6947 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6948 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6949 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6955 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6958 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6959 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
6960 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
6961 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6965 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6966 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6967 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6969 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6970 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6971 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6972 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6974 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6975 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6976 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6979 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6980 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6982 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6983 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6984 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6985 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
6986 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
6987 for e in msg_events {
6989 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
6990 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
6991 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
6992 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
6993 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
6996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7000 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7001 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7002 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7003 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7004 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7005 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7007 // Reestablish chan_1
7008 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7009 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7010 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7011 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7012 // Reestablish chan_2
7013 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7014 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7015 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7016 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7017 // Reestablish chan_3
7018 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7019 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7020 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7021 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7023 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7024 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7025 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7026 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7027 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7028 for e in msg_events {
7030 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7031 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7032 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7033 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7035 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7036 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7042 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7043 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7047 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7048 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7049 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7054 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7056 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7058 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7059 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7060 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7061 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7062 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7064 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7065 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7066 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7067 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7068 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7069 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7071 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7072 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7073 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7074 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7078 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7079 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7081 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7082 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7083 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7084 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7087 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7091 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7092 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7093 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7094 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7095 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7096 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7097 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7098 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7102 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7103 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7104 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7105 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7107 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7108 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7109 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7110 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7111 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7112 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7113 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7114 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7115 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7116 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7117 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7118 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7119 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7123 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7125 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7126 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7128 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7130 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7131 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7132 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7133 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7134 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7135 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7136 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7137 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7138 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7139 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7140 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7141 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7142 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7146 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7148 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7149 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7153 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7154 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7155 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7157 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7158 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7159 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7160 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7161 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7163 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7164 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7165 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7166 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7167 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7168 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7169 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7170 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7171 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7172 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7173 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7174 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7176 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7177 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7178 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7180 // Revoke local commitment tx
7181 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7183 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7184 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7185 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7186 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7188 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7189 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7191 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7192 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7193 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7195 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7196 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7197 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7199 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7200 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7201 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7202 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7204 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7205 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7206 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7207 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7208 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7209 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7210 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7211 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7212 match events.last().unwrap() {
7213 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7220 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7221 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7222 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7224 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7225 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7226 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7227 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7229 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7230 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7231 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7232 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7233 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7234 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7236 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7237 // available, which we check here:
7238 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7239 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7240 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7242 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7243 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7245 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7246 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7247 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7248 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7250 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7251 // output, checked above).
7252 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7253 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7254 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7256 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7257 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7258 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7259 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7260 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7264 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7265 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7266 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7267 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7268 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7270 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7271 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7272 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7273 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7275 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7279 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7280 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7281 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7282 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7283 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7284 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7285 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7289 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7290 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7291 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7292 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7294 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7295 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7296 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7297 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7298 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7299 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7300 // up bumped justice generation.
7301 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7304 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7309 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7310 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7311 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7314 // Provide preimage for one
7315 // Check aggregation
7317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7320 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7322 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7323 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7324 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7326 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7327 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7328 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7329 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7330 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7332 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7333 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7334 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7335 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7337 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7339 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7343 let feerate_timeout;
7344 let feerate_preimage;
7346 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7347 // 5 transactions including:
7348 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
7349 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7350 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
7351 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7352 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7353 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
7354 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7355 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7356 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
7358 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
7359 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
7361 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7362 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7363 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7364 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7366 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7367 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
7369 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
7372 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7373 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7374 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7376 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7377 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7378 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7379 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7383 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7384 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7386 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7387 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7389 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7390 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7391 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7392 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7393 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7394 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7396 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7397 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7398 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7399 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7400 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7402 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7403 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7404 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7405 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7406 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7411 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7412 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7416 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7417 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7418 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7419 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7420 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7421 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7422 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7423 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7429 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7431 let per_commitment_secret;
7432 let next_per_commitment_point;
7434 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7435 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7437 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7439 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7440 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7441 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7443 // Must revoke without gaps
7444 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7445 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7447 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7448 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7449 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7452 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7453 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7454 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7456 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7460 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7461 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7462 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7467 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7469 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7470 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7471 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7472 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7478 // Revoke local commitment tx
7479 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7481 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7482 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7483 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7484 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7486 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7487 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7489 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7491 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7492 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7493 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7494 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7495 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7496 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7500 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7501 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7502 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7504 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7505 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7506 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7511 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7512 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7513 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7517 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7518 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7520 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7521 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7522 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7524 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7526 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7527 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7528 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7530 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7532 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7533 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7534 // can get our balance.
7536 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7537 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7538 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7539 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7540 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7541 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7542 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7543 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7545 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7549 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7550 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7551 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7555 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7557 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7559 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7560 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7561 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7563 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7565 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7566 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7570 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7572 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7573 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7574 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7576 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7577 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7578 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7585 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7591 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7592 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7593 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7595 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7597 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7598 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7599 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7600 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7604 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7605 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7606 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7610 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7612 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7613 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7614 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7616 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7617 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7618 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7622 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7623 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7624 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7625 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7626 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7627 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7629 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7630 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7631 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7632 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7633 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7634 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7635 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7636 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7637 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7638 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7639 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7640 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7645 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7647 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7648 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7649 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7650 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7651 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7653 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7654 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7656 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7657 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7658 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7659 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7660 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7661 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7663 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7664 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7666 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7667 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7668 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7670 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7674 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7675 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7676 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7680 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7682 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7683 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7685 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7687 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7688 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7689 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7691 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7693 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7694 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7699 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7700 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7702 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7703 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7704 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7709 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7711 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7712 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7714 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7716 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7717 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7724 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7725 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7726 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7732 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7733 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7735 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7737 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7738 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7739 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7741 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7743 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7744 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7749 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7750 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7752 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7753 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7754 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7758 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7762 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7763 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7764 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7765 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7766 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7767 // and the channel should be closed.
7768 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7769 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7772 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7773 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7775 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7776 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7777 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7779 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7781 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7782 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7784 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7785 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7787 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7788 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7789 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7790 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7791 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7792 let accept_chan_msg = {
7794 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7795 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7797 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7799 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7801 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7802 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7804 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7805 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7807 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7808 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7810 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7811 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7812 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7813 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7814 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7815 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7820 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7824 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7825 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7826 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7830 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7832 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7833 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7835 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7837 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7838 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7839 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7841 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7843 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7844 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7845 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7847 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7848 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7850 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7851 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7857 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7858 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7859 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7861 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7862 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7863 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7870 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7871 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7872 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7873 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7876 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7877 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7879 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7880 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7882 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7883 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7888 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7889 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7893 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7895 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7896 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7897 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7898 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7900 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7901 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7902 route.paths.push(path);
7903 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7904 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7905 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7906 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7907 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7908 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7909 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7910 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7914 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7915 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7918 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7921 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7924 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7925 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7926 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7928 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7929 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7930 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7931 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7933 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7934 // values from previous calls.
7935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7936 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7939 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
7941 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7942 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7944 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7952 #[allow(deprecated)]
7953 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7954 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7955 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7959 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7961 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7963 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7965 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7966 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7967 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7968 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7969 } else { panic!(); }
7971 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7973 header: BlockHeader {
7975 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7976 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7977 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7981 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7982 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7983 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7984 } else { panic!(); }
7986 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
7987 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
7988 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
7989 block.header.time += 1;
7990 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7991 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7992 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
7995 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7996 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7998 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7999 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8000 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8001 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8003 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8004 // values from previous calls.
8005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8006 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8009 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8010 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8011 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8012 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8019 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8020 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8024 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8026 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8028 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8029 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8030 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8031 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8033 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8034 // resulting events.
8035 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8036 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8039 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8040 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8043 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8044 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8049 // We should fail the payment back
8050 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8051 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8052 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8053 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8054 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8056 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8061 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8062 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8063 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8065 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8066 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8067 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8068 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8070 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8072 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8073 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8075 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8076 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8077 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8078 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8082 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8083 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8084 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8085 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8088 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8089 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8090 // commitment at same time.
8092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8095 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8097 // Create some initial channel
8098 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8099 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8101 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8102 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8104 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8105 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8107 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8108 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8109 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8110 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8112 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8113 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8114 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8115 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8116 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8117 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8118 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8119 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8122 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8123 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8124 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8125 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8126 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8127 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8129 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8130 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8132 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8134 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8135 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8137 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8138 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8139 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8140 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8141 } else { assert!(false); }
8142 } else { assert!(false); };
8143 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8145 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8146 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8150 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8151 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8152 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8153 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8154 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8159 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8161 // Create some initial channel
8162 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8163 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8165 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8166 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8168 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8169 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8171 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8172 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8173 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8174 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8175 let watchtower_alice = {
8176 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8177 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8178 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8179 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8180 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8181 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8182 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8183 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8186 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8187 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8188 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8189 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8190 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8191 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8193 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8195 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8196 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8200 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8201 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8202 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8203 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8204 let watchtower_bob = {
8205 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8206 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8207 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8208 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8209 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8210 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8211 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8212 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8215 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8216 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8218 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8219 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8221 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8225 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8226 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8228 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8229 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8230 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8231 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8232 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8233 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8234 } else { assert!(false); }
8235 } else { assert!(false); };
8236 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8239 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8240 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8241 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8243 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8246 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8247 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8248 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8252 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8253 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8254 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8256 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8257 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8258 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8263 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8264 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8265 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8268 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8269 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8271 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8272 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8273 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8274 // before receiving funding_signed.
8275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8278 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8280 // Create an initial channel
8281 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8282 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8284 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8287 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8288 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8290 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8293 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8294 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8295 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8296 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8297 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8301 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8302 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8303 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8304 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8305 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8306 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8307 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8312 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8314 // Create some initial channels
8315 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8317 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8318 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8319 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8320 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8321 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8322 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8324 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8325 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8326 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8327 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8328 // this test before #653 fix.
8329 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8330 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8333 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8335 let htlc_timeout = {
8336 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8337 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8338 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8339 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8343 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8344 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8345 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8346 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8349 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8350 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8351 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8352 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8354 // Steps of the test:
8355 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8356 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8357 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8358 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8359 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8360 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8361 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8362 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8366 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8368 // Create some initial channels
8369 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8370 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8372 // Steps (1) and (2):
8373 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8374 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8376 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8377 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8378 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8379 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8380 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8381 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8382 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8384 // Steps (3) and (4):
8385 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8386 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8387 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8388 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8391 if !broadcast_alice {
8392 force_closing_node = 1;
8393 counterparty_node = 0;
8395 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8396 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8398 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8399 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8400 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8401 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8402 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8404 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8405 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8406 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8407 if broadcast_alice {
8408 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8410 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8412 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8413 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8417 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8418 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8419 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8421 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8423 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8424 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8425 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8426 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8427 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8428 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8430 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8431 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8432 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8433 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8434 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8435 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8437 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8438 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8443 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8444 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8445 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8448 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8450 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8451 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8452 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8457 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8458 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8459 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8465 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8467 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8470 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8472 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8473 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8474 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8479 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8482 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8483 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8484 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8485 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8486 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8487 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8488 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8489 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8490 if broadcast_alice {
8491 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8493 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8495 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8496 if broadcast_alice {
8497 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8498 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8499 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8500 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8502 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8503 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8505 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8506 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8511 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8512 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8514 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8515 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8516 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8517 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8519 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8520 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8521 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8523 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8524 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8525 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8526 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8527 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8528 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8529 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8531 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8532 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8538 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8539 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8540 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8541 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8542 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8546 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8547 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8548 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8550 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8551 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8552 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8553 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8559 // Create an initial channel
8560 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8561 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8562 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8563 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8565 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8566 // that it is rejected.
8567 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8569 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8572 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8573 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8574 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8575 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8576 // move forward with it.
8577 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8578 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8584 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8585 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8587 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8590 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8591 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8593 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8594 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8595 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8596 added_monitors.clear();
8598 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8600 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8601 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8603 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8606 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8607 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8608 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8609 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8612 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8615 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8616 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8617 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8618 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8619 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8625 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8626 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8627 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8628 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8629 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8630 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8632 let funding_created = {
8633 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8634 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8635 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8636 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8637 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8638 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8639 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8640 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8643 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8644 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8645 // still needs to be cleared here.
8646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8648 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8650 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8653 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8654 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8655 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8656 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8657 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8663 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8664 // everything is functional.
8665 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8667 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8668 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8669 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8670 added_monitors.clear();
8673 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8674 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8675 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8676 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8678 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8679 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8680 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8682 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8686 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8687 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8689 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8690 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8691 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8695 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8697 // Create some initial channels
8698 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8699 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8700 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8702 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8703 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8704 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8706 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8707 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8708 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8710 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8711 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8713 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8714 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8715 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8716 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8717 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8718 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8720 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8721 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8722 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8724 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8725 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8728 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8729 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8734 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8735 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8739 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8740 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8741 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8742 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8743 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8744 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8746 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8747 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8748 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8752 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8753 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8755 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8756 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8757 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8758 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8760 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8761 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8762 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8766 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8768 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8769 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8770 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8772 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8774 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8775 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8776 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8778 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8779 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8780 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8781 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8782 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8785 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8786 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8789 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8792 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8793 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8795 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8796 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8797 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8799 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8800 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8801 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8803 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8804 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8805 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8806 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8807 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8808 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8809 } else { panic!(); }
8810 } else { panic!(); }
8811 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8813 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8814 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8815 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8816 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8817 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8818 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8819 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8823 script_sig: Script::new(),
8824 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8825 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8827 output: vec![TxOut {
8829 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8832 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8833 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8836 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8837 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8838 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8839 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8840 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8841 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8842 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8843 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8844 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8845 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8846 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8847 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8848 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8849 // until we learned about an additional block.
8851 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8852 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8856 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8857 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8859 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8860 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8861 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8862 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8863 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8865 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8866 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8867 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8869 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8870 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8872 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8873 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8874 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8876 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8877 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8878 if test_height_before_timelock {
8879 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8880 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8881 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8882 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8884 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8885 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8886 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8887 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8888 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8889 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8891 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8892 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8894 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8895 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8896 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8897 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8898 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8899 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8902 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8903 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8904 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8905 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8906 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8907 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8908 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8909 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8910 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8915 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8916 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8917 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8920 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8924 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8926 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8928 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8929 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8930 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8932 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8935 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8937 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8938 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8939 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8941 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8944 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8947 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8948 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8950 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8951 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8952 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8953 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8954 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8955 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8956 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8957 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8958 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8962 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8964 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8965 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8966 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8968 let expected_destinations = vec![
8969 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8970 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8972 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
8973 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8977 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8979 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8980 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8983 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8984 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
8985 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
8986 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
8988 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
8989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8990 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8993 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8994 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8997 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
8999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9004 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9005 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9006 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9007 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9008 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9009 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9013 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9014 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9015 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9016 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9020 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9021 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9022 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9026 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9028 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9029 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9030 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9031 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9033 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9034 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9035 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9036 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9037 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9038 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9039 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9040 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9042 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9044 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9046 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9047 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9049 let session_privs = {
9050 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9051 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9052 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9053 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9054 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9057 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9062 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9064 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9067 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9070 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9071 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9072 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9074 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9075 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9077 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9080 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9081 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9082 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9084 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9088 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9089 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9090 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9093 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9094 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9095 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9099 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9100 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9106 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9110 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9112 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9115 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9117 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9119 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9123 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9127 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9129 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9130 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9131 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9132 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9133 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9134 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9135 final_value_msat: 10000,
9136 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9138 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9139 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9140 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9142 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9143 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9145 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9146 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9147 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9148 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9149 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9150 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9154 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9158 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9160 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9161 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9162 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9163 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9165 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9166 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9167 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9168 final_value_msat: 10000,
9169 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9171 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9172 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9173 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9174 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9175 let route = find_route(
9176 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9177 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9180 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9181 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9183 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9185 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9186 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9187 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9188 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9192 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9193 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9194 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9195 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9200 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9202 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9203 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9204 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9207 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9208 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9209 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9210 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9211 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9212 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9215 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9216 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9217 // amount of time to respond to.
9219 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9220 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9221 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9223 let failed_destinations = vec![
9224 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9225 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9229 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9231 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9232 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9235 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9237 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9239 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9240 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9241 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9243 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9246 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9247 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9248 enum ExposureEvent {
9249 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9251 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9253 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9254 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9257 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9258 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9261 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9262 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9263 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9264 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9265 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9266 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9267 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9268 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9271 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9272 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9275 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9277 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9278 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9279 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9280 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9282 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9284 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9285 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9286 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9288 let opt_anchors = false;
9290 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9293 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9294 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9298 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9299 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9302 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9305 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9306 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9307 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9309 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9310 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9311 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9312 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9314 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9315 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9317 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9318 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9320 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9321 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9324 if dust_outbound_balance {
9325 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9326 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9327 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9328 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9329 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9330 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9333 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9334 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9335 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9336 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9337 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9341 if dust_outbound_balance {
9342 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9343 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9344 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9345 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9346 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9349 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9350 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9351 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9352 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9357 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9358 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9359 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9360 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9361 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9363 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9364 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9365 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9367 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9369 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9370 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9371 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9373 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9374 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9375 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9376 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9377 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9379 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9380 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9381 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9382 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9384 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9385 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9387 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9388 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9389 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9391 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9392 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9394 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9396 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9399 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9400 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9401 added_monitors.clear();
9405 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9406 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9407 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9408 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9409 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9410 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9411 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9412 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9413 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9414 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9415 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9416 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9417 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9421 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9422 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9425 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9427 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9428 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9429 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9430 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9431 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9433 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9435 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9436 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9437 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9439 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9440 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9441 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9442 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9443 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9448 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9449 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9450 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9451 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9456 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9457 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9458 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9459 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());